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Abstract	  How	   can	   NGOs	   contribute	   to	   strengthening	   the	   democratic	   legitimacy	   of	  international	  intergovernmental	  institutions?	  The	  thesis	  pursues	  two	  lines	  of	  enquiry	   in	   order	   to	   contribute	   to	   this	   discussion	   in	   the	   context	   of	   global	  environmental	  politics:	   it	   looks	  at	  the	  external	  claims	  and	  internal	  practices	  of	  NGOs.	  	  With	   regards	   to	   external	   claims	   the	   thesis	   investigates	   the	   democratic	  demands	   formulated	  by	  the	  NGO	  communities	   interacting	  with	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	   the	   CBD	   respectively.	   Demands	   for	   equitable	   representation	   at	   the	  intergovernmental	   level	   and	   for	   participation	   by	   civil	   society	   stakeholders	  are	   especially	   prominent	   among	   the	   NGOs	   engaged	   with	   the	   climate	  convention.	  The	   thesis	   finds	  a	   convergence	  around	  very	   similar	  democratic	  demands	   across	   the	   NGO	   community,	   most	   of	   which	   draw	   upon	   recurrent	  governance	   norms	   and	   existing	   instances	   of	   good	   practice	   within	  environmental	  institutions.	  	  	  The	   thesis	   then	   turns	   to	   the	   internal	   practices	   of	   large	   international	  environmental	  NGOs	  to	  test	  the	  assumption	  that	  these	  organisations	  have	  the	  potential	   to	   act	   as	   “links”	   or	   as	   “transmission	   belts”	   between	   local	  communities	  and	  global	  policymaking	  processes.	  It	  proposes	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	   representation	   perspective	   for	   analysing	   the	   contribution	   of	   civil	   society	  organisations,	   and	   provides	   case	   studies	   of	   three	   large	   international	  environmental	  NGOs	  (WWF,	  Greenpeace	  and	  Friends	  of	  the	  Earth)	  and	  of	  the	  two	  issue-­‐specific	  civil	  society	  networks	  that	  organise	  NGO	  activities	  around	  the	  two	  UN	  conventions	  referred	  to	  above	  (the	  Climate	  Action	  Network	  and	  the	  CBD	  Alliance).	  	  	  The	   thesis	   shows	   that	   the	   potential	   for	   large	   NGOs	   to	   ‘represent’	   local	  communities	   is	   shaped	   by	   organisational	   structures,	   decision-­‐making	  processes,	  the	  strategy	  for	  bringing	  about	  change,	  funding	  sources,	  alliances	  and	   partnerships,	   and	   values.	   The	   findings	   underline	   the	   need	   to	   adopt	   a	  more	   differentiated	   understanding	   of	   the	   democratic	   contribution	   by	   civil	  society	  organisations	  to	  international	  intergovernmental	  institutions.	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I. Introduction	  How	  can	   the	   institutions	  of	  global	  governance	  become	  more	  accountable	   to	  the	   people	   whose	   lives	   they	   affect?	   How	   can	   large	   international	  nongovernmental	   organisations	   (NGOs)	   –	  which	   often	   direct	  much	   of	   their	  advocacy	  work	  towards	  these	  institutions	  –	  contribute	  to	  this	  objective?	  Can	  these	   groups	   act	   as	   ‘links’	   between	   communities	   on	   the	   ground	   and	  international	  intergovernmental	  organisations	  (IGOs)?	  In	  what	  ways	  are	  the	  world’s	   most	   influential	   NGOs	   themselves	   actually	   accountable	   to	   local	  communities	  in	  developing	  countries	  –	  the	  very	  communities	  who	  are	  often	  marginalised	   in	   global	   policymaking	   processes?	   These	   are	   some	   of	   the	   key	  questions	  that	  have	  led	  to	  the	  more	  specific	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  
i. Identifying	  the	  problem	  The	  creation	  of	  a	  range	  of	  international	  institutions	  has	  constituted	  a	  central	  element	   of	   interstate	   relations	   since	   the	   end	   of	   World	   War	   Two.	   The	  establishment	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   –	   “the	   parliament	   of	   man”	   (Kennedy	  2006)	   –	   encapsulated	   the	   determination	   of	   political	   leaders	   to	   “save	  succeeding	   generations	   from	   the	   scourge	   of	   war”	   and	   “reaffirm	   faith	   in	  fundamental	  human	  rights”	  (preamble	  of	  the	  charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations).	  The	  post-­‐war	  period	  also	  saw	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  international	  economic	  governance	  structures	  designed	  to	  support	  the	  growth	  of	  free	  trade	  and	  the	  development	  of	  an	  integrated	  global	  financial	  marketplace	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  institutions.	  	  	  More	   than	   60	   years	   later,	   the	   promises	   of	   international	   cooperation	   have	  been	   only	   partly	   fulfilled.	  While	   the	  world	   has	   been	   spared	   another	   global	  conflict	  and	  the	  world	  economy	  has	  (not	  always	  smoothly)	  proceeded	  along	  the	   trajectory	  of	  deeper	  economic	   integration,	   the	  existing	   system	  of	  global	  governance	   has	   failed	   to	   provide	   solutions	   to	   many	   of	   the	   most	   pressing	  global	   problems.	   This	   has	   been	   especially	   evident	   in	   the	   failure	   of	  international	   cooperative	   efforts	   to	   prevent	   some	   of	   the	   serious	   forms	   of	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global	   environmental	   degradation,	   notably	   global	   climate	   change.	   Progress	  towards	   an	   effective	   international	   agreement	   has	   been	   painfully	   slow.	   This	  has	   led	   to	   widespread	   disillusionment	   with	   multilateral	   diplomacy	   and	  eroded	  the	  trust	  in	  international	  institutions.	  	  	  The	   legitimacy	   of	   international	   institutions	   is	   not	   only	   being	   undermined	  when	   they	   fail	   to	   provide	   solutions	   to	   global	   problems.	   Another	   line	   of	  criticism	  relates	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  decisions	  within	  international	  institutions	  are	  often	  not	  taken	  in	  a	  fair,	  equitable	  and	  truly	  democratic	  manner.	  It	  is	  this	  side	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  deficit	  of	  international	  institutions	  that	  is	  of	  most	  concern	  to	  the	  questions	  addressed	  in	  this	  thesis	  –	  although	  the	  distinction	  between	  how	  decisions	   are	  made	   and	   the	   results	   achieved	   is	   often	  weak	   in	   practice.	   The	  complaint	   that	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   within	   many	   international	  institutions	  are	  ‘unfair’	  or	  ‘undemocratic’	  is	  not	  only	  voiced	  by	  those	  member	  states	   that	   feel	   that	   they	   are	   being	   disadvantaged	   in	   international	  negotiations.	  Similar	  –	  and	  often	  even	  more	  far-­‐reaching	  –	  forms	  of	  criticism	  have	   also	   come	   from	   the	   quarters	   of	   civil	   society.	   Highlighting	   the	  shortcomings	   of	   many	   international	   institutions	   and	   calling	   for	   higher	  standards	   of	   democracy	   and	   accountability	   has,	   however,	   not	   prevented	  many	  of	  these	  civil	  society	  groups	  from	  seeking	  dialogue	  and	  closer	  contact	  with	  a	  range	  of	  intergovernmental	  institutions.	  The	  institutions	  in	  turn	  have	  started	   engaging	   more	   closely	   with	   civil	   society	   over	   time.	   Opening	   up	  towards	  civil	   society	  has	  been	  one	  response	  by	   international	   institutions	   to	  the	   criticisms	   directed	   at	   them	   and	   is	   presented	   as	   evidence	   of	   an	  organisational	   shift	   towards	   greater	   transparency,	   participation	   and	  democracy.	  	  	  	  The	  contribution	  of	  NGOs	  towards	  the	  democratic	  legitimacy	  of	  international	  institutions	   will	   be	   assessed	   in	   this	   thesis	   against	   one	   particular	  interpretation	   of	   the	   ‘problem’:	   the	   fact	   that	   international	   institutions	   are	  often	   not	   accountable	   to	   the	   people	  whose	   lives	   they	   affect	   the	  most.	   This	  research	   focus	  builds	  on	   the	  argument	   that	   the	   transfer	  of	  decision-­‐making	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authority	  by	  states	  to	   institutions	  at	   the	  global	   level	  risks	  undermining	  “the	  congruence	  between	  the	  ‘people’	  that	  is	  being	  governed,	  and	  the	  ‘people’	  that	  is	   supposed	   to	   govern”	   (Scharpf	   1998,	   para.	   17).	   The	   crucial	   legitimacy	  problem	   arising	   from	   this	   lack	   of	   congruence	  with	   respect	   to	   international	  institutions	   is	   that	   a	   small	   group	   of	   decision-­‐makers	   might	   end	   up	  implementing	  policies,	   rules	   and	   regulations	   that	  have	  a	   substantial	   impact	  on	   the	   lives	   of	   citizens	  who	   are	   not	   able	   to	   hold	   these	   decision-­‐makers	   to	  account.	   In	   Keohane’s	   opinion,	   the	  most	   serious	   normative	   problem	   at	   the	  international	   level	   lies	   in	  making	   these	   decision-­‐makers	   accountable	   to	   the	  affected	  communities	  (Keohane	  2003).	  	  	  The	   notion	   that	   NGOs	   are	   able	   to	   enhance	   the	   democratic	   legitimacy	   of	  international	   institutions	   is	   not	   uncontroversial.	   Sympathetic	   voices	   on	   the	  one	  hand	  recognise	  the	  “democratising	  potential	  of	  the	  NGO	  phenomenon”	  in	  “carrying	  the	  voices	  and	  needs	  of	  the	  smallest	  communities	  to	   international	  attention,	   forging	   contacts	   between	   citizens'	   groups	   across	   the	   world	   and	  offering	   citizens	  direct	   channels	   of	   participation	   in	  world	   affairs”	   (Boutros-­‐Ghali	   1996,	   34).	   Critics	   point	   out,	   however,	   that	   these	   groups	   often	   fail	   to	  adhere	   to	   the	   same	   level	  of	   transparency,	   accountability	  or	  democracy	   that	  they	   demand	   of	   others.	   There	   is	   also	   the	   danger	   that	   a	   small	   number	   of	  powerful	   groups	   may	   end	   up	   monopolizing	   the	   relationships	   with	  international	   institutions,	   assuming	   influential	   gate-­‐keeping	   roles	   in	   the	  process	  and	  leaving	  less	  powerful	  groups	  on	  the	  margins.	  	  	  The	  objective	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  contribute	  to	  a	  more	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  the	  democratic	  contribution	  of	  NGOs	  in	  international	  institutions.	  To	  what	  extent	   and	   in	   what	   ways	   does	   the	   participation	   of	   NGOs	   in	   international	  institutions	   contribute	   to	   overcoming	   the	   lack	   of	   democratic	   congruence	  outlined	   above?	   	   The	   often	   cited	   democratic	   norm	   that	   those	   affected	   by	   a	  decision	  should	  be	  included	  in	  the	  corresponding	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  presents,	  of	  course,	  a	  challenging	  ideal	  in	  a	  constantly	  changing	  international	  system	   characterized	   by	   multiple	   loci	   of	   authority	   and	   diffuse	   lines	   of	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affectedness	   and	   responsibility.	   Nonetheless,	   this	   norm	  may	   be	   used	   as	   an	  ideal	   for	  approximation	  –	  do	  existing	  and	  emerging	   linkages,	  processes	  and	  practices	  bring	  us	  closer	  to	  meeting	  this	  ideal	  or	  not?	  	  	  
ii. Setting	  the	  scene:	  actors	  and	  context	  
	  
Actors	  and	  definitions	  The	   thesis	   will	   be	   looking	   primarily	   at	   three	   categories	   of	   actors	   –	  international	   institutions,	   affected	   communities	   and	   international	   NGOs	   –	  and	  their	  inter-­‐relationships.	  	  	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  research	  is	  on	  one	  type	  of	  international	  institutions,	  namely	  international	   intergovernmental	   organisations	   or	   IGOs.	   IGOs	   are	   distinct	  from	  private	  or	  mixed	  (i.e.	  private-­‐public)	  forms	  of	  governance	  institutions	  in	  that	  all	  their	  formal	  members	  are	  governments.	  As	  will	  be	  further	  discussed	  below	  (iii.	  Case	  selection),	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  empirical	  section	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  on	  two	   United	   Nations	   conventions	   rather	   than	   on	   other	   types	   of	  intergovernmental	   organisations	   such	   as	   the	   international	   financial	  institutions	   (IFIs)	   or	   regional-­‐level	   organisations.	   Both	   the	   restriction	   to	  purely	   intergovernmental	   institutions	   and	   the	   focus	   on	   the	   United	   Nations	  conventions	  are	  intended	  to	  allow	  for	  an	  easier	  comparison	  between	  the	  two	  cases.	  	  	  ‘Affected	   communities’	   is	   the	   term	   used	   in	   this	   thesis	   to	   refer	   to	   citizens	  whose	   lives	   are	   directly	   affected	   by	   the	   decisions	   taken	   –	   or	   the	   ‘decision	  failures’	   -­‐	   by	   international	   institutions.1	   One	   example	   would	   be	   the	  inhabitants	  of	  low-­‐lying	  coastal	  areas	  that	  are	  threatened	  by	  rising	  sea	  levels	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Of	  course,	  the	  criterion	  of	   ‘affectedness’	   is	  by	  itself	  an	  extremely	  loose	  one.	  Any	  British	  or	  German	   citizen	   who	   has	   to	   pay	   higher	   prices	   for	   imported	   food	   products	   as	   a	   result	   of	  draught	   in	   the	   producer	   countries	   can	   claim	   to	   be	   affected	   by	   climate	   change.	   This	  constitutes	  a	  relatively	  weak	  form	  of	  affectedness.	  Of	  concern	  for	  this	  research	  are	  situations	  where	   health	   and	   livelihood	   risk	   being	   harmed	   and	  where	   citizens	   have	   few	   resources	   at	  their	  disposal	  to	  shield	  them	  from	  these	  impacts.	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as	  a	  consequence	  of	  global	  warming.	  Another	  case	  is	  that	  of	  forest-­‐dependent	  communities	   whose	   livelihoods	   are	   impacted	   by	   the	   international	   policies	  designed	  to	  reduce	  deforestation	  and	  forest	  degradation.	  As	  already	  outlined	  above,	   ‘affectedness’	   in	  this	  sense	  should	  also	  translate	  into	  the	  opportunity	  to	  participate	  or	  be	  represented	  in	  the	  relevant	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  Of	  most	   concern	   for	   this	   thesis	   are	   those	   instances	  where	   this	   is	  not	   the	   case:	  where	  people	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  decision-­‐making	  process	  but	  tend	   to	  be	  marginalised	  or	  excluded	   in	   the	  making	  of	   this	  decision	  (Scholte	  2011,	   15).	   As	   such,	   the	   term	   ‘affected	   communities’	   is	   used	   primarily	   to	  denote	  citizens	  that	  are	  both	  affected	  and	  potentially	  marginalised.	  	  The	   term	   ‘international	   NGO’	   is	   used	   in	   this	   thesis	   for	   groups	   not	   formally	  associated	  with	  business	  or	  governmental	  interests,	  which	  have	  members	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  national	  organisations	  and/	  or	  individuals)	  or	  conduct	  operations	  in	  several	  countries	  (usually	  both).	  Oftentimes	  these	  NGOs	  also	  engage	  with	  intergovernmental	   organisations	   as	   part	   of	   their	   advocacy	   (and	   service	  delivery)	   work	   and	   probably	   constitute	   the	   ‘‘category	   of	   civil	   society	  organisations	   (CSOs)	   with	   most	   presence	   in	   UN	   system	   policy	   forums’’	  (McKeon	   with	   Kalafatic	   2009,	   x).2	   However,	   in	   the	   parlance	   of	   the	   United	  Nations,	  NGOs	  constitute	  just	  one	  of	  several	  officially	  recognised	  stakeholder	  groups.	   The	   UN	   Division	   for	   Sustainable	   Development	   (DSD),	   for	   instance,	  works	   with	   nine	   “major	   groups”.	   While	   NGOs	   are	   classified	   as	   one	   major	  group,	  they	  share	  this	  status	  with	  indigenous	  peoples,	  farmers,	  business	  and	  industry,	  women,	  youth,	  and	  trade	  unions,	  local	  authorities,	  and	  the	  scientific	  community.	   Moreover,	   the	   NGO	   constituency	   thus	   defined	   also	   includes	  regional,	  national	  and	  local	  NGOs.	  	  	  In	   practice,	   efforts	   designed	   to	   enhance	   the	   participation	   of	   ‘global	   civil	  society’	   are	   frequently	   synonymous	   with	   granting	   NGOs	   greater	   scope	   for	  involvement	  with	  IGOs	  (McKeon	  with	  Kalafatic	  2009,	  17;	  Sands	  1998	  cited	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The	  term	  CSO	  is	  occasionally	  used	  interchangeably	  with	  NGO	  in	  this	  thesis.	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Mason	  2005,	  30).	  The	  Report	  of	   the	  Commission	  on	  Global	  Governance,	   for	  instance,	   states,	   “Global	   Civil	   Society	   is	   best	   expressed	   in	   the	   global	   non-­‐governmental	   movement”	   (Commission	   on	   Global	   Governance	   1995,	   254).	  Around	   3500	   NGOs	   currently	   have	   consultative	   status	   with	   the	   United	  Nations	   Economic	   and	   Social	   Council	   (ECOSOC).	   Behind	   this	   number,	  however,	   lie	   considerable	   differences	   in	   resources,	   power	   and	   influence.	  Many	  of	   the	  most	   influential	  organisations	  continue	   to	  be	  headquartered	   in	  Western	   Europe	   and	   North	   America.	   The	   recognition	   of	   the	   considerable	  prominence	  and	  influence	  of	  NGOs	  in	  international	  institutions	  has	  led	  many	  observers	  to	  call	  for	  more	  research	  into	  the	  accountability,	  transparency	  and	  representativeness	   of	   these	   groups	   (Van	   Rooy	   2004;	   Collingwood	   2006;	  MacDonald	  2008;	  Erman	  and	  Uhlin	  2010).	  	  The	  reverse,	  however,	  also	  holds:	  it	  is	  precisely	  because	  of	  their	  considerable	  influence	   in	   global	   governance	   that	   large	   international	   NGOs	   hold	   the	  promise	  of	  acting	  as	  effective	  advocates	  for	  affected	  publics	  in	  global	  policy-­‐making	  processes	  (cf.	  Princen	  1994).	  The	  substantial	  resources	  they	  have	  at	  their	   disposal,	   their	   credibility,	   and	   good	   connections	   to	   many	   key	  governments	  mean	  that	  their	  voices	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  listened	  to.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  international	  NGOs	  are	  exposed	  to	  different	  local	  realities	  through	  their	  membership	  or	  supporter	  base,	  their	  national	  offices	  and	  their	  operations	  on	  the	  ground.	  This	  means	  that	  they	  are	  potentially	  able	  to	  play	  a	  valuable	  role	  in	   bringing	   local	   interests,	   opinions	   and	   experiences	   to	   the	   global	   level.	  Unlike	   multinational	   corporations	   or	   business	   associations,	   their	   ultimate	  objective	   is	   not	   private	   profit	   but	   the	   attainment	   of	   some	   form	   of	   public	  good.3	   As	   norm-­‐driven	   actors,	   they	   should	   be	   motivated	   in	   principle	   to	  defend	  the	  interests	  of	  marginalised	  communities	  against	  the	  powerful.	  The	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  able	  to	  simultaneously	  reach	  out	  to	  the	  local	  and	  the	  global	  level	   holds	   the	   potential	   for	   international	   NGOs	   to	   act	   as	   democratic	   links	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   This	   distinction	   is	   disputed	   by	   Sell	   and	   Prakash	   (2004)	   who	   argue	   that	   “normative	  frameworks	   as	  well	   as	   instrumental	   objectives	   inform	  actions	  of	   both	  NGOs	  and	  business”	  (Sell	  and	  Prakash	  2004,	  144).	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between	   local	   communities	   and	   international	   institutions.	   The	   notion	   of	  international	  NGOs	  as	  ‘links’	  is	  illustrated	  in	  the	  diagram	  below	  (diagram	  1).	  	  	  	  
	  	  
Diagram	  1:	  NGOs	  as	  links	  between	  affected	  communities	  and	  IGOs	  	  
A	  global	  governance	  framework	  The	  types	  of	  actors	  under	  investigation	  here	  render	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  with	   exclusive	   focus	   on	   nation-­‐states	   as	   the	   only	   relevant	   actors	   in	   the	  international	   system	   inadequate.	   Instead,	   the	   theoretical	   underpinnings	   of	  the	   thesis	   can	  be	   found	   in	   the	  academic	   literature	  of	  what	  has	  been	   coined	  ‘global	  governance’.	  While	  global	  governance	  appears	  to	  serve	  as	  an	  umbrella	  term	   that	   brings	   together	   a	   broad	   –	   and	  not	   necessarily	   always	   coherent	   –	  range	   of	   analyses	   and	   approaches,	   there	   are	   nevertheless	   a	   number	   of	  specific	  features	  that	  make	  it	  a	  useful	  lens	  to	  apply	  to	  this	  research	  question.	  According	   to	   Dingwerth	   and	   Pattberg,	   the	   concept	   of	   global	   governance	  differs	   from	   more	   state-­‐centric	   analyses	   in	   International	   Relations	   in	   four	  important	   ways:	   it	   “implies	   a	   multiactor	   perspective	   on	   world	   politics”;	   it	  “conceives	   of	  world	   politics	   as	   a	  multilevel	   system	   in	  which	   local,	   national,	  regional,	  and	  global	  political	  processes	  are	  inseparably	  linked”;	  the	  focus	  on	  
NGOs 
IGOs 
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the	   “plurality	   of	   mechanisms	   that	   horizontally	   link	   activities	   of	   various	  actors”;	   and	   the	   inclusion	   of	   “new	   spheres	   of	   authority”	   (Dingwerth	   and	  Pattberg	  2006,	  191-­‐193).	  These	  four	  features	  are	  all	  relevant	  to	  this	  research	  project,	  albeit	  to	  varying	  degrees.	  	  	  The	  multiactor	  perspective	   is	  probably	   the	  most	  obvious.	  A	  narrowly	  state-­‐centric	  form	  of	  analysis	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  the	  plethora	  of	  actors	  involved	  in	  global	   environmental	   politics.	   These	   include	   not	   only	   NGOs,	   which	   are	   of	  most	   interest	   for	   this	   research,	   but	   also	   transnational	   corporations	   and	  business	   lobby	   groups,	   science-­‐based	   organisations,	   supranational	  organisations,	  local	  community	  groups,	  social	  movements,	  and	  others.	  While	  the	  nature	  and	  actions	  of	  most	  IGOs	  are	  still	  controlled	  by	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  member	   states,	   a	   range	   of	   non-­‐state	   actors	   have	   in	  many	   cases	   gained	  considerable	   access	   and	   influence.	   This	   has	   given	   them	   a	   ‘voice’,	   if	   not	   a	  ‘vote’,	  in	  the	  making	  of	  global	  policies.	  	  Secondly,	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  interlinkages	  between	  different	  policy	  levels	  can	  also	   be	   extended	   to	   questions	   about	   how	   the	   actions	   of	   international	  organisations	  affect	   communities	   in	  different	  parts	  of	   the	  world,	  how	   these	  communities	   in	   turn	   are	   able	   to	   shape	   international	   policies	   –	   through	  governmental	   channels	   and	   other	   media	   -­‐	   and	   “how	   ideas	   expressed	   in	  transnational	   forums	   affect	   and	   are	   affected	   by	   ideas	   and	   practices	   in	  national,	  regional,	  or	  local	  settings”	  (Dingwerth	  and	  Pattberg	  2006,	  192).	  The	  thesis	   seeks	   to	   explore	   the	   potential	   for	   international	   NGOs	   to	   strengthen	  interlinkages	  between	  local	  communities	  and	  global	  policy	  processes.	  	  	  	  	  Thirdly,	  regarding	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  “horizontal”	  linkages,	  the	  authors	  also	  point	  to	  the	  less	  formal	  processes	  of	  coordination	  among	  public	  and	  private	  actors	   (including	   issue	   networks	   or	   advocacy	   coalitions	   (2006,	   193))	   that	  take	  place	  beside	   traditional	   intergovernmental	  negotiations.	   In	   the	  context	  of	   this	   research,	   this	  would	   involve	   looking	  at	   the	  way	  NGOs	  are	  organised	  around	  a	  particular	  IGO	  or	  a	  specific	  campaign,	  at	  the	  ways	  they	  coordinate	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their	   activities	   with	   other	   international	   and/	   or	   local	   partners,	   and	   at	  whether,	  for	  example,	  they	  tend	  to	  form	  ad-­‐hoc	  coalitions	  or	  more	  permanent	  networks.	  	  	  Private	   forms	   of	   governance	   such	   as	   the	   Global	   Reporting	   Initiative,	   the	  Equator	  Principles	  or	   the	  Forest	  Stewardship	  Council	  are	  examples	  of	  what	  Pattberg	  and	  Dingwerth	  point	  to	  as	  the	  fourth	  element	  of	  global	  governance.	  The	   implications	   of	   these	   forms	   of	   private	   rulemaking	   lie	   outside	   the	  conceptual	  parameters	  of	  this	  research.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  forms	  of	  governance	  raises	  additional	  questions	  about	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  ‘traditional’	  electoral	  forms	  of	  democratic	  control	  for	  holding	  power	  to	  account.	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  no	  a-­‐priori	  reason	  why	  many	  of	  the	   arguments	   set	   out	   in	   this	   thesis	   should	   not	   also	   be	   applicable	   to	   these	  new	  spheres	  of	  authority.	  It	  is	  entirely	  appropriate	  to	  ask	  whether	  influential	  NGOs	   –	   who	   are	   often	   initiators	   of	   and	   partners	   in	   private	   forms	   of	  governance	  –	  are	  able	  to	  act	  as	  democratic	  links	  between	  local	  communities	  and	  these	  private	  rulemaking	  processes.	  	  	  
iii. Case	  selection	  The	   empirical	   sections	   of	   the	   thesis	   focus	   on	   two	   international	  intergovernmental	   conventions	   and	   on	   five	   international	   NGOs	   and	   NGO	  networks.	   Most	   of	   the	   empirical	   analysis	   serves	   to	   understand	   the	   ‘inner	  workings’	   of	   the	   five	   international	   NGOs	   and	   networks	   although	   a	  considerable	  chunk	  of	  the	  analysis	  is	  also	  devoted	  to	  the	  democratic	  demands	  formulated	   by	   civil	   society	   organisations	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   two	   United	   Nations	  conventions:	   the	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (UNFCCC)	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  (CBD).	  	  The	   two	   convention	   case	   studies	  were	   chosen	  because	   they	  were	   set	   up	   to	  address	   two	   types	   of	   environmental	   problems	   that	   can	   only	   be	   tackled	  successfully	   through	   international	   cooperation:	   catastrophic	   climate	   change	  and	  the	  rapid	  loss	  and	  the	  exploitation	  of	  biodiversity.	  In	  both	  instances,	  the	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effects	   of	   these	   problems	   are	   felt	  most	   acutely	   among	  many	   of	   the	  world’s	  poorest	  citizens.	  Moreover,	  oftentimes	  the	  very	  interventions	  set	  up	  to	  tackle	  these	   environmental	   problems	   also	   have	   substantial	   (and	   sometimes	  negative)	  impacts	  on	  the	  livelihoods	  of	  these	  communities.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	   these	   affected	   communities	   are	   frequently	   insufficiently	  represented	   in	   the	   formulation	   of	   the	   policies	   that	   determine	   these	  interventions.	  Both	  climate	  change	  and	  biodiversity	  have	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  much	  environmental	  NGO	  campaigning	  over	  recent	  years,	  although	  the	  issue	  of	   climate	   change	  has	  undoubtedly	   gathered	   the	  most	   attention.	  Art’s	  1998	  analysis	  on	  the	  political	   influence	  of	   international	  NGOs	  also	  uses	  these	  two	  conventions	  as	  case	  studies	  (Arts	  1998).	  He	  investigates	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  NGO	  demands	  have	  shaped	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  negotiations.	  While	  his	  focus	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  NGOs	  on	  the	  results	  of	  the	  negotiations	  includes	  some	  discussion	   of	   demands	   for	   more	   participation	   (for	   example	   by	   indigenous	  peoples),	  this	  does	  not	  constitute	  the	  core	  of	  the	  analysis.	  By	  contrast,	  in	  this	  thesis,	  the	  emphasis	  of	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  NGO	  contribution	  in	  the	  context	  of	   the	   two	   conventions	   is	   on	   their	   democratic	   –	   and	   largely	   procedural	   –	  demands	   rather	   than	   on	   their	   efforts	   to	   shape	   targets,	   commitments	   or	  sanctioning	  mechanisms.	  	   	  The	  NGO	  case	  studies	  consist	  of	  three	  multi-­‐issue	  international	  NGOs,	  namely	  Greenpeace	   International	   (Greenpeace),	   the	   Worldwide	   Fund	   for	   Nature	  International	  (WWF)	  and	  Friends	  of	  the	  Earth	  International	  (FoEI),	  as	  well	  as	  of	   two	   issue	  specific	  NGO	  networks:	   the	  Climate	  Action	  Network	  (CAN)	  and	  the	   CBD	   Alliance.	   In	   the	   cases	   of	   the	   three	   multi-­‐issue	   NGOs,	   the	   focus	   is	  always	   on	   the	   international	   layer	   of	   the	   organisation.	   This	   is	   important	   to	  note	  as	  they	  are	  all	  made	  of	  national	  organisations	  that	  vary	  considerably	  in	  size	  and	  influence	  and	  can	  be	  relatively	  dissimilar.	  	  	  Greenpeace,	  WWF	   and	   FoEI	   are	   three	   of	   the	  most	   prominent	   international	  environmental	  NGOs	   that	   have	  managed	   to	   stay	   consistently	   relevant	   since	  their	   inception.	  The	  three	  groups	  have	  to	  a	   large	  extent	  shaped	  the	  modern	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environmental	  movement,	  especially	  in	  Western	  Europe.	  They	  also	  constitute	  the	   focus	   of	   Wapner’s	   1996	   book	   on	   ‘Environmental	   Activism	   and	   World	  Civic	  Politics’,	   one	   the	   few	   in-­‐depth	   comparative	  analyses	  of	   environmental	  NGOs.	   In	   his	   book	   Wapner	   argues	   that	   the	   three	   organisations	   stand	   for	  different	   approaches	   of	   shaping	   “world	   civic	   politics”	   (Wapner	   1996):	  Greenpeace	   directs	   its	   efforts	   at	   shaping	   environmental	   awareness,	   WWF	  stands	   for	   a	   strategy	   of	   empowering	   local	   communities,	   and	   FoEI	   lobbies	  state	   officials	   and	   international	   institutions.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   this	   research,	  Wapner’s	   1996	   analysis	   serves	   as	   a	   useful	   point	   of	   reference	   for	  understanding	   how	   the	   three	   organisations	   have	   evolved	   since	   the	   early	  1990s	   since	   many	   of	   the	   points	   made	   here	   about	   the	   NGOs’	   internal	  structures	  and	  priorities	  differ	  from	  the	  ones	  set	  out	  in	  his	  book.	  	  	  The	   Climate	   Action	   Network	   and	   the	   CBD	   Alliance	   differ	   from	   the	   three	  organisations	   described	   above	   in	   that	   they	   are	   actually	   coalitions	   of	  autonomous	   and	   very	   diverse	   NGOs	   who	   have	   come	   together	   around	   the	  United	   Nations’	   climate	   and	   biodiversity	   convention	   respectively.	   The	  discussion	   of	   CAN	   is	  more	   extensive	   than	   that	   of	   the	   CBD	   Alliance,	  mainly	  because	   the	   latter	   possesses	   a	   very	   loose	   organisational	   structure	   that	  provides	  less	  material	  for	  analysis.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  CBD	  Alliance	  constitutes	  a	  useful	  point	  of	  comparison	  with	  CAN.	  	  	  The	  rationale	  for	  including	  these	  two	  NGO	  networks	  emerges	  from	  the	  focus	  on	  the	  interlinkages	  between	  the	  different	  actors	  under	  investigation	  in	  this	  thesis.	   The	   focus	   of	   the	   thesis	   is	   on	   how	   international	   NGOs	   can	   act	   as	  democratic	   links	   between	   affected	   communities	   and	   international	  environmental	  institutions.	  This	  requires	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  to	  build	  a	  better	  understanding	   of	   how	   the	   organisational	   characteristics	   of	   different	  environmental	   NGOs	   (such	   as	   structure,	   policies	   and	   values)	   allow	   for	   the	  voices	  of	  affected	  communities	  to	  be	   ‘represented’	   in	  the	  global	  positions	  of	  these	   NGOs.	   However,	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   trying	   to	   influence	   particular	  intergovernmental	   policymaking	   processes	   –	   such	   as	   the	   United	   Nations	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Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  or	   the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	   -­‐	   many	   environmental	   NGOs	   coordinate	   their	   activities	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  these	   institutions	   with	   other	   nongovernmental	   groups	   in	   the	   shape	   of	  transnational	   issue	   networks.	   Many	   of	   the	   large	   international	   NGOs,	  including	  WWF,	   Greenpeace	   and	   FoEI,	   have	   played	   important	   roles	   in	   CAN	  since	   its	   creation.	   Therefore,	   in	   order	   to	   better	   understand	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	   voices	   of	   local	   communities	   are	   in	   fact	   represented	   by	  international	   NGOs	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   global	   environmental	   policymaking	   bodies,	  transnational	  NGO	  networks	   such	   as	   CAN	   are	   a	   crucial	   piece	   of	   the	   puzzle.	  Moreover,	  since	  these	  networks	  bring	  together	  organisations	  with	  a	  local	  or	  national	  focus	  as	  well	  those	  with	  a	  global	  outlook,	  they	  constitute	  good	  sites	  to	  study	  potential	  conflicts	  between	  local	  and	  global	  perspectives.	  	  	  
iv. Methodology	  The	  empirical	  sections	  of	  the	  thesis	  (chapters	  IV,	  VI	  and	  VII)	  draw	  mainly	  on	  primary	   documentation	   published	   by	   various	   NGOs	   and	   other	   civil	   society	  groups	  (such	  as	  indigenous’	  peoples	  organisations),	  documentation	  produced	  by	  the	  two	  UN	  conventions	  and	  a	  range	  of	  interviews	  with	  both	  NGO	  and	  IGO	  representatives.	   The	   primary	   sources	   were	   supplemented	   with	   secondary	  sources	  offering	  in-­‐depth	  case	  studies	  of	  individual	  NGOs	  and	  information	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  NGOs	  and	  the	  two	  UN	  conventions.	  	  	  The	  empirical	  findings	  presented	  in	  the	  section	  on	  the	  UNFCCC	  in	  chapter	  IV	  are	  mainly	  based	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  documents	  produced	  by	  NGOs,	  published	  between	   the	   meeting	   in	   Bali	   in	   December	   2007	   and	   prior	   to	   the	   fifteenth	  Conference	   of	   the	   Parties	   in	   Copenhagen	   in	  December	   2009.	   These	   include	  the	  written	  statements	  by	  environment	  and	  development	  NGOs	  submitted	  to	  the	  climate	  convention	  from	  late	  2007	  to	  mid-­‐2009	  and	  all	  available	  editions	  of	   the	   civil	   society	   newsletter	   ECO	  published	   between	  December	   2007	   and	  August	   2009	   (Bali	   2007,	   Bangkok	   2008,	   Bonn	   2008,	   Accra	   2008,	   Poznan	  2008,	  Bonn	  I	  2009,	  Bonn	  II	  2009,	  Bonn	  III	  2009).	  These	  NGO	  submissions	  can	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be	  accessed	  on	  the	  UNFCCC	  website4	  while	  the	  ECO	  newsletter	  can	  be	  found	  on	  the	  website	  of	  CAN.5	  The	  focus	  of	  the	  analysis	  is	  primarily	  on	  the	  written	  statements	   put	   forward	   by	   CAN	   due	   to	   its	   prominent	   position	   within	   the	  climate	   convention	   NGO	   community;	   however,	   a	   number	   of	   separate	  submissions	   by	   individual	   environmental	   and	   development	   NGOs	   (such	   as	  WWF,	   Greenpeace	   and	   FoEI)	   and	   other	   NGO	   networks	  working	   on	   climate	  change	   (e.g.	   Ecosystems	   Climate	   Alliance)	   that	   are	   available	   on	   the	   climate	  convention	  website	  have	  also	  been	  included.	  Besides	  the	  NGO	  submissions	  to	  the	   climate	   convention,	   the	   analysis	   is	   based	   on	   a	   review	   of	   selected	  NGO-­‐published	  materials	  on	  climate-­‐related	  issues	  produced	  for	  a	  wider	  or	  policy	  audience.	   For	   the	   subsequent	  discussion	  of	  NGO	  demands	   in	   the	   context	  of	  the	   biodiversity	   convention,	   NGO	   submissions	   made	   in	   2009	   and	   2010	  responding	  to	  the	  call	  for	  inputs	  to	  the	  process	  of	  revising	  and	  updating	  the	  strategic	  plan6,	  NGO	  submissions	  made	  between	  2007	  and	  2009	  relating	   to	  the	  proposed	  global	  regime	  on	  access	  and	  benefit	  sharing7,	  and	  all	  available	  editions	   of	   the	   ECO	   newsletter	   produced	   for	   the	   eighth	   Conference	   of	   the	  Parties	  (COP)	  in	  2006	  and	  COP	  9	  in	  2008	  were	  analysed.8	  Overall,	  however,	  demands	   for	   more	   equitable	   representation	   and	   participation	   structures	  feature	   much	   less	   in	   the	   NGO	   submissions	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   CBD	  compared	  to	  the	  UNFCCC.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  discussion	  of	  NGO	  demands	  in	  the	  section	   on	   the	   CBD	   draws	   more	   heavily	   on	   secondary	   sources	   and	   pays	  greater	   attention	   to	   existing	   analyses	   of	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   the	   convention,	  when	  a	  number	  of	  crucial	  governance	  issues	  were	  being	  debated.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   Website	   of	   the	   UNFCCC,	   Submissions	   by	   nongovernmental	   organisations,	  http://unfccc.int/parties_observers/ngo/submissions/items/3689.php	  5	  CAN	  International,	  ECO	  newsletter,	  http://www.climatenetwork.org/eco-­‐newsletters	  6	  A	  revised	  and	  updated	  strategic	  plan	   for	   the	  2011-­‐2020	  period	  was	  adopted	  at	   the	   tenth	  meeting	  of	  the	  COP	  in	  Nagoya,	  Japan,	  in	  October	  2010.	  	  7	  The	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  on	  Access	  and	  Benefit-­‐sharing	  was	  also	  adopted	  at	  this	  meeting.	  8	   The	   submissions	   are	  made	   available	   on	   the	   CBD	  website.	   Relating	   to	   the	   strategic	   plan:	  www.cbd.int/sp/sp2010+/inputs.shtml.	   Last	   accessed	   25.03.2010	   Relating	   to	   the	   ABS	  protocol:	  www.cbd.int/abs/submissions.	  Last	  accessed	  06.12.2012.	  The	  CBD	  ECO	  newsletter	  is	   available	   on	   the	  website	   of	   the	   CBD	  Alliance:	  www.cbdalliance.org/ecos/.	   Last	   accessed	  06.12.2012.	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The	  sources	  used	  for	  the	  case	  studies	  of	  the	  five	  NGOs	  and	  NGO	  networks	  in	  chapters	   VI	   and	   VII	   consist	   of	   written	   information	   published	   by	   the	   NGOs	  (websites,	  annual	  reports,	  documents	  relating	  to	  their	  governance	  structure	  and	   internal	  decision-­‐making	  procedures,	   internal	   guidelines,	  policy	  papers	  and	  position	   statements),	   of	   interviews	  with	   selected	   staff	  members	   and	  of	  analyses	   undertaken	   by	   other	   authors	   (secondary	   sources).	   Most	   of	   the	  empirical	  analysis	  undertaken	  for	  these	  chapters	  was	  conducted	  in	  2009	  and	  2010.	   The	   primary	   documentation	   published	   by	   the	   NGOs	   themselves	  was	  usually	   accessed	   from	   the	  organisations’	  websites.	  One	  problem	  with	  using	  these	  documents	   is	   that	   they	   are	  not	   always	   clearly	   categorized	   and	  dated.	  NGO	   documents	   differ	   in	   nature	   depending	   on	   what	   audience	   they	   are	  produced	  for:	  the	  general	  public	  and	  supporters,	  funding	  organisations,	  or	  as	  ‘internal’	   documents	   that	   are	   mainly	   addressed	   at	   the	   NGO’s	   staff.	   This	  sometimes	   necessitates	   triangulating	   information	   found	   in	   one	   document	  with	   other	   sources.	   There	   were	   a	   number	   of	   instances	   where	   NGO	  interviewees	   referred	   to	   particular	   internal	   documents	   (such	   as	   WWF’s	  internal	  governance	  review)	  but	  were	  not	  willing	  to	  share	  these	  documents.	  In	  general,	  however,	  the	  interviewees	  were	  happy	  to	  provide	  a	  general	  (but	  limited)	  account	  of	  the	  content	  of	  these	  documents.	  	  A	   total	   of	   17	   individuals	  were	   interviewed	   (one	   interview	  was	   a	   telephone	  conference	   with	   two	   interviewees	   participating	   at	   the	   same	   time),	   mainly	  between	  October	  2009	  and	  July	  2010.	  Two	  interviews	  (one	  with	  the	  chief	  of	  the	  New	  York	   office	   of	   the	  UN’s	   Nongovernmental	   Liaison	   Service	   and	   one	  with	   the	   advisor	   to	   the	   Stakeholder	   Forum	   on	   Global	   Governance)	   were	  conducted	   with	   the	   intention	   of	   gathering	   background	   information	   on	   the	  broader	  role	  of	  NGOs	  within	  the	  UN	  system.	  Two	  staff	  members	  from	  the	  CBD	  responsible	   for	   liaising	   with	   civil	   society	   were	   also	   interviewed.	   The	  remaining	   interviews	  were	  conducted	  with	  staff	  members	  of	   the	  NGOs	   that	  are	  analysed	  in	  chapters	  VI	  and	  VII,	  except	  in	  one	  case	  where	  an	  interviewee	  had	   been	   a	   FoEI	   campaigner	   in	   the	   past	   and	   was	   now	   working	   for	   a	  predominantly	   Southern	   NGO	   coalition	   on	   forests.	   Most	   of	   the	   interviews	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were	   conducted	   over	   Skype	   or	   on	   the	   telephone.	   The	   interviews	   lasted	  between	  30-­‐75	  minutes	   (on	   average	   about	   50	  minutes).	   Getting	   interviews	  with	   NGO	   representatives	   proved	   challenging.	   A	   lack	   of	   responses	  may	   be	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  interview	  requests	  were	  made	  during	  2009	  –	  a	  busy	  year	   for	   the	  NGOs	  under	   investigation	   in	   this	   thesis	  due	   to	   the	  high-­‐profile	  climate	   summit	   in	   December	   2009.	   Once	   contact	   with	   one	   NGO	  representative	  had	  been	  established,	   it	  became	  easier	  to	  arrange	  interviews	  with	   colleagues,	   usually	   by	   introduction	   or	   recommendation.	   Prior	   to	   the	  interview,	  the	  interviewees	  received	  a	  set	  of	  questions,	  which	  was	  tailored	  to	  their	   specific	   organisation	   and	   job	   description.	   The	   interviews	   themselves,	  however,	   were	   semi-­‐structured	   and	   frequently	   departed	   from	   the	   set	   of	  questions	   so	   as	   to	   not	   constrain	   the	   interviewees’	   responses	   and	   lines	   of	  thought.	  The	   job	  positions	  of	  a	  number	  of	   interviewees	  are	  provided	   in	   the	  thesis.	  Other	  interviewees	  preferred	  to	  remain	  anonymous	  and	  are	  therefore	  not	  identified	  in	  this	  way.	  	  	  Compared	   to	   the	   large	   body	   of	   literature	   on	   the	   role	   of	   civil	   society	   in	  international	  relations	  per	  se,	  there	  is	  a	  relative	  shortage	  of	  in-­‐depth	  analyses	  of	   individual	   NGOs.	   There	   are	   exceptions,	   of	   course,	   and	   those	   that	   are	  relevant	   to	   the	   NGOs	   under	   discussion	   in	   this	   thesis	   have	   been	   extremely	  useful	   for	   the	   analysis.	   These	   existing	   case	   studies	   tend	   to	   have	   a	   different	  focus	   to	   the	   one	   adopted	   in	   this	   thesis	   but	   nonetheless	   present	   a	   useful	  resource,	   especially	   since	  many	   of	   them	   also	   rely	   on	   interviews	   with	   NGO	  representatives	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  primary	  empirical	  research.	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	   however,	   that	   large	   NGOs	   –	   probably	   more	   so	   than	   many	   other	  organisations	   that	   often	   constitute	   objects	   for	   analysis	   in	   the	   field	   of	  International	   Relations	   –	   change	   over	   time	   and	   may	   adopt	   very	   different	  strategies	   or	   even	   values	   in	   response	   to	   changes	   in	   their	   external	  environment	  or	   internal	  developments,	  such	  as	  a	  change	  in	  leadership.	  This	  means	   that	   case	   studies	   of	   NGOs	   that	   are	   based	   on	   research	   undertaken	   a	  number	   of	   years	   ago	   are	   sometimes	   of	   limited	   applicability	   to	   the	  organisation	  today.	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v. Thesis	  outline	  
Chapter	  II	  starts	  by	  explaining	  how	  the	  preferences	  and	  interests	  of	  citizens	  are	   ‘transmitted’	   to	   international	   institutions	   via	   elected	   governmental	  delegates	  based	  on	  principal-­‐agent	  analysis.	   In	  practice,	   the	   complexities	  of	  global	  policy-­‐making	  and	  the	  institutional	  design	  of	  global	  governance	  mean	  that	  some	  communities,	  albeit	  affected	  by	  global	  policies,	  are	  not	  adequately	  represented	   in	   this	   way.	   The	   chapter	   discusses	   the	   various	   ‘democratic	  deficits’	   associated	   with	   international	   institutions	   and	   sketches	   the	   role	   of	  civil	   society	  against	   this	  backdrop.	  The	  chapter	  outlines	   two	  ways	   in	  which	  civil	   society	   organisations	   might	   help	   to	   address	   this	   problem:	   ‘external’	  demands	   for	   more	   democratic	   forms	   of	   decision-­‐making	   in	   international	  institutions	  articulated	  by	  NGOs,	  and	   the	  notion	   that	  NGOs	   themselves	  may	  act	  as	  links	  between	  international	  institutions	  and	  affected	  communities.	  The	  chapter	  presents	  a	  number	  of	  scholarly	  analyses	  that	  have	  similarly	  tried	  to	  portray	  NGOs	  in	  ‘relational	  terms’	  by	  focussing	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  interaction	  between	   large	  and	   influential	   civil	   society	  groups	  and	  communities	  or	   local	  community	  organisations.	  While	  these	  analyses	  yield	  useful	  insights,	  they	  do	  not	  assess	  the	  role	  of	  the	  NGOs	  and	  their	  links	  with	  these	  communities	  from	  the	   vantage	   point	   of	   bringing	   the	   voices	   of	   affected	   communities	   to	  international	  institutions.	  	  	  
Chapter	   III	   shows	   why	   the	   field	   of	   global	   environmental	   governance	  constitutes	   an	   appropriate	   field	   within	   which	   to	   situate	   this	   study.	   Global	  environmental	   problems	   can	   only	   be	   tackled	   effectively	   through	  international	   cooperation.	  While	  many	   forms	  of	   environmental	  degradation	  have	   severe	   consequences	   for	   the	   world’s	   poorest	   communities,	   existing	  forms	   of	   environmental	   governance	   are	   characterised	   by	   many	   of	   the	  participation	   and	   representation	  deficits	   discussed	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter.	  Chapter	  III	  provides	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  history	  of	  global	  environmental	  governance	   and	   sets	   out	   its	   ideational	   underpinnings.	   It	   discusses	   both	   the	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turn	   towards	   more	   participatory	   norms	   and	   practices	   and	   the	   growing	  influence	  of	  private	  actors	  such	  as	  NGOs.	  	  	  
Chapter	   IV	   starts	   by	   examining	   the	   ‘external	   dimension’	   of	   the	   NGO	  contribution	   in	   the	   form	  of	  democratic	  demands	  articulated	  by	  NGOs	   in	   the	  context	   of	   the	   global	   climate	   and	   biodiversity	   conventions.	   Part	   one	   of	  chapter	   IV	   illustrates	   the	  problems	  of	   climate	   change	   and	  biodiversity	   loss,	  outlines	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  two	  UN	  conventions	  set	  up	  to	  tackle	  them	  as	   well	   as	   of	   the	   role	   of	   NGOs	   therein.	   This	   is	   followed	   in	   part	   two	   of	   the	  chapter	   with	   an	   analysis	   of	   NGO	   demands	   in	   response	   to	   the	   alleged	  democratic	   deficits	   in	   the	   conventions.	   The	   analysis	   of	   NGO	   demands	  distinguishes	   between	   responses	   to	   representation	   inequities	   at	   the	  intergovernmental	   level	   and	   participation	   deficits	   and	   finds	   a	   convergence	  around	  very	  similar	  democratic	  demands	  across	  the	  NGO	  community,	  most	  of	  which	  draw	  upon	  recurrent	  governance	  norms	  and	  existing	  instances	  of	  good	  practice	  within	  global	  institutions.	  	  	  
Chapter	  V	  returns	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  NGOs	  as	  links	  between	  affected	  communities	  and	  international	   institutions	  and	  seeks	  to	  develop	  a	  conceptual	   framework	  for	  understanding	   the	   intrinsic	  potential	   of	  NGOs	   for	  bringing	   the	  voices	  of	  affected	   communities	   to	   global	   policy-­‐making	   processes.	   The	   point	   of	  departure	  is	  Pitkin’s	  1967	  work	  on	  representation,	  which	  is	  firmly	  grounded	  in	   a	   traditional	   nation-­‐state	   setting.	   The	   problems	   with	   applying	   Pitkin’s	  insights	   to	   the	  role	  of	   transnational	  NGOs	   in	  an	   international	  policy-­‐making	  context	   are	   acknowledged	   and	   discussed.	   Nonetheless,	   the	   chapter	   shows	  that	   many	   of	   the	   insights	   gained	   from	   a	   ‘representation	   perspective	   ‘	   -­‐	  especially	  the	  importance	  of	  responsiveness	  for	  democratic	  representation	  -­‐	  can	   be	   used	   for	   thinking	   about	   the	   role	   of	  NGOs.	   On	   this	   basis	   the	   chapter	  develops	  a	  number	  of	  research	  questions	  to	  guide	  the	  subsequent	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  individual	  NGOs	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	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The	  purpose	  of	  chapters	  VI	  and	  VII	  is	  to	  offer	  a	  practical	  illustration	  of	  how	  different	   international	  environmental	  NGOs	  and	  NGO	  networks	  may	  be	  able	  to	   act	   as	   democratic	   links	   between	   local	   communities	   and	   international	  institutions.	  The	  analysis	  of	  each	  organisation	  first	  tries	  to	  identify	  different	  forms	  of	  responsiveness	  before	  discussing	  why	  the	  organisation	  has	  adopted	  corresponding	   structures,	   policies	   and	   priorities.	   As	   stated	   above,	   the	   two	  chapters	   discuss	   three	   multi-­‐issue	   international	   NGOs	   (WWF,	   Greenpeace	  and	  FoEI)	  and	  two	  issue-­‐based	  NGO	  networks	  (Climate	  Action	  Network	  and	  the	   CBD	   Alliance).	   Chapter	   VI	   looks	   at	   WWF	   and	   Greenpeace	   as	   two	  examples	  of	  relatively	  hierarchical	  organisations,	  while	  chapter	  VII	  turns	  to	  FoEI,	   CAN	   and	   the	   CBD	   Alliance,	   all	   of	   which	   are	   more	   accurately	  characterised	  as	  networks.	  	  
	  
Chapter	  VIII	  draws	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  previous	  two	  chapters	  to	  assess	  a	  range	   of	   organisational	   characteristics	   that	   shape	   the	   potential	   of	   NGOs	   to	  assume	  representative	  functions	  at	  the	  interface	  between	  local	  communities	  and	   international	   institutions.	   These	   include	   organisational	   structure,	  decision-­‐making	  processes,	  the	  strategy	  for	  bringing	  about	  change,	  resource	  and	   funding	   sources,	   alliances	   and	   partnerships,	   and	   values.	   It	   presents	   a	  number	   of	   general	   conclusions	   regarding	   this	   ‘internal’	   dimension	   of	   the	  NGOs’	  contribution.	  The	  discussion	  is	  then	  opened	  up	  further	  to	  include	  both	  the	  findings	  relating	  to	  the	  two	  issue-­‐specific	  NGO	  networks,	  and	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  ‘external’	  NGO	  demands.	  Finally,	  the	  chapter	  restates	  the	  contributions	  made	   by	   the	   thesis	   in	   empirical,	   theoretical	   and	   policy	   terms,	   discusses	   a	  number	  of	  limitations,	  and	  provides	  suggestions	  for	  further	  research.	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II. Democratic	  deficits	  in	  global	  governance	  and	  the	  
role	  of	  NGOs	  The	   purpose	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   illustrate	   and	   contextualise	   the	   key	  problems,	  which	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  research	  questions	  addressed	  in	  the	  thesis.	  The	  most	   fundamental	   -­‐	   but	   extremely	   broad	   -­‐	   problem	   underpinning	   this	  research	  is	  the	  question	  of	  how	  international	  organisations	  can	  become	  more	  democratically	  accountable	  to	  the	  communities	  who	  are	  affected	  by	  policies	  developed	   at	   the	   international	   level.	   The	   focus	   of	   the	   thesis	   is	   more	  specifically	   on	   the	   contribution	   of	   international	   NGOs	   and	   the	   objective	   of	  this	  chapter	   is	   therefore	  also	  to	  build	  a	  conceptual	  bridge	   linking	  the	  broad	  problem	   of	   a	   global	   democratic	   deficit	   to	   the	  more	   specific	   contribution	   of	  international	  NGOs.	  	  	  This	  chapter	  is	  structured	  as	  follows.	  The	  first	  section	  (i)	  will	  use	  principal-­‐agent	   analysis	   to	   set	   out	   how	   citizen	   preferences	   are	   ‘transmitted’	   to	  international	   organisations	   via	   elected	   governmental	   delegates	   in	   a	  (simplified)	   liberal	   institutionalist	   model.	   The	   complex	   realities	   of	   global	  policy-­‐making	  and	  the	  current	  institutional	  design	  of	  global	  governance	  make	  it	   impossible,	   however,	   for	   all	   citizens	   to	   be	   fairly	   represented	   in	   global	  policy-­‐making	   processes.	   Section	   (ii)	  will	   therefore	   offer	   a	   relatively	   broad	  outline	   of	   the	   various	   ‘democratic	   deficits’	   that	   are	   associated	   with	   global	  institutions	   and	  have	   the	   effect	   of	   undermining	   the	  principle	   of	   democratic	  “congruence”	  in	  global	  politics	  (Scharpf	  1998,	  para.17).	  The	  participation	  by	  civil	   society	   organisations	   is	   discussed	   as	   one	   possible	   remedy	   to	   these	  deficits	   in	   section	   (iii).	   In	   particular	   the	   internal	   democratic	   practices	   of	  participating	  civil	  society	  organisations,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  external	  democratic	  demands	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   institutions	   of	   global	   governance	   are	   singled	   out	   for	  further	   investigation.	   Section	   (iv)	   returns	   to	   the	   question	   of	   how	  international	   NGOs	   relate	   to	   local	   communities	   and	   community-­‐based	  organisations	   and	   offers	   some	   empirical	   insights	   on	   these	   relational	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dynamics	   from	  existing	  analyses.	  A	   conclusion	  and	  an	  overview	  of	   the	  next	  steps	  are	  provided	  in	  section	  (v).	  	  
i. Linking	  citizens	  to	  international	  institutions	  According	   to	   standard	   liberal-­‐institutionalist	   analyses,	   international	  institutions	  exist	  because	  they	  provide	  important	  benefits	  for	  their	  members.	  Intergovernmental	  institutions	  are	  set	  up	  by	  states	  to	  facilitate	  the	  provision	  of	   global	   public	   goods	   which	   states	   are	   unable	   to	   deliver	   unilaterally.	   The	  World	  Bank	  defines	  global	  public	  goods	  as	  “aspects	   of	   development	   that	   reach	   across	   borders:	   examples	  include	  the	  environment,	  public	  health,	  and	  international	  trade	  and	   financial	   infrastructure.	   Actions	   are	   often	   needed	   that	  extend	   beyond	   what	   market	   systems	   or	   individual	   countries	  can	  do	   on	   their	   own	  –	   developing	  new	  vaccines,	   for	   instance,	  and	   reducing	   carbon	   emissions	   to	   address	   global	   warming”	  (World	  Bank	  2011).	  The	   mitigation	   of	   global	   public	   ‘bads’	   such	   as	   disease,	   pollution	   or	   global	  warming	  also	  presents	  a	  public	  good	   in	   this	  sense.	  When	  the	  welfare	  of	   the	  citizens	   of	   individual	   states	   risks	   being	   undermined	   by	   global	   public	  problems,	   governments	   may	   choose	   to	   work	   together	   to	   tackle	   trans-­‐boundary	   challenges	   at	   the	   functionally	   optimum	   level,	   be	   it	   bilaterally,	  regionally	  or	  globally.	  International	  organisations	  draw	  legitimacy	  from	  their	  ability	   to	   deliver	   such	   goods	   effectively.	   This	   has	   been	   referred	   to	   as	   the	  “output	  legitimacy”	  of	  institutions	  (Scharpf	  1999).	  	  	  Principal-­‐agent	   analysis	   presents	   the	   relationship	   between	   states	   and	  international	  organisations	  as	  one	  of	  delegation,	  with	  states	  (the	  principals)	  delegating	  certain	  governance	  functions	  to	  IGOs	  (the	  agents).	  Principal-­‐agent	  analysis	   can	   then	   be	   used	   to	   explain	   divergences	   between	   the	   original	  preferences	   of	   states	   and	   the	   outputs	   delivered	   by	   IGOs,	   and	   looks	   at	   the	  various	  mechanisms	  principals	   can	   employ	   to	   control	   their	   agents	   (Barnett	  and	  Finnemore	  2004;	  Hawkins	  et	  al	  2006).	  The	  act	  of	  delegation	  is	  defined	  as	  “a	  conditional	  grant	  of	  authority	  from	  a	  principal	  to	  an	  agent	  that	  empowers	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the	  latter	  to	  act	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  former”	   	  (Hawkins	  et	  al	  2006,	  7).	  However,	  delegation	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   agent	   are	   always	   in	   full	  accordance	  with	   the	  principal’s	  preferences.	   In	  principal-­‐agent	  analysis,	   the	  divergence	  of	  the	  agent’s	  outputs	  from	  the	  principal’s	  preferences	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  “agency	  slack”	  (Nielson	  and	  Tierney	  2003).	  This	  must	  be	  differentiated,	  however,	  from	  an	  acceptable	  degree	  of	  agent	  autonomy,	  which	  may	  well	  be	  in	  the	  principal’s	  interest.	  	  The	   relevance	   of	   the	   principal-­‐agent	   model	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   democratic	  international	   institutions	   becomes	   clearer	   when	   applied	   to	   the	  interconnected	  acts	  of	  delegation	  that	  are	  found	  at	  both	  the	  domestic	  and	  the	  international	   levels.	   The	   relationship	   between	   state	   principals	   and	   IGO	  agents	   does	   not	   exist	   in	   vacuum	   but	   constitutes	   one	   (important)	   link	   in	   a	  larger	  delegation	   chain.	  Elected	  governments	   can,	   of	   course,	   be	  understood	  as	  agents	  themselves	  to	  whom	  the	  domestic	  electorate	  has	  delegated	  the	  task	  of	   undertaking	   essential	   governance	   functions.	   Seen	   from	   this	   perspective,	  governments	   function	   as	   so-­‐called	   “proximate	   principals”,	   with	   citizens	  acting	  as	  the	  “ultimate	  principals”	  (Nielson	  and	  Tierney	  2003,	  242).	  The	  basic	  unit	   from	  which	  all	  other	  subsequent	  acts	  of	  delegation	  arise	   is	   in	  this	  view	  the	   individual	   (or,	   collectively,	   the	   citizens),	   as	   long	   as	   he	   or	   she	   is	   in	   a	  position	  to	  exercise	  his	  or	  her	  basic	  democratic	  rights.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	   according	   to	   liberal	   internationalism,	   individuals	   remain	   the	   ultimate	  democratic	  reference	  point	  (Moravcsik	  1997,	  516/517).	  However,	  the	  longer	  the	   chain	   of	   delegation	   between	   the	   “ultimate	   principals”	   and	   the	  implementing	   agents,	   the	   more	   diluted	   the	   opportunities	   for	   controlling	  these	   agents	   become.	   This	   has	   been	  held	   up	   as	   a	   structural	   obstacle	   to	   the	  existence	  of	  democratic	  international	  organisations	  (Dahl	  1999).	  	  	  The	   principal-­‐agent	   model	   offers	   a	   useful	   –	   albeit	   simplified	   –	   account	   of	  interest	   transmission	   from	   citizens	   to	   international	   organisations.	   Viewed	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  democratic	  legitimacy,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  principal	   and	   the	   agent	   mirrors	   that	   between	   the	   represented	   and	   the	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representative,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  more	  fully	  in	  chapter	  V	  of	  the	  thesis.9	  According	   to	   liberal	   internationalism,	   “representative	   institutions	   and	  practices	  constitute	  the	  critical	   ‘transmission	  belt’	  by	  which	  the	  preferences	  and	  social	  power	  of	   individuals	  and	  groups	  are	   translated	   into	  state	  policy”	  (Moravcsik	  1997,	  518).	  While	  principal-­‐agent	  analysis	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	   the	   outputs	   of	   the	   agent’s	   actions	   (and	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   these	  correspond	   to	   the	   principal’s	   preferences),	   theories	   of	   representation	   also	  examine	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   principal	   is	   able	   to	   exert	   (democratic)	  control	   over	   the	   agent.	   In	   this	   relationship,	   the	   delegation	   of	   authority	   –	  whereby	   the	  agent	   is	   endowed	  with	  a	  mandate	   to	   act	   in	   the	   interest	  of	   the	  principal	  on	  certain	  issues	  -­‐	  is	  only	  one	  side	  of	  the	  coin.	  This	  aspect	  has	  to	  be	  matched	   with	   an	   element	   of	   accountability,	   whereby	   the	   principal	   is	  informed	   about	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   agent	   and	   has	   access	   to	  mechanisms	   for	  sanctioning	  the	  agent	  if	  he	  consistently	  oversteps	  this	  mandate	  (Pitkin	  1967).	  Democracy	   is	   hence	   viewed	   “as	   a	   system	   of	   popular	   control	   over	  governmental	  policies	  and	  decisions”	  (Dahl	  1999,	  20).	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  exert	  a	  degree	  of	  democratic	  control	  over	  the	  actions	  of	  IGOs,	   citizens	   need	   to	   have	   access	   to	   institutions	   and	   mechanisms	   for	  authorisation	  and	  accountability	   that	  make	   it	  possible	   for	   their	  preferences	  to	  be	  transmitted	  upwards	  to	  policymakers	  in	  international	  organisations.	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Chapter	  V	  will	  attempt	  to	  apply	  the	  concept	  of	  representation	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  NGOs	  and	  affected	  communities.	  This	  construct	  presents	  a	  departure	  from	  more	  ‘traditional’	  models	  of	  representation	  that	  frequently	  focus	  exclusively	  on	  the	  citizens	  of	  a	  state	  and	  their	  elected	  representatives.	  Although	  theories	  of	  representation	  must,	  in	  turn,	  be	  distinguished	  from	   principal-­‐agent	   analysis	   (which	   may,	   or	   may	   not	   be,	   concerned	   with	   the	   issue	   of	  democracy)	   it	   is	   noteworthy	   that	   the	   role	   of	   non-­‐state	   actors	   is	   not	   one	   that	   has	   been	  investigated	  in	  detail	  by	  scholars	  employing	  the	  principal-­‐agent	  model,	  which	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	   states	   as	   unitary	   and	   rational	   actors.	   Lake	   and	   McCubbins,	   however,	   point	   out	   that	  incorporating	   the	   role	   of	   third	  parties,	   including	  NGOs,	   represents	   the	   research	   frontier	   in	  the	  field	  of	  principal-­‐agent	  analysis	  (Lake	  and	  McCubbins	  2006,	  341).	  As	  a	  subject	  for	  further	  research,	   they	   propose	   looking	   at	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   growth	   in	   the	   number	   of	  international	  NGOs	  and	  the	  trend	  towards	  greater	  delegation	  in	  international	  relations	  (ibid,	  360).	  According	  to	  the	  authors,	  the	  role	  of	  third	  parties	  can	  be	  incorporated	  into	  principal-­‐agent	  models	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  benefits	  they	  offer	  to	  the	  principal.	  Principals	  can	  make	  use	  of	  the	   information	  provided	  by	  third	  parties	  about	  the	  actions	  of	   the	  agent,	   thus	  reducing	  the	  costs	  incurred	  by	  the	  principal	  in	  supervising	  the	  agent.	  The	  emphasis	  of	  this	  model	  is	  thus	  on	  the	  information,	  knowledge	  and	  expertise	  supplied	  by	  NGOs	  (and	  not	  on	  their	  democratic	  contribution).	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an	   ideal	   world,	   the	   very	   individuals	   affected	   by	   the	   decisions	   taken	   in	  international	  organisations	  are	  the	  same	  citizens	  that	  are	  able	  to	  hold	  these	  institutions	  to	  account.	  Applied	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  ecological	  risk,	  this	  means	  that,	  “all	   those	   potentially	   affected	   by	   risks	   should	   have	   some	   meaningful	  opportunity	  to	  participate	  or	  otherwise	  be	  represented	  in	  the	  making	  of	  the	  policies	  or	  decisions	  which	  generate	  such	  risks”	  (Eckersley	  2000,	  118).	  This	  is	   the	   principle	   of	   democratic	   “congruence”	   discussed	   by	   Scharpf	   (1998,	  para.17).	  In	  practice,	  international	  organisations	  fail	  to	  fulfil	  this	  demanding	  requirement	  for	  a	  host	  of	  reasons,	  some	  of	  which	  will	  be	  set	  out	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  
	  
ii. Democratic	  deficits	  in	  global	  policy-­making	  The	  discrepancy	  between	  decision-­‐makers	  and	  affected	  citizens,	  or	   “choice-­‐bearers”	   and	   “choice-­‐makers”	   (Marchetti	   2008)	   in	   global	   politics,	   is	   a	   key	  problem	  for	  the	  democratic	  legitimacy	  of	  international	  institutions.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  extensive	  literature	  on	  the	  democratic	  legitimacy	  of	  global	  institutions	  –	  spanning	   questions	   such	   as	   whether	   global	   democracy	   is	   indeed	   desirable	  and	   feasible,	   what	   forms	   it	   could	   take,	   what	   impediments	   currently	   (or	  structurally)	   prevent	   its	   realisation,	   how	   existing	   institutions	   may	   be	  reformed	  to	  become	  more	  transparent,	  accountable	  and	  representative	  –	  the	  discussion	   below	   is	   by	   necessity	   selective	   and	   cursory	   and	   will	   use	   this	  discrepancy	  as	  its	  point	  of	  departure.	  The	  objective	  is	  to	  highlight	  a	  number	  of	   key	   problems	   against	   which	   to	   later	   discuss	   the	   potential	   (but	   limited)	  contribution	   of	   international	  NGOs.	   From	   the	   previous	   section	   it	   should	   be	  evident	   that	   this	   thesis	   looks	   at	   citizens,	   and	   not	   states,	   as	   the	   ultimate	  principals	  of	   IGOs.	  This	   section	  will	   focus	  on	   the	  obstacles	   likely	   to	   impede	  the	   transmission	   of	   preferences	   from	   affected	   citizens,	   via	   elected	  representatives,	  to	  international	  organisations.	  The	  focus	  is	  therefore	  on	  the	  democratic	   “input	   legitimacy”	   (Scharpf	   1999)	   of	   intergovernmental	  organisations	   –	   the	   democratic	   quality	   of	   the	   processes	   through	   which	  decisions	   are	   taken	   and	   policies	   are	   formulated	   in	   these	   venues.	   Input	  legitimacy	   pertains	   to	   aspects	   such	   as	   representation,	   participation	   and	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deliberation	  and	  must	  be	  conceptually	  distinguished	  from	  the	  organisation’s	  ability	  to	  successfully	  deliver	  global	  public	  goods	  (“output	  legitimacy”	  (ibid)).	  	  	  As	  put	  previously,	  the	  creation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  international	  institutions	  is	   largely	   necessitated	   by	   the	   existence	   of	   trans-­‐boundary	   challenges	   that	  states	  are	  unable	  to	  tackle	  unilaterally.	  These	  global	  challenges	  have	  become	  more	   numerous	   and	   acute	   with	   the	   intensification	   of	   globalization.	   In	   an	  interdependent	   world	   states	   find	   it	   increasingly	   difficult	   to	   cater	   to	   their	  citizens’	  concerns	  in	  a	  unilateral	  manner.	  Decisions	  taken	  within	  one	  country	  may	  have	  considerable	  impact	  on	  citizens	  in	  other	  countries	  and	  vice	  versa:	  the	   national	   political,	   economic	   and	   social	   domains	   of	   individual	   countries	  have	   become	   increasingly	   vulnerable	   to	   international	   developments.	  According	   to	   Held,	   “the	   operation	   of	   states	   in	   an	   ever	   more	   complex	  international	  system	  both	  limits	  their	  autonomy	  (in	  some	  spheres	  radically)	  and	   impinges	   increasingly	   upon	   their	   sovereignty”	   (Held	   1995,	   135).	   Both	  the	  process	  of	  globalization	  and	  the	  increasingly	  global	  nature	  of	  many	  large-­‐scale	  problems	  thus	  present	  a	  serious	  challenge	  to	  domestic	  democracy	  (Held	  and	  Hervey	  2009).	  States	  are	  caught	  in	  a	  catch-­‐22	  situation:	  	  their	  democratic	  sovereignty	  is	  undermined	  by	  the	  emergence	  of	  transnational	  challenges	  and	  problems.	  While	   governments	  may	  be	   able	   to	   tackle	   these	   challenges	  more	  effectively	   through	   institutionalized	   forms	   of	   international	   cooperation,	   the	  need	  to	  coordinate	  policies	  with	  other	  states	  in	  turn	  creates	  new	  problems	  of	  democratic	  control	  and	  influence.10	  The	  ability	  of	  individual	  states	  to	  push	  for	  international	   policies	   that	   are	   closely	   aligned	   with	   their	   own	   national	  interests	  is,	  of	  course,	  to	  a	  large	  degree	  a	  reflection	  of	  their	  political,	  military	  or	  economic	  power	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  Less	  powerful	  states	  are	  less	  likely	   to	   be	   able	   to	   impact	   these	   policies,	   even	   if	   they	   are	   as	   –	   or	   more	   –	  affected	  by	  the	  global	  challenges	  that	  need	  to	  be	  addressed.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	   International	   institutions	   are	   set	   up,	   of	   course,	   not	   only	   in	   reaction	   to	   the	   process	   of	  globalisation.	  Many	  of	  the	  policies	  that	  have	  emanated	  from	  international	  organisations	  such	  as	   the	   WTO	   or	   the	   IMF	   are	   intended	   to	   push	   for	   the	   deeper	   integration	   of	   domestic	  economies	   into	   the	   global	   economy.	   In	   this	   sense,	   international	   organisations	   are	   also	  actively	  promoting	  the	  process	  of	  globalisation.	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  At	   the	   most	   fundamental	   level	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   individual	   citizens	   can	  effectively	   be	   represented	   in	   international	   institutions	   is	   dependent	   on	   the	  quality	   of	   domestic	   democratic	   life	   and	   the	   opportunities	   for	   democratic	  participation	  at	  the	  local	  and	  national	  level.	  Free	  and	  regular	  elections	  are	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  representative	  democracies;	  complemented	  by	  a	  public	  space	  where	   free	   and	   open	   debate	   can	   take	   place.	   Strong	   democracies	   are	  characterised	  not	  only	  by	  elections	  but	  also	  by	  opportunities	   for	  citizens	   to	  participate	   in	   civic	   life,	   join	   interest	   groups	   and	   draw	   on	   information	  provided	  by	  a	  free	  and	  independent	  media.	  Most	  worrying	  from	  a	  democratic	  perspective	  are	  situations	  where	  citizens	  are	  denied	  a	  voice	  in	  political	  affairs	  because	   of	   the	   absence	   of	   democracy	   in	   particular	   countries	   (i.e.	   in	  undemocratic	   states)	   or	   a	   range	   of	   other	   material	   factors	   that	   undermine	  democracy	   and	   democratic	   participation	   domestically	   (for	   example	  corruption,	   civil	   war,	   extreme	   poverty).	   The	   direct	   oppression	   of	   citizens’	  rights,	   or	   the	   material	   lack	   of	   capacity	   to	   exercise	   them	   effectively,	  constitutes	   the	  most	  direct	  violation	  of	  democratic	  norms.	  According	   to	   the	  Economist	   Intelligence	  Unit’s	   (EIU)	   ‘Democracy	   Index	   2010’,	   only	   12.3%	  of	  the	   world’s	   population	   lives	   in	   “full	   democracies”,	   37.2%	   in	   “flawed	  democracies”,	   14.0%	   in	   “hybrid	   regimes”,	   and	   36.5%	   in	   authoritarian	  regimes	   (EIU	   2010,	   1).	   The	   latter	   are	   largely	   based	   in	   the	  Middle	   East	   and	  North	  Africa,	  with	  a	  substantial	  number	  also	  found	  in	  Asia,	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union	   and	   Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	   (EIU	  2010,	   8).	   This	   is	   also	   illustrated	   by	   the	  regional	   ‘democracy	   index	   average’	   in	   2010:	   3.43	   for	   the	   Middle	   East	   and	  North	  Africa,	  4.23	  for	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  5.53	  for	  Asia	  and	  Australasia,	  6.37	  for	   Latin	   America	   and	   the	   Caribbean,	   5.55	   for	   Eastern	   Europe,	   8.45	   for	  Western	  Europe,	  and	  8.63	  for	  North	  America	  (EIU	  2010,	  9).	  According	  to	  the	  authors	   of	   the	   2010	   assessment,	   the	   world	   experienced	   stagnation	   in	  democratisation	  between	  2006	  (when	  the	  first	  such	  index	  was	  constructed)	  and	  2008	  (the	  year	  of	  the	  second	  index)	  but	  “outright	  decline”	  between	  2008	  and	  2010	  (EIU	  2010,	  8).	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Even	   in	   functioning	   democracies	  with	   regular	   and	   free	   elections	   and	   fewer	  material	   (socio-­‐economic)	   constraints	   on	   the	   ability	   of	   all	   citizens	   to	  participate	   in	   political	   life,	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   factors	   contributing	   to	   a	  ‘democratic	   disconnect’	   between	   citizens	   and	   global	   politics.	   Many	  international	   policy	   issues	   are	   highly	   complex	   and	   the	   relevance	   of	   these	  issues	  to	  their	  everyday	  lives	  may	  not	  be	  immediately	  obvious	  to	  citizens.	  As	  a	   result,	   citizens	   may	   shun	   acquiring	   information	   and	   knowledge	   about	  international	   politics	   and	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   take	   political	   decisions	   on	   the	  basis	  of	  issues	  perceived	  to	  be	  closer	  to	  home.	  While	  the	  decision	  (or	  ‘default	  setting’)	  of	  leaving	  international	  policy	  making	  to	  the	  experts	  can	  be	  rational	  in	  light	  of	  the	  high	  individual	  costs	  of	  acquiring	  and	  processing	  information,	  this	  also	  carries	  a	  number	  of	  risks.	  Influential	  interest	  groups	  can	  exploit	  this	  situation	  to	  actively	  push	  their	  particular	  agenda,	  even	  if	  this	  happens	  at	  the	  expense	   of	   the	   majority	   of	   citizens.	   Some	   aspects	   of	   international	   politics	  (such	   as	   trade)	   are	   therefore	   especially	   vulnerable	   to	   capture	   by	   well-­‐organised	  special	  interests.	  	  	  Moving	   from	   the	   domestic	   to	   the	   global	   level,	   the	   structural	   design	   and	  formal	  and	  informal	  working	  practices	  of	  international	  organisations	  are	  also	  of	   potential	   concern	   from	   a	   democratic	   perspective.	   Many	   international	  organisations	   (especially	   the	   IFIs)	   are	   routinely	   criticised	   for	   replicating	   in	  their	   governance	   structures	   the	   existing	   global	   power	   imbalances	   between	  wealthy	   industrialised	   and	   poor	   developing	   countries.	   Rather	   than	  contributing	   towards	   overcoming	   global	   disparities,	   these	   organisational	  structures	  mean	   that	   the	   voices	   of	   citizen	   in	   economically	  weak	   or	   in	   very	  populous	   countries	   are	   effectively	   given	   less	   weight	   than	   those	   of	   their	  counterparts	  in	  Northern	  countries.	  This	  is	  illustrated,	  for	  example,	  by	  formal	  voting	   structures,	   but	   also	   by	   informal	   consensus	   building	   shaped	   by	   the	  interests	  of	  the	  most	  powerful,	  and	  the	  resort	  by	  powerful	  countries	  to	  small	  and	  unrepresentative	  organisations	  that	  include	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  countries.	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Without	  examining	   in	  detail	   the	   large	  variety	  of	  voting	  arrangements	   found	  in	  international	  organisations,	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  useful	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	   two	   main	   models	   of	   voting	   patterns	   associated	   with	   the	   UN	   and	   the	  Bretton	  Woods	  institutions	  respectively.	  These	  are	  the	  one-­‐country	  one-­‐vote	  model	   based	   on	   the	   principle	   of	   sovereign	   equality	   and	   the	   quota	   model	  derived	   from	   member	   countries’	   share	   of	   global	   GDP	   and	   financial	  contributions	  to	  the	  organisation.	  Both	  models	  present	  their	  own	  challenges	  in	   terms	   of	   democratic	   equality	   among	   citizens.	   The	   one-­‐country	   one-­‐vote	  model	   is	   the	   one	   employed	   in	   the	   UN	   General	   Assembly.	   It	   obviously	   fails	  completely	  to	  grasp	  demographic	  differences	  between	  states,	  bestowing	  the	  same	  number	  of	  votes	  on	  a	  small	  island	  state	  with	  only	  a	  few	  people	  as	  on	  a	  country	  with	   a	   huge	   population	   like	   India	   or	   China.	   As	   a	   result,	  within	   the	  one-­‐country	  one-­‐vote	  system,	  citizens	  of	  demographically	  large	  countries	  are	  underrepresented.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   quota	  model	   based	   on	   economic	  weight	  systematically	  favours	  citizens	  of	  rich	  countries.	  In	  the	  IMF,	  for	  example,	  the	  United	  States	  wield	  16.75	  %	  of	  the	  voting	  power	  (despite	  representing	  only	  4.6	   %	   of	   the	   global	   population)	   and	   are	   thus	   the	   only	   country	   that	   can	  singularly	   veto	   decision	   on	   quota	   adjustment	   and	   changes	   to	   the	   IMF’s	  articles	   of	   agreement	   (Chowla,	   Oatham	   and	   Wren	   2007).11	   Despite	   recent	  reforms	   (agreed	   in	   2008;	   entered	   into	   effect	   in	   2011)	   to	   strengthen	   the	  voting	   power	   of	   emerging	   and	   developing	   countries	   within	   the	   IMF,	   the	  economies	  of	  the	  G7	  continue	  to	  hold	  43%	  of	  votes	  (down	  from	  45.1	  %	  prior	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  This	  figure	  has	  been	  updated	  to	  reflect	  the	  more	  recent	  changes	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  votes	  within	  the	   IMF.	  Up-­‐to-­‐date	   figures	  can	  be	   found	  on	  the	   IMF	  website,	   IMF	  Members'	  Quotas	  and	   Voting	   Power,	   and	   IMF	   Board	   of	   Governors,	  http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx.	  Last	  accessed	  30.09.2012	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to	  the	  2008	  reforms)	  while	  the	  group	  of	  low-­‐income	  countries	  holds	  4.5	  %	  of	  votes	  (up	  from	  4%).12	  	  The	   formal	   distribution	   of	   votes	   is	   not	   the	   only	   mechanism	   that	   favours	  certain	   countries	   over	   others	   in	   the	   international	   system.	   The	   Global	  Environment	  Facility	  (GEF),	  for	  example,	  has	  sought	  to	  overcome	  some	  of	  the	  shortcomings	   inherent	   in	   applying	   either	   the	   one-­‐country	   one-­‐vote	   or	   the	  quota	   system	   by	   adopting	   the	   principle	   of	   double-­‐weighted	   majority.13	   In	  practice,	  the	  GEF	  tends	  to	  avoid	  resorting	  to	  a	  formal	  vote,	  preferring	  instead	  to	   reach	   agreement	   through	   negotiations	   and	   consensus	   building.	   Even	   in	  this	   formally	   more	   ‘democratic’	   arrangement	   powerful	   states	   are	   likely	   to	  dominate	  the	  proceedings	  due	  to	  their	  financial	  clout	  and	  greater	  resources,	  and	  because	  they	  have	  bigger	  delegations	  at	  the	  negotiations	  and	  are	  better	  able	   to	   link	   outcomes	   in	   one	   issue	   area	   to	   results	   in	   another.	   Different	  degrees	  of	  influence	  within	  international	  institutions	  are	  thus	  “indicative	  not	  only	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  unequal	  access	  to	  decision-­‐making,	  but	  of	  inequality	  of	  all	   types	   of	   resources”	   (Held	   and	  Hervey	   2009,	   11).	   Since	   formal	   decision-­‐making	   rules	   and	   procedures	   do	   frequently	   not	   reflect	   the	   ‘real-­‐world’	  distribution	   of	   power	   they	   risk	   being	   deliberately	   sidelined	   by	   the	   more	  powerful	  parties	  during	  the	  crucial	  stages	  of	  negotiations.	  This	  was	  apparent,	  for	  instance,	  during	  the	  COP-­‐15	  in	  Copenhagen,	  which	  “marked	  a	  new	  multi-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	   According	   to	   the	   IMF	   low-­‐income	   countries	   are	   “Poverty	   Reduction	   &	   Growth	   Trust	  (PRGT)	   eligible	   countries	  with	   annual	   per	   capita	   income	   below	   the	   prevailing	   operational	  International	   Development	   Association	   (IDA)	   cut-­‐off	   in	   2008	   (US$1,135)	   or	   below	   twice	  IDA's	   cut-­‐off	   for	   countries	   meeting	   the	   definition	   of	   a	   small	   country	   under	   the	   PRGT	  eligibility	   criteria.	   Zimbabwe	   is	   included.”	   Website	   of	   the	   IMF,	   Quota	   and	   Voting	   Shares	  Before	  and	  After	  Implementation	  of	  Reforms	  Agreed	  in	  2008	  and	  2010	  (In	  percentage	  shares	  of	   total	   IMF	   quota),	   Note	   viii.	   Retrieved	   from:	  http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pdfs/quota_tbl.pdf.	   Last	   accessed	  30.09.2012.	  Around	  72	  countries	  are	  eligible	  for	  the	  PRGT.	  IMF	  Website,	  List	  of	  LIC	  DSAs	  for	  PRGT-­‐Eligible	   Countries.	   Retrieved	   from:	  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/dsalist.pdf.	  Last	  accessed	  30.09.2012	  13	  The	  principle	   of	   double-­‐weighted	  majority	   requires	   a	   sixty	  percent	  majority	   of	   the	   total	  number	  of	  participant	  states,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  approval	  of	  donor	  countries	  representing	  a	  sixty	  percent	   majority	   of	   the	   total	   amount	   of	   financial	   contributions.	   This	   voting	   system	  constitutes	  a	  compromise	  arrangement	  between	  the	  UN	  and	  Bretton	  Woods	  systems.	  Payne	  and	   Samhat	   point	   out	   that	   this	   arrangement	  may	   be	   called	   a	   “double	   veto”	   as	   it	   gives	   the	  donor	  states	  an	  implicit	  threat	  of	  veto	  but	  also	  grants	  a	  mechanism	  to	  the	  South	  “for	  blocking	  projects	  and	  procedures	  urged	  upon	  them	  by	  the	  North”	  (Payne	  and	  Samhat	  2004,	  95).	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polar	   global	   climate	   order	  where	  multilateral	   principles	  were	  marginalised	  and	  replaced	  by	  a	  non-­‐transparent	  bargaining	  process	  between	  coalitions	  of	  willing	  states”	  (Bäckstrand	  2012,	  681).	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  unequal	  representation	  (formal	  and	  informal)	  within	  particular	  IGOs,	  we	  also	  need	  to	  look	  at	  the	  problem	  of	  exclusion	  more	  generally.	  This	  relates	   both	   to	   limited	  membership	  decision-­‐making	  bodies	  within	   existing	  IGOs	   	   (such	   as	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council)	   and	   to	   new	   intergovernmental	  initiatives	   that	   include	  only	  a	   limited	  number	  of	   countries.	  Examples	  of	   the	  latter	   include	   the	   various	   G-­‐groupings	   found	   at	   the	   international	   level,	  ranging	   from	   the	  G-­‐77	  made	  up	  of	  developing	   countries	   to	   the	  G8,	  G20,	  G3	  and	  others	  (Forman	  and	  Segaar	  2006,	  209).	  Small	  and	   ‘exclusive’	  groupings	  of	  states	  are	  problematic	  from	  a	  democratic	  perspective	  if	  their	  influence	  and	  impacts	   extend	   to	   citizens	   resident	   in	   countries	   beyond	   their	   immediate	  membership.	  Other	  examples	  of	  powerful	  organisations	  that	  exert	   influence	  beyond	   their	  membership	   include	   the	   OECD,	   the	   Basle	   Committee	   and	   the	  G10	  within	  the	  IMF	  (Forman	  and	  Segaar	  2006,	  210).	  As	  Forman	  and	  Segaar	  point	   out,	   concerns	   about	   the	   democratic	   legitimacy	   and	   accountability	   of	  many	  of	  these	  informal	  G-­‐groupings	  are	  also	  linked	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  few	  or	  no	  mechanisms	  of	  accountability	  oversight	  and	  no	  public	  records	  exist	  of	  their	  meetings	  and	  discussions	  (Forman	  and	  Segaar	  2006,	  213).	  	  Another	   trend	   that	  may	   be	   interpreted	   as	   a	   potential	   threat	   to	   democratic	  participation	   in	   global	   policymaking	   is	   the	   substantial	   role	   of	   corporate	  actors	   and	   the	   embrace	   of	   market-­‐oriented	   policy	   instruments	   (Cashore	  2002).	   It	   is	   manifested	   in	   the	   emergence	   of	   purely	   private	   forms	   of	  governance	  and	  the	  proliferation	  of	  market	  initiatives	  (Bernstein	  et	  al	  2012),	  as	   well	   as	   the	   considerable	   influence	   of	   corporate	   stakeholders	   in	  intergovernmental	   institutions	   or	   public-­‐private	   partnerships.	   Held	   and	  McGrew	  argue	  that,	  	  “the	  locus	  of	  legitimacy	  has	  shifted	  away	  from	  the	  public	  to	  the	  quasi-­‐public	   and	   private	   sector,	   both	   at	   the	   domestic	   and	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international	  level.	  The	  private	  agents,	  primarily	  multinational	  corporations,	   have	   been	   the	   greatest	   beneficiaries	   of	   this	  tendency	   and	   have	   consequently	   acquired	   the	   status	   of	  stakeholders	   in	  global	  governance	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  citizens	  participation”	  (Held	  and	  McGrew	  2000,	  10).	  	  According	   to	   Coleman	   and	   Porter,	   “Private	   authority	   poses	   challenges	   for	  democracy	   because	   the	   norms,	   practices	   and	   rules	   that	   flow	   out	   of	   these	  institutions	   may	   affect	   the	   social	   and	   economic	   well-­‐being	   of	   members	   of	  societies	   well	   beyond	   the	   firms	   or	   other	   actors	   involved”	   (Coleman	   and	  Porter	   2000,	   381).	   Dingwerth,	   however,	   argues	   that	   forms	   of	   private	  governance	   are	   not	   necessarily	   less	   legitimate	   in	   democratic	   terms	   than	  intergovernmental	   forms	  of	  governance	  as	   long	  as	   they	  are	  “designed	  as	  an	  inclusive,	  transparent	  and	  deliberative	  process”	  (Dingwerth	  2007,	  3).	  	  	  Finally,	  a	   special	   case	  of	  democratic	  exclusion	   in	  global	  politics	  needs	   to	  be	  mentioned	   briefly	   at	   this	   point.	   This	   case	   relates	   to	   minorities	   within	  individual	  states	  who	  share	  close	  bonds	  with	  similarly	  positioned	  minorities	  in	   other	   countries.	   One	   prominent	   example	   of	   this	   type	   of	   trans-­‐border	   or	  transnational	   constituency	   is	   the	   case	   of	   indigenous	   peoples,	   who	   live	   in	  many	  individual	  countries	  but	  rarely	  constitute	  a	  majority	  within	  them.	  Some	  estimates	   speak	   about	   a	   group	   of	   	   “some	   370	   million	   individuals,	  representing	   more	   then	   5000	   distinct	   peoples	   living	   in	   more	   than	   70	  countries”	   (Secretariat	   of	   the	   UNPFII	   2008,	   10).	   Indigenous	   peoples	   are	  disproportionately	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   affected	   by	   poverty	   and	   a	   lack	   of	  education	  and	  often	  struggle	  with	  accessing	  basic	  public	  services	  (Secretariat	  of	  the	  UNPFII	  2008,	  10).	  Marchetti	  and	  others	  argue	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  “are	   structurally	   excluded	   from	   representation	   at	   the	   international	   level,	  although	   they	   could	   potentially	   count	   as	   relevant	   actors	   if	   aggregated	  globally”	   (Marchetti	  2008,	  18).	  Demands	   for	  better	  participation	  provisions	  for	   indigenous	   peoples	   in	   those	   global	   policymaking	   processes	   that	   affect	  them	   are	   found	   in	   many	   of	   the	   sources	   analysed	   for	   this	   thesis	   (see	   in	  particular	  the	  discussion	  in	  chapter	  IV).	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This	  section	  has	  attempted	  to	  illustrate	  some	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  why	  citizens’	  voices	  risk	  becoming	  ‘lost’	  in	  institutions	  of	  global	  governance.	  One	  key	  point	  arising	   from	   the	   discussion	   above	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   various	   democratic	  deficits	   inherent	   in	   global	   policy-­‐making	   processes	   result	   in	   asymmetrical	  patterns	   of	   participation	   and	   representation	   at	   the	   international	   level.	  Structurally,	  citizens	  in	  democratic,	  wealthy	  and	  powerful	  countries	  are	  likely	  to	   be	   better	   represented	   than	   citizens	   in	   weak	   democracies	   and	   poor	  countries.14	  However,	  seen	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  democratic	  legitimacy,	  it	  is	   in	   particular	   those	   citizens	   that	   are	   affected	   yet	   simultaneously	  marginalised	  or	  excluded	   from	  global	  policy-­‐making	  processes	   that	  present	  cause	   for	   concern.	  While	   the	  objective	  here	   is	  not	   to	  develop	  hard	  and	   fast	  criteria	   for	   pinpointing	   those	   affected	   communities	   whose	   marginalisation	  from	   global	   political	   processes	   is	   most	   serious	   from	   a	   democratic	  perspective,15	   the	   discussion	   above	   has	   shown	   that	   the	   marginalisation	   or	  exclusion	   “of	   a	   vast	   portion	   of	   the	   world	   population	   from	   transnational	  decision-­‐making	  processes”	  (Marchetti	  2008,	  20)	  is	  strongly	  correlated	  with	  power	   asymmetries	   at	   the	   international	   level.	   From	   this	   perspective	   it	   is	  useful	  to	  “refocus	  the	  discussion	  of	  global	  democracy	  on	  the	  crucial	  pathology	  of	  political	  exclusion	  (..)	  when	  an	  actor	  is	  deprived	  of	  his/	  her	  entitlements	  to	  influence	  public	  decisions	  at	  the	  international	  and	  global	  level”	  (Archibugi	  et	  al	  2010,	  105)	  	  
iii. Filling	  the	  gap?	  NGOs	  and	  global	  democratic	  deficits	  	  The	   preceding	   discussion	   has	   shown	   that	   global	   policy-­‐making	   is	  characterised	  by	  very	  different	  types	  of	  democratic	  flaws	  –	  the	  identification	  of	   the	  most	   appropriate	   ‘solutions’	  will	   thus	   depend	   on	   the	   specific	   causes	  that	  are	  being	  addressed.	  The	  challenge	   is	  enormous	  and	   it	   is	   therefore	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Organised	  interests	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  be	  better	  represented	  than	  diffuse	  interests	  but	  this	  is	  not	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  research.	  	  15	  MacDonald	  (2008)	  addresses	  this	  challenge.	  Her	  goal	  is	  to	  construct	  theoretically	  rigorous	  benchmarks	   that	   can	  be	  used	   to	  determine	   at	  what	  point	   ‘affectedness’	   translates	   into	   the	  democratic	   entitlement	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   relevant	   decision-­‐making	   process.	   Her	  contribution	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  chapter	  V	  of	  this	  thesis.	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surprising	  that	  these	  issues	  continue	  to	  be	  heavily	  debated	  in	  academic	  and	  policy	   circles.	   A	   number	   of	   reforms	   have	   been	   implemented	   within	  international	  organisations	  over	  recent	  years,	  many	   in	  response	   to	  growing	  concerns	   about	  democratic	   shortcomings	   –	   amounting,	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   some	  observers,	  to	  a	  broader	  “deliberative	  turn”	  in	  (environmental)	  policymaking	  (Bäckstrand	   et	   al	   2010a).	   Initiatives	   include	   steps	   to	   increase	   the	  transparency	   of	   IGOs,	   changes	   to	   the	   formal	   governance	   structures	   to	   give	  more	  voting	   rights	   to	  Southern	  governments,	   and	  –	  of	  most	   interest	   to	   this	  chapter	   -­‐	   a	   marked	   increase	   in	   the	   level	   of	   engagement	   with	   civil	   society	  actors	  (Steffek	  and	  Nanz	  2008).	  But	  how	  convincing	  is	  the	  notion	  on	  the	  part	  of	   many	   policymakers	   and	   academics	   that	   NGOs	   can	   represent	   the	   voices,	  interests	   and	   perspectives	   of	   affected	   communities	   in	   global	   policymaking	  venues?	  	  	  The	   concept	   of	   ‘civil	   society’	   in	   combination	   with	   ‘democracy’	   and	  ‘international	   organisations’	   does	   not	   automatically	   conjure	   up	   images	   of	  peaceful	   cooperation.	   More	   radical	   civil	   society	   groups	   –	   frequently	  associated	  with	  the	  anti-­‐globalisation	  and	  the	  global	  justice	  movement	  –	  have	  been	   among	   the	   most	   vocal	   and	   prominent	   critics	   of	   international	  organisations,	   especially	   the	   International	  Monetary	  Fund	   (IMF),	   the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organisation	  (WTO).	  Many	  of	  these	  groups	  were	  involved	   in	   the	  massive	   anti-­‐WTO	   street	   protests	   at	   the	  WTO’s	  ministerial	  conference	   in	  Seattle	   in	  1999.	  Less	  visibly	  perhaps,	   a	  number	  of	  CSOs	  have	  established	   themselves	   as	   knowledgeable	   watchdogs	   of	   these	   institutions	  through	   collecting	   and	  making	   available	   information	   about	   their	   activities,	  holding	   the	   institutions	   accountable	   for	   their	   environmental	   and	   social	  impacts	  on	  citizens	  in	  developing	  countries,	  and	  calling	  for	  higher	  standards	  of	   representativeness	   and	   participation.	   Examples	   of	   this	   type	   of	   NGOs	  include	  the	  Bank	  Information	  Center	  (www.bicusa.org)	  and	  CEE	  Bank	  Watch	  (www.bankwatch.org).	   Still	   further	   along	   the	   ‘cooperation-­‐seeking’	   end	   of	  the	   spectrum	   are	   located	   the	   large	   number	   of	   NGOs	   that	   have	   proactively	  sought	  the	  engagement	  and	  dialogue	  with	  international	  organisations,	  hoping	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to	   change	   existing	   structures	   and	   processes	   from	   within.	   There	   is	   debate	  among	   both	   practitioners	   and	   academic	   observers	   as	   to	   where	   along	   the	  ‘confrontation	  to	  cooperation	  spectrum’	  civil	  society	  groups	  should	  operate.	  Dryzek	  points	   out	   that	   there	   are	   different	   conceptualisations	   of	   global	   civil	  society	  at	  play,	  from	  ones	  that	  see	  its	  proper	  role	  in	  terms	  of	  contestation	  of	  power	   to	   others	   that	   emphasise	   its	   contributions	   to	   governance	   (Dryzek	  2012).	   Individual	   groups	   may	   struggle	   to	   find	   the	   right	   balance	   between	  making	  use	  of	  the	  opportunities	  available	  for	  cooperation	  with	  international	  organisations	  and	  maintaining	  a	  suitable	  distance	  that	  allows	  them	  to	  act	  as	  independent	   observers	   and	   critical	   watchdogs	   or	   challengers	   of	   the	   status	  quo.	  	  	  	  One	  way	   that	  NGOs	  may	  help	   to	  address	  some	  of	   the	  democratic	  deficits	  of	  international	  institutions	  is	  by	  helping	  them	  connect	  better	  with	  the	  affected	  communities.	   By	   “linking	   the	   local	   to	   the	   international	   levels	   of	   politics”	  (Princen	   1994,	   33),	   NGOs	   make	   it	   possible	   for	   local	   communities	   to	  “upstream”	   their	   grievances	   to	   international	   institutions,	   in	   the	   hope	   that	  changes	  at	   the	  global	   level	  will	  protect	   their	   interests	  more	  effectively	   than	  local	  politics	  alone	  (Princen	  1994,	  40).	  Similarly,	  Steffek	  and	  Nanz	  argue	  that,	  “organised	  civil	  society	  [thus]	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  function	  as	  a	  ‘transmission	  belt’	   between	   a	   global	   citizenry	   and	   the	   institutions	   of	   global	   governance”	  (Steffek	  and	  Nanz	  2008,	  3).	  Payne	  and	  Samhat	  suggest	  that	  the	  participation	  of	  NGOs	  “lends	  voice	  to	  excluded	  constituencies	  in	  global	  politics”	  (Payne	  and	  Samhat	   2004,	   27).	   The	   participation	   by	   civil	   society	   organisations	   is	   often	  viewed	   as	   additional	   and	   supplementary	   to	   intergovernmental	   channels	   of	  representation	   in	   world	   politics.	   Through	   bypassing	   “the	   traditional	  diplomatic	  channels	  of	  governmental	  representation,	  the	  participation	  of	  civil	  society	  may	  establish	  an	  additional	   and	  more	  direct	   link	  between	  decision-­‐makers	   and	   their	   transnational	   constituency”	   (Kissling	   and	   Steffek	   2008,	  208).	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References	   to	   this	   type	   of	   role	   for	   CSOs	   are	   also	   found	   in	   the	   popular	  academic	  and	  policy	  debates	  on	  ‘stakeholder	  engagement’,	  where	  the	  alleged	  democratic	  and	  efficiency	  contributions	  of	  civil	  society	  to	  global	  governance	  institutions	   are	   often	   conflated.	   The	   fields	   of	   global	   environmental	   politics,	  sustainable	  development	  and	  health	  have	  all	   seen	  a	  proliferation	  of	  various	  forms	   of	   stakeholder	   engagement	   processes,	   such	   as	   multi-­‐stakeholder	  dialogues,	  consultations	  and	  partnerships	   that	  bring	   together	  governmental	  and	   nongovernmental	   actors	   in	   governance	   arrangements.	   The	   direct	  involvement	   of	   relevant	   stakeholders	   in	   these	   processes	   is	   considered	   to	  enhance	   the	   chances	   for	   the	   successful	   on-­‐the-­‐ground	   implementation	   of	  particular	   policies.	   Some	   observers	   also	   see	   these	   initiatives	   as	   first	   steps	  towards	   the	   development	   of	   a	   “global	   stakeholder	   democracy”	   (Bäckstrand	  2006;	   MacDonald	   2008),	   which	   “draws	   variously	   upon	   principles	   of	  protecting	   the	   vulnerable,	   functional	   representation,	   affectedness	   and	  expertise”	  (Bäckstrand	  2006,	  472).	  This	  model	  is	  generally	  not	  conceived	  as	  a	  fully-­‐fledged	   substitute	   for	   democratic	   intergovernmentalism	   but,	   again,	   as	  complementary	   to	   “intergovernmental	   decision-­‐making	   by	   providing	   a	   key	  mechanism	  for	  transmission	  of	  civil	  society	  deliberations	  to	  the	  public	  arena	  of	  decision-­‐making”	  (Smith	  2003,	  79-­‐80	  cited	  in	  Bäckstrand	  2006,	  475).	  The	  stakeholder	   model	   similarly	   relies	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   particular	  organisations	   and/	   or	   individuals	   can	   act	   as	   legitimate	   spokespersons,	   or	  ‘representatives’	  for	  wider	  communities	  (often	  major	  groups)	  affected	  by,	  or	  with	  a	  stake	  in,	  global	  policies	  (Bäckstrand	  2006,	  476).	  	  While	   the	   notion	   of	   NGOs	   as	   links	   between	   local	   communities	   and	  international	   institutions	   holds	   the	   promise	   of	   greater	   global	   democracy,	   it	  also	  encounters	  considerable	  challenges.	  One	  set	  of	  objections	  relates	  to	  the	  specific	   attendance	   and	   participation	   patterns	   of	   NGOs	   in	   international	  institutions	   (Bexell,	  Tallberg	  and	  Uhlin	  2011,	  87).	  Despite	   the	  popularity	  of	  the	   stakeholder	   participation	   rhetoric	   among	   policy-­‐makers,	   many	   civil	  society	  organisations	  feel	  that	  their	  participation	  is	  largely	  symbolic	  and	  that	  the	  ‘real’	  negotiations	  continue	  to	  take	  place	  behind	  closed	  doors.	  Despite	  the	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enormous	   interest	   and	   level	   of	   mobilisation	   by	   civil	   society	   around	   the	  Copenhagen	   climate	   summit	   in	   December	   2009,	   for	   example,	   civil	   society	  representatives	   were	   by	   and	   large	   physically	   barred	   from	   entering	   the	  convention	  centre.	  According	  to	  Bäckstrand,	  	  “The	   diversity	   of	   discourses,	   from	   professionalised	   NGOs	   on	  the	   ‘inside’	   to	   the	   protesting	   global	   climate	   justice	  movement	  on	   the	   ‘outside’	   amounts	   to	   a	   transnational	   public	   sphere	   (..)	  However,	   COP-­‐15	   lacked	   formal	   mechanisms	   to	   represent	  stakeholder	  interests	  in	  the	  agenda-­‐setting	  and	  negotiations,	  as	  well	   as	   participatory	   policy	   innovations	   to	   promote	  institutions,	   institutional	   interactions	   between	   stakeholders	  and	  decision-­‐makers”	  (Bäckstrand	  2012,	  682).	  	  Although	  the	  organisers	  of	  the	  Copenhagen	  summit	  were	  widely	  criticised	  for	  their	   apparent	   hostility	   towards	   civil	   society	   groups,	   complaints	   about	  insufficient	   access	   are	   not	   new.	   While	   considerable	   opportunities	   for	  participation	   may	   exist	   on	   paper,	   opportunities	   for	   actual	   influence	   are	  limited.	  	  	  Moreover,	  a	  number	  of	  observers	  have	  pointed	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  many	  of	   the	  power	   imbalances	   undermining	   equitable	   representation	   among	  governments	  are,	  in	  fact,	  mirrored	  (or	  even	  exacerbated)	  at	  the	  level	  of	  civil	  society	  (Carr	  and	  Norman	  2008;	  Hoffman	  2012).	  The	  result	  can	  be	  a	  “double	  representation	   of	   the	   west	   and	   north	   through	   both	   powerful	   states	   and	  NGOs”	  (Kahler	  2005,	  Biermann	  and	  Pattberg	  2008	  cited	  in	  Held	  and	  Hervey	  2009,	   10).	   An	   analysis	   of	   the	   participants	   at	   the	   UN	   Stakeholders	  Implementation	   Conference	   (IC),	   for	   example,	   which	   followed	   the	   2002	  World	  Summit	  on	  Sustainable	  Development	  (WSSD)	  shows	  that	  	  “despite	   the	   explicit	   aim	   to	   rectify	   power	   imbalances	   as	  measured	   by	   national	   representation,	   the	   world's	  'stakeholders'	  were	  less	  represented	  at	  the	  IC	  than	  at	  the	  WSSD	  forum.	   The	   WSSD	   drew	   representation	   from	   180	   countries	  (including	   representation	   from	   heads	   of	   state),	   whereas	   only	  49	   countries	   were	   represented	   at	   the	   IC”	   (Carr	   and	   Norman	  2008,	  362).	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While	   practical	   considerations	   such	   as	   the	   physical	   location	   of	   an	  international	  meeting	  (or	  IGO	  secretariat)	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  government-­‐provided	  funds	  enabling	  CSOs	  to	  attend	  are	  obvious	  key	  factors	  that	  explain	  specific	   attendance	   patterns,	   structural	   power	   differentials	   among	   societal	  groups	   are	   probably	   even	   more	   important.	   Large	   and	   well-­‐resourced	  organisations	  (often	  based	  in	  the	  global	  North)	  not	  only	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  employ	   designated	   liaison	   staff	   for	   particular	   IGOs	   and	   to	   send	   multiple	  delegates	  to	  meetings,	  but	  may	  also	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  offer	  concrete	  benefits	  to	  governmental	  delegates	  and	   IGO	  staff	   (briefing	  papers,	  access	   to	  experts,	  accessible	   scientific	   analyses)	   that	   further	   strengthen	   their	   influence	   with	  these	   key	   decision-­‐makers.	   Examining	   the	   role	   of	   NGOs	   in	   global	  conservation	  policy-­‐making	  Holmes	  finds	  that	  a	  small	  number	  of	  very	  big	  and	  well-­‐resourced	   groups	   have	   been	   the	   primary	   beneficiaries	   of	   the	   trend	  towards	   the	   devolution	   of	   responsibilities	   from	   the	   interstate	   to	   the	   non-­‐state	  level	  (Holmes	  2011,	  7)	  	  However,	  even	  leaving	  aside	  the	  problems	  arising	  at	  the	   level	  of	   interaction	  between	  NGOs	  and	  international	   institutions,	   there	  have	  been	  growing	  calls	  for	  more	   research	   into	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   the	  participating	  NGOs	   themselves	  (Van	  Rooy	   2004;	   Collingwood	   2006;	   Kissling	   and	   Steffek	   2008;	   Erman	   and	  Uhlin	  2010;	  Bexell,	  Tallberg	  and	  Uhlin	  2010).	  Kissling	  and	  Steffek	  (2008),	  for	  instance,	   offer	   a	   very	   systematic	   analysis	   of	   civil	   society	   participation	   as	   a	  “cure	   for	   the	   democratic	   deficit”	   in	   global	   and	   European	   governance,	   but	  concentrate	   their	   attention	   on	   the	   level	   of	   interaction	   between	   governance	  institutions	  and	  CSOs.	  They	  acknowledge,	  however,	  that	  this	  does	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  and	  that	  	  “future	  research	  on	  the	  potentially	  democratising	  effects	  of	  civil	  society	  participation	  in	  international	  governance	  should,	  therefore,	  shift	  its	   focus	   from	   IOs	   to	   CSOs”	   (Kissling	   and	   Steffek	   2008,	   216).	   Uhlin	   (2010)	  differentiates	   between	   the	   input,	   throughput	   and	   output	   legitimacy	   of	  nonstate	  actors.	  He	  considers	  representation	  and	  inclusion	  elements	  of	  input	  legitimacy;	   transparency,	   accountability,	  participation	  and	  deliberation	  part	  of	   throughput	   legitimacy	   (2010,	  24),	   and	  uses	   the	   term	   “democratic	  output	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legitimacy”	  to	  denote	  the	  democratic	  consequences	  of	  private	  actors’	  actions	  (Uhlin	   2010,	   32).	   He	   does	   not	   intend	   these	   “different	   dimensions	   of	  democratic	   legitimacy”	   to	   be	   used	   as	   “operational	   criteria	   for	   empirical	  research	   ‘measuring’	   the	   democratic	   legitimacy	   of	   different	   TNAs”,	   but	  suggests	   that	   they	   may	   nonetheless	   serve	   as	   points	   of	   departure	   for	   an	  empirical	   evaluation	   (Uhlin	   2010,	   33).	   Initiatives	   to	   assess	   the	  “accountability”	   of	   NGO	   have	   also	   been	   undertaken	   outside	   the	   academic	  field.	  One	  notable	   example	   is	   the	   ‘Global	  Accountability	  Project’	   by	   the	  One	  World	  Trust,	  which	  uses	  similar	   indicators	   to	  assess	  and	  compare	  elements	  of	  transparency,	  participation,	  evaluation	  and	  complaints	  mechanisms	  within	  NGOs,	  international	  corporations	  and	  IGOs	  (Blagescu	  and	  Lloyd	  2006).	  	  	  An	   empirical	   analysis	   of	   NGOs	   as	   democratic	   links	   between	   local	  communities	   and	   international	   institutions	   will	   thus	   contribute	   further	   to	  this	   emerging	   field	   of	   research	   on	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   NGOs.	   While	   there	   is	  considerable	   overlap	   with	   the	   broader	   ‘democratic	   legitimacy	   of	   NGOs’	  debate,	  the	  particular	  focus	  adopted	  in	  this	  thesis	  is,	  however,	  more	  specific.	  Of	  most	   concern	  here	   is	   the	   relationship	  between	  affected	  communities	   (as	  outlined	   earlier)	   and	   international	   NGOs	   and	   the	   extent	   and	   the	   ways	   in	  which	   the	   NGOs	   are	   able	   and	   willing	   to	   incorporate	   the	   views	   and	  preferences	   of	   these	   communities	   in	   their	   own	   policy	   positions.	   The	  difference	   in	   emphasis	   between	   conceptualising	   NGOs	   as	   ‘democratic	  conduits’	   for	   these	  communities	  and	  assessing	   the	  democratic	   legitimacy	  of	  NGOs	  in	  more	  general	  terms	  can	  be	  illustrated	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  important	  criteria	  of	  transparency.	  Transparency	  –	  regarding,	  for	  example,	  the	  sources	  of	   income,	   expenditures,	   and	   the	   social	   and	   environmental	   impact	   of	   their	  activities	  –	  is	  widely	  considered	  an	  essential	  prerequisite	  for	  establishing	  the	  democratic	  legitimacy	  or	  ‘accountability’	  of	  private	  actors.	  Judged	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  ‘linkage’	  role,	  however,	  the	  main	  concern	  is	  the	  information	  that	  the	  NGO	  makes	  available	  specifically	  to	  the	  affected	  communities,	  not	  to	  the	  public	  at	  large.	   There	   may	   even	   be	   instances	   where,	   in	   order	   to	   work	   with	   these	  communities,	  NGOs	  may	  have	  to	  restrict	  the	  information	  they	  make	  available	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to	   other	   actors.	   An	   example	   would	   be	   an	   NGO	   working	   with	   communities	  whose	   human	   rights	   are	   under	   threat	   and	   where	   the	   identities	   of	   these	  communities	   have	   to	   be	   concealed	   to	   protect	   them	   from	   persecution,	  retaliation	   or	   other	   forms	   of	   potential	   harm.	   Similarly,	  with	   regards	   to	   the	  criterion	  of	  participation,	  an	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  the	  ability	  and	  willingness	  of	   CSOs	   to	   involve	   their	  members	   or	   supporters	   in	   their	   internal	   decision-­‐making	  and	  in	  how	  they	  define	  political	  priorities	  (Kissling	  and	  Steffek	  2008,	  216)	  is,	  undoubtedly,	  essential	  for	  understanding	  their	  ability	  to	  act	  as	  ‘links’.	  Nonetheless,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   bear	   in	   mind	   that	   members	   or	   other	  supporters	  are,	  in	  many	  cases,	  not	  the	  same	  as	  the	  affected	  communities	  who	  are	  marginalised	  in	  global	  policy-­‐making	  processes.	  	  	  	  This	   is	   not	   to	   deny	   that	   NGOs	   as	   participants	   in	   global	   political	   processes	  have	   their	   own	   political	   agendas,	   interests	   and	   ambitions.	   This	   thesis	  suggests,	  however,	  that	  their	  contribution	  to	  global	  politics	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  and	   in	  some	  circumstances	  actually	  does	  go	  beyond	   this:	  NGOs	  may	  also	  act	   as	   ‘representatives’	   of	   other	   citizens.	   In	   this	   NGOs	   are	   similar	   to	   what	  Warren	   (2008)	   has	   termed	   “citizen	   representatives”:	   this	   “involves	   citizens	  themselves	   serving	   in	  representative	   capacities:	   lay	   citizens	   represent	  other	  citizens”	   (Warren	   2008,	   50).	  He	  makes	   the	   point	   that	  many	   initiatives	   that	  are	  often	  talked	  about	  as	  practical	  applications	  of	  “participatory	  democracy”	  (such	   as	   citizen	   juries,	   stakeholder	   meetings,	   public	   submissions,	   focus	  groups	  and	  others)	  in	  fact	  “involve[s]	  a	  form	  of	  representation	  that	  depends	  upon	   the	   active	   participation	   of	   a	   relatively	   few	   citizens	   who	   function	   as	  
representatives	  of	  other	  citizens”	  (Warren	  2008,	  51).	  The	  structure	  and	  nature	  of	   global	   policy-­‐making	   further	   amplifies	   this	   distinction	   between	  ‘participation	  by	  the	  few’	  and	  ‘representation	  of	  the	  many’	  and	  makes	  it	  much	  harder	  for	  lay	  citizens	  to	  participate.	  In	  this	  environment,	  international	  NGOs	  are	  one	  of	  several	  (albeit	  a	  relatively	  powerful	  category	  of)	  groups	  that	  ‘stand	  for’	  citizens	  more	  broadly.	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Besides	   potentially	   themselves	   acting	   as	   democratic	   links	   between	   citizens	  and	  international	   institutions,	  NGOs	  may	  also	  put	  pressure	  on	  IGOs	  to	  build	  more	  direct	  links	  with	  their	  affected	  constituencies	  on	  the	  ground.	  This	  may	  involve	   holding	   IGOs	   to	   account	   for	   their	   impacts	   and	   calling	   for	   fairer	  participation	   procedures	   and	   equitable	   representation	   within	   the	   target	  institutions.	   The	   notion	   that	   the	   democratic	   contribution	   of	   civil	   society	  actors	   can	   and	   should	   be	   assessed	   both	   with	   reference	   to	   their	   internal	  practices	   and	   their	   ‘external’	   democratic	   demands	   has	   already	   been	   put	  forward	  most	  explicitly	  by	  a	  number	  of	  scholars	  concerned	  with	  the	  role	  and	  practices	   of	   social	   movements.	   Marchetti,	   for	   instance,	   argues	   that	   “social	  movements	   formulate	   external	   claims	   that	   force	   the	   strengthening	   of	  democratic	   practices	   in	   international	   institutions”	  while	   also	   strengthening	  democracy	   through	   their	   “internal	   practices”	   (Marchetti	   2008,	   165).	   A	  comparative	   study	  of	  democratic	   visions	   and	  practices	  by	   social	  movement	  organisations	  associated	  with	  the	  global	  justice	  movement	  finds	  that,	  “conceptions	  of	  democracy	  emerge	  as	  particularly	  relevant	  for	  this	   movement,	   committed	   to	   addressing	   external	   as	   well	   as	  internal	  transformation.	  Regarding	  the	  external,	  the	  movement	  must	   adapt	   to	   challenges	   to	   representative	   democracy	   (..)”	  (della	  Porta	  2009,	  6)	  Della	  Porta	  refers	  to	  this	  as	  the	  “external	  dimension	  of	  democracy”,	  besides	  the	  different	  forms	  of	  “internal”	  democracy	  adopted	  by	  the	  social	  movement	  organisations.	   While	   the	   social	   movement	   organisations	   analysed	   in	   the	  study	  tend	  to	  consider	  the	  international	  financial	  institutions	  and	  the	  WTO	  as	  ‘anti-­‐democratic’	  and	  thus	  practically	  (and	  ideationally)	  beyond	  reform,	  “the	  orientation	  towards	  strengthening	  the	  institutions	  of	  global	  governance,	  but	  at	   the	   same	   time	   democratising	   them,	   is	   in	   fact	   especially	   visible	   in	   the	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  UN	  or	  the	  EU”	  (della	  Porta	  2009,	  10).	  	  	  Simply	  encouraging	  more	  participation	  by	  civil	  society	  groups	  is	  not	  in	  itself	  sufficient	   for	   addressing	   the	   problem	   of	   representation	   and	   participation	  asymmetries	   at	   the	   international	   level.	   In	   fact,	   an	   overreliance	   on	   the	  stakeholder	   participation	   rhetoric	   can	   become	   a	   smokescreen	   that	   diverts	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attention	   from	   the	   more	   structural	   causes	   of	   inequality	   at	   the	  intergovernmental	   level.	   In	   the	   eyes	   of	   a	   non-­‐Western	   commentator,	   this	  carries	   the	   danger	   that,	   “tweaking	   levels	   of	   participatory	   democracy	   at	   the	  margins	  of	  global	  institutions	  ignores	  the	  substantive	  bases	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	   those	   institutions	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   i.e.	   the	   power	   and	   the	   privileges	   of	  Western	   states”	   (Mahbubani	  2011,	  133).	  There	   is	  no	   fast	   and	  easy	   solution	  for	   addressing	   global	   democratic	   deficits	   in	   a	   highly	   complex	   world.	   Real	  progress	   can	   only	   be	  made	   by	   adopting	   a	  multi-­‐level	   policy	   of	   small	   steps,	  addressing	   forms	  of	  democratic	  exclusion	   from	  the	   local	   to	   the	  global	   level,	  and	   searching	   for	   ways	   to	   achieve	   both	   more	   equitable	   forms	   of	  intergovernmental	   representation	   and	   greater	   participation	   by	   affected	  citizens.	  	  	  While	   this	   thesis	   does	   not	   attempt	   a	   thorough	   and	   comprehensive	  exploration	   of	   what	   institutional	   reforms	   would	   best	   address	   the	  representation	   inequities	   and	   power	   imbalances	   that	   characterise	   many	  global	   institutions	   today,	   it	   is	  nonetheless	   important	   to	   consider	  how	   these	  issues	  are	  taken	  up	  and	  approached	  by	  civil	  society	  organisations.	  This	  thesis	  therefore	   pursues	   two	   lines	   of	   inquiry:	   it	   seeks	   to	   analyse	   the	   internal	  practices	  of	  individual	  INGOs	  for	  evidence	  of	  responsiveness	  to	  communities	  on	   the	   ground,	   and	   examines	   the	   demands	   and	   proposals	   emanating	   from	  participating	  civil	  society	  groups	  for	  strengthening	  the	  democratic	  legitimacy	  of	   two	   UN	   conventions.	   A	   better	   understanding	   of	   these	   two	   forms	   of	  democratic	   contributions	   by	   civil	   society	   actors	   –	   the	   internal	   and	   external	  dimensions	  referred	  to	  above	  –	  would	  constitute	  important	  groundwork	  for	  drawing	  better	  informed	  conclusions	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  NGOs	  to	  strengthen	  the	  democratic	  legitimacy	  of	  international	  institutions.	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Diagram	  2:	  External	  and	  internal	  dimension	  of	  NGOs’	  democratic	  contribution	  	  
iv. Existing	  accounts	  of	  NGOs	  as	  links	  	  The	  role	  of	  international	  NGOs	  in	  bringing	  the	  voices	  of	  local	  communities	  to	  global	  politics	  has	  already	  been	  explored	  by	  a	  number	  of	  authors,	  albeit	  not	  always	  against	   the	  backdrop	  of	   the	  democratic	  deficits	  outlined	  above.	   It	   is	  nonetheless	  helpful	  to	  offer	  a	  short	  overview	  of	  three	  different	  analyses	  that	  present	   CSOs	   from	   a	   relational	   perspective	   and	   seek	   to	   gain	   a	   better	  understanding	   of	   how	   larger	   groups	   relate	   to	   community-­‐based	  organisations	   or	   communities	   on	   the	   ground	   –	   shedding	   some	   light	   on	   the	  ability	  of	  NGOs	  to	  act	  as	  ‘links’	  from	  the	  local	  to	  the	  global	  level.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  section	  is	  therefore	  to	  present	  three	  different	  pieces	  of	  research	  that	  present	   CSOs	   from	   a	   relational	   perspective.	   Keck	   and	   Sikkink	   (1998),	   Bob	  (2005)	  and	  Hertel	  (2006)	  are	  all	  useful	   in	   illuminating	  particular	  aspects	  of	  the	   relationship	  between	   international	  NGOs	   and	   local	   actors	   and	  how	   this	  relationship	   is	   played	   out	   in	   a	   situation	   of	   structural	   inequality.	   These	  accounts	   are	  useful	   as	   they	   allow	  us	   to	   gain	   some	   important	   empirical	   and	  theoretical	   insights	   into	  the	  role	  of	  NGOs	  as	   links	  between	   local	  groups	  and	  
NGOs 
IGOs 
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global	   political	   processes	   against	   which	   the	   model	   of	   NGOs	   as	  ‘representatives’	  can	  be	  developed	  in	  chapter	  V.	  	  	  Keck	   and	   Sikkink’s	   analysis	   of	   transnational	   advocacy	   networks	   (TANs)	  counts	  as	  one	  of	  the	  pioneering	  pieces	  of	  research	  on	  the	  role	  and	  influence	  of	   transnational	  NGO	   campaigns.	  Using	   three	   case	   studies	   on	   human	   rights	  advocacy	   in	   Latin	   America,	   environmental	   advocacy	   in	   networks	   and	  transnational	   networks	   on	   violence	   against	   women,	   they	   present	  transnational	  campaigns	  networks	  as	  norm	  entrepreneurs	  who	  “try	  not	  only	  to	   influence	  policy	  outcomes,	   but	   to	   transform	   the	   terms	  and	  nature	  of	   the	  debate”	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  1998,	  2).	  The	  authors	  develop	  a	  typology	  of	  tactics	  these	  actors	  employ	   to	  get	   targets	   (states	  or	   international	  organisations)	   to	  move	  closer	  to	  their	  own	  ideas	  and	  values.	  These	  tactics	  include	  information	  politics	   (“the	   ability	   to	   quickly	   and	   credibly	   generate	   politically	   useful	  information	  and	  move	  it	  to	  where	  it	  has	  the	  most	  impact”),	  symbolic	  politics	  (“the	   ability	   to	   call	   upon	   symbols,	   actions,	   or	   stories	   that	  make	   sense	   of	   a	  situation	  for	  an	  audience	  that	  is	  frequently	  far	  away”),	  leverage	  politics	  (“the	  ability	   to	   call	   upon	   powerful	   actors	   to	   affect	   a	   situation	   where	   weaker	  members	   of	   a	   network	   are	   unlikely	   to	   have	   influence”),	   and	   accountability	  politics	  (“the	  effort	  to	  hold	  powerful	  actors	  to	  their	  previously	  stated	  policies	  or	  principles”)	   (Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  1998,	  16).	   In	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  analysis,	  national	  or	   local	  actors	  that	  are	  unable	  to	  bring	  their	  concerns	  to	  their	  own	  government	  when	  domestic	   channels	   for	   representation	   are	  blocked	   resort	  to	  building	  relationships	  with	  groups	  in	  other	  countries	  or	  with	  transnational	  networks	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   getting	   these	   external	   groups	   to	   exert	   direct	   or	  indirect	  (via	  other	  governments	  or	   international	  organisations)	  pressure	  on	  their	  own	  national	  government.	  	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  work	  provides	  a	  good	  starting	  point	  for	  thinking	  about	  the	  relationship	   between	   local	   groups	   and	   international	  NGOs	   and	   the	   issue	   of	  representation.	   Firstly,	   the	   “boomerang”	   strategy	   outlined	   by	   Keck	   and	  Sikkink	  is	  a	  response	  by	  local	  actors	  to	  a	  “blockage”	  of	  domestic	  claims	  (Keck	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and	   Sikkink	   1998,	   12):	   in	   other	   words,	   a	   representation	   failure	   through	  conventional	   democratic	   channels.	   Tarrow	   points	   out	   that	   this	   does	   not	  necessarily	  have	  to	  correspond	  to	  the	  outright	  repression	  of	  domestic	  claims;	  it	  may	   simply	  be	   the	   case	   that	   foreign	   actors	   are	  more	   responsive	   to	   these	  claims	   than	   domestic	   political	   institutions	   (Tarrow	   2005,	   146).	   From	   the	  perspective	   of	   certain	   local	   actors,	   international	   NGOs	   may	   therefore	  substitute	   as	   potentially	   more	   effective	   representatives	   than	   domestic	  institutions.	   If	   international	   NGOs	   then	   manage	   to	   contribute	   towards	   the	  attainment	  of	  policy	  outcomes	   that	  are	  closer	   to	   the	  original	  preferences	  of	  these	  groups,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  talk	  of	  a	  successful	  implementation	  of	  “leverage	  politics”	   (Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  1998,	  16).	  The	   idea	   that	  NGOs	   can	  act	   as	   ‘links’	  between	  local	  communities	  and	  international	  forums	  is	  thus	  implicit	  in	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  analysis	  but	  not	  subjected	  to	  critical	  scrutiny.	  	  	  Applying	  a	   representation	  approach	   to	   transnational	   advocacy	  networks	  or	  to	   the	   relationship	   between	   local	   groups	   and	   international	   NGOs	   more	  broadly	   would	   also	   help	   to	   illuminate	   the	   dynamics	   that	   exist	   in	   the	  interactions	  between	  different	  groups.	  While	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  point	  out	  that	  advocacy	   networks	   may	   involve	   a	   range	   of	   actors	   from	   national	   and	  international	  NGOs,	  local	  social	  movements,	  foundations,	  the	  media,	  religious	  and	   political	   associations,	   vocal	   individuals	   to	   parts	   of	   regional	   and	  international	   intergovernmental	   organisations	   (Keck	   and	   Sikkink	   1998,	   9),	  they	   devote	   less	   attention	   to	   analysing	   the	   relationships	   among	   these	  different	   actors.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   their	   case	   study	   on	   the	   Polonoroeste	  campaign	   on	   deforestation	   in	   the	   Brazilian	   Amazon	   shows	   how	   the	  relationship	  between	  local	  activists	  and	  the	  “Washington	  activists”	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink	   1998,	   140)	   changed	   in	   the	   course	   of	   the	   campaign	   throughout	   the	  1980s,	   with	   the	   voices	   and	   experiences	   of	   the	   locally	   affected	   groups	  gradually	   increasing	   in	   importance.	   The	   dynamics	   and	   the	   discourse	   of	   the	  campaign	   itself	   changed	   towards	   an	   emphasis	   on	   participation	   and	  “‘partnership’	   in	   which	   genuine	   links	   between	   organisations	   of	   those	  suffering	  harm	  and	   those	  speaking	   for	   them	  were	  crucial	   to	   the	  campaign’s	  
	   54	  
legitimacy”	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  1998,	  142).	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  do	  not	  focus	  on	  the	   nature	   of	   these	   links	   or	   on	   the	   mechanisms	   through	   which	   the	   shift	  towards	   participation	   and	   partnership	   was	   implemented	   in	   the	   campaign	  network	   and	   whether	   it	   did	   indeed	   lead	   to	   campaign	   objectives	   that	  corresponded	   more	   closely	   to	   the	   preferences	   of	   the	   local	   communities.	  Moreover,	   they	   touch	   only	   briefly	   upon	   the	   issue	   of	   unequal	   power	  relationships	  between	  actors	  in	  transnational	  campaign	  networks.	  However,	  these	  omissions	  are	  justified	  by	  the	  focus	  of	  their	  work,	  which	  is	  on	  the	  effect	  and	   impact	   of	   transnational	   advocacy	  networks	   on	   international	   normative	  changes	   and	   does	   not	   extend	   to	   analysing	   the	   networks	   themselves.	   Other	  scholars	  have	  tackled	  this	  issue	  directly.	  	  	  Bob	   (2004)	   and	   Hertel	   (2006)	   have	   both	   offered	   new	   perspectives	   on	   the	  dynamics	  that	  exist	  between	  the	  different	  actors	  in	  transnational	  campaigns.	  Their	   focus	   is	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   actors	   at	   the	   local	   level	   and	  international	  NGOs	  (Hertel	  refers	  to	  campaigns).	  Particular	  attention	  is	  paid	  to	   the	  power	  dynamics	  between	   these	  actors.	  Whereas	  Bob	  emphasizes	   the	  “marketing”	   imperatives	   that	   constrain	   the	   autonomy	   and	   potential	   for	  impact	  by	  local	  social	  movements,	  Hertel	  looks	  more	  closely	  at	  the	  means	  for	  influence	  available	  to	  local	  activists.	  	  	  Bob	   analyses	   the	   relationship	   between	   international	   NGOs	   and	   social	  movements	   in	   the	   “global	  morality	  market”	   (Bob	  2005,	  4).	  He	  points	   to	   the	  fact	   that	   out	   of	   the	   plethora	   of	   social	   movements	   worldwide,	   only	   a	   few	  manage	   to	   attract	   large-­‐scale	   public	   attention	   and	   win	   the	   support	   of	  powerful	   global	   players.	   Rather	   than	   a	   playground	   open	   to	   all,	   global	   civil	  society	   is	   better	   understood	   as	   a	   “Darwinian	   arena	   in	  which	   the	   successful	  prosper	   but	   the	  weak	  wither”	   (Bob	   2005,	   8).	   As	   a	   result,	   local	   or	   national	  social	  movements	  resort	  to	  competing	  over	  NGO	  support,	  which,	  if	   it	  can	  be	  obtained,	   is	   considered	   an	   important	   source	   of	   influence	   and	   leverage	   in	  putting	   more	   effective	   pressure	   on	   their	   own	   national	   governments.	   This	  competition,	   however,	   takes	   place	   in	   a	   situation	   of	   structural	   inequalities	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between	   powerful	   international	   NGOs	   and	   resource-­‐poor	   local	  movements.	  He	   observes	   that	   local	   movements	   end	   up	   changing	   their	   strategies,	  legitimising	   discourses	   or	   internal	   structures	   in	   their	   attempts	   to	   attract	  support.	   Those	   movements	   that	   possess	   more	   experience	   or	   material	  resources	  to	  pursue	  a	  successful	  ‘marketing’	  strategy	  are	  likely	  to	  win	  at	  this	  game.	   Less	   experienced	   movements	   that	   do	   not	   play	   by	   the	   rules,	   get	   left	  behind.	   International	   NGOs	   in	   turn,	   also	   have	   something	   to	   gain	   from	   this	  exchange:	  largely	  non-­‐material,	  motivational	  resources	  that	  provide	  meaning	  for	  their	  activities	  (Bob	  2005,	  14/15).	  	  	  According	  to	  Bob,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  particular	  movement	  becoming	  adopted	  by	   an	  NGO	  patron	   is	   largely	   dependent	   on	   the	   degree	   to	  which	   it	   overlaps	  with	   the	   target	  NGO	  on	   five	  critical	  attributes:	  substantive	  goals,	  customary	  tactics,	   ethical	   precepts,	   cultural	   attitudes,	   and	   organisational	   needs	   (Bob	  2005,	   26).	   Accordingly,	   the	  movement	   is	  more	   likely	   to	   succeed	   at	   gaining	  support	   if	   it	   manages	   to	   strategically	   “frame”	   these	   critical	   attributes	   to	  appeal	  to	  the	  target	  NGO	  (Bob	  2005,	  27).	  Bob	  also	  points	  to	  the	  centrality	  of	  “gatekeepers”	   in	   network	   formation:	   large	   and	   influential	   players	   with	   a	  reputation	   for	   credibility	   whose	   decision	   to	   support	   a	   particular	   cause	   or	  movement	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  imitated	  by	  other	  international	  groups	  who	  rely	  on	  the	   gatekeepers’	   judgement	   (Bob	   2005,	   18).	   Examples	   of	   such	   gatekeeper	  NGOs	   include	  Amnesty	   International	  or	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	   in	   the	   field	  of	  Human	  Rights	   or	  WWF,	  Greenpeace	  or	  FoEI	  with	   respect	   to	   environmental	  politics	  (ibid).	  	  Bob’s	   analysis	   shows	   that	   the	   concerns	   of	   local	   groups,	   once	   taken	   up	   by	  transnational	   actors	   and	   put	   forward	   in	   a	   global	   arena,	   are	   not	   necessarily	  ‘authentic’	  reflections	  of	  their	  experiences.	  He	  outlines	  a	  number	  of	  structural	  factors	   that	  make	   it	   impossible	   to	   talk	   about	   either	   a	   linear	   or	   a	   balanced	  transmission	  of	  preferences	  from	  the	  grassroots	  up.	  His	  work	  shows	  that	  the	  voices	  of	  those	  who	  know	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  international	  NGO	  circuit	  are	  likely	  to	  dominate	  the	  discourse	  –	  global	  advocacy	  as	  an	  exclusive	  private	  members	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club.	  In	  fact,	  Bob	  argues	  that	  the	  need	  for	  local	  movements	  to	  engage	  in	  self-­‐marketing	  can	  even	  lead	  to	  situations	  whereby	  “pressure	  to	  conform	  to	  NGO	  concerns	  can	  contravene	  a	  movement’s	  original	  goals	  and	  tactics”	  (Bob	  2005,	  184).	   International	   NGOs	   in	   turn	   also	   have	   strong	   incentives	   to	   devote	  themselves	   to	   those	   groups	  whose	   profile	  most	   closely	  matches	   their	   own	  requirements.	  Bob’s	   analysis	   is	  useful	   from	  a	   representation	  perspective	  as	  he	   shows	   how	   both	   local	   groups	   and	   international	   NGOs	   work	   towards	  minimising	   the	   risk	   for	   conflict	   in	   their	   relationship.	   His	   work	   is	   also	  insightful	  if	  we	  want	  to	  determine	  what	  or	  whom	  NGOs	  claim	  to	  represent.	  As	  highlighted	   by	   Bob’s	   work	   this	   involves	   critically	   questioning	   whether	  existing	  (ex-­‐ante)	  preferences	  of	  affected	  citizens	  are	  taken	  up	  by	  the	  NGOs	  in	  the	  process	  of	  representation	  or	  whether	  the	  NGOs	  themselves	  play	  a	  part	  in	  creating	  these	  very	  preferences	  (or	  even	  the	  communities)	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (Castiglione	   and	  Warren	   2006,	   13).	   Overall,	   Bob’s	   research	   focus	   is	   on	   the	  need	   for	   adaptation	   that	   allows	   local	   movements	   to	   survive	   in	   the	   “global	  morality	  market”	  and	  he	  does	  not	  account	   for	  how	   local	  actors	   in	   turn	  may	  potentially	   succeed	   in	   impacting	   the	   dominant	   discourse	   despite	   their	  situation	  of	  relative	  weakness	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  actors.	  	  	  It	  is	  this	  potential	  for	  influence	  by	  local	  actors	  over	  international	  campaigns	  that	   constitutes	   the	   focus	   of	   Hertel’s	   (2006)	   analysis.	   She	   seeks	   to	   explain	  more	  precisely	  how	  apparently	  materially	  or	  politically	  less	  powerful	  actors	  can	  succeed	   in	  shaping	  the	  normative	  agenda	  of	  a	  campaign	  once	   launched.	  To	  do	   this,	  Hertel	  demonstrates	   that	   affected	  groups	   resort	   to	   two	   types	  of	  mechanisms	  to	  influence	  the	  development	  of	  international	  norms:	  “blocking”	  and	  “backdoor	  moves”.	  Blocking	  occurs	  when	  actors	  at	  the	  receiving	  end	  of	  a	  campaign	   succeed	   in	   “halting	   or	   at	   least	   significantly	   stalling	   a	   campaign’s	  progress	   in	  order	   to	  pressure	  senders	   to	   change	   their	   frame”	   (Hertel	  2006,	  6).	   Backdoor	   moves	   are	   more	   subtle:	   the	   receiving-­‐end	   activists	   do	   not	  openly	  challenge	  the	  normative	  elements	  of	  the	  campaign	  but	  still	  manage	  to	  insert	  their	  own	  reference	  points	  and/	  or	  policy	  proposals	  (Hertel	  2006,	  6).	  In	   emphasising	   that	   local	   groups	   themselves	   engage	   in	   a	   screening	  process	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with	  respect	  to	  the	  international	  campaigns	  they	  participate	  in,	  Hertel	  differs	  from	  Bob	  whose	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  players	  within	   these	   campaigns	   (i.e.	   large	   international	   NGOs)	   to	   accept	   or	   reject	  ‘applicants’.	  Hertel	  therefore	  allows	  more	  scope	  for	  independent	  influence	  by	  local	  social	  movements	  than	  Bob,	  who	  treats	  their	  power	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  benefits	   they	   can	   offer	   international	   NGOs,	   reduced	   by	   their	   (much	   larger)	  need	   for	   NGO	   support	   (Bob	   2005,	   20).	   Hertel’s	   focus	   on	   the	   potential	   for	  influence	   by	   local	   groups	   on	   transnational	   campaign	   highlights	   another	  important	   element	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   representation:	   the	   notion	   that	   this	   is	  not	  a	  one-­‐way	  relationship	  but	   that	   the	  representative	  and	   the	  represented	  are	  mutually	  constitutive	  and	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  both	  parties.	  	  
	  
v. Conclusion	  and	  next	  steps	  Traditionally,	   the	   democratic	   legitimacy	   of	   intergovernmental	   institutions	  has	  been	  derived	  directly	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  citizens	  are	  represented	  through	   their	   governments.	   As	   the	   discussion	   in	   this	   chapter	   has	   shown,	  reality	  is	  far	  more	  complex	  and	  there	  are	  myriad	  reasons	  for	  why	  the	  voices	  of	   citizens	   might	   not	   be	   heard	   in	   global	   policymaking	   processes.	   The	  discrepancy	  between	  democratic	  control	  and	  actual	  or	  potential	  affectedness	  risks	   undermining	   ‘‘the	   congruence	   between	   the	   ‘people’	   that	   is	   being	  governed,	  and	  the	   ‘people’	   that	   is	  supposed	  to	  govern’’	  (Scharpf	  1998,	  para.	  17).	  	  Concerns	   about	   democratic	   deficits	   in	   international	   institutions	   have	   often	  been	   followed	  by	  calls	   for	   civil	   society	  organisations	   to	  come	   to	   the	   rescue.	  The	   contribution	   of	   NGOs	   and	   other	   CSOs	   to	   the	   democratic	   legitimacy	   of	  international	   institutions	  can	  be	  broadly	  classified	   in	   two	  categories	  set	  out	  by	  Marchetti	  (2008):	  “external	  claims”	  and	  “internal	  practices”.	  With	  regards	  to	  the	  external	  claims,	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  research	  is	  on	  demands	  formulated	  by	  NGOs	  that	  address	  issues	  of	  representation	  and	  participation	  within	  IGOs.	  A	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  internal	  practices	  allows	  us	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  about	  the	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extent	   to	   which	   NGOs	   implement	   democratic	   standards	   within	   their	   own	  organisations,	   and	   in	   particular	   about	   their	   ability	   to	   act	   as	   democratic	  intermediaries,	   or	   links,	   between	   affected	   communities	   and	   international	  institutions.	   This	   dual	   focus	   also	   offers	   an	   empirical	   investigation	   of	   the	  criticism	   that	   NGOs	   frequently	   do	   not	   live	   up	   to	   the	   same	   standards	   and	  ideals	  they	  demand	  of	  others.	  	  Let	  us	  turn	  first	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  external	  claims.	  Chapter	  IV	  of	  the	  thesis	  will	  investigate	   to	  what	   extent	   	   -­‐	   and	  how	   	   -­‐	  debates	   relating	   to	   the	  democratic	  legitimacy	   of	   global	   institutions	   are	   taken	  up	   by	   and	  played	   out	  within	   the	  NGO	   communities	   interacting	   with	   the	   United	   Nations	   Framework	  Convention	   on	   Climate	   Change	   and	   the	   Convention	   on	   Biological	   Diversity	  respectively.	   In	   order	   to	   capture	   some	   of	   the	   key	   points	   outlined	   in	   the	  discussion	  of	  democratic	  deficits	  above,	  the	  chapter	  will	  distinguish	  between	  NGO	   proposals	   targeted	   at	   representation	   inequities	   among	   governments	  and	   NGO	   demands	   for	   strengthening	   opportunities	   for	   participation	   by	  societal	  stakeholders	  (Koenig-­‐Archibugi	  2006,	  14).	  	  	  Two	  sets	  of	  research	  questions	  will	   therefore	  guide	  the	  analysis	  of	   the	  NGO	  
external	  democratic	  demands	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  two	  conventions:	  	   1. To	  what	  extent	  do	  NGOs	  criticise	  the	  formal	  and	  informal	  distribution	  of	   influence	  among	  governments	   and	  what	   reforms	  do	   they	  propose	  and	  support?	  2. How	   important	   are	   demands	   for	   greater	   participation	   by	   affected	  communities	   and	   community-­‐based	   organisations?	   What	   shape	   do	  these	  demands	  take	  and	  what	  role	  do	  they	  play	  in	  different	  contexts?	  	  Addressing	  the	  external	  before	  the	   internal	  dimension	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  using	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   ‘problem’	   –	   the	   alleged	   democratic	   shortcomings	  within	  particular	  international	  institutions	  –	  as	  the	  point	  of	  departure.	  It	  also	  helps	   to	   ground	   the	   analysis	   of	   individual	   environmental	   NGOs	   in	   a	   better	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understanding	  of	  the	  context	  they	  operate	  in.	  Moreover,	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  democratic	   deficits	   in	   two	   actual	   conventions	   helps	   to	   gain	   a	  more	   specific	  understanding	  of	  who	  is	  most	  affected	  by	  the	  policies	  emanating	  from	  these	  institutions	   and	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   these	   affected	   communities	   are	  represented	  or	  marginalised	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  processes.	  	  	  As	   the	   discussion	   in	   this	   chapter	   has	   shown,	   we	   often	   find	   a	  more	   or	   less	  explicit	   assumption	   among	   policymakers	   and	   scholars	   that	   civil	   society	  organisations	   can	   act	   as	   ‘links’	   between	   local	   communities	   and	   global	  policymaking	  processes.	  However,	  specific	  empirical	  analyses	  of	  what	  exactly	  such	  linkages	  mean	  and	  how	  they	  may	  be	  operationalised	  are	  in	  short	  supply.	  Does	  this	  merely	  imply	  that	  civil	  society	  groups	  are	  better	  than	  international	  policymakers	   at	   having	   an	   ear	   at	   the	   ground	   and	   picking	   up	   ideas	   and	  demands	   from	  the	   local	   level?	  Or	  does	   it	   refer	   to	  more	   formalized	   forms	  of	  decision-­‐making	  that	  involve	  mechanisms	  for	  responsiveness	  within	  the	  civil	  society	   organisations	   themselves?	   Chapter	   V	   will	   address	   this	   issue	   by	  proposing	   a	   representation	   perspective	   for	   analyzing	   civil	   society	  organisations.	   The	   subsequent	   chapters	   will	   then	   try	   to	   gather	   empirical	  insights	  through	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  procedure	  of	  three	  large	  international	   multi-­‐issue	   NGOs	   and	   two	   issue-­‐specific	   NGO	   networks.	  Through	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   possibilities	   for	   democratic	   practices	   and	  structures	  within	  NGOs,	  the	  thesis	  tries	  to	  develop	  a	  clearer	  understanding	  of	  the	   internal	  potential	  of	  NGOs	  for	  bringing	  the	  voices	  of	  affected	  publics	  to	  international	  organisations,	  guided	  by	  the	  following	  research	  questions:	  	   1. What	  are	   the	  structures	  and	  processes	  allowing	   for	   the	  participation	  by	  and	  responsiveness	  to	  local	  communities	  that	  can	  be	  found	  within	  international	  NGOs?	  	  2. What	   drives	   or	   motivates	   NGOs	   to	   act	   as	   ‘representatives’	   of	   local	  communities	  in	  international	  organisations?	  3. What	   are	   the	   potential	   conflicts	   and	   challenges	   that	   NGOs	   face	   in	  pursuing	  this	  role?	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4. What	   are	   the	   effects	   and	   consequences	   of	   NGOs	   acting	   as	  representatives	  in	  this	  way?	  	  An	  important	  caveat	  emerging	  from	  the	  discussion	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  analysing	  the	  democratic	  demands	  by	  NGOs	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  global	  actors	  still	  does	  not	  address	  the	  fundamental	  problem	  of	  democratic	  shortcomings	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  This	  level	  of	  analysis	  falls	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study.	  It	  should	  be	  acknowledged,	  however,	  that	  many	  NGO	  roles	  and	  activities	  on	  the	   ground	   –	   such	   as	   education,	   capacity-­‐building	   and	   supporting	   local	  development	   –	   are	   potentially	   important	   in	   strengthening	   the	   ability	   of	  citizens	   to	   participate	   more	   fully	   and	   effectively	   in	   democratic	   life	   (at	   the	  local,	  national	  and	  international	  levels).	  Wapner	  refers	  to	  this	  as	  the	  “politics	  of	  localism”	  through	  which	  NGOs	  “attempt	  to	  empower	  local	  communities	  so	  they	  can	  better	  control	  their	  environmental	  and	  developmental	  destinies	  and,	  in	  so	  doing,	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  wider	  spheres	  of	  collective	  life”	  (1996,	  73).	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III. Global	  environmental	  governance	  This	   chapter	   aims	   to	   provide	   a	   brief	   trajectory	   and	   overview	   of	   global	  environmental	   governance,	   focussing	   on	   the	   intergovernmental	   institutions	  and	   the	   participation	   of	   non-­‐state	   actors	   therein.	   There	   are	   a	   number	   of	  reasons	  why	   the	   environment	   constitutes	   an	   appropriate	   issue	   area	  within	  which	  to	  situate	  this	  study.	  	  	  Firstly,	   trans-­‐boundary	   environmental	   problems	   and	   the	   search	   for	  appropriate	   responses	   have	   emerged	   as	   central	   concerns	   for	   policymakers	  over	   recent	   decades.	   According	   to	   Falkner,	   “states	   have	   come	   to	   accept	   a	  basic	   form	   of	   global	   environmental	   responsibility	   that	   has	   grown	   into	   an	  emerging	  primary	  institution”	  (Falkner	  2012,	  514).	  The	  growing	  acceptance	  of	   environmental	   responsibility	   has	   led	   to	   the	   search	   for	   multilateral	  responses	   to	   many	   of	   the	   most	   pressing	   environmental	   problems.	  Nonetheless,	   environmentalism	   continues	   to	   present	   “a	   challenger	   norm	   in	  international	   society”	   that	   competes	   with	   “existing	   primary	   institutions	   of	  sovereignty,	  international	  law	  and	  the	  market”	  (Falkner	  2012,	  515).	  	  	  Secondly,	   despite	   the	   search	   for	   multilateral	   responses,	   policy-­‐making	  processes	  at	  the	  international	  level	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  forms	  of	  democratic	  control	   and	   participation	   found	   domestically.	   Global	   environmental	  governance	   is	   prone	   to	  many	   of	   the	   democratic	   problems	   discussed	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter.	  Many	   of	   the	   dominant	   interpretations	   of	  what	   constitute	  global	   environmental	   threats	   and	   desirable	   environmental	   outcomes	   have	  been	   developed	   without	   the	   participation	   of	   the	   most	   affected	   parties	  (Forsyth	  2003,	  10).	  Furthermore,	  many	  of	  the	  strategies	  designed	  to	  achieve	  environmental	   protection	   have	   serious,	   and	   sometimes	   negative,	  consequences	   for	   the	   lives	  of	  communities	  on	  the	  grounds	  –	  although	  these	  same	  communities	  are	  often	  not	   responsible	   for	   causing	   the	  environmental	  destruction	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  The	  affected	  communities	  are	  frequently	  not,	  or	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only	   insufficiently,	   consulted	   in	   the	   design	   and	   implementation	   of	  environmental	  protection	  projects	  and	  policies.	  	  	  Thirdly,	  non-­‐state	  actors,	   including	  NGOs,	  already	  play	  an	   important	  role	   in	  international	   environmental	   politics,	   more	   so	   than	   in	   many	   international	  issue	  areas	  (Arts	  2006).	  Most	  environmental	  problems	  are	  not	  the	  product	  of	  deliberate	  state	  policies	  –	  they	  are	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  the	  ‘security	  dilemma’	  that	  arises	   from	   states	   pursuing	   their	   self-­‐interest	   according	   to	   the	   Realist	  paradigm.	  Instead,	  environmental	  degradation	  is	  better	  understood	  as	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	   the	  dense	  web	  of	  processes	  of	  production	  and	  consumption	  that	  characterise	   the	  world	  economy.	  Every	  day,	  millions	  of	   individual	  decisions	  affecting	   the	   environment	   are	   taken	   not	   by	   governmental	   actors	   but	   by	  business,	   consumers	   and	   citizens.	   Effective	   strategies	   for	   change	   require	  broad	  societal	  backing	  and	  the	  involvement	  of	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  actors.	  	  The	  chapter	  is	  structured	  as	  follows.	  Section	  (i)	  will	  provide	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  history	  of	  global	  environmental	  governance,	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  large	  global	   UN	   conferences	   on	   the	   environment	   starting	   in	   1972.	   The	   main	  intergovernmental	   institutions	   of	   global	   environmental	   governance	   –	   the	  United	   Nations	   Environment	   Programme,	   the	   Commission	   on	   Sustainable	  Development	   and	   the	   Global	   Environment	   Facility	   –	   are	   all	   institutional	  offspring	   of	   these	   conferences.	   Section	   (ii)	   will	   illustrate	   the	   ideational	  underpinnings	   of	   global	   environmental	   governance	   and	   show	   how	   the	  concept	  of	  sustainable	  development	  has	  emerged	  as	  a	  central	   leitmotif.	  The	  gradual	   establishment	   of	   participatory	   norms	   and	   practices	   in	   global	  environmental	  governance	  constitutes	  the	  focus	  of	  section	  (iii)	  while	  section	  (iv)	   will	   focus	   more	   specifically	   on	   the	   participation	   of	   NGOs.	   A	   brief	  conclusion	  (v)	  will	  provide	  the	  link	  to	  the	  subsequent	  chapters.	  	  	  
i. The	  institutions	  of	  global	  environmental	  governance	  The	   large	  and	  highly	  visible	  UN-­‐sponsored	  conferences	  on	  the	  environment	  and	  development	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  at	  regular	   intervals	  since	  the	  1970s	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are	   milestones	   in	   the	   history	   of	   global	   environmental	   politics.	   The	   most	  important	   multilateral	   organisations	   and	   conventions	   explicitly	   mandated	  with	   protecting	   the	   global	   environment	   or	   addressing	   particular	  environmental	   challenges	   such	   as	   climate	   change	   are	   the	   institutional	  offspring	  of	  these	  conferences.	  	  	  	  
UN	  conferences	  and	  agreements	  The	   1972	   United	   Nations	   Conference	   on	   the	   Human	   Environment	   held	   in	  Stockholm,	  	  “a	  watershed	  in	  the	  development	  of	  international	  environmental	  law”	  (Elliott	  2004,	  7),	  established	  a	  number	  of	  precedents	  that	  helped	  shape	  the	   nascent	   system	   of	   global	   environmental	   governance.	   Among	   the	  conference’s	  outputs	  were	  	  	   (i) A	   non-­‐binding	   ‘Declaration	   on	   the	   Human	   Environment’	  containing	   26	   principles	   concerning	   the	   environment	   and	  development;	  	  (ii) An	   ‘Action	   Plan	   for	   the	   Human	   Environment’	   outlining	   109	  recommendations	   spanning	   six	   broad	   areas	   (human	   settlements,	  resource	   management,	   pollution,	   development,	   social	   aspects	   of	  the	  environment,	  and	  international	  organisations);	  and	  	  (iii) A	  resolution	  on	   the	   ‘Institutional	  and	  Financial	  Arrangements	   for	  International	  Environmental	  Cooperation’	  	  	  It	   was	   the	   latter	   which	   paved	   the	  way	   for	   the	   creation	   by	   the	   UN	   General	  Assembly	  of	   the	  United	  Nations	  Environment	  Programme	   (UNEP)	  designed	  to	   oversee	   and	   coordinate	   environmental	   activities	   within	   the	   UN	   system.	  Innovative	   about	   the	   conference’s	   format	   was	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   formal	   NGO	  conference	  and	  an	   informal	   ‘People’s	  Forum’	   took	  place	   in	  parallel	  with	   the	  official	   proceedings.	   While	   the	   NGOs’	   influence	   on	   official	   conference	  proceedings	   and	   outcomes	   was	   minimal,	   the	   gathering	   still	   had	   important	  benefits	   in	   terms	   of	   bringing	   together	   activists	   from	   a	   range	   of	   countries,	  regions	  and	  backgrounds.	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  Twenty	   years	   would	   pass	   until	   the	   next	   global	   conference	   on	   the	  environment.	   These	   two	   decades	   following	   Stockholm	   saw	   a	   number	   of	  noteworthy	   international	   initiatives,	   such	   as	   the	   treaties	   designed	   to	   tackle	  the	  trade	  in	  endangered	  species	  or	  the	  threat	  of	  desertification,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  publication	  of	   influential	  reports,	   including	  the	  Club	  of	  Rome’s	  1972	   ‘Limits	  to	  Growth’	  report	  and	  the	  Brundtland	  Commission’s	  ‘Our	  Common	  Future’	  in	  1987.	   This	  was	   also	   the	   period	   during	  which	   the	   Green	  Movement	   rapidly	  grew	   in	   size	   in	   a	   number	   of	   European	   countries.	   Environmental	   disasters	  such	  as	  the	  toxic	  gas	  leak	  at	  Bhopal	  in	  1984,	  which	  killed	  over	  3000	  people16,	  and	  the	  fallout	  from	  the	  Chernobyl	  nuclear	  disaster	  in	  1986	  contributed	  to	  a	  heightened	  sense	  of	  concern	  among	  citizens.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  the	  1980s	  saw	  the	   opening	   for	   signature	   of	   what	   is	   generally	   considered	   one	   of	   the	   few	  examples	  of	  successful	  international	  cooperation	  on	  an	  environmental	  issue:	  the	   Montreal	   Protocol	   on	   Substances	   that	   Deplete	   the	   Ozone	   Layer,	   which	  entered	  into	  force	  on	  1	  January	  1989	  (Litfin	  1995).	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  growing	  influence	   of	   the	   global	   South	   in	   multilateral	   negotiations,	   the	   protocol	  included	  a	  number	  of	  specific	  provisions	  designed	  to	  alleviate	  the	  economic	  costs	  of	  eliminating	  CFCs	  to	  developing	  countries.	  	  	  The	   1992	   United	   Nations	   Conference	   on	   Environment	   and	   Development	  (UNCED)	   held	   in	   Rio	   was	   attended	   by	   176	   delegates	   and	   received	  unprecedented	   levels	   of	   media	   and	   public	   attention	   (Connelly	   and	   Smith	  2003,	   238).	   In	   parallel	   with	   the	   official	   conference	   over	   18,000	   NGO	  representatives	  from	  all	  over	  the	  world	  came	  together	  for	  the	  Global	  Forum,	  a	  parallel	  summit	  specifically	   for	  NGO	  participants	  (Carr	  and	  Norman	  2008,	  361).	   However,	   most	   of	   them	   were	   not	   allowed	   into	   the	   government	  negotiations	  and	  the	  Global	  Forum	  was	   in	   fact	  held	   in	  specially	  constructed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	   Some	   campaigners	   claim	   that	   the	   true	  number	  of	  Bhopal	   victims	   lies	  much	  higher,	  with	  around	  20,000	  people	  dying	  later	  as	  a	  result	  of	  injuries	  and	  long-­‐term	  health	  effects	  suffered.	  BBC	   Website	   (no	   year).	   ‘On	   this	   day:	   03.	   December	   1984’.	   BBC	   Website:	  	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/3/newsid_2698000/2698709.stm	  Last	  accessed	  29.04.2008.	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tents	  about	  40	  kilometres	  from	  the	  official	  discussions	  (Chatterjee	  and	  Finger	  1994,	  63).	  Five	  agreements	  were	  signed	  at	  Rio:	  the	  Rio	  Declaration,	  Agenda	  21,	   the	   Declaration	   on	   Forest	   Principles,	   the	   Framework	   Convention	   on	  Climate	   Change	   and	   the	   Convention	   on	   Biological	   Diversity.	   The	   latter	   two	  had	   been	   negotiated	   separately	   but	   were	   opened	   for	   signature	   during	   the	  conference	  and	  are	   therefore	  considered	  part	  of	   the	  UNCED	  process.	   It	  was	  also	  at	   the	  Rio	  summit	   that	   the	  Global	  Environment	  Facility	  was	  created	  as	  the	  funding	  mechanism	  for	  global	  environmental	  issues.	  	  	  The	  Rio	  Declaration,	  a	  set	  of	  nonbinding	  guiding	  principles	   for	  national	  and	  international	   environmental	   behaviour,	   endorsed	   the	   polluter	   pays	  principle17	   and	   the	   precautionary	   principle18	   as	  well	   as	   expressing	   support	  for	   greater	   participation	   and	   transparency	   in	   environmental	   policymaking.	  The	   declaration	   also	   coined	   the	   much-­‐quoted	   phrase	   of	   ‘common	   but	  differentiated	   responsibilities’	   (‘CBDR’	   -­‐	   principle	   7)	   for	   the	   environment.	  The	   ‘CBDR’	  principle	  holds	   that	   countries	   should	   assume	  different	   levels	   of	  commitment	  for	  global	  environmental	  protection,	  depending	  on	  their	  level	  of	  development	  and	  capacity	  to	  act,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  have	  contributed	   to	   these	   problems	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   Furthermore,	   the	   Rio	  Declaration	   singled	   out	   for	   importance	   the	   contributions	   to	   effective	  environmental	   protection	   of	   a	   number	   of	   stakeholder	   groups,	   mentioning	  specifically	   the	   need	   for	   full	   participation	   by	   women	   (Principle	   20),	   the	  importance	   to	   engage	   “the	   youth	   of	   the	   world”	   (Principle	   21)	   and	   that	  “indigenous	  people	  and	  their	  communities	  and	  other	  local	  communities	  have	  a	  vital	   role	   in	  environmental	  management	  and	  development”	   (Principle	  22)	  (United	  Nations	  1992a).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  According	  to	  the	  polluter	  pays	  principle	  “all	  costs	  should	  be	  borne	  by	  the	  polluter,	  so	  that	  polluters	  should	  not	  otherwise	  have	  an	  unfair	  commercial	  or	  competitive	  advantage”	  (Elliot	  2004,	  143).	  The	  internalisation	  of	  environmental	  externalities	  is	  key	  to	  this	  principle.	  	  	  18	   The	   precautionary	   principle	   is	   usually	   interpreted	   to	  mean	   that,	   in	   the	   face	   of	   scientific	  uncertainty,	   policy-­‐makers	   should	   act	   early	   to	   prevent	   harm	   rather	   than	   wait	   until	   harm	  occurs.	   At	   the	   international	   level,	   the	   application	   of	   the	   precautionary	   principle	   has	   led	   to	  trade	  disputes	  between	   the	  European	  Union	  and	   the	  United	  States,	  most	  prominently	  over	  the	  use	  of	  hormones	  in	  beef.	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Agenda	   21	   was	   intended	   as	   a	   “comprehensive	   plan	   of	   action	   to	   be	   taken	  globally,	  nationally	  and	  locally	  by	  organisations	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  System,	  Governments,	   and	  Major	  Groups	   in	   every	   area	   in	  which	  humans	   impact	   on	  the	  environment”	  (UN	  1992b).	   Its	   forty	  chapters	  are	  split	   into	   four	  sections	  on	   ‘Social	   and	   Economic	   Dimensions’,	   ‘Conservation	   and	   Management	   of	  Resources	   for	   Development’,	   ‘Strengthening	   the	   Role	   of	  Major	   Groups’	   and	  ‘Means	  of	  Implementation’	  (ibid).	  In	  late	  1992	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  set	  up	  the	  Commission	  on	  Sustainable	  Development	  (CSD)	  as	   the	  body	  charged	  to	  monitor	  and	  review	  implementation	  of	  Agenda	  21.	  	  	  The	  next	  big	   international	  conference	  on	  the	  global	  environment	  took	  place	  in	   Johannesburg	   in	  2002	  as	  a	  10-­‐year	   follow-­‐up	  to	  UNCED	  and	   is	  known	  as	  the	  World	   Summit	   on	   Sustainable	   Development	   (WSSD).	   In	   reaction	   to	   the	  disappointing	  situation	  at	  Rio	  where	  NGOs	  had	  met	  in	  relative	  isolation	  from	  official	  proceedings	  and	  thus	  had	  had	  little	  opportunity	  for	  influence,	  the	  UN-­‐sponsored	   ‘Stakeholders	   for	   Our	   Common	   Future	   Implementation	  Conference’	   was	   formed	   (Carr	   and	   Norman	   2008).	   The	   objective	   of	   this	  initiative	  was	  to	  allow	  331	  stakeholder	  representatives	  from	  50	  countries	  to	  get	  together	  subsequent	  to	  the	  WSSD,	  develop	  common	  positions	  on	  the	  key	  items	   addressed	   at	   the	   official	   conference	   and	   therefore	   exert	   a	   more	  targeted	   influence	   on	   the	   planning	   and	   implementation	   process	   (Carr	   and	  Norman	   2008,	   359).	   Separately	   from	   this,	   business	   groups	   used	   the	  opportunity	  to	  organise	  a	  concurrent	  business	  forum	  (DeSombre	  2006,	  29).	  The	   Johannesburg	   Summit	   also	   institutionalised	   new	   connections	   between	  the	  different	   types	   of	   actors	   involved	   in	   the	   field	   of	   environmental	   politics.	  Among	  its	  key	  outcomes	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  so-­‐called	  type	  II	  partnerships	  for	  implementation	   –	   initiatives	   that	   brought	   together	   business,	   governments	  and	  civil	  society	  actors.19	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	   As	   of	   late	   2011,	   the	   website	   of	   the	   UN	   Division	   for	   Sustainable	   Development	   lists	   348	  partnerships	  “contributing	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  Agenda	  12,	  Rio+5	  and	  the	  Johannesburg	  Plan	   of	   Implementation”	   Website	   of	   the	   Division	   for	   Sustainable	   Development.	  http://webapps01.un.org/dsd/partnerships/public/statisticsResults.do	   Last	   accessed	  18.10.2011	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  The	  timing	  of	  the	  WSSD	  was	  unfortunate:	  it	  was	  brought	  forward	  by	  a	  couple	  of	  weeks	   to	   the	  end	  of	  August	   in	  order	   to	  avoid	   clashing	  with	   the	  one-­‐year	  anniversary	   of	   the	   9/11	   attacks.	   Still,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   threat	   of	   large-­‐scale	  terror	  attacks	  was	  now	  occupying	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  her	  allies	   may	   go	   some	   way	   towards	   explaining	   why	   environmental	   issues	  became	   relegated	   to	   the	  margins	   of	   the	   international	   political	   agenda,	  with	  major	  states	  unwilling	  to	  take	  on	  substantial	  new	  commitments	  in	  that	  field.	  Moreover,	   Elliott	   considers	   the	   ‘Johannesburg	   Plan	   of	   Implementation’	   as	  “particularly	  weak	  on	  the	  issues	  of	  rights	  and	  justice	  which	  (..)	  are	  central	  to	  sustainable	   development	   and	   environmental	   protection”	   (Elliott	   2004,	   27).	  While	   it	   contained	   a	   number	   of	   seemingly	   “progressive	   normative	  statements”,	   these	   were	   consistently	   “qualified	   by	   a	   deference	   to	   national	  law”	  (Elliott	  2004,	  27).	  	  	  
The	  main	  environmental	  IGOs	  The	  key	  bodies	  mandated	  to	  deal	  with	  global	  environmental	  politics	  are	  the	  United	   Nations	   Environment	   Programme	   (UNEP),	   the	   Commission	   for	  Sustainable	   Development	   (CSD)	   and	   the	   Global	   Environment	   Facility.	   The	  first	  two	  are	  squarely	  located	  within	  the	  UN	  system	  while	  the	  GEF	  constitutes	  a	   hybrid	   arrangement,	   coordinated	   jointly	   by	   UNEP,	   UNDP	   and	   the	  World	  Bank	  (with	  the	  latter	  exerting	  most	  influence).	  Two	  important	  issue-­‐focussed	  conventions	   –	   the	   UN	   Framework	   Convention	   on	   Climate	   Change	   and	   the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  –	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  	  The	  United	  Nations	  Environment	  Programme	  has	  already	  been	  mentioned	  as	  the	   main	   institutional	   outcome	   of	   the	   Stockholm	   Conference.	   UNEP	   is	  incorporated	  as	  a	  subsidiary	  body	  to	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  and	  reports	  to	  the	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Council	  (ECOSOC).	  The	  decision	  to	  situate	  the	  newly	  created	  UNEP	  secretariat	  in	  Nairobi,	  Kenya,	  was	  an	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  growing	  influence	  of	  developing	  countries	  within	  the	  UN	  system	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	   1970s.	   It	   also	   reflected	   the	   recognition	   that	   the	   management	   of	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environmental	   issues	   is	   central	   to	   the	  development	   agenda	   –	   a	   point	  made	  repeatedly	   by	   developing	   country	   delegates	   at	   the	   Stockholm	   Conference.	  The	  choice	  of	  location	  makes	  it	  at	  times	  hard	  for	  UNEP	  to	  maintain	  close	  links	  with	   other	   UN	   programmes	   and	   the	   agencies	   that	   it	   is	   charged	   with	  overseeing	   and	  necessitates	   a	   disproportionate	   amount	   of	   air	   travel	   on	   the	  part	  of	  UNEP	  personnel	  (DeSombre	  2006,	  11)	  	  UNEP	   is	   run	   by	   an	   ECOSOC	   elected	   58-­‐member	   governing	   council,	   which	  adheres	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  geographical	  representation	  and	  contains	  16	  seats	  for	  African	  states,	  13	   for	  Asian	  states,	  6	   for	  Eastern	  European	  states,	  10	   for	  Latin	   American	   states,	   and	   13	   seats	   for	   Western	   Europe	   and	   ‘other’	  countries.20	  Governing	  council	  meetings	   take	  place	  every	  two	  years	  and	  are	  held	  concurrently	  with	  the	  ‘Global	  Ministerial	  Environmental	  Forum’.	  Day-­‐to-­‐day	  management	  is	  facilitated	  by	  the	  secretariat	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  executive	   director.	   UNEP	   has	   a	   history	   of	   high-­‐visibility	   and	   proactive	  executive	  directors:	  starting	  with	  Maurice	  Strong,	  followed	  by	  Mostafa	  Tolba,	  Elizabeth	  Dowdswell,	  Klaus	  Toepfer,	  and	  currently	  Achim	  Steiner.	  	  The	   Commission	   on	   Sustainable	   Development	   (CSD)	   is,	   as	   was	   already	  mentioned,	   one	   of	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	   1992	   Rio	   Summit	   mandated	   with	  overseeing	   the	   implementation	   of	   Agenda	   21.	   Its	   53	  member	   governments	  are	   elected	   by	   ECOSOC	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   regional	   representation	   and	   the	  commission	  also	  reports	  to	  ECOSOC	  (Elliott	  2004,	  98).	  After	  the	  2002	  WSSD	  the	  commission	  also	  received	  the	  responsibility	  for	  monitoring	  the	  execution	  of	   the	   ‘Johannesburg	   Plan	   of	   Implementation’	   in	   its	   mandate	   (DeSombre	  2006,	   32).	   In	   addition	   to	  monitoring	   the	   progress	   of	   these	   agreements,	   the	  CSD	   is	   charged	   with	   the	   broad	   task	   of	   promoting	   “the	   integration	   of	  environment	   and	   development	   concerns	  within	   the	   UN	   system	   and	   among	  governments”	   (Elliott	   2004,	   98).	   Its	   impact,	   however,	   has	   been	   limited.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	   Website	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   Environment	   Programme.	   Rules	   of	   Procedure	   of	   the	  Governing	   Council	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   Environment	   Programme.	  http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?Documentid=77&Articleid=1158&L=En	  Last	  accessed	  18.10.2011	  
	   69	  
Despite	   its	   above-­‐mentioned	   review	   functions,	   the	   CSD	   has	   no	   powers	   of	  enforcement	  or	  means	  for	  sanctioning	  laggards	  (Elliott	  2004,	  98).	  DeSombre	  sees	  the	  primary	  impact	  of	  the	  CSD	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  norms,	  the	  generation	  of	   information	   and	   development	   of	   capacity;	   moreover,	   the	   commission	  “plays	   an	   important	   role	   in	   bringing	   non-­‐state	   actors	   into	   the	   otherwise	  largely	   intergovernmental	   focus	   within	   the	   United	   Nations,	   and	   increases	  access	  by	  these	  actors	  in	  UN	  discussions	  and	  negotiations”	  (DeSombre	  2006,	  34).	  	  The	   Global	   Environment	   Facility	   is	   sometimes	   considered	   the	   most	  significant	   outcome	   of	   the	   1992	   UNCED,	   where	   it	   was	   designated	   as	   the	  official	   funding	   instrument	   for	   Agenda	   21.	   It	   is	   the	   single	   largest	   source	   of	  funding	  for	  the	  global	  environment.	  Since	  its	  inception	  it	  has	  committed	  “$9.5	  billion,	  supplemented	  by	  more	  than	  $42	  billion	  in	  cofinancing,	  for	  more	  than	  2,700	   projects	   in	   more	   than	   165	   developing	   countries	   and	   countries	   with	  economies	   in	   transition”	   (Global	   Environment	   Facility	   2011).	   It	   is	   the	   only	  multi-­‐convention	  financing	  facility	  in	  existence	  and	  performs	  this	  function	  for	  the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  (CBD),	  the	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	   on	   Climate	   Change	   (UNFCCC),	   the	   Stockholm	   Convention	   on	  Persistent	   Organic	   Pollutants,	   and	   the	   UN	   Convention	   to	   Combat	  Desertification.	   It	   also	   supports	   the	   multilateral	   fund	   of	   the	   Montreal	  Protocol.	   The	   institutional	   design	  of	   the	  GEF	   is	   unusual	   in	   that	   it	   has	   three	  implementing	   agencies	   (the	  World	   Bank,	   UNEP	   and	   UNDP)	   that	   –	   at	   least	  formally	   –	   participate	   in	   the	   organisation	   on	   an	   equal	   basis.	   In	   reality,	  however,	   the	  World	  Bank	   exerts	  by	   far	   the	  most	   influence	   and	   also	  houses	  the	  GEF	  secretariat,	  although	   this	   is	   considered	   functionally	   independent	  of	  the	  Bank	  (Young	  2002).	  Its	  main	  governing	  body	  is	  the	  council:	  the	  delegates	  are	   elected	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   equitable	   geographical	   representation	   and	   it	   is	  formally	  accountable	  to	  the	  GEF	  assembly,	  which	  meets	  every	  three	  years.	  	  	  Measured	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   contribution	   to	   halting	   or	   reversing	   global	  environmental	   degradation	   the	   intergovernmental	   institutions	   of	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environmental	  governance	  have,	  on	  balance,	  performed	  poorly.	  The	  reasons	  for	   their	  weak	   track	   record	   range	   from	   severe	   funding	   shortages,	   a	   lack	   of	  support	  from	  key	  governments,	  diffusion	  of	  responsibility	  across	  competing	  agencies,	   to	   accusations	   of	   bureaucratic	   inefficiency	   and	   lack	   of	  competence.21	  UNEP,	  for	  instance,	  has	  to	  mostly	  rely	  on	  voluntary	  donations	  by	   its	  member	   states	   as	   a	   result	   of	   its	   status	   as	   a	   ‘program’	   rather	   than	   a	  ‘specialised	   agency’	   (DeSombre	   2006,	   12).	   This	   makes	   the	   organisation	  highly	   susceptible	   to	   fluctuations	   in	   states’	   support	   for	   particular	  environmental	  issues.	  	  	  	  Critics	   have	   also	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   absence	   of	   one	   central	   authority	   to	  oversee	   global	   environmental	   policy	   within	   the	   UN	   system	   hampers	  effectiveness	  (Biermann	  2000).	  Besides	  the	  bodies	  already	  mentioned	  there	  are	   a	   host	   of	   agencies	   addressing	   particular	   environmental	   issues,	   while	  often	   failing	   to	   coordinate	   their	   activities	   among	   each	   other.	   The	   United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme	  (UNDP)	  for	  instance,	  deals	  with	  a	  range	  of	  environmental	   issues	   in	   pursuing	   its	   sustainable	   development	   mandate.	   A	  number	  of	  other	  agencies	  such	  as	  the	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organisation,	  the	  World	  Health	  Organisation	  and	  the	  World	  Meteorological	  Organisation	  act	  on	  issues	  as	  diverse	  as	  food	  safety,	  the	  use	  of	  pesticides	  and	  climate	  change,	  all	  of	   which	   are	   closely	   linked	   to	   environmental	   politics.	   This	   dispersal	   of	  environmental	   responsibilities	   across	   many	   distinct	   UN	   agencies	   and	  programmes	   has	   given	   rise	   to	   accusations	   of	   overlap,	   bureaucratic	  inefficiency	  and	  rivalry	  among	  agencies.	  	  	  	  Calls	   for	   reform	   have	   been	   around	   for	   decades,	   ranging	   from	   demands	   to	  strengthen	   the	  position	   of	  UNEP	   to	   the	   abolition	   of	   the	   current	   plethora	   of	  agencies	  involved	  in	  various	  aspects	  of	  environmental	  governance,	  to	  replace	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  According	  to	  the	  Economist,	  UNEP	  is	  casually	  referred	  to	  in	  UN	  circles	  “as	   ‘INEPT’	  for	   its	  lack	   of	   focus	   and	   reliance	   on	   glossy	   brochures.”	   The	   Economist	   ‘High	   hopes	   and	   slender	  means’,	   October	   29	   2007	  http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10049715	   Last	  accessed	  02.05.2008	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them	  with	  a	  single	  new	  World	  Environment	  Organisation.22	  Also	  noteworthy	  is	  the	  long-­‐standing	  proposal	  to	  turn	  the	  defunct	  Trusteeship	  Council,	  one	  of	  the	   UN’s	   six	   principal	   organs,	   into	   a	   body	   charged	   with	   overseeing	   the	  protection	   of	   the	   global	   environment.	   Like	   all	   the	   other	   demands	   for	  substantial	   reform	   of	   the	   UN	   system,	   this	   suggestion	   has	   not	   attracted	   the	  support	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  states	  that	  hold	  the	  veto	  over	  any	  amendments	  to	   the	   UN	   charter.	   In	   an	   attempt	   to	   invigorate	   the	   debate	   on	   UN	   reform,	   a	  group	   of	   academics	   have	   recently	   articulated	   the	   ‘Hakone	   Vision’	   in	  which	  they	   call	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   Sustainable	   Development	   Council,	  possibly	  “organised	  as	  a	  dual-­‐chamber	  system,	  consisting	  of	  governments	  on	  the	  one	  side	  and	  issue-­‐specific	  representatives	  from	  non-­‐state	  actors	  on	  the	  other”	  (Kanie	  et	  al	  2012,	  301).	  	  
ii. The	  ideational	  underpinnings	  of	  modern	  environmentalism	  	  The	   birth	   of	   the	   modern	   environmental	   movement	   in	   the	   industrialised	  world	   is	  generally	  dated	  back	  to	  Rachel	  Carson’s	  1962	  publication	  of	   ‘Silent	  Spring’,	  although	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  environmental	  issues	  had	  already	  made	  it	   onto	   the	   international	   political	   agenda	   long	   before	   that	   decade.23	   While	  concerned	  in	  particular	  with	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  large-­‐scale	  and	  indiscriminate	  use	   of	   pesticides	   on	   birdlife,	   Carson’s	   book	   helped	   trigger	   a	   broader	  awareness	  of	  the	  adverse	  effects	  on	  the	  environment	  of	  many	  existing	  human	  and	   industrial	  practices.	   In	  1968,	  Garrett	  Hardin	  employed	  the	  metaphor	  of	  the	   “tragedy	   of	   the	   commons”	   in	   his	   article	   for	   the	   journal	  Science	   (Hardin	  1968)	  –	  the	  term	  was	  quickly	  associated	  not	  only	  with	  the	  perceived	  threat	  posed	   by	   rapid	   global	   population	   growth	   but	   also	   became	   a	   shorthand	   for	  many	  of	  the	  Malthusian	  concerns	  about	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  earth’s	  carrying	  capacity.	   Here	   were	   thus	   already	   two	   key	   themes	   that	   came	   to	   have	   a	  profound	   impact	   on	   the	   shape	   of	   global	   environmental	   politics	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	   A	   good	   overview	   of	   the	   state	   of	   the	   debate	   around	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   World	  Environment	  Organisation	  is	  provided	  by	  Biermann	  and	  Bauer	  (eds.)	  (2005).	  23	  Note,	  for	  example,	  the	  first	  international	  treaty	  on	  flora	  signed	  in	  Bern	  in	  1889,	  a	  series	  of	  further	  agreements	  on	  flora	  in	  the	  1920s	  and	  1950s,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  first	  agreement	  on	  fauna	  in	  1902:	  the	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Birds	  useful	  to	  Agriculture	  (Greene	  1999,	  389).	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following	  decades:	  concerns	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  rising	  levels	  of	  pollution	  on	  a	  fragile	   ecological	   balance	   (with	   serious	   implications	   for	   human	   health),	  together	   with	   a	   growing	   awareness	   of	   how	   environmental	   challenges	   at	   a	  global	   scale	   were	   inextricably	   tied	   to	   trends	   in	   population	   growth	   and	  economic	  development.	  	  	  In	   1972,	   the	   same	   year	   as	   the	   Stockholm	   Conference,	   the	   Club	   of	   Rome24	  published	   its	   report	   on	   the	   ‘Limits	   to	   Growth’.	   The	   model	   developed	   in	  ‘Limits	   to	   Growth’	   predicted	   that	   humanity’s	   ecological	   footprint	   would	  eventually	  overshoot	  the	  planet’s	  carrying	  capacity,	  leading	  to	  contraction.25	  	  This	  line	  of	  argument	  bears	  resemblance	  to	  much	  earlier	  thinking	  about	  the	  connection	   between	   resource	   scarcity	   and	   population	   growth.	   In	   the	   18th	  Century,	  Thomas	  Malthus	  wrote	  ‘An	  Essay	  on	  the	  Principle	  of	  Population’	  in	  which	   he	   argued	   that	   population	   growth	   would	   eventually	   result	   in	   food	  shortages	   and	   lead	   to	   a	   struggle	   for	   survival	   among	  humans.	   The	   ‘limits	   to	  growth’	  scenario	  is	  one	  of	  impending	  and	  inevitable	  gloom	  for	  mankind	  if	  the	  world’s	   population	   follows	   its	   natural	   inclination	   to	   reproduce	   and	   pursue	  economic	   betterment.	   Resource	   scarcity	   presents	   one	   given	   limit	   to	  continued	   growth;	   another	   is	   posed	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   planet’s	   ability	   to	  assimilate	   ever	   greater	   quantities	   of	   waste	   will	   eventually	   be	   exhausted,	  leading	  to	  a	  build-­‐up	  of	  toxic	  pollution	  that	  endangers	  human	  survival.	  	  	  Back	   in	   the	   18th	   century	   Malthus	   proposed	   a	   radical	   solution	   to	   the	  population	  dilemma.	  In	  his	  worldview	  the	  cause	  of	  rapid	  population	  growth	  was	  the	  tendency	  of	  the	  poor	  to	  reproduce	  at	  unsustainable	  levels,	  a	  practice	  encouraged	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   state	   provided	   them	   with	   a	   basic	   level	   of	  subsistence	   food.	  He	  believed	   that	  without	   this	   form	  of	   assistance	   the	  poor	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	   According	   to	   its	   website,	   “the	   Club	   of	   Rome	   was	   founded	   in	   1968	   as	   an	   informal	  association	   of	   independent	   leading	   personalities	   from	   politics,	   business	   and	   science.”	   Its	  aims	   are,	   among	   others,	   “to	   identify	   the	   most	   crucial	   problems	   which	   will	   determine	   the	  future	   of	   humanity”	   and	   “to	   develop	   and	   propose	   practical	   solutions	   to	   the	   challenges	  identified.”	   The	   Club	   of	   Rome	  Website	   http://www.clubofrome.org/?p=324	   Last	   accessed	  13.10.2011	  25	   The	   Club	   of	   Rome,	   ’40	   years	   Limits	   of	   Growth’.	   Video	   viewable	   at	  http://www.clubofrome.org/?p=326	  Last	  accessed	  13.10.2011	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would	  be	  driven	  to	  have	  fewer	  children	  –	  advocating	  in	  essence	  that	  it	  would	  be	  preferable	  to	  let	  them	  starve	  now	  than	  in	  the	  future.	  While	  Malthus’	  policy	  recommendations	   are	   easily	   refuted	   (for	   one,	   poorer	   families	   tend	   to	   have	  more	   children	   not	   less,	   thus	   the	   argument	   that	   economic	   deprivation	   will	  limit	   population	   growth	   does	   not	   hold),	   the	   underlying	   logic	   of	   ultimately	  unsustainable	  population	  growth	  is	  not	  only	  found	  in	  the	   ‘Limits	  to	  Growth’	  report	  but	  was	  also	   taken	  up	  by	  a	  number	  of	  other	  academics	  and	  scholars	  during	  that	  period.	  One	  example	  of	  this	  type	  of	  thinking	  is	  Paul	  Ehrlich’s	  1968	  book	  ‘The	  Population	  Bomb’	  which	  famously	  stated	  that	  the	  “battle	  to	  feed	  all	  of	  humanity	  is	  over”	  and	  argued	  that	  mass	  starvation	  was	  imminent	  (Ehrlich	  1968).	  	  A	   new	   generation	   of	   thinkers,	   however,	   challenged	   the	   underlying	  assumptions	  and	   the	   implications	  of	  neo-­‐Malthusianism,	   for	  example	   in	   the	  form	  of	  “the	  Promethean	  Response”	  (Dryzek	  2005,	  57).	  This	  “response”	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  limits	  is	  mistaken	  and	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  the	  efficiency	   of	   the	   market	   in	   managing	   scarcity	   as	   well	   as	   for	   the	   ability	   of	  humans	  to	  employ	  technology	  to	  adapt	  to	  new	  and	  changing	  circumstances.	  Against	  the	  doom	  and	  gloom	  scenario	  put	  forward	  by	  those	  adhering	  to	  the	  ‘limits	  to	  growth’	  thesis,	  the	  Prometheans	  subscribe	  to	  an	  optimistic	  view	  of	  the	  future	  and	  man’s	  ability	  to	  come	  up	  with	  technical	  solutions	  to	  evolving	  challenges.	   Dryzek	   (2005)	   refers	   to	   Julian	   Simon’s	   work	   in	   the	   1980s	   and	  Bjorn	  Lomborg’s	   ‘The	  Sceptical	  Environmentalist’	  published	   in	  2001	  as	   two	  key	  texts	  that	  display	  continuity	  in	  their	  Promethean	  assumptions.	  It	   is	  also	  worth	  mentioning	   Beckerman	   who	  maintains	   that	   there	   is	   no	   real	   conflict	  between	   economic	   growth	   and	   the	   environment	   and	   puts	   forward	   many	  arguments	  that	  are	  also	  found	  in	  Lomborg’s	  work	  (Beckermann	  1995).	  	  The	   belief	   that	   economic	   growth	   and	   environmental	   protection	   are	  fundamentally	   compatible	   underpins	   the	   dominant	   ‘sustainable	  development’	  discourse	  in	  global	  environmental	  governance.	  In	  1983	  the	  UN	  Secretary	  General	  commissioned	  a	  report	  on	  the	  pressing	  environmental	  and	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development	   challenges	   facing	   the	   international	   community.	   The	  independent	  World	  Commission	  on	  Environment	  and	  Development	  (WCED)	  was	  set	  up	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly	  and	  entrusted	  with	  the	  task	  of	  producing	  this	  analysis.	  Gro	  Harlem	  Brundtland,	  the	  former	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  Norway,	  headed	   the	   commission	   and	   in	   1987	  presented	   ‘Our	  Common	  Future’	   (also	  referred	   to	   as	   the	   Brundtland	   Report)	   to	   the	   UN	   General	   Assembly.	   This	  report	   has	   been	   credited	   with	   introducing	   the	   concept	   of	   sustainable	  development	   into	   the	  mainstream	   international	  political	  discourse,	  defining	  it	   as	   “development	   that	   meets	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   present	   without	  compromising	   the	   ability	   of	   future	   generations	   to	   meet	   their	   own	   needs”	  (WCED	  1987,	  8).	  Lafferty	  identifies	  three	  basic	  elements	  in	  the	  commission’s	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  ‘sustainable	  development’:	  firstly,	  “the	  element	  of	  so-­‐called	  ‘physical	  sustainability’,	  whereby	  human	  development	  must	  be	  assessed	  with	  respect	   to	   the	   limits	   of	   nature	   and	   overall	   global	   ecological	   balance”;	  secondly,	   “an	   element	   of	   ‘global	   equity’,	   whereby	   the	   extractive	   and	  distributional	  aspects	  of	  environment-­‐and-­‐development	  should	  be	  equitably	  divided	   among	   living	   generations,	   both	   locally	   and	   globally”;	   thirdly	   “an	  element	  of	  ‘generational	  equity’	  whereby	  the	  environment-­‐and-­‐development	  relationship	   must	   be	   assessed	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   needs	   of	   future	  generations”	  (Lafferty	  1996,	  188-­‐189).	  	  	  The	   fact	   that	   the	   Brundtland	   Commission	   sought	   to	   integrate	   concerns	   of	  equity	   among	   living	   generations	   into	   the	   international	   environmental	  discourse	   reflected	   a	   growing	   acceptance	   of	   the	   political	   demands	   put	  forward	   by	   the	   governments	   of	   the	   global	   South.	   Developing	   countries	  traditionally	   regarded	   a	   narrow	   focus	   on	   environmental	   protection	   as	   a	  potential	   obstacle	   to	   their	   right	   to	   development.	   From	   Stockholm	   onwards	  they	   therefore	   tried	   to	   link	   environmental	   to	   developmental	   concerns	   by	  pointing	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  poverty	  as	  one	  of	  the	  main	  causes	  of	  unsustainable	  practices	   by	   citizens	   in	   developing	   countries.	   These	   attempts	   at	   creating	  linkages	   met	   with	   some	   initial	   resistance	   from	   a	   number	   of	   developed	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countries.26	  In	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  Stockholm	  Conference	  of	  1972	  the	  US	  voted	  against	   a	   resolution	   stating	   that	   environmental	   protection	   efforts	  must	   not	  hinder	   development	   in	   the	   third	   world	   (Keck	   and	   Sikkink	   1998,	   124).	   By	  1992,	  however,	  the	  concept	  of	  sustainable	  development	  had	  emerged	  as	  the	  ideational	  pillar	  of	  global	  environmental	  governance,	   “a	   ‘global	  bargain’	   (...)	  struck	   between	  North	   and	   South	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   acceptance	   from	   both	  sides	   of	   the	   desirability	   of	   achieving	   a	   truly	   global	   economy	   which	   would	  guarantee	  growth	  and	  better	  environmental	  records	  to	  all”	  (De	  Campos	  Melle	  2000,	  35).	  	  	  In	   addition	   to	   linking	   environmental	   protection	   efforts	   to	   the	   fight	   against	  poverty,	  developing	  country	  governments	  also	  pointed	  out	  repeatedly	  that	  it	  were,	   in	   fact,	   the	  current	   lifestyles	  and	  consumptions	  patterns	   in	   the	  North	  that	  put	  the	  greatest	  strain	  on	  shared	  natural	  resources	  –	  countries	  that	  had	  reached	   their	   high	   levels	   of	   development	  with	   scant	   regard	   for	   sustainable	  practices.	   UNCED’s	   Agenda	   21,	   Chapter	   4,	   captured	   this	   by	   stating	   that	   the	  “major	   cause	   of	   continued	   deterioration	   of	   the	   global	   environment	   is	   the	  unsustainable	   pattern	   of	   consumption	   and	   production,	   particular	   in	  industrialised	  countries”	  (UN	  1992).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  industrialised	  country	  governments	   began	   to	   emphasize	   the	   fact	   that	   their	   efforts	   towards	  environmental	  protection	  risked	  being	  cancelled	  out	  by	  the	  enormous	  future	  environmental	   impact	   of	   rapidly	   developing	   countries	   such	   as	   India	   and	  China.	  The	  principle	  of	  ‘common	  but	  differentiated	  responsibilities’	  was	  thus	  held	   up	   as	   “an	   attempt	   to	  meet	   Northern	   concerns	   that	   all	   countries	   have	  obligations	  and	  Southern	  concerns	   that	   those	  obligations	  are	  not	   the	  same”	  (Elliott	  2004,	  174).	  	  Although	   sustainable	   development	   has	   emerged	   as	   the	   central	   leitmotif	   for	  global	  environmental	  governance,	  the	  concept	  is	  not	  without	  its	  critics.	  These	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	   But	   note	   that	   –	   as	   always	   –	   analysing	   the	   debate	   as	   a	   North	   vs.	   South	   conflict	   means	  oversimplifying	   it.	   The	   position	   of	   some	   European	   countries	   (notably	   Sweden)	   differed	  remarkably	  from	  that	  of	  the	  US	  during	  the	  Stockholm	  process	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  1998,	  123-­‐4).	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argue	  that	  it	  is	  far	  from	  certain	  whether	  any	  approach	  is	  really	  able	  to	  cater	  in	   equal	   measure	   to	   the	   goals	   of	   both	   sustainability	   and	   development	   and	  that	   there	   is,	   in	   fact,	   a	   trade-­‐off	   between	   the	   two.	   Those	   who	   believe	   that	  current	  resources	  should	  primarily	  be	  used	  to	  finance	  and	  support	  economic	  development	   in	   poor	   countries	   rely	   on	   the	   argument	   that	   industrialised	  countries	   are	   able	   to	   ‘decouple’	   economic	   growth	   from	   ecological	   damage	  and	   have	   shown	   improvements	   across	   a	   broad	   spectrum	   of	   environmental	  indicators	  (Connelly	  and	  Smith	  2003,	  68).	   In	  this	  view,	   increased	  sensitivity	  towards	  environmental	  concerns	  and	  popular	  support	  for	  greater	  regulatory	  efforts	  to	  combat	  pollution	  will	  come	  naturally	  once	  countries	  reach	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  economic	  development.	  Opponents	  of	  this	  view	  question	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  ‘decoupling’	  thesis	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  relies	  on	  the	  displacement	  of	  pollution	  and	  energy-­‐consumption	  to	  less	  industrialised	  countries	  and	  point	  out	  that	  it	  is	  still	  far	  from	  certain	  that	  decoupling	  can	  really	  be	  achieved	  in	  a	  systematic	   fashion	   through	   public	   policy	   in	   the	   long	   term	   (Connelly	   and	  Smith	  2003,	  69).	  They	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  naive	  to	  assume	  that	  “existing	  political,	  economic,	   and	   social	   institutions	   can	   internalise	   the	   care	   for	   the	  environment”	  (Hajer	  1995,	  25).	  	  	  In	   short,	   critical	   voices	   believe	   that	   current	   sustainable	   development	  strategies	  do	  not	  challenge	  the	  very	  norms	  and	  practices	  that	  are	  the	  cause	  of	  environmental	   degradation	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   The	   UNCED	   process	   and	   its	  legacy	  on	   the	   institutional	  design	  of	   global	   environmental	   governance	   is,	   in	  this	   view,	   characterised	   as	   a	   prime	   example	   of	   “the	   compromise	   of	   liberal	  environmentalism”	   (Bernstein	   2001).	   It	   has	   reinforced	   a	   problem-­‐solving	  approach	  within	  the	  fixed	  parameters	  of	  the	  liberal	  economic	  order	  without	  questioning	   its	   key	   pillars	   and	   core	   values.	   In	   fact,	   the	   Rio	   Conference	   has	  been	  described	  as	  a	  process	  that	  “fully	  institutionalised	  the	  shift	  from	  seeing	  industry	   and	  wealth	   as	   the	   cause	   of	   environmental	   degradation	   to	   viewing	  them	  as	  the	  solution	  to	  environmental	  problems”	  (DeSombre	  2005,	  28).	  The	  pro-­‐growth	   and	   pro-­‐development	   paradigm	   is,	   according	   to	   Chatterjee	   and	  Finger	  (1994),	  shared	  not	  only	  by	  the	  global	  North	  but	  also	  by	  Southern	  elites	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and	  most	  international	  NGOs.	  Through	  participating	  in	  global	  environmental	  conferences	   but	   without	   exerting	   any	   influence,	   international	   NGOs	   have	  become	   co-­‐opted	   into	   (and	   have	   thereby	   legitimised)	   the	   very	   process	   and	  hegemonic	  discourse	  of	  sustainable	  development	   that	  many	  of	   them	  sought	  to	  criticize	  originally	  (Chatterjee	  and	  Finger	  1994,	  103).	  	  Connelly	  and	  Smith,	  however,	  also	  point	   to	   the	  emergence	  of	  an	  alternative	  trajectory	   to	   ecological	  modernisation	  within	   contemporary	   green	   political	  theory:	   they	   term	   this	   “ecological	   democratisation”	   (Connelly	   and	   Smith	  2003,	   71).	   The	   dominant	   institutions	   of	   global	   environmental	   governance	  have	   historically	   neglected	   the	   “experiences	   and	   needs	   of	   the	  disenfranchised”	  (Connelly	  and	  Smith	  2003,	  71),	  in	  both	  their	  interpretation	  and	  implementation	  of	  sustainable	  governance	  and	  in	  how	  they	  identify	  the	  problems	  to	  be	  addressed:	  “many	  explanations	  of	  environmental	  degradation	  within	   political	   ecology	   have	   been	   constructed	  without	   the	   participation	   of	  affected	  peoples,	   and	  without	   acknowledging	  how	  explanations	  may	   reflect	  social	   framings”	  (Forsyth	  2003,	  10).	  This	   ‘blind	  spot’	  can	  only	  be	  addressed	  through	  encouraging	   the	  participation	  of	   these	  communities	   in	   the	  relevant	  decision-­‐making	  processes,	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  “through	  the	  democratisation	  of	  technological,	  economic	  and	  political	  decision	  making	  [that]	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  (and	  trust	  in)	  institutions	  will	  be	  rebuilt”	  (Connelly	  and	  Smith	  2003,	  71).	  “	  	  
iii. Strengthening	  participation	  in	  global	  environmental	  governance	  Environmental	   politics	   is	   often	   still	   classified	   as	   an	   area	   of	   ‘low	   politics’	   in	  International	  Relations	  and	  is	  therefore	  seen	  as	  lacking	  some	  of	  the	  saliency	  and	  inherent	  tensions	  that	  characterize	  more	  traditional	  security	  concerns.27	  The	   classification	   of	   many	   environmental	   issues	   as	   low	   saliency	   politics	  makes	   it	   easier	   for	   non-­‐state	   actors	   to	   participate	   in	   and	   influence	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	   The	   view	   of	   environmental	   politics	   as	   distinct	   from	   the	   classical	   security	   agenda	   is,	   of	  course,	   strongly	   contested.	   In	   particular,	   any	   conflict	   analysis	   that	   takes	   account	   of	   the	  problem	  of	  growing	  resource	  scarcity	  acknowledges	  the	  fact	  that	  environmental	  degradation	  and	  continuing	  resource	  depletion	  are	  already	   important	  contributing	   factors	   in	  many	  civil	  conflicts.	  Some	  fear	  that	  the	  same	  factors	  will	  also	  lead	  to	  interstate	  conflict	  in	  future.	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environmental	  negotiations	  and	  decision-­‐making	  processes.	  Specific	  features	  of	   environmental	   politics	   also	  mitigate	   in	   favour	   of	   participatory	   practices:	  the	   need	   for	   scientific	   input,	   the	   importance	   of	   gathering	   and	   analyzing	  information	  about	  environmental	  degradation,	  the	  need	  to	  address	  all	  groups	  within	   society	   to	   achieve	   more	   sustainable	   patterns	   of	   production	   and	  consumption,	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  establishing	  links	  from	  the	  global	  to	  the	  local	   in	   order	   to	   realise	   effective	   implementation.	   In	   addition	   to	   these	  ‘output’-­‐related	  factors,	  the	  abovementioned	  democratic	  considerations	  have	  also	  shaped	  the	  development	  of	  participatory	  norms	  in	  global	  environmental	  governance.	  This	  section	  will	  briefly	  illustrate	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  participatory	  norms	   have	   cropped	   up	   in	   global	   environmental	   politics	   over	   recent	   years	  and	   will	   introduce	   epistemic	   communities	   and	   business	   as	   two	   important	  groups	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	   involved.	  The	   following	  section	  will	   then	   turn	   to	  the	  role	  of	  nongovernmental	  organisations	  (NGOs),	  the	  category	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  that	  constitutes	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  analysis.	  	  
	  The	  growing	  emphasis	  on	  participation	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors	   in	   international	  environmental	   agreements	   is	   a	   relatively	   recent	   phenomenon.	   The	   Ramsar	  Convention	  on	  Wetlands	  (1971),	  for	  example,	  merely	  “assigns	  ‘bureau	  duties’	  to	  the	  International	  Union	  for	  the	  Conservation	  of	  Nature	  (IUCN)”	  (Raustiala	  1997,	   722)	   	   –	   a	   ‘special	   case’	  NGO	   that	   also	   counts	   governments	   among	   its	  members.	   The	   1974	   Convention	   for	   the	   Preservation	   of	   Marine	   Pollution	  from	  Land-­‐based	  Sources	  does	  not	  mention	  the	  rights	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  to	  observe	  or	  participate	  (Raustiala	  1997,	  722).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  number	  of	  treaties	   and	   agreements	   signed	   during	   the	   1970s	   provided	   important	  precedents	   in	   terms	  of	  granting	  greater	  access	   to	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  An	  early	  trendsetter	   in	   terms	   of	   institutionalizing	   the	   role	   of	   NGOs	   in	   international	  environmental	  agreements	  was	  the	  1973	  Convention	  on	  International	  Trade	  in	  Endangered	  Species	  (CITES),	  which	  gave	  NGOs	  the	  right	   to	  participate	   in	  meetings	   of	   the	   Conference	   of	   the	   Parties	   (Raustiala	   1997,	   722-­‐723;	   Payne	  and	   Samhat	   2004,	   61).	   Later	   environmental	   agreements	   such	   as	   the	   1989	  Montreal	  Protocol	  on	  Substances	   that	  Deplete	   the	  Ozone	  Layer	  or	   the	  1992	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UN	   Framework	   Convention	   on	   Climate	   Change	   also	   included	   specific	  mechanisms	  for	  NGO	  participation.	  	  	  	  The	  need	   for	   the	  participation	  by	  relevant	  stakeholders	  already	  constituted	  an	  important	  element	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  sustainable	  development	  put	  forward	  by	   the	   Brundtland	   Commission.	   The	   preparatory	   work	   for	   the	   Brundtland	  Report	  of	  1987	  had	  included	  a	  series	  of	  public	  consultations	  with	  concerned	  citizens	  and	  organisations	  between	  March	  1985	  and	  February	  1987	  (Elliott	  2004,	   14).	   The	   participatory	   dimension	   of	   sustainable	   development	   was	  further	  developed	   in	  principle	  10	  of	   the	  1992	  Rio	  Declaration,	  which	  states	  that,	   “environmental	   issues	   are	   best	   handled	   with	   participation	   of	   all	  concerned	   citizens,	   at	   the	   relevant	   level”	   (United	   Nations	   1992a).	   The	  declaration	   also	   emphasizes	   the	   importance	   of	   public	   bodies	   providing	  citizens	  with	  access	   to	   information	  concerning	   the	  environment	   (“including	  information	  on	  hazardous	  materials	  and	  activities	  in	  their	  communities”)	  and	  access	   to	   complaints	   and	   response	   mechanisms,	   including	   redress	   and	  remedy	   (ibid).	   Similarly,	   Agenda	   21,	   designed	   to	   provide	   the	   blueprint	   for	  implementation	  of	   the	  Rio	  Declaration,	  holds	   in	  article	  23.1	   that	   “critical	   to	  the	   effective	   implementation	   of	   the	   objectives,	   policies	   and	   mechanisms	  agreed	  to	  by	  Governments	   in	  all	  programme	  areas	  of	  Agenda	  21	  will	  be	  the	  commitment	  and	  genuine	  involvement	  of	  all	  social	  groups”	  (UN	  1992b).	  The	  nine	   ‘major	   groups’	   singled	   out	   at	   Rio	   as	   having	   a	   legitimate	   interest	   in	  participating	   in	   the	   formulation	   and	   implementation	   of	   sustainable	  development	   strategies	   are	   business,	   farmers,	   indigenous	   people,	   local	  governments,	   NGOs,	   the	   scientific	   community,	   trade	   unions,	   women	   and	  youth.	  	  	  
	  While	   both	   the	   Rio	   Declaration	   and	   Agenda	   21	   constitute	   non-­‐binding	  commitments,	  the	  1998	  Aarhus	  Convention	  on	  Access	  to	  Information,	  Public	  Participation	   in	   Decision-­‐making	   and	   Access	   to	   Justice	   in	   Environmental	  Matters	   is	   a	   regional	   binding	   instrument	   and	   as	   such,	   the	   most	   important	  institutionalisation	  in	  treaty	  law	  of	  the	  commitment	  to	  participation	  made	  at	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Rio	   (Mason	   2005,	   78).	   The	   Aarhus	   convention	   employs	   a	   “non-­‐territorial	  definition	   of	   the	   ‘public	   concerned’”,	   which	   encompasses	   “those	   natural	   or	  legal	  persons	  affected	  or	  likely	  to	  be	  affected	  by,	  or	  having	  an	  interest	  in,	  the	  relevant	   decision-­‐making”	   (Mason	   2005,	   78).	   At	   their	   2005	   meeting	   in	  Kazakhstan,	   the	   parties	   to	   the	   convention	   agreed	   to	   adopt	   the	   so-­‐called	  ‘Almaty	   Guidelines’,	   which	   focus	   more	   explicitly	   on	   the	   “application	   of	   the	  principles	  of	  the	  Convention	  in	  international	  environmental	  decision-­‐making	  processes	   and	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   international	   organisations	   in	  matters	  relating	  to	  the	  environment”	  (United	  Nations	  Economic	  Commission	  for	  Europe	  2005).	  	  	  Bäckstrand	   (2006)	   points	   out	   that,	   by	   the	   time	   of	   the	   World	   Summit	   on	  Sustainable	   Development	   in	   Johannesburg	   in	   2002	   the	   sustainable	  development	   debate	   had	   further	   progressed	   from	   the	   emphasis	   on	  participation	  by	  the	  ‘major	  groups’	  evident	  at	  Rio.	  The	  objective	  was	  now	  to	  create	   modes	   of	   participation	   “structured	   to	   encourage	   deliberation	   and	  collaboration	  of	  disparate	   actors	  with	  a	   stake	   in	   implementation	  of	  Agenda	  21”	   (Bäckstrand	   2006,	   470).	   New	   efforts	   were	   concentrated	   on	   ‘multi-­‐stakeholderships’,	  which,	  Bäckstrand	  argues,	  move	  “beyond	  participation	  to	  include	   new	   forms	   of	   hybrid	   governance	   and	   deliberation	   between	   state,	  business	  and	  civil	   society”	   (Bäckstrand	  2006,	  470).	   In	  her	  case	  study	  of	   the	  WSSD,	  she	  points	  to	  “two	  distinctive	  deliberative	  mechanisms,	  which	  aimed	  at	   facilitating	   interaction	   between	   governmental	   delegates	   and	   non-­‐state	  actors”	  (Bäckstrand	  2006,	  482):	  Multi-­‐stakeholder	  dialogues	  and	  partnership	  initiatives	  (the	  type	  II	  agreements	  mentioned	  above).	  Type	  II	  agreements	  are	  intended	   to	   facilitate	   the	   implementation	   of	   Agenda	   21,	   thus	   helping	   to	  “reduce	   the	   ‘implementation	   gap’	   in	   sustainable	   development	   by	   ‘results-­‐based’	   and	   ‘outcome-­‐oriented’	   partnerships”	   (Bäckstrand	   2006,	   488).	   They	  consist	   of	   voluntary	   cooperative	   arrangements	   between	   governmental,	  corporate	  and	  NGO	  actors	  designed	  to	  deliver	  benefits	  in	  areas	  as	  diverse	  as	  health,	   conservation	   and	   sustainable	   development.	   Multi-­‐stakeholder	  dialogues	  by	  contrast,	  serve	  to	  shape	  the	  process	  of	  policy-­‐development;	  they	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are	   initiated	  by	  the	  CSD	  and	  used	  to	  bring	  together	  governmental	  delegates	  and	   representatives	   of	   major	   groups	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   exchanging	  information	  and	  views	  on	  the	  issues	  under	  discussion.	  These	  dialogues	  were	  used	   both	   in	   the	   preparatory	   process	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   WSSD,	   as	   well	   as	  during	  the	  summit	  in	  Johannesburg	  itself.	  	  
	  Besides	  NGOs	  as	   the	  most	  prominent	  representatives	  of	  global	  civil	   society,	  two	  other	  stakeholder	  groups	  have	  also	  come	  to	  play	  very	  influential	  roles	  in	  international	   environmental	   policy-­‐making:	   scientists,	   or	   epistemic	  communities,	   and	   business.	   Scientists	   are	   important	   participants	   in	   most	  environmental	   regimes,	   with	   scientific	   organisations	   generally	   granted	  observer	   status	   at	   conferences	   of	   parties	   and	   other	   policy-­‐making	   fora	  (Elliott	   2004,	   115).	   Haas	   defines	   epistemic	   communities	   as	   “transnational	  networks	   of	   knowledge-­‐based	   communities	   that	   are	   both	   politically	  empowered	   through	   their	   claims	   to	   exercise	   authoritative	   knowledge	   and	  motivated	  by	  shared	  causal	  and	  principled	  beliefs”	  (Haas	  1990,	  349	  cited	  in	  Elliott	  2004,	  115-­‐6).	  According	  to	  Litfin,	  the	  power	  of	  epistemic	  communities	  “derives	   from	   their	   perceived	   ability	   to	   make	   authoritative	   knowledge	  claims”	  (Litfin	  1995,	  251).	  In	  the	  context	  of	  global	  environmental	  politics	  it	  is	  important	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  way	  scientific	  knowledge	  (or	  uncertainty)	  is	  “framed”	   to	   support	   particular	   political	   objectives	   (Litfin	   1995,	   255).	   The	  important	   point	   to	   note	   is	   that	   science	   is	   rarely	   value-­‐free	   and	   that	   “social	  and	   political	   framings	   are	   woven	   into	   both	   the	   formulation	   of	   scientific	  explanations	   of	   environmental	   problems,	   and	   the	   solutions	   proposed	   to	  reduce	  them”	  (Forsyth	  2003,	  1).	  	  	  Business	  lobby	  groups	  and	  companies	  have	  also	  come	  to	  play	  an	  increasingly	  influential	   role	   in	   shaping	   international	   environmental	   policy.	   They	   exert	  influence	  through	  direct	  participation	  as	  an	   important	  stakeholder	  group	  in	  multilateral	  environmental	  negotiations,	  through	  the	  lobbying	  of	  government	  delegates	  and	  the	  use	  of	  domestic	  political	  channels,	   their	  relationship	  with	  the	  media,	  and	  the	  funding	  of	  relevant	  research	  and	  business-­‐friendly	  NGOs.	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Business	   does	   not	   constitute	   a	  monolithic	   interest	   group	   in	   environmental	  politics	   and	   different	   industries	   and	   sectors	   may	   occupy	   very	   different	  positions	  on	  the	  same	  environmental	  issue	  (Falkner	  2008).	  NGOs	  can	  exploit	  these	  differences	  among	  corporate	  actors	  and	  enter	  into	  alliances	  with	  more	  progressive	   business	   groups	   –	   a	   form	   of	   partnership	   politics	   that	   is	  increasingly	   common	   in	  environmental	  politics	   (of	   course,	   corporate	  actors	  also	   use	   these	   alliances	   strategically).	   While	   variations	   exist	   among	  corporations	  depending	  on	  the	  nature	  of	   their	   industry	  and	  their	   individual	  position	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   peers,	   it	   can	   be	   reasonably	   assumed	   that	   business	   is	   (on	  balance)	   more	   likely	   than	   other	   segments	   of	   society	   to	   oppose	   stringent	  regulatory	   frameworks	   designed	   to	   reduce	   environmental	   pollution	   and	  lobby	  in	  favour	  of	  self-­‐regulatory	  approaches.	  	  	  In	  chapter	  II,	  the	  case	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  was	  pointed	  out	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	   transnational	   constituency	   at	   risk	   of	   democratic	   exclusion	   from	   global	  policy-­‐making	   processes	   (Marchetti	   2008).	   Just	   like	   NGOs,	   the	   scientific	  community	  and	  business,	  indigenous	  people	  constitute	  one	  of	  the	  UN’s	  ‘major	  groups’.	   The	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   are	   recognized	   in	   a	   number	   of	  international	  agreements	  and	  legal	  frameworks,	  most	  directly	  in	  the	  2007	  UN	  Declaration	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   (UNDRIP),	   the	   ILO	  Convention	   Nr.	   169	   concerning	   Indigenous	   and	   Tribal	   Peoples	   in	  Independent	   Countries	   (1989)	   and	   the	   Convention	   on	   Biological	   Diversity	  (discussed	   in	   chapter	   IV).	   The	   United	   Nations	   Permanent	   Forum	   on	  Indigenous	  Issues	  (UNIPFII)	  was	  set	  up	  in	  2000	  and	  reports	  to	  ECOSOC.	  The	  forum’s	   16	   members	   are	   nominated	   in	   equal	   parts	   by	   governments	   and	  indigenous	   peoples.	   It	   has	   the	   mandate	   to	   discuss	   and	   raise	   awareness	   of	  indigenous	  issues	  within	  ECOSOC’s	  areas	  of	  work	  and	  has	  a	  recommendation	  and	   coordination	   role	   on	   indigenous	   issues	   within	   the	   broader	   UN	   system	  (Secretariat	  of	  the	  UNPFII	  2008,	  2).	  	  Despite	  the	  formal	  recognition	  of	   indigenous	  peoples	  and	  their	  rights	   in	  the	  UN	   system,	   there	   is	   a	   lack	   of	   definitional	   clarity	   as	   to	   what	   communities	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might	   be	   defined	   as	   indigenous.	   According	   to	   Article	   33	   of	   the	   UNDRIP,	  “Indigenous	   peoples	   have	   the	   right	   to	   determine	   their	   own	   identity	   or	  membership	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  customs	  and	  traditions”	  (UNGA	  2008).	  This	  reflects	  a	  somewhat	  circular	  logic	  according	  to	  which	  a	  local	  community	  has	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐identify	  as	  ‘indigenous’	  and	  will	  be	  recognized	  as	  such.	  In	  practice,	   indigenous	   peoples	   are	   usually	   associated	   with	   a	   particular	  relationship	   to	   the	   lands	   they	   inhabit	   and	  with	   a	   sense	   of	   community	   that	  sets	  them	  apart	  from	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population:	  “The	   term	   ‘indigenous	   peoples’	   has	   become	   a	   general	  denominator	   for	   distinct	   peoples	   who,	   through	   historical	  processes,	   have	   been	  pursuing	   their	   own	   concept	   and	  way	   of	  human	   development	   in	   a	   given	   socio-­‐economic,	   political	   and	  historical	  context.	  Throughout	  history,	  these	  distinct	  groups	  of	  peoples	  have	  tried	  to	  maintain	  their	  group	  identity,	  languages,	  traditional	   beliefs,	   worldviews	   and	   way	   of	   life	   and,	   most	  importantly,	   the	   control	   and	   management	   of	   their	   lands,	  territories	   and	   natural	   resources,	   which	   allow	   and	   sustain	  them	  to	  live	  as	  peoples.”	  (Secretariat	  of	  the	  UNPFII	  2008,	  7)	  The	   international	   recognition	   of	   the	   status	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   together	  with	  the	  relative	  definitional	  vagueness	  creates	  incentives	  and	  opportunities	  for	   local	   communities	   to	   self-­‐identify	   as	   indigenous.	   The	   discourse	   of	  indigenous	  peoples	   can	  be	   strategically	  deployed	  by	   local	   communities	   and	  can	   help	   them	   to	   access	   better	   developed	   channels	   for	   participation.	   Some	  warn,	  however,	  that	  “there	   is	   a	  heavy	  price	   to	  be	  paid	   for	   the	   emphasis	  placed	  by	  proponents	   of	   indigenous	   knowledge	   on	   cultural	   purity,	  continuity,	   and	   alterity.	   Such	   efforts	   at	   cultural	   conservation	  make	  no	   room	   for	   the	  vast	  majority	  of	   the	  world’s	  poor,	  who	  live	   on	   the	   margins	   of	   subsistence	   and	   the	   most	   degraded	  ecological	   conditions	   but	  who	   cannot	   claim	   to	   be	   ‘indigenous	  people’	   in	   the	   limited	   definition	   accorded	   that	   term.”	   (Gupta	  1998,	  289	  quoted	  in	  Dove	  2006,	  193-­‐194)	  The	   various	   efforts	   and	   initiatives	   undertaken	   by	   international	  environmental	   institutions	  with	   the	   proclaimed	  objective	   of	   fostering	  more	  and	  broader	  participation	  by	  key	  stakeholders	  certainly	   look	   impressive	  on	  paper.	  To	  what	  extent	  they	  amount	  to	  a	  democratisation	  of	  global	  politics	  –	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and	   specifically	   encourage	   greater	   inclusion	   of	   marginalised	   groups	   in	  international	   environmental	   policy-­‐making	   –	   remains	  questionable.	  Despite	  the	   hype	   surrounding	   the	   apparently	   broad	   societal	   participation	   at	   the	  UNCED	  and	  (to	  a	  lesser	  degree)	  the	  WSSD,	  the	  official	  conference	  documents	  were	  hardly	  affected	  by	  various	  NGOs	  (Chatterjee	  and	  Finger	  1994,	  96).	  The	  discrepancies	   in	   power	   and	   influence	   among	   the	   various	   participants	   are	  considerable:	   clearly	   states	   hold	   a	   privileged	  position	   and	   control	   channels	  for	  access	  by	  other	  actors.	  However,	  even	  among	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  the	  ability	  to	   fully	   exploit	   these	   channels	   and	   influence	   policy	   outcomes	   is	   to	   a	   large	  degree	   a	   function	   of	   their	   respective	   resources,	   bargaining	   assets	   and	  connections	  to	  key	  governmental	  actors.	  	  
	  
iv. The	  role	  of	  environmental	  NGOs	  Paralleling	   the	   shift	   in	  multilateral	   environmental	   initiatives	   from	   an	   early	  narrow	   concentration	   on	   conservation	   issues	   to	   a	   broader	   sustainable	  development	  perspective,	  environmental	  NGOs	  have	  also	  shifted	  the	  focus	  of	  their	   attention	   and	   activities	   to	   new	   environmental	   challenges	   over	   time.	  While	   a	   small	   number	  of	   organisations	   such	   as	   the	  UK-­‐based	  Royal	   Society	  for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Birds	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Sierra	   Club	   and	   the	   National	  Audubon	   Society	   in	   the	   US	   can	   trace	   their	   history	   back	   to	   the	   early	   20th	  century,	   the	   majority	   of	   environmental	   NGOs,	   particularly	   those	   with	   an	  international	   focus,	  only	  formed	  after	  World	  War	  Two.28	  As	  more	  and	  more	  groups	   vied	   to	   occupy	   a	   place	   on	   the	   newly	   emerging	   international	  environmental	   agenda,	   they	   also	   expanded	   the	   scope	   of	   their	   operations.	  ‘New’	   environmental	   issues	   included	   pollution,	   the	   use	   of	   pesticides	   and	  fertilisers,	   nuclear	   power,	   resource	   depletion	   and	   waste	   management	  (Ahmed	   and	   Potter	   2006,	   210).	   While	   the	   Stockholm	   Conference	   in	   1972	  provided	  a	  valuable	  opportunity	  for	  these	  groups	  to	  come	  together	  at	  a	  global	  level,	   the	   years	   following	   Stockholm	   were,	   however,	   characterised	   by	  declining	  public	  interest	  in	  environmental	  issues.	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  1973	  oil	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  WWF	  was	  set	  up	  in	  1961;	  FoEI	  in	  1969	  and	  Greenpeace	  in	  1971.	  	  
	   85	  
crisis,	   economic	   recession	   and	   high	   unemployment	   rates	   in	  many	  Western	  countries,	   and	   a	   critical	   backlash	   against	   the	   doom	   scenarios	   painted	   by	  environmentalists	   in	   the	   late	   1960s	   contributed	   to	   this	   decline	   (Arts	   1998,	  20).	  	  This	  trend	  started	  to	  reverse	  again	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1980s.	  As	  mentioned	  before,	  the	   1980s	  were	   a	   decade	   characterised	   by	   a	   sense	   of	   impending	   crisis	   and	  deep	   concern	   about	   the	  planet’s	   future	   in	  many	  European	   countries	   and	   in	  the	   United	   States,	   a	   feeling	   reinforced	   by	   a	   number	   of	   environmental	  disasters	  during	  that	  period.	  As	  environmental	  concerns	  once	  again	  entered	  mainstream	   consciousness,	   membership	   in	   many	   US	   and	   European	  environmental	  organisations	  increased	  rapidly.	  In	  the	  US	  alone,	  membership	  in	  the	  Environmental	  Defence	  Fund	  (EDF)	  doubled	  between	  1985	  and	  1990,	  and	  again	  between	  1990	  and	  1991.	  The	  Nature	  Conservancy	  and	  the	  Natural	  Resources	  Defence	  Council	   both	   grew	  by	   a	   factor	   of	   2.7	  between	  1985	  and	  1990,	  the	  World	  Wildlife	  Fund	  –	  US	  grew	  5.6	  times	  and	  Greenpeace	  increased	  its	  membership	  from	  400,000	  to	  850,000.29	  	  In	   the	   developing	  world,	   too,	   the	   environment	   became	   a	   rallying	   point	   for	  concerned	   citizens	   in	   the	   1980s.	   Keck	   and	   Sikkink	   point	   to	   the	   wave	   of	  democratic	   transitions	   in	  Latin	  America	  during	   that	  period	  as	  giving	  rise	   to	  an	   enabling	   context	   for	   new	   movements	   and	   old	   conservation	   groups	   to	  coordinate	   their	   activities	   (Keck	   and	   Sikkink	   1998,	   130).	   In	   South	   and	  Southeast	   Asia	   environmental	   advocacy	   groups	   connected	   with	   existing	  community	   groups	   and	   NGOs	   working	   directly	   with	   the	   poor,	   and	  environmental	   concerns	   were	   taken	   up	   in	   the	   formulation	   of	   alternative	  visions	  of	  development	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  1998,	  130).	  Chatterjee	  and	  Finger	  refer	   to	   these	   groups	   as	   “second	  generation”	  NGOs	  –	   groups	   that	   sought	   to	  integrate	   sustainability	   concerns	  with	   a	   broader	   struggle	   for	   a	   community-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  These	  numbers	  are	  quoted	  by	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  (1998,	  128).	  Source:	  Data	  from	  National	  Wildlife	   Federation,	   The	   Conservation	   Directory	   (Washington,	   D.C.:	   National	   Wildlife	  Federation,	  1976,	  1982,	  1986,	  1990).	  All	  numbers	  relate	  to	  the	  US.	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based	   and	   participatory	   approach	   to	   development	   (Chatterjee	   and	   Finger	  1994,	  74).	  Elliott	   in	  turn	  distinguishes	  these	  groups	  from	  “third	  generation”	  NGOs:	   groups	   concerned	   with	   linking	   these	   local	   efforts	   to	   a	   larger	  “simultaneous	   challenge	   to	   global	   environment	   and	   development	  frameworks”	  (Elliott	  2004,	  120).	  The	  emergence	  of	  networks	  including	  both	  developed	  and	  developing	  country	  activists	  over	  the	  last	  decade	  should	  also	  be	  noted,	  allowing	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  groups	  to	  coordinate	  their	  strategies	  and	  activities	  at	  the	  transnational	  level.	  	  	  Analyses	   of	   the	   role	   of	   NGOs	   in	   global	   environmental	   governance	   may	   be	  broadly	   classified	   as	   one	   of	   the	   following:	   those	   that	   regard	   NGOs	   as	  democratising	   agents	   in	   global	   environmental	   governance;	   those	   that	  concentrate	  on	  the	  efficiency	  contributions	  NGOs	  make	  to	  intergovernmental	  negotiation	  processes	  and	  agreement	  implementation;	  and	  those	  that	  analyse	  the	   role	   of	   NGOs	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   impact	   on	   normative	   developments	   in	  global	   environmental	   politics.	   As	   most	   of	   the	   analysis	   undertaken	   in	   this	  thesis	  focuses	  on	  the	  NGOs’	  potential	  for	  making	  democratic	  contributions	  to	  global	  environmental	  governance,	  this	  section	  shall	  briefly	  illustrate	  the	  two	  other	  roles.	  Many	  of	   these	  distinctions	  are,	  however,	  of	  a	   theoretical	  nature	  and	  the	  different	  types	  of	  roles	  often	  converge	  in	  practice.	  	  
	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  efficiency	  or	  “output	  legitimacy”	  (Scharpf	  1999)	  of	   global	   governance,	   NGOs	   are	   able	   to	   offer	   a	   number	   of	   very	   concrete	  benefits	   such	  as	   knowledge,	   expertise,	   information	  and	  other	   resources.	  By	  pursuing	   ‘insider	   strategies’,	   i.e.	   directly	   working	   with	   international	  organisations,	   NGOs	   may	   have	   the	   opportunity	   to	   participate	   in	   policy	  deliberations,	   albeit	   almost	   always	   in	   a	  much	  more	   restricted	   fashion	   than	  governments,	   and	   often	   only	   in	   a	   tokenistic	   way.	   Writing	   about	   epistemic	  communities,	   Litfin	   (1995)	   uses	   the	   term	   “knowledge	   brokers”	   for	   those	  groups	  that	  act	  as	  interpretative	  intermediaries	  between	  factual	  information	  and	   policymakers.	   This	   role	   description	   also	   applies	   to	   the	  more	   research-­‐orientated	   NGOs	   that	   are	   sometimes	   able	   to	   “frame”	   and	   interpret	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information	   for	   policymakers	   as	   to	   support	   their	   own	   values	   and	   beliefs.	  According	   to	   Litfin	   this	   “is	   a	   substantial	   source	   of	   power,	   especially	   under	  conditions	   of	   scientific	   uncertainty	   such	   as	   those	   which	   characterise	  environmental	   problems”	   (Litfin	   1995,	   254).	   Scientific	   information	   is,	  however,	   not	   the	   only	   relevant	   form	   of	   knowledge	   that	   NGOs	   can	   offer	   to	  policy-­‐makers.	   Yet	   another	   important	   source	   of	   influence	   is	   their	   ability	   to	  provide	  local	  perspectives	  on	  global	  issues,	  through	  the	  provision	  of	  	  “earth-­‐centred	  knowledge”	  (Princen	  1994,	  36).	  	  Raustiala,	   who	   analyses	   the	   relationship	   between	   states,	   NGOs	   and	  environmental	  institutions	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  neoliberal	  institutionalist	  theory,	   emphasises	   the	   benefits	  NGOs	   are	   able	   to	   offer	   governments	   in	   the	  process	  of	  regime	  creation	  and	  maintenance	  (Raustiala	  1997).	  A	  key	  strength	  of	  NGOs	  is	  their	  ability	  to	  produce,	  analyse	  and	  present	  information	  through	  policy	   research	   and	   development.	   This	   allows	   states	   to	   “maximise	   policy	  information	   and	   research	  while	  minimising	   expenditures”	   (Raustiala	   1997,	  727).	   Developing	   countries	   in	   particular	   are	   likely	   to	   benefit	   from	   having	  access	   to	   this	   relatively	   cost-­‐effective	   pool	   of	   information	   and	   expertise.	  Raustiala	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  the	  collaboration	  between	  the	  NGO	  FIELD	  and	  the	   Alliance	   of	   Small	   Island	   States	   (AOSIS)	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   climate	  change	  negotiations,	  where	  FIELD	  provided	  advice	  and	  legal	  expertise	  to	  the	  AOSIS	   delegates	   (Raustiala	   1997,	   728).	   Other	   functions	   assumed	   by	   NGOs	  and	   related	   to	   the	  provision	  of	   information	   include	   the	  monitoring	   of	   state	  commitments,	  acting	  as	   “fire-­‐alarms”	   that	  alert	  governments	  and	   the	  public	  to	   undesired	   delegate	   actions,	   and	   reporting	   on	   ongoing	   negotiations	  (Raustiala	  1997,	  729).	  	  The	   role	   of	   NGOs	   as	   ‘service	   providers’	   for	   governments	   and	   international	  organisations	  has	  been	  strengthened	  over	  recent	  decades,	  largely	  as	  a	  result	  of	   the	   popularity	   of	   the	   ‘partnership’	   model	   in	   development	   and	  environmental	  policy	  implementation.	  The	  World	  Bank	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  this	   trend:	   the	   total	   number	   of	   World	   Bank	   projects	   with	   civil	   society	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involvement	   has	   increased	   from	   50	   in	   1990	   to	   294	   in	   2009	   (81%	   of	   the	  World	  Bank’s	  projects	   in	  2009)	  (IBRD/	  World	  Bank	  2009,	  25).	  Two	  specific	  examples	  of	   such	  partnerships	   from	   the	  environmental	   field	  are	   the	   ‘World	  Bank-­‐WWF	  Global	   Forest	   Alliance’,	   which	  was	   created	   in	   1998	   and	   is	   now	  active	   in	  30	  countries,	  and	   the	   ‘Critical	  Ecosystem	  Partnership	  Fund’,	  a	  150	  million	   dollar	   initiative,	   financed	   and	   run	   by	   a	   consortium	   of	   private	   and	  public	   actors	   including	   Conservation	   International,	   the	   World	   Bank,	   the	  Global	   Environment	   Facility,	   the	   MacArthur	   Foundation	   and	   the	   Japanese	  government	  (Chapin	  2004,	  24).	  NGOs	  make	  attractive	  project	  partners	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons:	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  possess	  considerable	  expertise	  and	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	   experience,	   may	   be	   able	   to	   work	   in	   a	   more	   flexible	   and	   less	  bureaucratic	  way	  than	  governmental	  agencies,	  and	  are	  sometimes	  preferred	  by	   recipient	   governments.	   While	   such	   ‘partnerships’	   may	   give	   NGOs	   some	  scope	  for	  influencing	  the	  projects	  they	  are	  involved	  in	  and/	  or	  shaping	  future	  thinking	  on	  particular	  issues,	  by	  and	  large	  their	  influence	  remains	  limited	  to	  “the	  confluence	  of	  governmental	  incentives	  and	  NGO	  comparative	  advantages	  and	  resources”	  (Raustiala	  1997,	  720).	  Power	  continues	  to	  lie	  with	  states	  and	  the	   participation	   of	   other	   actors	   does	   not	   constitute	   a	   qualitative	  transformation	   of	   global	   governance.	   Critics	   contend,	   moreover,	   that	   in	  becoming	   ‘agents’	   of	   governments,	   NGOs	   expose	   themselves	   to	   co-­‐optation	  by	  dominant	  institutions	  and	  discourses	  (Chatterjee	  and	  Finger	  1994).	  	  	  The	  risk	  of	  co-­‐optation	  is	  less	  apparent	  when	  NGOs	  pursue	  so-­‐called	  ‘outsider	  strategies.’	   In	   these	   roles	  NGOs	   strive	   to	  maintain	   a	   critical	   distance	   to	   the	  loci	  of	  power,	  or	  “empowered	  spaces”	  (Dryzek	  2009).	  Their	  objectives	  lie	  in	  ‘holding	  power	  to	  account’	  in	  the	  widest	  sense.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  through	  which	  NGOs	  work	  towards	  this	  goal:	  by	  building	  public	  expectations	  in	   order	   to	   increase	   the	   pressure	   on	   policy-­‐makers;	   passing	   information	  about	  the	  actions	  of	  governmental	  delegates	  in	  international	  negotiations	  to	  their	   domestic	   media	   and/	   or	   political	   opposition;	   and	   highlighting	   the	  failure	   and	   shortcomings	   of	   governments	   in	   meeting	   their	   international	  commitments.	   Many	   NGOs	   also	   focus	   on	   the	   malpractices	   of	   corporations,	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especially	   in	  developing	  countries,	  and	  try	  to	  bring	  these	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  policy-­‐makers	   and	   consumers	   in	   the	   industrialised	   world	   (Wapner	   1996).	  Strategies	  for	  holding	  corporate	  actors	  to	  account	  include	  initiating	  lawsuits,	  calling	   for	   consumer	   boycotts,	   and	   building	   pressure	   on	   governmental	  representations	   to	   take	   action	   (which	   may	   include	   pushing	   for	   stricter	  regulation).	   These	   strategies	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   particularly	   successful	   when	  their	   targets	  have	  a	  high	  public	  profile	  or	  have	  previously	  made	  pledges	   to	  improve	  their	  environmental	  performance	  that	  they	  fail	  to	  meet.	  In	  practice,	  the	   boundaries	   between	   insider	   and	   outsider	   roles	   are	   often	   fluid:	   “groups	  move	   between	   these	   categories	   over	   time	   depending	   on	   which	   strategies	  they	   adopt;	   and	   the	   insider-­‐outsider	   distinction	   describes,	   in	   reality,	   a	  spectrum	   of	   access	   and	   influence	   rather	   than	   a	   hard-­‐and-­‐fast	   dichotomy”	  (Newell	  2005,	  99).	  	  	  Like	   in	   many	   other	   issue	   areas,	   environmental	   NGOs	   often	   work	   at	   the	  cutting	  edge	  of	  promoting	  the	  acceptance	  of	  new	  environmental	  norms	  and	  values.	   Efforts	   designed	   to	   deal	   with	   many	   large-­‐scale	   environmental	  challenges	  such	  as	  climate	  change	  or	   the	  conservation	  of	  biodiversity	  mean	  that	   the	   costs	   are	   borne	   by	   present	   generations	  whereas	   any	   benefits	  may	  not	  be	   apparent	  until	   a	   long	   time	   into	   the	   future.	  Election	   cycles	   and	  other	  short-­‐term	   feedback	   mechanisms	   designed	   to	   ensure	   accountability	   in	  democratic	  political	   systems,	  however,	   limit	   the	  capacity	  and	  willingness	  of	  governments	   to	   respond	   to	   environmental	   challenges	   with	   long	   horizons.	  NGOs	   do	   not	   work	   under	   these	   constraints	   to	   the	   same	   extent:	   their	  motivation	  for	  action	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  based	  on	  ideals	  and	  norms	  and	  they	  are	   therefore	   in	   a	   good	   position	   to	   advocate	   long-­‐term	   strategies	   that	  may	  prove	   unpopular	   at	   present.	   As	   a	   result,	   NGOs	   have	   been	   portrayed	   as	  guardians	   of	   the	   interests	   of	   future	   generations	   and	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   the	  “transnational	   development	   of	   intergenerational	   equity	   would	   seem	   to	   be	  encouraged	  by	  extending	  participation	  rights	  to	  NGOs	  in	  the	  formulation	  and	  implementation	  of	  international	  environmental	  laws	  and	  standards”	  (Mason	  2005,	  31).	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  Wapner	  analyses	  environmental	  NGOs	  as	  “cultural	  agents	  that	  shape	  the	  way	  vast	  numbers	  of	  people	  understand	  themselves	  and	  the	  world	  around	  them”	  (Wapner	   2002,	   38).	   Environmental	   NGOs	   work	   towards	   changing	   and	  realigning	   the	   ideational	   underpinnings	   of	   existing	   environmentally	  destructive	  social	  practices.	  In	  East	  Asia,	  to	  cite	  one	  of	  Wapner’s	  examples,	  a	  number	  of	  wild	  animals	  such	  as	  bears,	  tigers	  and	  rhinos	  are	  sought	  after	  and	  caught	   for	   their	   allegedly	   health-­‐promoting	   benefits	   (such	   as	   bear	   bile	   or	  rhino	  horn).	  Among	  the	  strategies	  employed	  by	  NGOs	  to	  fight	  these	  practices	  are	   attempts	   to	   change	   existing	   belief	   systems	   through	   dialogue	   and	  awareness-­‐raising	  activities	   targeted	  at	   consumers	  and	  health	  practitioners	  (Wapner	  2002,	  47).	  One	  of	  the	  first	  global	  campaigns	  designed	  and	  executed	  by	   environmental	   NGOs	   with	   the	   objective	   of	   changing	   broad	   societal	  attitudes	  centred	  on	  the	  protection	  of	  whales.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  environmental	  movement	   achieved	   considerable	   success	   in	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s	   in	  changing	   existing	   perceptions	   of	   whales	   from	   a	   resource	   traditionally	  exploited	   by	   humans	   to	   one	   of	   an	   endangered	   specie	   worthy	   of	   particular	  protection,	   and	   portraying	   whales	   as	   creatures	   with	   “anthropomorphic	  qualities”	   (Wapner	   2002,	   48).	   These	   normative	   and	   cultural	   changes	   can	  have	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	  the	  institutions	  of	  global	  governance,	  although	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  establish	  and	  measure	  clear	  causal	  links.	  	  	  
v. Conclusion	  The	   chapter	   sketched	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   current	   intergovernmental	  architecture	   of	   global	   environmental	   governance	   and	   introduced	   the	   main	  UN	  institutions	  responsible	  for	  global	  environmental	  issues.	  It	  also	  illustrated	  how	   the	   thinking	   about	   environmental	   protection	   has	   evolved	   over	   recent	  years	   and	   how	   participatory	   ideas	   and	   practices	   have	   become	   more	  widespread	   in	   international	   efforts	   to	   combat	   environmental	   degradation.	  Environmental	  NGOs	  and	  other	  non-­‐state	  actors	  have	  been	  quick	  to	  seize	  the	  opportunities	  offered	  to	  them	  and	  have	  strengthened	  their	  engagement	  with	  international	  IGOs	  over	  recent	  decades.	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  The	  current	  system	  of	  global	  environmental	  governance	  is,	  however,	  far	  from	  ‘democratic’.	   Environmental	   policy	   responses	   continue	   to	  be	   shaped	  by	   the	  interests	   of	   the	   most	   powerful	   but	   not	   necessarily	   the	   most	   affected	   or	  vulnerable	   states.	   Moreover,	   participation	   rights	   for	   civil	   society	  organisations	  might	   look	  good	  on	  paper	  but	  actually	  offer	  only	  very	   limited	  opportunities	  for	  exerting	  real	  influence	  –	  in	  particular	  for	  the	  most	  affected	  communities.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  analyse	  the	  democratic	  shortcomings	  of	  two	   UN	   conventions	   and	   ask	   whether	   and	   how	   NGOs	   have	   responded	   to	  these.	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IV. The	   external	   dimension:	   NGO	   democratic	  
demands	   in	   the	   global	   climate	   and	   biodiversity	  
conventions.	  	  This	  chapter	  seeks	  to	  investigate	  NGO	  demands	  for	  more	  democratic	  forms	  of	  governance	  in	  the	  United	  Nations	  climate	  and	  biodiversity	  conventions.	  The	  analysis	   is	   intended	   to	   provide	   a	   more	   specific	   empirical	   illustration	   and	  examination	   of	   the	   theoretical	   arguments	   relating	   to	   democratic	   deficits	  within	  global	  policy-­‐making	  processes	  outlined	  before.	  Chapter	  II	  introduced	  Marchetti’s	   (2008)	   distinction	   of	   two	   types	   of	   potential	   contributions	   by	  NGOs	   to	   more	   democratic	   forms	   of	   governance	   at	   the	   global	   level:	  	  formulating	   “external	   claims	   that	   force	   the	   strengthening	   of	   democratic	  practices	  in	  international	  institutions”	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  working	  through	  the	   	   “internal	   practices	   of	   democracy”	   (Marchetti	   2008,	   165)	   on	   the	   other.	  The	   focus	   of	   the	   chapter	   is	   on	   the	   external	   claims	   and	   demands	   made	   by	  NGOs	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (UNFCCC)	   and	   the	   Convention	   on	   Biological	   Diversity	   (CBD),	   which	   might	  contribute	   to	   “the	   strengthening	   of	   democratic	   practices	   in	   international	  institutions”.	  The	   issue	  of	   “internal	  practices	  of	  democracy”	  of	  NGOs	  will	  be	  addressed	  (in	  part)	  theoretically	  in	  chapter	  V	  and	  empirically	  in	  chapters	  VI	  and	  VII.	  	  NGO	  demands	  for	  more	  democratic	  forms	  of	  governance	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  two	   framework	   conventions	   cannot	   be	   meaningfully	   analysed	   without	   an	  understanding	  of	   the	  problems	  of	   climate	   change	   and	  biodiversity	   loss	   and	  the	   specific	   characteristics	   of	   the	   intergovernmental	   conventions	   set	   up	   to	  tackle	  them.	  This	  chapter	  therefore	  consists	  of	  two	  parts.	  Part	  one	  will	  offer	  an	   overview	   of	   the	   climate	   and	   the	   biodiversity	   conventions	   and	   the	  participation	  of	  NGOs	  therein.	  This	  is	  followed	  in	  part	  two	  of	  the	  chapter	  by	  an	  analysis	  of	  NGO	  demands	  in	  response	  to	  the	  alleged	  democratic	  deficits	  in	  the	   conventions.	   The	   discussion	   of	   NGO	   demands	  will	   distinguish	   between	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responses	   to	   representation	   inequities	   at	   the	   intergovernmental	   level	   and	  participation	  deficits	   in	   the	   two	  conventions.	  Rather	   than	  a	  straightforward	  comparison,	   the	  analysis	   is	   skewed	   towards	   the	   climate	   convention.	  This	   is	  because	   the	   issue	   of	   climate	   change	   has	   triggered	   a	   particularly	   intense	  debate	   around	   issues	   of	   democracy,	   not	   only	   within	   academia,	   but	   also	  among	   governments	   and	   NGOs.	   This	   is	   also	   reflected	   in	   the	   availability	   of	  sources	   for	   empirical	   analysis.	   Nonetheless,	   highlighting	   both	   the	  divergences	   and	   similarities	   in	   the	   way	   NGOs	   have	   responded	   (or	   not)	   to	  alleged	   representation	   inequities	   and	   participation	   deficits	   in	   the	   two	  conventions	  makes	   it	  possible	   to	  move	  beyond	  an	   idiosyncratic	  assessment	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  link	  the	  discussion	  to	  the	  broader	  field	  of	  environmental	  politics	  (admittedly,	  in	  the	  UN	  context	  only).	  On	  a	  more	  practical	  level	  it	  also	  helps	   to	   better	   understand	   the	   many	   ‘cross-­‐references’	   to	   other	  environmental	  regimes	  made	  by	  NGOs	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  context,	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  conclusion.	  	  	  
PART	   ONE:	   The	   United	   Nations	   climate	   and	  
biodiversity	  conventions	  and	  the	  role	  of	  NGOs	  The	   United	   Nations	   Framework	   Convention	   on	   Climate	   Change	   and	   the	  Convention	   on	   Biological	   Diversity	   are	   both	   institutional	   outcomes	   of	   the	  1992	  Earth	  Summit.	  The	  issues	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  global	  biodiversity	  loss	  are	   suitable	   examples	   of	   the	   type	   of	   transnational	   challenges	   that	   states	  cannot	   tackle	   unilaterally	   and	   hence	   necessitate	   international	   cooperation.	  Both	  present	  highly	   complex	  and	   far-­‐reaching	  global	  problems	   that	  already	  affect	  millions	  of	  people	  the	  world	  over	  and	  –	  unless	  they	  can	  be	  successfully	  addressed	  –	  will	  create	  further	  havoc	  in	  many	  of	  the	  world’s	  poorest	  regions.	  Furthermore,	   as	   UN	   bodies	   they	   share	   a	   number	   of	   formal	   governance	  features	  (such	  as	  the	  one	  state	  –	  one	  vote	  principle)	  and	  are	  characterised	  by	  a	   relatively	   high	   degree	   of	   openness	   towards	   participation	   by	   non-­‐state	  actors.	  The	  two	  conventions	  therefore	  constitute	  good	  cases	  for	  comparison.	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i. The	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  The	   likely	   future	   impacts	   of	   climate	   change	   on	   the	  world’s	   ecosystems	   and	  the	   livelihoods	   of	   millions	   of	   humans	   are	   so	   immense	   that	   most	  environmental	   (as	   well	   as	   social	   and	   economic)	   issues	   can	   no	   longer	   be	  analysed	   in	   isolation	   from	   this	   global	   challenge.	  Melting	   glaciers,	   rising	   sea	  levels,	  an	  increased	  frequency	  and	  intensity	  of	  extreme	  weather	  events	  such	  as	  droughts,	   floods	   and	   cyclones,	   an	   increase	   in	   certain	   infectious	  diseases,	  and	   an	   accelerating	   rate	   of	   biodiversity	   loss	   in	   key	   regions	   are	   among	   the	  already	  observed	  and	  expected	  consequences	  of	  an	   increase	   in	  global	  mean	  temperature.	   While	   most	   policy-­‐makers	   acknowledge	   the	   need	   for	   urgent	  action	   on	   climate	   change,	   both	   with	   respect	   to	   mitigation	   and	   adaptation,	  measurable	  progress	  has	  been	  slow	  or	  non-­‐existent.	  	  	  	  Anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  increasing	  concentration	  of	  carbon	   dioxide	   and	   other	   greenhouse	   gases	   in	   the	   global	   atmosphere.	  International	   efforts	   to	   control	   climate	   change	   have	   therefore	   primarily	  sought	  to	  control	  the	  emission	  of	  greenhouse	  gases	  (GHGs),	  although	  there	  is	  a	   growing	   recognition	   of	   the	   need	   for	   adaptation	   measures,	   especially	   in	  those	   countries	   most	   vulnerable	   to	   the	   effects	   of	   climate	   change.	   Global	  atmospheric	   concentrations	  of	   carbon	  dioxide	  now	  stand	  at	  over	  380	  parts	  per	   million	   (ppm),	   up	   from	   280ppm	   before	   the	   start	   of	   the	   industrial	  revolution	  (IPCC	  2007).30	  The	  International	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change’s	  (IPCC)	  Fourth	   Assessment	   Report	   calculates	   that	   the	   global	   average	   surface	  temperature	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   21st	   century	   could	   be	   between	   1.1	   and	   6.4	  degrees	   Celsius	   above	   the	   temperature	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   20th	   century,	  depending	  on	  whether	  and	  by	  how	  much	  the	  increase	  in	  CO2	  emissions	  can	  be	  slowed	  down	  (IPCC	  2007).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  The	  IPCC’s	  Fourth	  Assessment	  Report:	  Climate	  Change	  2007	  uses	  a	  figure	  of	  379	  ppm	  for	  2005.	  Since	  then,	  the	  concentration	  of	  CO2	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  has	  almost	  certainly	  increased	  further	   so	   that	   the	   IPCC’s	   Fifth	  Assessment	  Report	  due	   in	  2014	   is	   likely	   to	   report	   an	   even	  higher	  number.	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Largely	   thanks	   to	   the	   relentless	   campaigning	   by	   environmental	   NGOs	   over	  recent	   years,	   most	   states	   have	   proclaimed	   their	   support	   for	   limiting	   the	  increase	   in	   global	   temperature	   to	   two	   degrees	   Celsius.	   For	   this	   to	   be	  achieved,	  emissions	  would	  need	  to	  peak	  in	  the	  next	  10-­‐20	  years	  and	  decline	  markedly	   thereafter.	   Climate	   scientists	   have	   calculated	   that	   –	   in	   theory	   -­‐	  there	   is	   a	   reasonable	   chance	   of	   reaching	   the	   two	   degrees	   target	   if	   global	  emissions	  are	  halved	  by	  2050	  compared	  to	  1990	  (Ulmer	  2009).	  The	  current	  global	  emissions	  path,	  however,	  offers	  little	  reason	  for	  hoping	  that	  this	  target	  will	  be	  met	  in	  time.	  According	  to	  the	  International	  Energy	  Agency,	  global	  CO2	  emissions	  from	  the	  energy	  sector	  reached	  a	  new	  record	  in	  2010	  and	  show	  no	  sign	  of	  declining.	  While	  major	  developing	  countries,	  notably	  China	  and	  India,	  are	   responsible	   for	   most	   of	   the	   growth	   in	   global	   emissions,	   the	   OECD	  countries	   continue	   to	   have	   the	   highest	   emissions	   on	   a	   per	   capita	   basis	  (International	  Energy	  Agency	  2011).	  	  The	   proclaimed	   objective	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   is	   to	   achieve	   “stabilization	   of	  greenhouse	   gas	   concentrations	   in	   the	   atmosphere	   at	   a	   level	   that	   would	  prevent	   dangerous	   anthropogenic	   interference	   with	   the	   climate	   system”	  (UNFCCC	   1992).	   The	   convention	   is	   considered	   one	   of	   the	   most	   important	  outcomes	   of	   the	   1992	   Earth	   Summit	   and	   entered	   into	   force	   in	   1994,	   once	  ratified	  by	  50	  countries.	  Parties	  to	  the	  convention	  were	  not	  required	  to	  take	  concrete	   abatement	   measures:	   they	   merely	   agree	   to	   pursue	   collaborative	  action	   and	   research	   on	   climate	   change	   mitigation	   and	   to	   participate	   in	   a	  voluntary	   reporting	  mechanism,	   the	   national	   greenhouse	   gas	   inventory.	   As	  such,	  the	  convention	  itself	  did	  not	  provide	  any	  legally	  binding	  targets	  for	  GHG	  emissions	   in	   member	   countries.31	   These	   were	   later	   agreed	   in	   a	  supplementary	  agreement	  to	  the	  convention,	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  which	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  This	  is	  not	  unusual	  given	  the	  UNFCCC’s	  status	  as	  a	  ‘framework	  convention’.	  A	  framework	  convention	   “establishes	   the	   general	   architecture	   of	   the	   regime,	   including,	   for	   example,	   its	  objectives,	  principles,	  basic	  obligations,	  and	   institutions”	   (Bodanksy	  2010,	  186).	  Additional	  protocols	  are	  negotiated	  to	  set	  out	  more	  specific	  commitments	  building	  on	  the	  more	  general	  objectives	  of	  the	  convention.	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adopted	  at	  the	  third	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  (COP-­‐3)	  in	  1997	  and	  entered	  into	  force	  at	  the	  COP-­‐11	  in	  Montreal	  in	  2005.	  	  	  The	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   sets	   binding	   emission	   targets	   for	   37	   industrialised	  countries	  and	  the	  European	  Union.	  Specific	  emission	  caps	  are	  only	   imposed	  on	   the	   developed	   countries	   listed	   in	   Annex	   1	   of	   the	   protocol,	   while	  developing	   countries	   are	   exempt	   from	   such	   reduction	   commitments.	   The	  protocol	  also	  established	  three	  types	  of	  ‘Flexible	  Mechanisms’	  to	  help	  Annex	  1	   countries	   achieve	   their	   reduction	   targets.	   These	  market-­‐based	  mitigation	  policies	   work	   on	   the	   economic	   efficiency	   case	   that	   emission	   reductions	  should	  be	  done	  as	  cost	  effectively	  as	  possible.	  As	  the	  effect	  on	  the	  atmosphere	  is	   the	   same,	   no	   matter	   where	   in	   the	   world	   emission	   cuts	   take	   place,	   the	  mechanisms	  are	  designed	   to	   steer	   investments	   in	  GHG	  reduction	   initiatives	  to	  those	  places	  where	  the	  highest	  returns,	  in	  terms	  of	  reduced	  emissions,	  can	  be	  realised.	  Emission	  trading	  allows	  states	  that	  have	  reduced	  their	  emissions	  more	  than	  required	  by	  the	  protocol	  to	  sell	  the	  excess	  in	  the	  form	  of	   ‘carbon	  credits’	   to	   other	   countries	   to	   use	   for	   their	   own	   reduction	   obligations.	   Joint	  Implementation	  means	   that	   developed	   countries	   parties	   can	   receive	   credit	  for	  emission	  reduction	  projects	  undertaken	   in	  other	  Annex	  1	  countries	  (the	  economies	   in	   transition	   that	   are	   also	   included	   in	   Annex	   1).	   The	   Clean	  Development	   Mechanism	   (CDM),	   by	   contrast,	   refers	   to	   emissions	   permits	  that	  developed	  countries	  (and	  the	  private	  sector)	  are	  able	  to	  acquire	  through	  investing	  in	  emission	  reduction	  projects	  in	  developing	  countries	  (non-­‐Annex	  1	   countries).	   Besides	   the	   emission	   reduction	   effects,	   these	   CDM-­‐accredited	  projects	   are	   also	   intended	   to	   yield	   benefits	   for	   sustainable	   development	   in	  these	  countries.	  	  	  Although	  the	  United	  States	  participated	  in	  the	  1997	  negotiations	  and	  signed	  the	  agreement,	  the	  Bush	  administration	  announced	  in	  2001	  that	  it	  would	  not	  ratify	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  arguing	  that	  the	  protocol	  would	  harm	  the	  economic	  interests	   of	   the	   United	   States	   and	   that	   the	   absence	   of	   targets	   for	   fast	  developing	   economies	   such	   as	   China	   and	   India	   was	   undermining	   the	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credibility	   of	   the	   agreement.	   The	   European	   Union,	   by	   contrast,	   tried	   to	  establish	   itself	  as	   international	   leader	   in	  global	  climate	  change	  action	  in	  the	  1990s.	  EU	  member	  countries	  took	  on	  relatively	  ambitious	  reduction	  targets,	  jointly	   agreeing	   to	   a	  20%	  decrease	   in	  GHG	  emissions	  below	  1990	   levels	  by	  2020.	   Russia	   also	   refused	   initially	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   but	  changed	   its	   position	   and	   eventually	   ratified	   it	   in	   2004.32	   Most	   of	   the	   G77	  countries	  are	  opposed	  to	  binding	  emissions	  limitations	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  extremely	  low	  per	  capita	  emissions	  and	  the	  overriding	  need	  for	  development	  in	   their	   countries.	   However,	   with	   emissions	   rising	   rapidly	   in	   the	   major	  developing	   economies,	   industrialised	   countries	   began	   to	   insist	   that	   a	   post-­‐Kyoto	  agreement	  would	  have	  to	  include	  more	  stringent	  provisions	  relating	  to	  developing	  country	  emissions	  targets.	  This	  division	  has	  become	  the	  defining	  fault	  line	  of	  global	  climate	  politics	  and	  one	  of	  the	  main	  obstacles	  to	  progress.	  	  	  The	   objective	   of	   the	   COP-­‐15,	  which	  met	   in	   Copenhagen	   in	  December	  2009,	  was	  to	  reach	  a	  new	  agreement	  to	  take	  over	  from	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  due	  to	  expire	  in	  2012.	  At	  their	  meeting	  in	  Bali	  in	  December	  2007,	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  convention	   had	   already	   agreed	   on	   the	   ‘Bali	   Roadmap’,	   which	   outlined	   the	  steps	  “to	  reach	  an	  agreement	  on	  long-­‐term	  cooperative	  action	  up	  and	  beyond	  2012	   to	   be	   adopted	   at	   its	   15th	   session	   in	   Copenhagen	   in	   December	   2009”	  (UNFCCC	   2007).	   The	   new	   agreement	  was	   to	   include	   four	   ‘building	   blocks’:	  mitigation,	   adaptation,	   technology	   transfer,	   and	   financing.	   With	   respect	   to	  mitigation,	   the	   new	   agreement	   would	   have	   to	   do	   the	   following:	   set	   new	  targets	   for	   Annex	   1	   countries;	   agree	   on	   comparable	   targets	   for	   the	   United	  States;	   and	   come	  up	  with	   first	   time	   targets	   for	  many	   developing	   countries.	  Parties	   at	   the	   Bali	  meeting	   also	   addressed	   a	   range	   of	   other	   issues,	   such	   as	  governance	  of	  the	  Adaptation	  Fund	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  reducing	  emissions	  from	   deforestation,	   technology	   transfer	   and	   changes	   to	   the	   Clean	  Development	  Mechanisms.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	   Giddens	   attributes	   the	   Russian	   change	   of	   mind	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   country	   needed	   EU	  support	  for	  joining	  WTO	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  Russia	  received	  very	  favourable	  terms	  under	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  which	  effectively	  allowed	  it	  to	  profit	  from	  selling	  ‘hot	  air	  emissions’	  (Giddens	  2009,	  188).	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  Although	  vested	  with	  high	  expectations,	   the	  COP-­‐15	   failed	   to	  come	  up	  with	  either	  a	  legally	  binding	  agreement	  or	  numerical	  reduction	  targets.	  Instead,	  in	  a	   last-­‐minute	   ditch	   to	   save	   the	   negotiations,	   the	   heads	   of	   states	   of	   a	   small	  group	  of	   countries	  hammered	  out	  a	  document,	  which	  was	  presented	   to	   the	  plenary	  for	  adoption	  on	  the	  final	  day	  of	  the	  conference.	  The	  group	  engaging	  in	  this	  form	  of	  ‘backroom	  bargaining’	  included	  only	  a	  small	  number	  of	  around	  25	   countries,	   with	   the	   final	   breakthrough	   achieved	   by	   an	   even	   smaller	  meeting	   between	   the	   heads	   of	   states	   of	   the	   US,	   China,	   India	   and	   Brazil	  (Bodansky	   2010,	   4-­‐5).	   Since	   this	   arrangement	   completely	   bypassed	   the	  regular	  inclusive	  negotiation	  format	  typical	  of	  UN	  summits,	  many	  developing	  countries	  complained	  about	  being	  ignored	  by	  the	  ‘big	  players’.	  However,	  the	  process	  was	  also	  notable	  for	  sidelining	  the	  European	  Union	  during	  the	  crucial	  hours,	   which	   until	   Copenhagen	   had	   been	   seen	   as	   a	   leader	   in	   the	   climate	  negotiations.	   In	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	   the	   developments	   at	   the	  Copenhagen	   summit	   were	   widely	   interpreted	   as	   a	   reflection	   of	   a	   new	  geopolitical	   reality,	   in	   which	   real	   veto	   power	   lies	   with	   major	   emerging	  economies	  such	  as	  China	  and	  India.	  	  	  Due	  to	  the	  fierce	  opposition	  of	  a	  small	  handful	  of	  developing	  countries	  led	  by	  Sudan,	   Bolivia	   and	   Venezuela,	   the	   Copenhagen	   Accord	   was	   not	   formally	  integrated	  into	  the	  UN	  process;	  instead	  the	  parties	  merely	   ‘took	  note’	  of	  the	  accord	   in	   the	   final	   document.	  This	  development	  only	   served,	   in	   the	   eyes	  of	  some	  commentators,	  to	  further	  demonstrate	  what	  many	  had	  already	  agreed	  on:	   that	   the	  Copenhagen	  summit	  would	  go	  down	  as	  a	  particularly	  shameful	  episode	  in	  the	  UN-­‐led	  fight	  against	  climate	  change.	  In	  fact,	  many	  disappointed	  observers	  started	  questioning	  the	  very	  ability	  of	  the	  UN	  process	  to	  deliver,	  at	  a	   global	   scale	   and	   within	   the	   required	   timeframe,	   the	   progress	   needed	   to	  prevent	   the	   high	   costs	   of	   global	  warming.	   Some	   advocated	   a	   refocusing	   on	  local	  and	  national	  processes	  (Maier	  2010),	  while	  others	  pointed	  to	  the	  need	  to	   allow	   for	   a	   “building	   bloc”	   approach	   at	   the	   international	   level,	   “which	  develops	  different	  elements	  of	  climate	  governance	  in	  an	  incremental	  fashion	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and	   embeds	   them	   in	   a	   broader	   political	   framework”	   (Falkner,	   Stephan	   and	  Vogler	  2010,	  252). 	  Once	   the	   Copenhagen	   dust	   had	   settled,	   however,	   there	   were	   also	   voices	  arguing	   that	   the	   record	   was	   not	   necessarily	   as	   dismal	   as	   portrayed	   in	   the	  immediate	   aftermath	  of	   the	   summit.	  A	   relatively	   large	  number	  of	   countries	  made	  use	  of	  the	  subsequent	  opportunity	  to	  pledge	  specific	  mitigation	  actions.	  For	  the	  first	  time	  such	  promises	  also	  came	  from	  major	  developing	  countries	  such	  as	  China	  and	  India	  who	  both	  pledged	  reductions	  in	  the	  carbon	  intensity	  of	   their	  economies.	  Moreover,	   the	  accord	  contained	  some	  promises	   for	  new	  money	   from	  developed	   countries:	   these	   included	   the	   promise	   of	   additional	  funding	   in	   the	   range	   of	   $30	   billion	   for	   the	   period	   2010-­‐2012	   for	   both	  mitigation	   and	   adaptation	   (so-­‐called	   ‘fast-­‐start	   finance’);	   the	   goal	   of	   raising	  $100	  billion	  by	  2020	  from	  both	  private	  and	  public	  sources	  to	  help	  developing	  countries’	  mitigation	  efforts,	  and	  promises	  for	  more	  multilateral	  funding	  for	  adaptation	   “to	   be	   delivered	   through	   effective	   and	   efficient	   fund	  arrangements,	   with	   a	   governance	   structure	   providing	   for	   equal	  representation	  of	  developed	  and	  developing	  countries”	  (UNFCCC	  2009).	  	  
NGO	  participation	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  The	   fact	   that	   the	  UNFCCC	  was	   ‘born’	   at	   the	   1992	  UNCED	  meant	   that	  NGOs	  were	  able	   to	  capitalise	  on	   the	  relatively	  high	   levels	  of	   civil	   society	  visibility	  and	   participation	   that	   are	   often	   associated	   with	   the	   Earth	   Summit	   (see	  previous	   chapter).	   In	   line	   with	   broader	   UN	   practice,	   the	   right	   of	   NGOs	   to	  become	   observers	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   meetings	   was	   hence	   enshrined	   in	   the	  convention	   text	   from	   the	   start.	   NGOs	  may	   be	   admitted	   as	   long	   as	   they	   are	  “qualified	   in	   matters	   covered	   by	   the	   Convention”	   and	   unless	   “at	   least	   one	  third	   of	   the	   Parties	   present	   object”	   (UNFCCC	   1992).	   The	   UNFCCC	   includes	  business	   and	   industry	   associations	   as	   well	   as	   research	   institutions	   and	  universities	   in	   its	   definition	   of	   interested	  NGOs.	   National	   and	   international	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NGOs	   in	   the	   sense	  understood	   in	   this	   thesis	   constitute	   therefore	  a	   subset	   –	  albeit	  a	  substantial	  one	  -­‐	  of	  all	  the	  NGOs	  listed	  on	  the	  UNFCCC	  website.33	  	  	  NGOs	   that	   are	   admitted	   as	   observers	   to	   the	   convention	   have	   formed	  themselves	   into	   six	   loose	   constituencies:	   business	   and	   industry	  NGOs,	   local	  government	   and	   municipal	   authorities,	   indigenous	   peoples	   organisations	  (IPOs),	   research	   and	   independent	   nongovernmental	   organisations,	   trade	  unions,	  and	  environmental	  NGOs	  (ENGOs).	  The	  constituency	  status	  of	   three	  more	   groups	   (farmers,	  women	   and	   youth)	  was	   under	   review	  until	   COP-­‐17.	  Each	  constituency	  is	  linked	  to	  a	  designated	  ‘focal	  point’	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  facilitating	   more	   effective	   dialogue	   between	   the	   observer	   NGOs	   and	   the	  secretariat.	   The	   UNFCCC	   secretariat	   is	   careful	   to	   point	   out,	   however,	   that	  participation	   in	   a	   particular	   constituency	   is	   voluntary,	   “neither	   official	   nor	  binding”	   and	   that	   it	   “does	   not	   preclude	   direct	   communication	   with	   the	  secretariat	  by	  any	  observer	  organisation,	  nor	  does	  it	  imply	  any	  ‘sovereignty’	  over	   the	   constituency	  on	   the	  part	  of	   the	   focal	  point	  organisation”	   (UNFCCC	  n.d.	   ‘Non-­‐governmental	   organisation	   observer	   constituencies’).	   The	  international	   secretariat	   of	   the	   Climate	   Action	   Network	   constitutes	   the	  formal	   ‘constituency	   focal	   point’	   for	   the	   constituency	   of	   ‘environmental	  NGOs’	   at	   the	   UNFCCC,	   although	   CAN’s	   members	   also	   include	   development	  NGOs.	   It	   is	  worth	  noting	   that	  unlike	   the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity,	  the	   UNFCCC	   has	   no	   separate	   provision	   for	   the	   participation	   of	   indigenous	  peoples	   –	   a	   point	   of	   criticism	   frequently	  made	   by	   some	   of	   its	   civil	   society	  stakeholders.	  	  The	   number	   of	   admitted	   NGO	   observer	   organisations	   has	   expanded	  continuously	   since	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   UNFCCC:	   from	   178	   at	   the	   COP-­‐1	   to	  around	  1400	  at	  the	  time	  of	  COP-­‐16	  (UNFCCC	  2010).	  Of	  course,	  not	  all	  of	  these	  groups	   are	   able	   to	   send	   representatives	   to	   all	   relevant	  COPs.	  Analysing	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Most	  the	  NGOs	  as	  defined	  in	  chapter	  1	  (not	  linked	  to	  business	  or	  governmental	  interests)	  classify	   themselves	   either	   as	   environmental	   NGOs,	   as	   research	   and	   independent	   NGOs,	   or	  ‘without	  constituency’.	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influence	  of	  NGOs	  on	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  between	  1995-­‐1997,	  Betsill	  (2008)	  notes	  that	  40	  ENGOs	  sent	  representatives	  to	  at	  least	  two	  negotiating	  sessions	  during	  that	  period.	  Greenpeace,	  WWF	  and	  FoEI	  (the	  three	  NGOs	  that	  will	  be	  analysed	   in	   chapters	   VI	   and	   VII)	   had	   the	   largest	   delegations	   at	   these	  meetings.	  Although	  the	  UNFCCC	  has	  some	  grants	  available	  to	  encourage	  the	  participation	  of	  Southern	  NGOs,	  only	  a	  quarter	  of	  the	  attending	  groups	  came	  from	  the	  global	  South	  and	  these	  were	  frequently	  only	  represented	  by	  one	  or	  two	   delegates	   (Betsill	   2008,	   46).	   The	   level	   of	   NGO	   attendance	   at	   previous	  UNFCCC	  COPs	   is	   dwarfed,	   however,	   by	   the	  massive	   turnout	  by	   civil	   society	  groups	   in	   Copenhagen.	   The	   total	   number	   of	   individual	   NGO	   observers	  registered	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   COP-­‐15	  was	   around	   20,600	   –	   compared	   to	  3900	  at	   the	  COP-­‐14	   in	  2008	  and	  5000	  at	   the	  COP-­‐13	  (Bali)	   in	  2007	  (Fisher	  2010,	   13).	   The	  Danish	   organisers	   resorted	   to	   strictly	   limiting	   access	   to	   the	  conference	   building	   in	   the	   second	   week	   of	   the	   negotiations,	   effectively	  leaving	  many	  civil	  society	  attendees	  out	  in	  the	  cold.	  	  	  Of	  course,	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  interventions	  of	  environmental	  NGOs	  made	  directly	  at	   the	   COPs	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   and	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   offers	   only	   a	   limited	  snapshot	  of	  a	  much	  wider	  spectrum	  of	  activities.	  NGO	  influence	  may,	  in	  fact,	  be	   largest	  not	   in	   their	  position	  as	  official	  observers	  (or	  protestors)	  at	   these	  meetings	  but	  by	   shaping	   the	   agenda	  of	   particular	   governments	  before	   they	  even	   arrive	   at	   the	   negotiations,	   i.e.	   through	   lobbying	   governments	   and	  mobilising	  public	  opinion	   in	   their	  home	  countries	   (Newell	  2000).	   Similarly,	  sometimes	   NGOs	   find	   themselves	   in	   the	   privileged	   position	   of	   enjoying	  particularly	   high	   levels	   of	   access	   to	   certain	   governmental	   delegations.	   The	  Swiss	   government,	   for	   example,	   has	   in	   the	  past	   allocated	   three	   seats	   on	   its	  negotiating	   team	   to	   nongovernmental	   participants:	   one	   for	   academics,	   one	  for	   business	   and	   one	   for	   environmental	   NGOs	   (Raustiala	   and	   Bridgeman	  2007,	  18).	  Another	   frequently	  discussed	  example	  of	   close	  government-­‐NGO	  cooperation	   relates	   to	   the	   advisory	   services	  provided	  by	   the	  Foundation	  of	  Environmental	   Law	   and	   Development	   (FIELD)	   for	   the	   delegation	   of	   the	  Alliance	  of	  Small	  Island	  States	  (Raustiala	  1997,	  728).	  McGregor	  explains	  that,	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as	  direct	  access	   to	   the	  convention	  centre	  became	  more	  and	  more	  restricted	  for	   NGOs	   towards	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Copenhagen	   negotiations,	   many	  governments	   started	   adding	  NGO	   representatives	   to	   their	   own	  delegations,	  thus	  enabling	   the	  NGOs	  “more	  privileged	  access”	   than	  they	  would	  have	  had	  as	  NGO	  observers	  (McGregor	  2011,	  3).	  	  	  Even	  before	  the	  COP-­‐15	  illustrated	  the	  huge	  gap	  between	  the	  demands	  made	  by	   NGOs	   and	   the	   meagre	   results	   of	   Copenhagen,	   the	   relatively	   limited	  influence	   of	   these	   groups	   on	   the	   actual	   outcome	   of	   climate	   change	  negotiations	  had	  already	  been	  documented.	  Betsill	  (2008),	  for	  instance,	  finds	  that	   ENGOs	   had	   little	   effect	   on	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	  negotiations	  during	  the	  period	  1995	  to	  1997	  but	  influenced	  the	  negotiations	  process.	   For	   example,	   CAN’s	   objectives	   between	   1995-­‐1997	   included	   a	  commitment	   by	   industrialised	   countries	   to	   reduce	   their	   emissions	   20%	  below	  1990	  levels	  by	  2005;	  the	  final	  protocol	  merely	  requires	  them	  to	  reduce	  their	  aggregate	  GHG	  emissions	  5.2%	  below	  1990	  levels	  by	  the	  period	  2008-­‐2012	  (Betsill	  2008,	  52).	  Moreover,	  although	  CAN	  was	  opposed	  to	  emissions	  trading	   for	   industrialised	   countries	   and	   to	   the	   inclusion	   of	   carbon	   credits	  from	   sinks	   during	   the	   negotiations,	   both	  mechanisms	   found	   their	  way	   into	  the	   final	   agreement	   (ibid).	   However,	   as	   Betsill	   and	   Corell	   point	   out,	   this	   in	  itself	  is	  not	  necessarily	  sufficient	  evidence	  for	  a	  lack	  of	  NGO	  influence.	  NGOs	  may	   be	   tempted	   to	  make	   very	   stringent	   demands	   in	   order	   to	   ‘turn	   up	   the	  heat’	   on	   governmental	   delegates	   and	   to	   shift	   the	   yardstick	   by	   which	   the	  agreement	   is	   considered	   successful,	   while	   in	   private	   recognising	   even	  outcomes	   below	   their	   publicly	   proclaimed	   preferences	   as	   positive	  achievements	  (Betsill	  and	  Corell	  2008,	  27).	  	  	  
ii. The	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  The	  global	  politics	  of	  conservation	  encompasses	  a	  wide	  and	  varied	  spectrum	  of	   concerns:	   the	   protection	   of	   particular	   species,	   habitats	   and	   ecosystems,	  biological	  resources	  and	  genetic	  diversity.	  Far	  from	  being	  a	  narrowly	  ‘green’	  issue,	   it	   is	   linked	   to	   a	   host	   of	   social,	   economic	   and	  political	   considerations.	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According	   to	   Elliott,	   the	   conservation	   agenda	   is	   not	   only	   characterised	   by	  “political	   tensions”	   over	   “appropriate	   management	   strategies”,	   but	   also	  “bound	   up	   in	   disagreements	   over	   sustainable	   use,	   commodification	   and	  intellectual	  property	  rights,	  utility	  rather	  than	  amenity	  value,	  the	  imperative	  of	   sovereign	  ownership	  of	  natural	   resources,	   conflicting	  values	  and	  cultural	  traditions,	   and	   disputes	   about	   what	   constitutes	   a	   local	   or	   global	   problem”	  (Elliott	  2004,	  29).	  	  	  In	  popular	  discourse,	  the	  protection	  of	  biological	  diversity	  is	  often	  reduced	  to	  the	   need	   to	   ‘save’	   particular	   endangered	   species	   from	  becoming	   extinct.	   In	  fact,	  the	  term	  ‘biodiversity’	  encompasses	  more	  than	  this;	  besides	  “diversity	  of	  species”	   it	   also	   refers	   to	   the	   “genetic	   diversity	   within	   species	   and	   the	  diversity	   of	   habitat	   that	   supports	   biological	   life”	   (Elliott	   2004,	   30).	   This	  means	   that	   the	   problem	   of	   biodiversity	   loss	   encompasses	   not	   only	   the	  extinction	  of	  species	  but	  also	  the	  degradation	  of	  whole	  ecosystems,	  as	  well	  as	  the	   erosion	   of	   genetic	   diversity.	   This	   broad	   understanding	   of	   the	   challenge	  makes	   it	   almost	   impossible	   to	   put	   precise	   numbers	   on	   the	   scale	   of	   the	  problem,	   to	   single	   out	   specific	   causes	   or	   to	   develop	   simple	   solutions.	  According	   to	   the	   CBD,	   species	   are	   being	   lost	   at	   a	   rate	   of	   50-­‐100	   times	   the	  natural	  rate	  (Secretariat	  of	  the	  CBD	  2000,	  5),	  while	  IUCN	  claims	  that	  the	  rate	  of	   species	   extinction	   is	   up	   to	   1000	   to	   10,000	   times	   the	   ‘background’	   or	  natural	   rate	   (IUCN	  2007).	  At	   the	  2002	   Johannesburg	   Summit,	   governments	  agreed	  to	  achieve	  a	  “significant	  reduction”	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  biodiversity	  loss	  by	  2010	  but	   have	   failed	   to	  meet	   this	   commitment.	   The	  Millennium	  Ecosystem	  Assessment	  Report	  identified	  five	  “direct	  drivers”	  of	  biodiversity	  loss:	  habitat	  change,	   climate	   change,	   invasive	   species,	   over-­‐exploitation	   and	   pollution	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(Millennium	  Ecosystem	  Assessment	  2005).34	  These	  drivers	  in	  turn	  are	  linked	  to	   “indirect	   drivers”:	   “population	   change	   (including	   growth	   and	  migration),	  change	   in	   economic	   activity	   (including	   economic	   growth,	   disparities	   in	  wealth,	  and	   trade	  patterns),	   sociopolitical	   factors	   (including	   factors	  ranging	  from	   the	   presence	   of	   conflict	   to	   public	   participation	   in	   decision-­‐making),	  cultural	   factors,	   and	   technological	   change”	   (Millennium	   Ecosystem	  Assessment	  2005,	   19).	   Similar	   to	   the	  problem	  of	   climate	   change,	   rapid	   and	  irreversible	  biodiversity	  loss	  is	  fundamentally	  linked	  to	  human	  activity	  which	  risks,	  according	  to	  the	  CBD,	  “creating	  the	  greatest	  extinction	  crisis	  since	  the	  natural	   disaster	   that	   wiped	   out	   the	   dinosaurs	   65	   million	   years	   ago”	  (Secretariat	  of	  the	  CBD	  2000,	  6).	  	  Despite	  the	  enormity	  of	  this	  challenge	  the	  problem	  of	  global	  biodiversity	  loss	  has	  received	  far	   less	  public	  attention	  than	  climate	  change	  over	  recent	  years	  and	  has	  not	  triggered	  anything	  close	  to	  the	  high	  level	  of	  popular	  and	  business	  mobilisation	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  Copenhagen	  in	  2009.	  There	  are	  also	   fewer	   comprehensive	   academic	   analyses	   on	   the	   global	   politics	   of	  conservation,	   especially	   by	   scholars	   with	   a	   political	   and	   social	   science	  background	  (rather	  than	  conservation	  biologists)	  than	  exist	  on	  global	  climate	  politics.	   With	   respect	   to	   this	   research,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   CBD	   has	   not	   been	  subject	   to	   the	  same	   ‘hype’	  as	   the	  climate	  negotiations	  has	  made	   it	  easier	   to	  gain	  access	  and	  conduct	  interviews	  with	  key	  NGO	  and	  CBD	  policy-­‐makers.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  relative	  shortage	  of	  academic	  analyses	  from	  political	  and	  social	   scientists	   of	   the	   CBD	   has	   been	   a	   challenge.	   Although	   the	   two	  conventions	   share	   the	   same	   lineage	   as	   institutional	   outcomes	   of	   the	   1992	  UNCED,	   relative	   to	   the	   climate	   convention,	   the	   CBD	   comes	   across	   like	   the	  little-­‐known	  sibling	  of	  a	  high-­‐profile	  Hollywood	  celebrity.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	   The	   Millennium	   Ecosystem	   Assessment	   (MA)	   was	   initiated	   by	   former	   UN	   Secretary	  General	   Kofi	   Annan	   in	   2001.	   Its	   objective	   “was	   to	   assess	   the	   consequences	   of	   ecosystem	  change	   for	   human	   well-­‐being	   and	   the	   scientific	   basis	   for	   action	   needed	   to	   enhance	   the	  conservation	   and	   sustainable	   use	   of	   those	   systems	   and	   their	   contribution	   to	   human	  well-­‐being.	  The	  MA	  has	  involved	  the	  work	  of	  more	  than	  1360	  experts	  worldwide.”	  The	  findings	  of	  the	   assessment	   exercise	   were	   formally	   approved	   by	   the	   board	   in	   2005.	   Website	   of	   the	  Millennium	   Ecosystem	   Assessment:	   http://www.maweb.org/en/About.aspx.	   Last	   accessed	  17.09.2012	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  The	   draft	   of	   the	   convention	   opened	   for	   signature	   at	   Rio	   in	   1992	   was	   the	  result	   of	   an	   intense	   negotiation	   process	   under	   the	   auspices	   of	   the	   United	  Nations	   Environment	   Programme	   (UNEP).	   The	   intergovernmental	  negotiation	  committee	  (INC)	  meetings	  for	  the	  CBD	  started	  a	  few	  months	  after	  those	   for	   the	   UNFCCC35,	   and	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   the	   biodiversity	   negotiations	  were	   somewhat	   affected	   by	   the	   developments	   in	   the	   climate	   arena.	   For	  example,	  many	  Southern	  countries	  were	  unhappy	  with	   the	  way	   the	  climate	  negotiations	  were	   developing	   and	  were	   determined	   to	   instead	   secure	   their	  interests	  through	  the	  new	  biodiversity	  convention	  (McGraw	  2002,	  15).	  UNEP	  also	  felt	  sidelined	  in	  the	  climate	  negotiations	  now	  proceeding	  under	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  and	   consequently	   “was	  anxious	   to	   justify	   its	   institutional	  existence”	   (McGraw	   2002,	   15)	   in	   the	   biodiversity	   arena	   instead.	  Moreover,	  developing	   countries	   were	   happy	   for	   UNEP	   to	   play	   a	   central	   role	   as	   they	  considered	   biodiversity	   a	   more	   technical	   and	   scientific	   issue,	   with	   fewer	  political	  and	  economic	  implications,	  than	  climate	  change	  (Arts	  1998,	  163).36	  UNEP	  therefore	  became	  the	  ‘mid-­‐wife’	  to	  the	  CBD;	  reflecting	  on	  the	  first	  ten	  years	  of	  the	  convention,	  Klaus	  Toepfer	  (the	  former	  head	  of	  UNEP)	  still	  refers	  to	   his	   sense	   of	   “parental	   pride”	   in	   noting	   the	   CBD’s	   achievements	   to	   date	  (Toepfer	  2004,	  1).	  	  The	  CBD	  entered	   into	   force	   in	  December	  1993,	   following	   ratification	  by	  30	  countries.37	   Its	   stated	   objectives	   are,	   firstly,	   the	   conservation	   of	   biological	  diversity;	   secondly,	   the	   sustainable	   use	   of	   its	   components,	   and,	   thirdly,	   the	  fair	   and	   equitable	   sharing	   of	   the	   benefits	   arising	   from	   the	   utilisation	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  UNFCCC	  INC1	  in	  Feb	  1991;	  CBD	  INC1	  in	  June/	  July	  1991	  (Art	  1998,	  104/	  164)	  36	  The	  climate	  issue,	  by	  contrast,	  was	  strongly	  perceived	  as	  a	  political	  and	  economic	  one	  by	  developing	  countries	  from	  the	  start.	  As	  such,	  they	  preferred	  negotiations	  to	  take	  place	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	   instead	  of	  a	  specialised	  agency	  such	  as	  the	  WMO,	  UNEP	  or	  IPCC	  (Arts	  1998,	  104-­‐105).	  Rosendal	  (2000)	  offers	  a	  slightly	  different	  explanation.	  According	  to	  her,	  the	  move	  to	  UNEP	  reflected	  the	  US	  and	  IUCN’s	  hopes	  that	  in	  this	  forum	  the	  issue	   of	   conservation	   could	   be	   delinked	   from	   the	   controversial	   discussions	   around	  utilisation,	  economic	  value	  and	  property	  rights	  (Rosendal	  2000,	  112).	  	  37	  The	  United	  States	  decided	  not	   to	  become	  party	   to	   the	  Convention	  (it	   signed,	  but	  did	  not	  ratify	   the	   treaty)	   largely	  due	   to	  domestic	  opposition	   to	   the	  Convention	  by	   the	  powerful	  US	  biotechnology	  industry.	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genetic	  resources	  (CBD,	  Article	  1).	  The	  convention	  of	  parties	  meets	  every	  two	  years	   to	   review	  progress	  under	   the	   convention,	   identify	  new	  priorities	   and	  set	   work	   plans	   for	   members.	   The	   convention’s	   permanent	   secretariat	   is	  located	  in	  Montreal,	  Canada.	  The	  Subsidiary	  Body	  on	  Scientific,	  Technical	  and	  Technological	   Advice	   (SBSTTA)	  meets	   in	   between	   the	   COP	  meetings	   and	   is	  tasked	   with	   providing	   “expert	   assessments	   and	   reports	   to	   the	   COP	   on	   all	  aspects	   of	   its	  work”	   (Herkenrath	  2002,	   30).	   The	   SBSTTA’s	  mandate	   is	   very	  broad	   and	   includes	   functions	   such	   as	   providing	   advice,	   undertaking	  assessments	  and	  the	  development	  of	  methodologies.	  	  The	  parties	  to	  the	  convention	  are	  asked	  “to	  develop	  national	  strategies,	  plans	  or	   programmes	   for	   the	   conservation	   and	   sustainable	   use	   of	   biological	  diversity”	  and	  to	  integrate	  “the	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  of	  biological	  diversity	   into	   relevant	   sectoral	   or	   cross-­‐sectoral	   plans,	   programmes	   and	  policies”	  (CBD	  article	  6).	  They	  are	  also	  asked	  to	  engage	   in	  the	   identification	  and	  monitoring	  of	  biodiversity	  (article	  7)	  and	  undertake	  impact	  assessments	  (article	  14).	  The	  convention	  addresses	  both	  in-­‐situ	  and	  ex-­‐situ	  conservation	  measures38;	   the	   establishment	   of	   protected	   areas	   constitutes	   a	   major	  component	  of	   the	  former	  (article	  8).	  Many	  of	   the	  solutions	  proposed	  by	  the	  CBD	  indicate	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  biodiversity	  loss	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  market	  failure	  and	  hence	  effective	  solutions	  need	  to	  put	  an	  economic	  value	  on	  biodiversity:	  the	   “challenge	   is	   to	   find	   economic	   policies	   that	   motivate	   conservation	   and	  sustainable	   use	   by	   creating	   financial	   incentives	   for	   those	   who	   would	  otherwise	  over-­‐use	  or	  damage	  the	  resource”	  (Secretariat	  of	  the	  CBD	  2000,	  7).	  	  The	   third	   objective	   of	   the	   convention	   relating	   to	   the	   fair	   and	   equitable	  sharing	   of	   benefits	   responds	   to	   concerns	   by	   developing	   countries	   over	   the	  centuries-­‐old	  practice	  of	  ‘bioprospecting’	  by	  foreign	  explorers,	  scientists	  and	  corporations,	   without	   providing	   adequate	   compensation	   to	   the	   original	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  In-­‐situ	  conservation	  refers	  to	  on-­‐site	  conservation,	  or	  the	  protecting	  of	  a	  particular	  species	  in	   its	   natural	   habitat.	   Ex-­‐situ	   conservation	   means	   ‘off-­‐site	   conservation’,	   whereby	   a	  particular	  species	  is	  protected	  outside	  of	  its	  natural	  habitat,	   for	  example	  in	  a	  zoo,	  botanical	  garden	  or	  in	  a	  seed	  bank.	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‘owners’	  of	  biological	  resources.	  One	  specific	  case,	  described	  by	  Schröder	  and	  Pogge	   (2009),	  may	  be	  used	   to	   illustrate	   the	   implications	  of	   this	  practice.	   In	  1991,	   Merck,	   a	   German	   pharmaceutical	   company,	   obtained	   a	   patent	   on	   a	  treatment	  for	  glaucoma,	  sold	  in	  the	  form	  of	  eye	  drops.	  The	  active	  ingredient	  was	   found	   in	   the	   leaves	   of	   a	   bush,	  which	   grows	   exclusively	   in	   the	  Amazon	  region	  and	  Merck	  started	  sourcing	  the	  substance	  from	  Brazil.	  Merck	  was	  then	  under	  no	  legal	  obligation	  to	  share	  the	  proceeds	  from	  this	  product	  with	  either	  Brazil	  or	  the	  local	  communities	  who	  were	  harvesting	  the	  leaves;	  moreover,	  a	  Brazilian	  citizen	  would	  have	  to	  purchase	  the	  product	  at	  German	  prices	  and	  a	  Brazilian	   company	   would	   have	   to	   pay	   royalties	   to	   Merck	   if	   it	   wanted	   to	  produce	  a	  generic	  version	  of	  the	  medicine	  (Schröder	  and	  Pogge	  2009,	  269).	  Developing	  countries	  argued	  that	   this	   type	  of	  scenario	  was	   far	   too	  common	  and	  ethically	  objectionable	  and	  supported	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  legal	  instrument	  on	   access	   and	   benefit	   sharing	   (ABS)	   at	   the	   international	   level.	   This	   finally	  took	   shape	   in	   the	   form	  of	   an	   ‘International	   Protocol	   on	  Access	   and	  Benefit	  Sharing’,	  which	  was	   agreed	   on	   at	   the	  much-­‐anticipated	  10th	  meeting	   of	   the	  COP	  in	  Nagoya,	  Japan,	  in	  October	  2010.	  The	  two	  other	  main	  issues	  tackled	  in	  Nagoya	  were	  the	  development	  of	  a	  new	  strategic	  plan	  for	  2011-­‐2020	  and	  an	  agreement	   on	   how	   to	   raise	   additional	   financial	   resources	   for	   the	  convention.39	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
NGO	  participation	  in	  the	  CBD	  The	  formal	  rules	  governing	  NGO	  participation	  in	  the	  CBD	  are	  similar	  to	  those	  in	   the	   UNFCCC.	   NGOs	   need	   to	   have	   a	   thematic	   link	   to	   the	   convention	  (“qualified	  in	  a	  field	  relating	  to	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  of	  biological	  diversity”)	   and	   their	   participation	  must	   not	   be	   objected	   to	   by	  more	   than	   a	  third	  of	  the	  parties	  (CBD	  Article	  23	  (5)).	  According	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  procedure,	  “Such	   observers	   may,	   upon	   the	   invitation	   of	   the	   President,	   participate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  In	  2000,	  the	  parties	  adopted	  the	  Cartagena	  Protocol	  on	  Biosafety,	  which	  aims	  to	  regulate	  the	   trans-­‐boundary	  movement	  of	   living	  organisms	   that	   could	   adversely	   affect	  biodiversity.	  The	  protocol	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  2003.	  As	  the	  CBD	  itself	  provides	  more	  than	  ample	  material	  for	   discussion,	   this	   chapter	  will	   not	   look	   at	   the	   Cartagena	   Protocol,	   nor	  will	   it	   discuss	   the	  range	   of	  NGO	   activities	   associated	  with	   the	   protocol	   (for	   a	   discussion	   of	   these	   see	  Burgiel	  2008).	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without	   the	   right	   to	   vote	   in	   the	   proceedings	   of	   any	   meeting	   in	   matters	   of	  direct	  concern	  to	  the	  body	  or	  agency	  they	  represent”	  (Secretariat	  of	  the	  CBD	  2005).	  Besides	  the	  large	  international	  NGOs,	  there	  are	  also	  many	  smaller	  and	  often	  nationally	  or	  regionally	   focused	  NGOs	  present	  at	   the	  COPs.	  One	  major	  determinant	   of	   the	   geographical	   spread	  of	   observer	  NGOs	   is,	   of	   course,	   the	  location	   of	   the	  meeting	   of	   the	   parties.	  NGOs	   in	   the	   respective	   host	   country	  tend	   to	  be	  particularly	   active	   in	   the	   run-­‐up	   to	  and	  during	   the	  COP,	   and	  are	  often	   instrumental	   in	   coordinating	   broader	   NGO	   activities	   and	   working	   in	  partnership	   around	   the	   convention.	   During	   the	   2008	   COP	   in	   Bonn,	   for	  example,	   the	   German	   NGO	   network	   Forum	   for	   Environment	   and	  Development	  played	  this	  role.	  Similarly,	   the	   Japan	  Civil	  Society	  Network	  for	  the	  CBD	  was	  set	  up	   in	   January	  2009	  to	   lay	   the	  groundwork	   for	  civil	  society	  participation	  at	  the	  10th	  COP	  in	  Nagoya,	   Japan,	   in	  October	  2010.	  On	  a	  more	  permanent	   basis,	   however,	   the	   NGOs	   participating	   in	   the	   CBD	   are	   not	  organised	   through	   a	   formal	   umbrella	   organisation,	   or	   constituency	   focal	  point,	   directly	   comparable	   to	   the	  Climate	  Action	  Network.	  A	  more	   informal	  network	   of	   civil	   society	   organisations	   and	   NGOs	   working	   on	   issues	   of	  biodiversity	  exists	   in	   the	   shape	  of	   the	  CBD	  Alliance,	  which	  was	  set	  up	  after	  the	  COP-­‐6	  in	  2002.40	  	  Unlike	  the	  UNFCCC,	  the	  CBD	  does	  not	  publish	  statistics	  on	  the	  number	  of	  NGO	  participants	   on	   its	  website.	   However,	   NGO	   interviewees	   familiar	  with	   both	  conventions	  agree	  that,	  while	  the	  number	  of	  NGO	  participants	  in	  the	  CBD	  has	  increased	   since	   the	   early	   1990s,	   they	   present	   a	   relatively	   small	   group	  compared	  to	  the	  multitude	  of	  NGOs	  clustered	  around	  the	  climate	  convention.	  The	   difference	   in	   ‘quantitative’	   NGO	   participation	   characterized	   the	   two	  conventions	  even	  prior	  to	  their	  formal	  entry	  into	  force:	  according	  to	  Arts,	  the	  international	  negotiating	   committee	   (INC)	  meetings	  of	   the	  UNFCCC	  were	   in	  general	  visited	  by	  about	  50	  to	  75	  organisations	  whereas	  only	  about	  5	  to	  10	  NGOs	  made	  it	  to	  the	  biodiversity	  INCs	  (Arts	  1998,	  169).	  Following	  the	  1992	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  The	  structure	  and	  role	  of	  the	  CBD	  Alliance	  and	  how	  it	  differs	  from	  CAN	  will	  be	  looked	  at	  in	  detail	  in	  chapter	  VII	  of	  the	  thesis.	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Rio	   Conference,	  where	   the	   convention	  was	   opened	   for	   signature,	   the	  NGOs	  started	  to	  pay	  more	  attention.	  Arts	  links	  this	  to	  the	  United	  States’	  refusal	  to	  ratify	   and	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   had	   now	   become	   apparent	   that	   the	   CBD	   was	  about	  more	  than	  narrow	  conservation	  issues,	  with	  its	  mandate	  extending	  to	  developmental,	   economic	   and	   environmental	   issues	   (Arts	   1998,	   170).	  Organisations	   such	   as	   Greenpeace	   International,	   FoEI,	   the	   Environment	  Liaison	   Centre	   International	   (ELCI),	   the	   Third	   World	   Network	   (TWN)	   and	  Birdlife	  International	  all	  started	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  convention	  after	  the	  Rio	  Conference	  (ibid).	  An	  NGO	  interviewee	  involved	  with	  the	  CBD	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	   onwards	   maintains	   that	   there	   was	   a	   very	   strong	   Southern	   NGO	  presence	   from	   the	   start,	   with	   “clearly	   a	   majority	   of	   Southern	   CSO	  representatives”	   at	   several	   conferences	   in	   the	   late	   1990s	   (interview	   with	  director	   of	   Global	   Forest	   Coalition,	   07.04.2010).	   In	   the	   CBD,	   she	   argues,	  “Southern	   delegates	   see	   the	   strategic	   advantages	   of	   having	  NGOs	   and	   IPOs	  participate	  in	  the	  development	  and	  implementation	  of	  policies”	  (ibid).	  	  	  NGO	  representatives	  with	  a	  track	  record	  of	  engaging	  with	  the	  CBD	  find	  that	  the	   CBD	   is	   relatively	   open	   to	   civil	   society	   participation,	   compared	   to	  many	  other	   international	   environmental	   conventions,	   including	   the	   UNFCCC.	  Equally,	   the	  NGOs	  appear	   to	  prefer	   a	   strategy	  of	   engagement	  with	   the	  CBD	  rather	   than	  more	  confrontational	   ‘outsider’	   tactics:	  unlike	   in	   the	  case	  of	   the	  climate	   negotiations,	   there	   were	   almost	   no	   protest	   activities	   organised	  around	  the	  meetings	  of	   the	  CBD	  in	  the	  1990s	  (Arts	  1998,	  170).	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  possible	  explanations	  for	  the	  relative	  openness	  of	  the	  CBD	  to	  civil	  society.	  Firstly,	  as	  already	  indicated	  above,	  the	  politics	  of	  global	  biodiversity	  are	   characterised	   by	   less	   high-­‐level	   political	   and	   economic	   bargaining	   than	  global	   climate	   policy.	   Moreover,	   the	   conservation	   community	   has	   long	  recognised	   that	   the	   involvement	   of	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   societal	   and	   local	  stakeholders	   is	  a	  crucial	  pre-­‐condition	   for	   the	  successful	   implementation	  of	  conservation	   projects.	   This	   is	   also	   echoed	   in	   the	   convention’s	   ‘ecosystem	  approach’	   to	   conservation,	  which	   emphasizes	   that	   the	   objectives	   of	   natural	  resource	  management	   “are	  a	  matter	  of	   societal	   choice”	  and	  should	   “involve	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all	   relevant	   sectors	   of	   society”	   (Secretariat	   of	   the	   CBD	   2004).	   Another	  explanation	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  CBD	  is	  hosted	  by	  UNEP,	  which	  has	  always	  tended	   to	  work	   closely	  with	   NGOs	   and	   civil	   society	   organisations	   and	   has,	  because	  of	   its	  geographical	   location	   in	  Nairobi,	  also	  enjoyed	  relatively	  good	  relations	  with	  Southern	  groups.	  	  	  The	   CBD	   secretariat	   also	   seems	   keen	   to	   reassure	   the	   NGOs	   that	   their	  contributions	  to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  convention	  are	  indeed	  valued;	  in	  a	  message	  to	  the	  “environmental	  NGOs	  of	  our	  planet”	  Dr	  Ahmed	  Djoghlaf,	  the	  executive	  secretary	  of	   the	  CBD,	  acknowledges	   that	  NGOs	  “played	  a	   leading	  role	   in	   the	  initial	  conception,	  negotiation	  and	  adoption	  of	   the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity,	   and	   continue	   to	   shape	   policy	   development”	   and	   invites	   them	   to	  bring	  their	  “ideas	  and	  enthusiasm”	  to	  the	  eighth	  COP	  (Secretariat	  of	  the	  CBD	  2006).	  One	  interviewee	  mentioned	  that	  Dr	  Djoghlaf	  makes	  a	  point	  of	  paying	  a	  visit	  to	  the	  NGO	  meeting	  that	  takes	  place	  just	  prior	  to	  the	  COP	  and	  welcoming	  the	   participants	   personally,	   and	   to	   tell	   them	   that	   they	   are	   valuable	  contributors	   to	   the	   CBD	   (interview	   with	   biodiversity	   campaigner,	  Greenpeace	   International,	   05.03.2010).	   The	   extent	   to	   which	   formal	  participation	  rights	   for	   civil	   society	  and	   the	   language	  of	  participation	  really	  translate	   into	   concrete	   NGO	   influence	   on	   policy	   outcomes	   is	   questioned,	  however,	   both	   by	   researchers	   and	   some	   NGO	   practitioners,	   with	   one	  interviewee	  doubting	  that	  NGO	  participation	  goes	  much	  beyond	  “coming	  and	  giving	   statements”	   (interview	   with	   biodiversity	   campaigner,	   Greenpeace	  International,	  08.03.2010).	  	  	  NGOs	  are	  generally	  permitted	  to	  attend	  working	  group	  and	  plenary	  sessions	  at	  the	  CBD	  and,	  subject	  to	  permission	  by	  the	  chair,	  allowed	  to	  take	  the	  floor	  at	  the	  end	  of	   the	  session	  (following	   the	  statements	  by	  governments	  and	  other	  IGOs).	  NGOs	  rarely	  speak	  as	  individual	  organisations;	  the	  “weight	  of	  practice”	  is	  to	  deliver	  joint	  statements	  (interview	  with	  senior	  legal	  advisor	  and	  senior	  environmental	   affairs	   officer,	   outreach	   &	   major	   groups,	   CBD,	   09.03.2010).	  Occasionally,	   the	   chair	   may	   exclude	   NGOs	   from	   particularly	   contentious	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discussions	   or	   they	   are	   unable	   to	   give	   their	   statements	   due	   to	   time	  constraints	   (ibid;	   interview	   with	   biodiversity	   campaigner,	   Greenpeace	  International,	  05.03.2010).	  In	  addition,	  NGOs	  are	  sometimes	  able	  to	  comment	  on	  draft	  papers	   that	  are	   circulated	  by	   the	  CBD	  secretariat;	   they	   can	   submit	  statements	  online	  and	  participate	   in	  online	  discussion	   forums	  on	  particular	  issues,	   such	   as	   the	   revision	   and	  updating	   of	   the	   strategic	   plan.41	   It	   appears	  that	  those	  NGOs	  (and	  particular	  individuals	  from	  NGOs)	  that	  are	  able	  to	  offer	  expertise	  and	  competence	  on	  specific	  issues	  in	  the	  negotiations	  can	  use	  these	  to	   build	   long-­‐term	   working	   relationships	   with	   particular	   delegates	   and	  officials.	  On	  issues	  such	  as	  living	  modified	  organisms	  NGOs	  were	  able	  to	  offer	  their	   expertise	   to	   some	   developing	   country	   delegations	   that	   -­‐	   in	   the	   early	  phase	   of	   the	   negotiations	   –	   had	   had	   little	   exposure	   to	   what	   was	   then	   a	  relatively	   new	   issue	   on	   the	   global	   agenda	   (interview	   with	   biodiversity	  campaigner,	  Greenpeace	  International,	  08.03.2010).	  	  	  In	  fact,	  with	  a	  few	  important	  exceptions	  such	  as	  the	  treaty	  on	  ABS,	  the	  focus	  of	   the	   CBD	   has	   increasingly	   shifted	   from	   policy	   development	   to	  implementation	  over	  recent	  years.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  participation	  of	  civil	  society	   organisations	   at	   the	   national	   level	   has	   become	   more	   important,	  whereas	  there	  is	   less	  scope	  now	  for	  NGOs	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  development	  of	   new	   policies.	   Civil	   society	   organisations	   play	   an	   important	   role	   in	  monitoring	  countries’	  progress	  in	  implementing	  nationally	  the	  commitments	  they	   have	   made	   at	   the	   international	   level.	   The	   CBD	   also	   encourages	   the	  participation	   of	   these	   groups	   in	   the	   ‘National	   Biodiversity	   Strategies	   and	  Action	  Plans’	  processes,	  which	  constitute	  “a	  major	  tool	  for	  implementing	  the	  CBD	  at	  the	  national	  level”	  (Herkenrath	  2002,	  29).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  A	  revised	  strategic	  plan	  for	  the	  post-­‐2010	  period	  was	  adopted	  at	  the	  10th	  COP	  in	  October	  2010.	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PART	  TWO:	  Representation	  and	  participation	  deficits	  
and	  NGO	  responses	  The	   purpose	   of	   the	   second	   part	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   discuss	   potential	  representation	   and	   participation	   deficits	   in	   the	   climate	   and	   biodiversity	  conventions	   and	   to	   show	   how	   NGOs	   have	   responded	   to	   these.	   As	   such	   it	  seeks	   to	   offer	   a	   more	   specific	   interpretation	   of	   some	   of	   the	   shortcomings	  relating	   to	   the	   democratic	   “input	   legitimacy”	   (Scharpf	   1999)	   of	   global	  policymaking	  that	  were	  already	  discussed	  in	  more	  general	  terms	  in	  chapter	  II.	  As	  laid	  out	  before,	  a	  crucial	  precondition	  for	  democratic	  legitimacy	  is	  that	  those	   affected	   by	   a	   particular	   political	   decision	   have	   a	   say	   in	   how	   this	  decision	  is	  made	  and	  are	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  influence	  its	  outcome.	  This	  ideal	   is	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   approximated	   in	   international	   institutions	  with	   a	  governance	   structure	   that	   allows	   even	   relatively	   weak	   (in	   economic	   or	  military	   terms)	   states	   to	   shape	   the	   policies	   that	   affect	   their	   citizens.	   In	  addition,	  facilities	  that	  allow	  for	  direct	  participation	  by	  societal	  stakeholders,	  notably	   the	  most	  affected	  communities,	   in	   the	   formulation	  of	   those	  policies	  that	  will	  impact	  their	  lives	  should	  supplement	  intergovernmental	  channels	  of	  representation.	  	  	  The	  following	  discussions	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  the	  CBD	  adopt	  slightly	  different	  perspectives	   on	   the	   representation	   and	   participation	   deficits	   in	   the	   two	  conventions.	  The	  UNFCCC	  is	  analysed	  predominantly	  ‘through	  the	  eyes’	  of	  the	  NGO	  community	  –	  representation	  and	  participation	  deficits	  are	  presented	  as	  seen	  by	  the	  NGOs.	  This	  has	  not	  been	  possible	  to	  quite	  the	  same	  extent	  for	  the	  CBD	  as	  NGOs	  that	  are	   involved	   in	   the	  biodiversity	  convention	  are	  relatively	  less	   focused	  on	   issues	  of	   fairness	  and	  equity	   in	   the	  governance	  structure	  of	  the	  convention.	  Some	  of	  the	  possible	  reasons	  for	  this	  will	  be	  explored	  below.	  This	  means	  that	  there	  is	  simply	  less	  empirical	  material	  available	  that	  shows	  NGO	   criticisms	   of	   alleged	   democratic	   shortcomings	   in	   the	   biodiversity	  convention	   and	   NGO	   proposals	   on	   how	   to	   address	   these.	   The	   way	   the	  analysis	  of	   the	  CBD	  is	  undertaken	  also	  differs	   from	  that	  of	   the	  UNFCCC	   in	  a	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second	  regard.	  Broadly	  speaking,	  whereas	  most	  of	  the	  debates	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  are	  around	  the	  development	  of	  policies	  and	  new	  institutions,	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  CBD’s	  work	  has	  shifted	  more	  to	  creating	  the	  right	  conditions	  for	   implementation	   at	   the	   national	   level	   (the	   discussion	   around	   a	  International	  Protocol	  on	  Access	  and	  Benefit	  Sharing	  and	  the	  development	  of	  a	   new	   strategic	   plan	   constitute	   the	   two	   notable	   exceptions).	   Since	   the	  intention	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   to	   analyse	   the	   NGO	   contributions	   to	   global	  policymaking	  (rather	  than	  implementation),	  the	  case	  of	  the	  CBD	  necessitates	  a	  reflection	  on	  past	  discussions	  around	  some	  of	  the	  more	  contentious	  policy	  and	   governance	   issues,	   many	   of	   which	   resulted	   in	   a	   compromise	   between	  developing	  and	  developed	  countries.	  Both	  of	  these	  factors	  mean	  that,	   in	  the	  case	   of	   the	   CBD,	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   democratic	   legitimacy	   and	   NGO	  concerns	  therewith	  draws	  more	  heavily	  on	  academic	  analyses	  and	  secondary	  sources	   than	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   UNFCCC.	   Nonetheless,	   the	   CBD	   provides	   a	  valuable	  case	  for	  comparison	  with	  the	  climate	  convention	  –	  not	  only	  due	  to	  the	  many	   structural	   similarities	   of	   the	   two	   conventions	   highlighted	   before,	  but	  also	  because	  of	  the	  frequent	  references	  to	  the	  CBD	  made	  by	  NGOs	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  UNFCCC.	  	  	  
iii. Representation	  inequities	  and	  NGO	  responses	  IGOs	   are	   most	   likely	   to	   approximate	   the	   ideal	   of	   equitable	   representation	  when	  characterised	  by	  both	  formal	  and	  informal	  decision-­‐making	  procedures	  that	   guarantee	   fair	   representation	   for	   developing	   countries.	   The	  discussion	  around	   potential	   representation	   inequities	   at	   the	   intergovernmental	   level	  therefore	  needs	   to	   address	   the	  question	  of	  weight	   (Koenig-­‐Archibugi	  2006,	  14):	   how	   fairly	   are	   representation	   rights	   distributed	   among	   the	   member	  states?	   Falk	   speaks	   about	   the	   need	   for	   “horizontal	   reforms”	   that	   seek	   “to	  make	  the	  system	  more	  legitimate	  with	  respect	  to	  relations	  among	  sovereign	  states”	   (Falk	   2005,	   171).	   Linked	   to	   these	   procedural	   concerns	   are	   more	  substantive	  concerns:	  what	  issues	  are	  included	  in	  the	  agenda	  and	  in	  the	  final	  policies?	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Representation	  inequities	  and	  NGO	  responses:	  the	  case	  of	  the	  UNFCCC42	  As	   a	   UN	   treaty,	   the	   climate	   convention’s	   system	   of	   representation	  corresponds	   to	   the	   one	   state	   -­‐	   one	   vote	   arrangement.	   As	   such,	   the	   formal	  allocation	  of	  votes	  among	  countries	  appears	  at	   first	  glance	   less	  problematic	  from	  the	  viewpoint	  of	  democratic	   legitimacy	   than	  alternative	  arrangements	  based	   on	   financial	   contributions	   or	   economic	   power	   that	   are	   used,	   for	  example,	  in	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  institutions.	  The	  issue	  of	  voting	  has,	  however,	  proved	  contentious	  since	  COP-­‐1.	  The	  parties	  to	  the	  convention	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  agree	  on	  rule	  42	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  procedure,	  which	  allows	  for	  decisions	  to	   be	   taken	   by	   a	   two	   third	   majority.	   As	   a	   result,	   decisions	   can	   only	   be	  achieved	  on	  a	  consensus	  basis.	  The	  problem	  with	  consensus	  decision-­‐making	  is	  that	  it	  can	  lead	  to	  agreements	  along	  the	  ‘lowest	  common	  denominator’	  and	  that	  individual	  or	  small	  groups	  of	  countries	  are	  easily	  able	  to	  block	  progress.	  This	  ‘flaw’	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  process	  became	  clearly	  evident	  at	  the	  Copenhagen	  Summit,	   where	   the	   parties	   not	   only	   failed	   to	   come	   up	   with	   an	   ambitious	  agreement,	  but	  where	   the	   little	  which	  was	  agreed	  on	  could	  not	  be	   formally	  adopted	  due	   to	   the	  veto	  of	  a	  small	  handful	  of	  countries.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  the	  promise	   of	  UN	   style	   decision-­‐making	   is	   that	   countries	   are	   –	   at	   least	   on	  paper	  –	  equal	  participants	  and	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  recognise	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  decisions	  that	  they	  have	  all	  agreed	  to.	  	  	  The	   NGO	   submissions	   that	   include	   demands	   for	   equitable	   representation	  among	   governments	   tend	   to	   refer	   to	   new	   and	   proposed	   institutions,	  particular	  with	  respect	  to	  climate	  finance,	  where	  there	  are	  still	  uncertainties	  regarding	  the	  governance	  structures.	  The	  question	  of	  how	  these	  bodies	  may	  be	   governed	   in	   a	   democratic	   yet	   effective	   fashion	   has	   precipitated	   intense	  debates	   at	   the	   intergovernmental	   level	   and	   among	   nongovernmental	  observers.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	   The	   sections	   that	   deal	   with	   NGO	   responses	   to	   representation	   and	   participation	   in	   the	  UNFCCC	  have	  been	  published	  in	  Dombrowski	  (2010).	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The	   detailed	   draft	   design	   for	   a	   future	   Copenhagen	   treaty	   submitted	   by	   a	  group	   of	   NGOs	   illustrates	   this	   point.	   The	   proposal	   stresses	   that	   the	  governance	  structure	  of	  the	  proposed	  ‘Copenhagen	  Climate	  Facility’	   ‘‘should	  reflect	   a	   democratic	   decision-­‐making	   structure	   with	   an	   equitable	   and	  balanced	   regional	   representation,	   ensuring	   significant	   representation	   from	  developing	   countries’’	   (David	   Suzuki	   Foundation	   et	   al	   2009).	   Moreover,	  ‘‘securing	   the	   representation	   of	   the	  most	   vulnerable	   countries	   should	   be	   a	  priority,	  as	  they	  will	  be	  most	  impacted	  by	  unchecked	  climate	  change’’	  (ibid).	  The	   WWF	   makes	   a	   similar	   point	   in	   its	   proposal	   for	   ‘Technology	   Action	  Programmes’,	   which	   envisages	   an	   executive	   board	   of	   technology	   ‘‘with	  balanced	   representation	   of	   developing	   and	   developed	   countries’’	   (WWF	  2008a).	  There	  is	  some	  -­‐	  perhaps	  deliberate	  -­‐	  ambiguity	  regarding	  the	  precise	  meaning	  of	  ‘balanced’,	  ‘equitable’	  or	  ‘significant’	  in	  these	  submissions.	  While	  some	  NGOs	  shun	  away	  from	  specifying	  a	  clear	  ratio	  in	  their	  proposals,	  others	  are	   explicitly	   demanding	  majority	   representation	   for	   developing	   countries.	  CAN,	   for	   instance,	   calls	   for	   “equitable	   representation”	   and	   “representative	  governance”	   in	   a	   future	   financial	   mechanism	   and	   argues	   that	   it	   should	   be	  modelled	   on	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol’s	   Adaptation	   Fund	   Board	  (CAN	  2009a,	  CAN2009b).	  This	  means	  that	  a	  majority	  of	  developing	  countries	  should	   make	   up	   the	   board	   of	   the	   proposed	   financial	   mechanism,	   together	  with	   “specific	   and	   significant	   representation”	   for	   the	   “most	   vulnerable	  developing	  countries”	  (CAN	  2007).	  According	  to	  CAN,	  ‘‘a	  developing	  country	  majority	  is	  more	  equitable	  than	  an	  equal	  distribution	  between	  AI	  and	  non-­‐AI	  countries’’	   since	   ‘‘there	   are	   41	   Annex-­‐I	   countries	   and	   151	   non-­‐Annex-­‐I	  countries’’	  (CAN	  2009a).	  A	  group	  of	  development	  NGOs	  is	  also	  more	  explicit	  in	   their	   proposal	   for	   a	   UN	   climate	   fund,	   whose	   executive	   board	   should	  operate	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   ‘‘one	   country	   one	   vote	   rule	   and	   a	   majority	  representation	   for	   non-­‐Annex	   1	   countries’’	   (Christian	   Aid	   on	   behalf	   of	  APRODEV	  2009).	  	  The	   governance	   structure	   of	   the	   Adaptation	   Fund	   Board	   of	   the	   Kyoto	  Protocol	   is	   repeatedly	   referred	   to	   in	   the	   NGO	   documents	   as	   exemplary:	   it	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‘‘scores	  a	  first	  in	  representative	  governance’’,	  mainly	  because	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  it	   has	  majority	   representation	   from	   developing	   countries	   (CAN	   2009e).	   As	  such,	   it	   serves	   as	   a	   template	   for	   the	   design	   of	   other	   climate	   funds	   (CAN	  2009a).	   The	   demands	   for	   equitable	   representation	   and	   participation	   in	  climate	   policy-­‐making	   are	   justified	   on	   both	   normative	   and	   efficiency-­‐based	  grounds.	   The	   normative	   argument	   presents	   more	   representation	   for	  vulnerable	   countries	   (and	   communities)	   as	   a	   precondition	   for	   achieving	  global	   justice	   as	   it	   is	   these	   countries	   that	   will	   be	   suffering	   most	   from	   the	  negative	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change	  without	  having	  contributed	  substantially	  to	   the	   current	   levels	   of	   greenhouse	   gases	   in	   the	   atmosphere.	   NGOs	   also	  employ	   the	   rationale	   of	   effectiveness,	   arguing	   that	   institutions	   that	   are	  accepted	  as	  legitimate	  by	  developing	  countries	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  succeed	  in	  promoting	   a	   shift	   towards	   low-­‐carbon	   development.	   These	   normative	   and	  practical	   considerations	   also	   seem	   to	   explain	   NGO	   support	   for	   any	   future	  financial	   mechanism	   to	   be	   based	   within	   the	   UN	   structure	   (under	   the	  authority	   of	   the	   Conference	   of	   the	   Parties)	   rather	   than	   in	   other	   existing	   or	  new	  international	  institutions.	  	  The	  twin	  principles	  of	  country	  ownership	  and	  subsidiarity	   in	  policy-­‐making	  and	   implementation	   are	   also	   crucial	   for	   enhancing	   opportunities	   for	  participation	  by	  developing	  countries	  and	  for	  maximizing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  climate	  action	  and	  therefore	  enjoy	  wide	  support	  across	  the	  NGO	  community.	  They	   are	   intended	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   most	   affected	   countries—as	   well	   as	  particular	   stakeholder	   groups	   within	   these	   countries—have	   the	   greatest	  possible	   influence	   over	   determining	   national	   priorities	   for	   adaptation	   and	  mitigation	   action	   and	   the	   allocation	   of	   financial	   resources.	   One	   way	   of	  operationalising	   these	   principles	   is	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   country-­‐level	  coordinating	   body,	   which	   would	   be	   linked	   not	   only	   to	   the	   global	   climate	  convention	   process	   but	   also	   to	   various	   domestic	   stakeholder	   groups.	   The	  NGO	   proposal	   for	   so-­‐called	   in-­‐country	   coordinating	   mechanisms,	   for	  example,	  is	  modelled	  on	  similar	  mechanisms	  employed	  by	  the	  Global	  Fund	  to	  Fight	   Tuberculosis,	   AIDS	   and	   Malaria	   (hereafter	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   Global	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Fund).43	   In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   climate	   convention,	   these	   are	   presented	   as	   a	  way	   of	   facilitating	   ‘‘a	   country-­‐driven	   process,	   representing	   all	   relevant	  stakeholders,	   particularly	   the	   most	   vulnerable	   communities,	   ensuring	   a	  bottom-­‐up	  approach	  to	   identify	  adaptation	  needs	  on	   local,	  sub-­‐national	  and	  national	  levels’’	  (CAN	  2009b;	  CAN	  2009d).	  Similar	  to	  this	  is	  the	  proposal	  for	  the	   creation	  of	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  national	   groups	  as	  national	   implementing	  partners	   for	   the	   climate	   convention	   (Christian	   Aid	   on	   behalf	   of	   APRODEV	  2009).	  These	  proposals	  bring	  together	  two	  modes	  of	  responses	  to	  the	  alleged	  representation	   and	   participation	   deficits	   in	   global	   climate	   governance	  outlined	   above.	   They	   are	   intended	   to	   address	   representation	   and	  participation	   failings	   at	   the	   intergovernmental	   level	   by	   giving	   developing	  countries	   a	   greater	   say	   in	   how	   funding,	   particularly	   in	   the	   context	   of	  adaptation,	  is	  to	  be	  allocated	  and	  used	  nationally,	  but	  also	  firmly	  endorse	  the	  principle	  of	  stakeholder	  participation.	  This	  second	  aspect	  -­‐	  NGO	  support	  for	  the	   participation	   of	   particularly	   affected	   and	   especially	   vulnerable	  stakeholder	  groups	  at	  all	   levels	  of	  climate	  policy-­‐making—will	  be	  discussed	  further	  below.	  	  Interestingly,	   despite	   expressing	   their	   support	   for	   the	   principle	   of	  subsidiarity	  in	  the	  climate	  convention	  context,	  the	  NGO	  submissions	  analysed	  here	  contain	  hardly	  any	  explicit	  references	  to	  the	  role	  of	  sub-­‐national	  entities	  or	   cities	   in	   the	   global	   climate	   regime.	   Local	   governments	   and	   municipal	  authorities	   present	   a	   separate	   constituency	   group	   and	   in	   their	   own	  submissions	   demand	   a	   more	   substantial	   formal	   role	   for	   cities	   and	   local	  authorities	   in	   the	   climate	   convention.	   Besides	   their	   broad	   calls	   for	   the	  participation	  of	  all	  relevant	  stakeholders	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  decision-­‐making,	  the	  environmental	  and	  development	  NGOs	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  attach	  much	  priority	  to	  supporting	  these	  demands.	  This	  is	  noteworthy,	  given	  that	   ‘‘by	  2030,	  two-­‐thirds	   of	   humanity	   will	   live	   in	   urban	   centres	   where	  more	   than	   73%	   of	   all	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  The	  Global	  Fund’s	  guidelines	  for	  its	  country	  coordinating	  mechanisms	  can	  be	  found	  on	  the	  Fund’s	   website	   and	   share	   many	   features	   with	   the	   NGO	   proposals	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  UNFCCC:	   http://www.	   theglobalfund.org/en/ccm/guidelines/?lang=en.	   Last	   accessed	  19.09.2012	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energy	  is	  consumed	  today”	  (ICLEI	  2009).	  Besides	  the	  fact	  that	  actions	  taken	  by	   cities	   and	   other	   sub-­‐national	   actors	   already	   present	   an	   important	  contribution	   to	   global	  mitigation	   and	   adaptation	   efforts,	   these	   sub-­‐national	  levels	   of	   governance	   present	   potentially	   valuable	   opportunities	   for	  facilitating	  the	  participation	  by	  locally	  affected	  communities	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  climate	  change.	  	  It	   is	   often	   impossible	   to	   distinguish	   between	   procedural	   and	   substantive	  equity	   and	   fairness	   demands	   in	   the	  NGO	   positions.	   The	   demands	   for	  more	  equitable	   representation	   by	   governments	   outlined	   here	   tend	   to	   go	   hand	   in	  hand	  with	  NGO	  support	   for	   issues	   that	  are	   considered	  especially	   important	  by	   developing	   countries,	   both	   as	   underlying	   ethical	   principles	   and	   as	  desirable	   policy	   outcomes.	   For	   example,	   many	   NGO	   submissions	   to	   the	  climate	   convention	   emphasise	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   moral	   responsibility	   for	  climate	   change	   lies	   with	   industrialised	   countries	   and	   that	   these	   countries	  need	   to	   take	   the	   lead	   in	   cutting	   emissions	   (the	   ‘responsibility	   argument’).	  NGOs	   also	   support	   demands	   for	   the	   provision	   of	   financial	   resources	   and	  technology	   transfer	   to	   strengthen	   adaptation	  measures	   in	   those	   regions	   of	  the	  developing	  world	  that	  are	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  consequences	  of	  climate	   change	   (the	   ‘vulnerability	   argument’).	   Finally,	   as	   pointed	   out	   by	  analysts	   of	   NGO	   influence	   in	   climate	   negotiations,	   a	   number	   of	   NGOs	   have	  offered	   expertise	   and	   information	   services	   as	   direct	   support	   for	   some	  developing	  country	  delegations	   (Raustiala	  1997;	  Newell	  2000).	   In	   this	  way,	  NGOs	  are,	  to	  some	  extent,	  addressing	  the	  problem	  that	  capacity	  and	  resource	  shortages	  can	  be	  important	  reasons	  for	  less	  effective	  participation	  by	  smaller	  developing	  countries’	  delegations	  in	  global	  negotiations.	  	  
Representation	  inequities	  and	  NGO	  responses:	  the	  case	  of	  CBD	  As	   in	   the	   UNFCCC,	   parties	   to	   the	   CBD	   are	   formally	   represented	   on	   a	   one	  country	  –	  one	  vote	  basis	  and	  adhere	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  consensus	  decision-­‐making.	  The	  CBD’s	  rules	  of	  procedure	  mention	  the	  possibility	  of	  having	  a	  vote	  as	   a	   last	   recourse	   if	   consensus	   cannot	   be	   reached.	   Just	   as	   in	   the	   UNFCCC,	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however,	  the	  relevant	  paragraph	  is	  bracketed	  which	  means	  that	  parties	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  agree	  on	  this	  issue.	  Of	  course,	  as	  in	  other	  international	  fora,	  the	  formal	  rules	  for	  representation	  tell	  us	  little	  about	  the	  practical	  realities	  of	  how	   power	   is	   distributed	   based	   on	   capacity	   and	   resources	   among	   the	  governments.	  The	  bargaining	  power	  of	  governmental	  delegates	  is	  not	  only	  a	  function	  of	  what	  they	  have	  to	  offer	  the	  other	  parties,	  but	  is	  also	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  reflection	  of	  their	  negotiating	  skills,	  and	  their	  understanding	  of	  and	  expertise	  in	  the	  issues	  at	  stake.	  Since	  the	  CBD	  addresses	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  issues,	  many	  of	  which	   are	   highly	   technical	   in	   nature,	   governments	   that	   are	   only	   able	   to	  send	   a	   few	   delegates	   or	   have	   not	   had	   the	   opportunity	   to	   gain	   substantial	  experience	   on	   specific	   issues	   can	   be	   at	   a	   disadvantage.	   This	   problem	   is	  further	   compounded	   when	   several	   negotiation	   sessions	   are	   taking	   place	  simultaneously	   during	   the	   COPs,	   leaving	   countries	  with	   very	   few	   delegates	  thinly	  spread	  on	  the	  negotiations	  (Rosendal	  2000),	  or	  when	  highly	  technical	  negotiations	  are	  conducted	  in	  English.	  	  	  There	   is,	   unlike	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   UNFCCC,	   little	   evidence	   of	   NGO	   concern	  with	  formal	  governmental	  representation	  inequities	  in	  the	  CBD.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  possible	  explanations	  for	  this	  divergence	  in	  NGO	  responses	  to	  the	  two	   conventions.	  One	  may	   simply	  be	   the	   fact	   that	   –	   relative	   to	  many	  other	  international	   forums	   –	   the	   convention	   text	   reflects	   many	   demands	   by	  Southern	  countries	  and	  its	  decision-­‐making	  structure	  is	  relatively	  egalitarian.	  From	   the	   early	   days	   of	   the	   convention,	   developing	   countries	   have	   had	   a	  relatively	   strong	   standing	   therein.	   Another	   (linked)	   explanation	   may	   be	  related	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  issue.	  Many	  aspects	  of	  biodiversity	  conservation	  have	   been	   less	   politicised	   at	   the	   international	   level	   and	   have	   not	   been	   as	  explicitly	  linked	  to	  questions	  of	  global	  justice	  as	  climate	  change	  politics.	  One	  exception	   to	   this	   is	   the	   debate	   on	   access	   and	   benefit	   sharing;	   however,	  although	   this	   issue	   is	   highly	   political	   it	   has	   attracted	   much	   less	   public	  attention	  than	  climate	  change.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  however,	  the	  debates	  at	  the	  CBD	  appear	  more	  focused	  on	  implementation	  issues	  and	  less	  on	  questions	  of	  governance	   relating	   to	   new	   decision-­‐making	   bodies	   (such	   as	   the	   proposed	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financial	   mechanism	   or	   REDD	   board	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   UNFCCC).	   As	   such,	  many	  of	  the	  NGOs	  have	  similarly	  chosen	  to	  focus	  on	  implementation-­‐related	  issues.	  Finally,	   the	  nature	  and	  composition	  of	   the	  participating	  NGOs	   in	   the	  CBD,	  or	  at	   least	   that	  of	   the	   individual	  NGO	  representatives	  they	  send	  to	  the	  convention,	   might	   explain	   the	   different	   levels	   of	   emphasis	   placed	   on	  democratic	   demands.	   The	   following	   discussion	   will	   briefly	   explore	   these	  factors.	  	  	  Broader	   structural	   factors	   and	   the	  particular	  nature	  of	   the	   issue	  determine	  the	   conditions	   under	   which	   countries	   are	   able	   to	   exert	   influence	   in	   the	  biodiversity	   negotiations.	   Most	   of	   the	   world’s	   biodiversity	   is	   located	   in	   a	  number	   of	   Southern	   mega-­‐diverse	   countries	   whereas	   most	   of	   the	  technologies	   needed	   to	   exploit	   this	   commercially	   are	   based	   in	   Northern	  countries.	   Insofar	   as	   companies	   and	   research	   institutions	   in	   Northern	  countries	   want	   access	   to	   the	   genetic	   resources	   of	   the	   global	   South,	   mega-­‐diverse	   countries	   can,	   at	   least	   in	   theory,	   derive	   substantial	   bargaining	  strength	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  sovereign	  control	  over	  their	  biological	  resources.	  It	  is	  worth	  contrasting	  this	  situation	  with	  the	  climate	  negotiations,	  where	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   issue	   (i.e.	   the	   need	   to	   reduce	   global	   emissions)	  effectively	   renders	   the	   largest	   current	   and	   future	   polluters	   –	  Northern	   and	  major	  developing	  countries	  –	  most	  influential.	  However,	  Rosendal	  also	  makes	  the	   valuable	   point	   that	   “as	   long	   as	   developed	   countries	   have	   free	   access	   to	  germplasm	   through	   international	   gene	   banks,	   they	   have	   an	   incentive	   to	  remain	  free-­riders	  in	  reaping	  the	  benefits	  from	  genetic	  resources”	  (Rosendal	  2000,	  170).	  	  According	  to	  the	  same	  author	  (Rosendal	  2000)	  the	  text	  of	  the	  convention	  as	  opened	  for	  signature	  in	  1992	  reflected	  a	  number	  of	  important	  changes	  from	  the	  status	  quo	  ante	  at	  the	  insistence	  of	  Southern	  countries.	  Through	  affirming	  the	  sovereign	  control	  of	  countries	  over	   their	  biological	  resources	  and	  citing	  the	  fair	  and	  equitable	  sharing	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  genetic	  resources	  as	  one	  of	  its	  three	   overarching	   objectives,	   the	   CBD	   represents	   an	   instrument	   through	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which	  Southern	  countries	  attempted	   to	   rectify	  an	  existing	  global	   imbalance	  between	   users	   and	   providers	   of	   genetic	   resources.	   Most	   importantly,	  biological	  and	  genetic	  resources	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  considered	  to	  fall	  under	  the	   ‘common	   heritage	   of	   mankind’	   principle,	   which,	   in	   practice,	   had	   been	  interpreted	  as	  a	   ‘free	  access’	  regime	  by	  actors	   in	  the	  global	  North.	  The	  very	  fact	  that	  the	  CBD’s	  scope	  goes	  beyond	  narrow	  conservation	  issues,	  as	  initially	  envisaged	   by	   a	   number	   of	   Northern	   countries,	   and	   encompasses	   bigger	  developmental	  questions	  and	  equity	  concerns	  is	  also	  a	  reflection	  of	  Southern	  priorities	   at	   the	   time.	   Not	   all	   observers	   share	   this	   assessment	   of	   the	  convention	  as	  a	  victory	  for	  the	  global	  South,	  however	  –	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  the	   limited	   success	   of	   the	   CBD	   in	   achieving	   its	   objectives	   since	   1993.	   It	   is	  evident,	   for	   instance,	   that	   the	   funds	   provided	   by	   the	   Global	   Environment	  Facility	   (which	   in	   turn	   depends	   largely	   on	   contributions	   by	   the	   OECD	  countries)	  are	  not	  sufficient	  for	  the	  many	  tasks	  that	  have	  been	  bestowed	  onto	  the	   CBD	   by	   its	   members.	   Moreover,	   the	   CBD’s	   principle	   of	   countries’	  sovereignty	   over	   their	   biological	   and	   genetic	   resources	  might	   be	   relatively	  weak	  in	  the	  face	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  (IPRs)	  promoted	  by	  the	  WTO	  and	   the	  United	  States.	  From	  this	  perspective,	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  CBD	  and	   its	  associated	  norms	  is	  extremely	  limited	  as	  other	  global	  economic	  policies	  and	  institutions	  have	  a	  much	  greater	  role	  –	  and	  often	  countervailing	  influence	  -­‐	  in	  the	  world	  economy.	  	  Pre-­‐shadowing	  the	  debates	  in	  the	  UNFCCC,	  the	  question	  of	  funding	  and	  how	  the	   CBD’s	   financial	   mechanism	   should	   be	   governed	   proved	   especially	  contentious	   during	   the	   CBD’s	   negotiation	   phase.	   The	   G77	   developing	  countries	  demanded	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  financial	  mechanism	  for	  the	  CBD,	  under	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   COP,	  while	   OECD	   countries	   favoured	   the	   Global	  Environment	   Facility	   as	   the	   CBD’s	   permanent	   financial	   mechanism.	  According	   to	   McGraw,	   the	   decision	   to	   designate	   the	   GEF	   as	   the	   financial	  mechanism	   on	   an	   initially	   ‘interim	   basis’	   was	   a	   compromise	   between	  Northern	   and	   Southern	   countries	   (McGraw	   2002,	   27).	   However,	   in	   a	  concession	  to	  developing	  countries,	  the	  convention	  text	  also	  states,	  that	  “the	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mechanism	   shall	   function	   under	   the	   authority	   and	   guidance	   of,	   and	   be	  accountable	  to,	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  for	  purposes	  of	  this	  Convention”	  (CBD,	  Article	  21	  (1)).	  Other	  points	  of	  disagreement	  concerned	  the	  definition	  of	  incremental	  costs	  and	  the	  appropriate	  criteria	  for	  designing	  CBD	  projects	  (i.e.	   should	   these	  encompass	  broad	  national	   criteria	  or	  narrow	  biodiversity	  objectives)	  (Rosendal	  2000,	  167;	  Arts	  1998,	  221).	  Continuing	  disagreements	  between	   parties	   meant	   that	   they	   were	   unable	   to	   agree	   on	   a	   permanent	  financial	   mechanism	   to	   replace	   the	   GEF	   and	   simply	   extended	   the	   GEF’s	  interim	  status	  instead,	  subject	  to	  reforms	  in	  the	  GEF’s	  governance	  structure.	  On	   the	   crucial	   issue	   of	   funding	   then,	   formal	   representation	   rights	   among	  governments	   follow	   the	   restructured	  GEF	  model,	  which	  operates	   according	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  a	  double-­‐weighted	  majority,	  thus	  combining	  the	  UN-­‐style	  one	   country	   one	   vote	   system	   with	   representation	   rights	   that	   reflect	   the	  economic	  strength	  and	  financial	  contributions	  of	  member	  countries.	  	  	  It	   is	  also	   important	   to	  note	   that	  most	  of	   the	   few	  NGOs	  that	  were	  present	   in	  the	   formation	   stage	   of	   the	   CBD	   were	   large	   Northern-­‐based	   conservation	  focused	   groups	  who	   did	   not	   share	   the	   positions	   of	   developing	   countries	   at	  the	   time.	   According	   to	  Rosendal	   (1991,	   33	   cited	   in	  Rosendal	   2000,	   94)	   the	  few	   conservation	  NGOs	   that	  were	   involved	   in	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   the	  CBD’s	  formation	   such	   as	   the	   IUCN	  and	  WWF	  actually	   feared	   that	  no	   conservation	  agreement	   could	   be	   reached	   if	   the	   broader	   social	   and	   equity	   concerns	   of	  developing	   countries	   were	   included	   in	   the	   negotiations.	   On	   the	   issue	   of	  financing,	   only	   Greenpeace	   made	   a	   forceful	   intervention	   on	   the	   legal	  incompatibility	   of	   the	   CBD	   and	   the	   GEF	   at	   the	   first	   COP,	   arguing	   that	   this	  arrangement	   did	   not	   meet	   the	   requirement	   set	   out	   in	   the	   treaty	   that	   the	  financial	  mechanism	  should	  operate	  under	  the	  authority	  and	  guidance	  of	  the	  COP	  (Arts	  1998,	  223).	  However,	  on	  this	  issue	  Greenpeace	  was	  not	  supported	  by	   other	   participating	   NGOs	   such	   as	   World	   Resources	   Institute,	   EDF	   and	  WWF	   who	   saw	   the	   continued	   debate	   as	   an	   unnecessary	   distraction	   (Arts	  1998,	  223).	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More	   recently	   it	   appears	   that	   in	   the	   CBD	   and	   among	   the	   NGOs	   associated	  with	  it	  debates	  over	  the	  appropriate	  governance	  of	  a	  new	  or	  revised	  financial	  mechanism	  have	  receded	   into	   the	  background	   in	   light	  of	   the	  more	  pressing	  need	   to	  generate	  new	  and	  more	   funds	   for	  conservation	  work	   in	  developing	  countries.	  The	  problem	  of	   insufficient	   funds	  constitutes	  a	  major	  obstacle	   to	  successful	  implementation	  of	  the	  convention.	  One	  possible	  solution	  has	  been	  put	   forward	   by	   IUCN:	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   ‘Green	   Development	   Mechanism’	  modelled	   on	   the	   UNFCCC’s	   CDM	   which	   could	   help	   to	   generate	   new	   and	  additional	  funding	  from	  the	  private	  sectors,	  and	  therefore	  require	  little	  or	  no	  government	   funding	  (IUCN	  2009).	  This	  proposal	   is	   -­‐	  not	  surprisingly	   -­‐	  seen	  critically	  by	  many	  other	  NGOs	  who	  point	  to	  the	  mixed	  record	  of	  the	  CDM,	  in	  particular	  its	  failure	  to	  achieve	  substantial	  global	  emission	  cuts	  and	  to	  apply	  stringent	  social	  and	  ecological	  safeguards.	  	  Despite	   the	   seemingly	   strong	   influence	   of	   developing	   countries	   within	   the	  CBD,	   the	   NGO	   representatives	   interviewed	   for	   this	   chapter	   acknowledged	  that	   some	   small	   and	   developing	   countries	   (especially	   the	   Small	   Island	  Developing	  States	  (SIDS)	  and	  the	  Least	  Developed	  Countries	  (LDCs))	  can	  be	  at	   a	   disadvantage	   in	   the	   CBD	   negotiations,	   as	   their	   delegations	   are	   often	  under-­‐staffed	   and	   not	   as	   experienced	   on	   some	   of	   the	   issues	   discussed.	   A	  number	   of	   NGO	   interviewees	   pointed	   to	   examples	   of	   NGOs	   working	   with	  disadvantaged	  governments	  in	  these	  situations,	  offering	  their	  expertise	  (such	  as	  in	  the	  GMO	  case	  referred	  to	  above)	  or	  even	  providing	  translation	  services.	  It	   appears	   that	   a	   number	   of	   NGOs,	   especially	   the	  well-­‐resourced	   ones	  who	  also	   possess	   substantial	   scientific	   expertise,	   have	   been	   able	   to	   offer	   their	  expertise	   to	   governmental	   delegations,	   sometimes	   building	   long-­‐term	  working	  relationships,	  or	  even	  including	  representatives	  from	  their	  national	  offices	   in	   country	   delegations.	   Some	   NGOs	   are	   reluctant,	   however,	   to	   give	  much	   detail	   on	   this	   aspect	   of	   their	   work	   in	   order	   not	   to	   jeopardise	   their	  working	   relationships	   with	   the	   governments	   in	   question	   (interview	   with	  director	   of	   global	   policy,	  WWF	   International,	   11.02.2010).	   Of	   course,	   it	   can	  also	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  capacity	  shortages	  of	  some	  governmental	  delegations	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present	  one	  opportunity	  for	  influence	  for	  the	  NGOs.	  Instead	  of	  having	  to	  wait	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  negotiating	  sessions,	  where	  they	  may,	  at	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  chair,	  be	  permitted	  to	  take	  the	  floor	  as	  observers,	  they	  are	  able	  to	  input	  directly	   into	   the	   contributions	   by	   parties,	   which	   are	   bound	   to	   carry	   more	  weight.	   This	   source	   of	   influence	   should	   not	   be	   seen	   in	   a	   subversive	   way,	  however,	  as	   it	   is	  always	   the	  governments	  who	  decide	  whether	  and	   to	  what	  extent	   to	   rely	   on	   NGO	   input	   (and	   as	   such	   will	   also	   be	   using	   it	   to	   their	  advantage).	  	  	  Finally,	  the	  fact	  that	  demands	  for	  equity,	  justice	  and	  democracy	  feature	  more	  prominently	   in	   the	   NGO	   submissions	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   than	   in	   the	   NGO	  submissions	   to	   the	  CBD	   is	   also	   a	   reflection	  of	   the	  different	   compositions	  of	  the	  respective	  NGO	  communities.	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  discussion	  in	  part	  one,	  the	  NGOs	   engaged	   with	   or	   otherwise	   targeting	   the	   UNFCCC	   are	   from	   a	   wide	  range	   of	   backgrounds	   and	   include	   many	   groups	   that	   do	   not	   have	  environmental	  politics	  as	  their	  primary	  focus	  and	  often	  take	  a	  more	  overtly	  political	  or	  social	  stance.	  Framing	  the	  global	  politics	  of	  climate	  change	  in	  the	  language	  of	  ‘climate	  justice’	  has	  helped	  to	  bring	  together	  these	  very	  different	  groups	   around	  a	   common	  agenda	  of	   linking	   climate	   change	  policy	   to	   social	  justice	   and	   equity	   considerations.	   The	   wider	   NGO	   community	   has,	   by	  contrast,	  not	  responded	  to	  the	  challenge	  of	  biodiversity	   loss	  with	  a	  unifying	  idea	  of	   ‘biodiversity	   justice’.	   Instead,	   the	  NGOs	  most	   engaged	  with	   the	  CBD	  tend	  to	  come	  from	  a	  conservation	  background,	  or	  at	   least	  send	  members	  of	  staff	  with	  a	  background	  in	  conservation	  biology	  or	  genetics	  to	  the	  meetings.	  This	  would	  explain	  why	  NGO	  interventions	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  technical	  and	  less	  politicized	  than	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  UNFCCC.	  	  	  
Representation	  inequities	  and	  NGO	  responses	  in	  the	  two	  conventions	  The	   analysis	   shows	   that	   the	   NGOs	   engaged	   with	   the	   UNFCCC	   and	   CBD	  respectively	   have	   placed	   very	   different	   degrees	   of	   emphasis	   on	   issues	   of	  inequitable	   representation	   in	   their	  written	   submissions	   to	   the	   conventions.	  Possible	   reasons	   for	   this	   divergence	   –	   in	   particular	   for	   the	   lack	   of	   NGO	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demands	  for	  more	  equitable	  representation	  structures	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  CBD	  -­‐	  were	  explored	  above.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  UNFCCC,	  the	  governance	  structure	  of	   the	   proposed	   finance	   facility	   has	   emerged	   as	   the	   main	   target	   of	   NGO	  demands	  for	  fair	  representation	  among	  governments.	  In	  particular	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  Adaptation	  Fund	  Board	   is	  heralded	  by	   the	  NGOs	  as	  a	   template	   for	  the	  governance	   structure	  of	  other	   finance	  mechanisms.	  The	  need	   to	   situate	  any	  new	  institutions	  firmly	  within	  the	  UN	  structure	  is	  also	  widely	  stressed	  in	  the	  NGO	  submissions.	  The	  principles	  of	  country	  ownership	  and	  subsidiarity	  allow	   developing	   countries	   to	   shape	   those	   elements	   of	   climate	   policy	   that	  affect	  their	  citizens	  and	  may	  be	  operationalised	  in	  mechanisms	  similar	  to	  the	  Global	  Fund’s	  in-­‐country	  coordinating	  mechanisms.	  	  	  Discussed	   above	   were	   primarily	   procedural	   demands	   voiced	   by	   NGOs	   and	  issues	  of	  formal	  governance.	  Of	  course,	  as	  was	  already	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  II	  of	  the	  thesis,	  the	  formal	  distribution	  of	  votes	  is	  rarely	  an	  accurate	  reflection	  of	   the	   true	   distribution	   of	   power	   and	   influence	   among	   participants.	   The	  observation	  that	  “all	  states	  may	  legally	  be	  equal	   in	  many	  global	   forums,	  but	  some	  states	  are	  clearly	  more	  equal	  than	  others”	  (Hoffman	  2012,	  2)	  certainly	  applies	   to	   the	   two	  UN	   conventions	   under	   discussion	   here.	   The	   issue	   of	   the	  how	  NGOs	   respond	   to	   the	  more	   informal	   representation	   imbalance	   among	  governments	   has,	   admittedly,	   only	   been	   touched	   on.	   There	   is	   some	   –	  anecdotal	   –	   evidence	   of	   NGOs	   offering	   support	   to	   delegates	   that	   may	   be	  disadvantaged	  due	  to	  language	  barriers,	  the	  small	  size	  of	  their	  delegations	  or	  the	   fact	   that	   they	  possess	   relatively	   less	  expertise	  and	  specialized	   technical	  knowledge	   in	  some	   issues	  under	  discussion	   than	   the	  much	   larger	  and	  well-­‐resourced	  delegations	  from	  rich	  countries.	  However,	   these	   instances	  cannot	  count	  as	   systematic	   responses	  by	  NGOs	   to	   fundamental	  problems	  of	  power	  imbalances	  among	  governments.	  	  	  Of	   course,	   both	   the	   ‘real’	   distribution	   of	   power,	   understood	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  “real-­‐world	  influence	  in	  determining	  substantive	  outcomes”	  (Hoffman	  2012,	  3),	   and	   the	   NGO	   responses	   to	   this	   are	   much	   harder	   to	   gauge.	   Formal	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procedural	   demands	   have	   the	   advantage	   that	   they	   are	   easier	   to	   identify.	  Moreover,	   the	   existence	   of	   formally	   democratic	   structures	   in	   international	  institutions	   is	  perhaps	  not	  a	  sufficient	  but	  certainly	  a	  necessary	  condition	  if	  strongly	   impacted	   countries	   are	   to	   have	   influence	   in	   the	   making	   of	   those	  decisions	   that	   affect	   their	   citizens.	   As	   set	   out	   before,	   the	   democratic	   gap	  between	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  and	  affected	  communities	  might	  also	  be	  narrowed	   through	   the	   creation	   of	   direct	   means	   of	   access	   for	   societal	  stakeholders.	  This	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  next	  section.	  	  	  
iv. Participation	  deficits	  and	  NGO	  responses	  	  NGO	   support	   for	   the	   greater	   participation	   by	   affected	   stakeholders	   at	   the	  different	   levels	   of	   policymaking	   constitutes	   the	   second	   category	   of	   NGO	  responses	   identified	   here.	   In	   this	   sense,	   NGOs	   are	   pushing	   for	   broader	  societal	   access	   to	   decision-­‐making	   (Koenig-­‐Archibugi	   2006,	   14;	   Bäckstrand	  and	  Lövbrand	  2006,	  55),	  beyond,	  and	   in	  co-­‐existence	  with,	   the	  channels	   for	  representation	  through	  national	  governments.	  This	  corresponds	  to	  demands	  for	   “vertical	   reforms,	   taking	  greater	  account	  of	  actors	  other	   than	  states	  and	  recognising	   transnational	   social	   forces	   whose	   prominence	   and	   role	   exhibit	  the	   growing	   obsolescence	   of	   any	   system	   of	   global	   governance	   that	   relies	  exclusively	  on	  a	  Westphalian	  conception	  of	  world	  order”	  (Falk	  2005,	  171).	  	  
Participation	  deficits	  and	  NGO	  responses:	  the	  UNFCCC44	  	  In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   climate	   convention,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   distinguish	   between	  two	   types	   of	   NGO	   demands	   designed	   to	   support	   the	   participation	   of	  particularly	   affected	   and/or	   vulnerable	   groups:	   proposals	   for	   climate	  convention-­‐linked	  domestic-­‐level	  mechanisms	  that	  allow	  for	  participation	  by	  stakeholders	   in	   the	   local	   and	   national	   context,	   and	   proposals	   for	  institutionalising	  participation	  at	  the	  international	  level	  directly.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	   The	   discussion	   of	   NGO	   responses	   to	   participation	   deficits	   in	   the	   UNFCCC	   has	   been	  published	  in	  Dombrowski	  (2010).	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National	   policy-­‐making	   bodies	   such	   as	   the	   ‘in-­‐country	   coordinating	  mechanisms’	   discussed	   above	   are	   intended	   to	   address	   potential	  representation	   inequities	   at	   the	   international	   intergovernmental	   level	   by	  giving	   governments,	   especially	   those	   of	   recipient	   countries,	   more	   control	  over	  their	  national	  climate	  policy	  priorities.	  However,	  these	  mechanisms	  are	  also	   intended	   to	   enable	   the	   participation	   of	   a	   diverse	   range	   of	   societal	  stakeholders	   in	   the	  policy-­‐making	  process.	  NGOs	  are	  particularly	   careful	   to	  point	   out	   that	   the	   participation	   of	   those	   who	   are	   especially	   affected	   or	  vulnerable,	   notably	  marginalised	   communities,	   indigenous	   peoples,	  women	  and	   youth	   should	   be	   prioritised.	   CAN,	   for	   example,	   argues	   that	   ‘‘National	  Adaptation	  Plans	  or	  Strategies	  should	  be	  prepared	  with	  the	  full	  involvement	  of	  civil	  society,	  vulnerable	  communities,	  and	  the	  private	  sector’’	  (CAN	  2009)	  and	   that:	   ‘‘It	   is	   imperative	   that	   the	   most	   vulnerable	   people,	   who	   have	  contributed	   least	   to	   climate	   change	   but	   are	  most	   affected	   by	   it,	   are	   at	   the	  heart	   of	   decision-­‐making	   about	   adaptation	   and	   risk	   management’’	   (CAN	  2008).	  	  A	   number	   of	   references	   indicate	   a	   preference	   by	   some	   NGOs	   for	   the	  development	   of	   mandatory	   standards	   for	   stakeholder	   participation,	  applicable	  in	  particular	  to	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  local	  communities	  (David	  Suzuki	   Foundation	   et	   al	   2009;	   Global	   Witness	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   Ecosystem	  Climate	   Alliance	   2009;	   Forest	   Peoples	   Programme	   2009).	   Such	   standards	  would	  be	  developed	  and	  agreed	  internationally	  (and	  in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  affected	   stakeholders)	   and	   implemented	   in	   the	   domestic	   context.	   The	  proposed	  in-­‐country	  coordinating	  mechanisms,	  for	  instance,	  are	  supposed	  to	  ‘‘follow	   guidelines	   for	   adequate,	   active	   and	   meaningful	   stakeholder	  participation’’,	   to	  be	  developed	  by	  the	  executive	  committee	  of	   the	  proposed	  Copenhagen	   climate	   facility	   (David	   Suzuki	   Foundation	   et	   al	   2009).	   The	  guidelines	   developed	   by	   the	   World	   Commission	   on	   Dams	   (WCD)	   are	  repeatedly	   cited	   as	   an	   example	   of	   best	   practice	  with	   regard	   to	   stakeholder	  participation,	  which	   could	   serve	   as	   a	   template	   for	   similar	   guidelines	   in	   the	  context	   of	   climate	   policy	   (Forest	   Peoples	   Programme	  2009).	   Several	   of	   the	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NGO	   submissions	   express	   support	   for	   some	   level	   of	   monitoring	   and	  enforcement	   of	   such	   standards,	   especially	   in	   their	   positions	   on	   the	   REDD	  (Reducing	   Emissions	   from	   Deforestation	   and	   Forest	   Degradation)	  mechanism	  (discussed	  below).	  This	  would	  include	  third	  party	  monitoring	  or	  the	   creation	   of	   an	   independent	   ombudsman	   to	   guarantee	   that	   countries	  follow	   social	   and	   governance-­‐related	   standards,	   including	   those	   relating	   to	  the	   participation	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   (Schroeder	   2010)	   and	   local	  communities,	   in	   their	   REDD	   policies.	   Country	   performance	   may	   even	   be	  linked	   to	   the	   allocation	   of	   REDD	   funds	   (Global	   Witness	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	  Ecosystem	  Alliance	  2009).	  	  While	  making	  the	  adoption	  of	  certain	  principles	  on	  stakeholder	  participation	  a	   pre-­‐condition	   for	   funding	   eligibility	  may,	   at	   first	   glance,	   appear	   to	   be	   an	  effective	   way	   of	   securing	   public	   participation	   in	   national	   climate	   policy-­‐making,	  such	  proposals	  also	  risk	  alienating	  those	  governments	  who	  consider	  the	   imposition	   of	   social	   standards	   an	   interference	   in	   domestic	   political	  processes.	  This	  problem	  became	  apparent	  during	  the	  debate	  on	  formulating	  mandatory	  standards	  for	  participatory	  impact	  assessments	  and	  independent	  appeals	   mechanisms	   in	   CDM	   projects,	   whereby	   ‘‘Developing	   country	  governments	  opposed	  the	  imposition	  of	  all	  such	  protections,	  arguing	  that	  as	  sovereign	   states	   they	   alone	   would	   design	   CDM	   national	   processes’’	   (Fogel	  2004,	   113).	   Another	   problem	   with	   relying	   on	   standardized	   participation	  mechanisms	   in	   the	   domestic	   context	   lies	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   some	   of	   the	  most	  affected	   communities	   are	   often	   marginalised	   from	   domestic	   political	  processes	  for	  a	  host	  of	  wider	  economic	  and	  socio-­‐cultural	  reasons.	  Capacity	  building	   and	   the	   recognition	   of	   cultural,	   political	   and	   economic	   rights	   are	  hence	   important	   elements	   of	   democratic	   participation	   -­‐	   a	   challenge	   also	  widely	  acknowledged	  by	  the	  NGOs.	  	  Besides	   expressing	   support	   for	  multi-­‐stakeholder	   processes	   in	   the	   national	  context,	   the	  NGOs	  also	  emphasise	   the	  need	   for	  participation	  by	  particularly	  affected	   groups,	   especially	   indigenous	   peoples,	   at	   the	   international	   level,	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namely	   in	  the	  climate	  convention	  directly.	   In	  order	  to	  achieve	  this,	   they	  are	  calling	  on	  parties	  to	  ‘‘create	  means	  by	  which	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  directly	  represented	   in	   the	   climate	   negotiation	   process’’	   (Climate	   Law	   and	   Policy	  Project	   2009).	   The	   participation	   practices	   employed	   by	   the	   Convention	   on	  Biological	   Diversity	   and	   the	   UN	   Convention	   to	   Combat	   Desertification	   are	  referred	  to	  as	  instances	  of	  good	  practice	  that	  the	  climate	  convention	  should	  also	   adopt.	  More	   specifically,	   indigenous	   peoples	   should	   have	   the	   ‘‘right	   to	  speak	  directly	  to	  texts	  under	  negotiation	  and	  to	  participate	  in	  contact	  groups	  and	   friends	   of	   the	   chair	   meetings	   where	   matters	   (like	   forests	   and	   related	  issues)	  may	  affect	  them’’	  (ibid).	  Parties	  should	  also	  be	  encouraged	  to	  include	  representatives	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  local	  communities	  in	  their	  official	  delegations.	   The	   importance	   of	   allocating	   funding	   to	   support	   the	  participation	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  is	  also	  acknowledged	  (Coordinating	  Body	  of	   Indigenous	   Organisations	   of	   the	   Amazon	   Basin	   2009).	   Relatively	   less	  attention	  is	  given	  to	  participation	  rights	  for	  other	  stakeholder	  groups	  such	  as	  farmers,	  youth	  or	  women.	  	  	  
Reducing	  Emissions	  from	  Deforestation	  and	  Forest	  Degradation	  (REDD)	  One	  of	   the	   issues	  which	  have	   triggered	  much	  NGO	   lobbying	  at	   the	  UNFCCC	  over	   recent	   years	   has	   been	   the	   question	   of	   how	   to	   avoid	   emissions	   from	  deforestation.	   The	   creation	   of	   an	   international	   mechanism	   for	   ‘Reducing	  Emissions	   from	   Deforestation	   and	   Degradation’	   (REDD)	   constitutes	   one	   of	  the	   work	   areas	   of	   the	   Bali	   action	   plan.	   The	   objective	   is	   to	   develop	  internationally	  accepted	  methodologies	  for	  REDD	  credits,	  which	  are	  expected	  to	   play	   an	   important	   role	   as	   part	   of	   the	   post-­‐2012	   climate	   agreement.	   The	  case	   of	   REDD	   is	   a	   good	   example	   of	   international	   policymaking	   with	  potentially	   very	   serious	   impacts	   on	   local	   communities,	   especially	   forest-­‐dependent	   indigenous	  peoples.	  So	   far,	  however,	   these	  affected	  communities	  have	   not	   been	   given	   any	   formal	   opportunities	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	  negotiations	   about	   a	   future	   agreement	   on	   REDD.	   Indigenous	   peoples’	  representatives	   expressed	   their	   frustration	   with	   their	   exclusion	   from	   the	  climate	   negotiations	   in	   Bali	   in	   2007,	   when	   they	   staged	   protests	   and	   wore	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gags	   with	   the	   letters	   ‘UNFCCC’	   written	   on	   them	   (Climate	   and	   Capitalism	  2007).	  The	  case	  of	  REDD	  therefore	  presents	  a	  highly	  relevant	  example	  of	  how	  international	   NGOs	   have	   responded	   to	   concerns	   over	   participation	   and	  representation	  deficits	  in	  a	  specific	  instance	  of	  climate	  related	  policy-­‐making	  and	  of	  their	  proposed	  solutions.	  	  	  The	  need	  for	  recognising	  and	  respecting	  the	  rights	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  other	   local	  communities,	   together	  with	  calls	   for	  securing	   their	  participation	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  on	  REDD-­‐related	  policies,	  feature	  prominently	  in	  the	  relevant	   NGO	   submissions	   to	   the	   UNFCCC.	   NGOs	   argue	   for	   the	   inclusion	   of	  participation	   norms	   and	   principles	   in	   the	   design	   of	   the	   REDD	  mechanism,	  pointing	  out	  that	  these	  norms	  are	  already	  set	  out	  in	  a	  range	  of	  international	  instruments	   and	   included	   in	   other	   international	   environmental	   agreements	  and	   conventions,	   such	   as	   the	   Convention	   on	  Biological	  Diversity.	   They	   also	  outline	  some	  of	  the	  more	  specific	  modalities	  through	  which	  the	  participation	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  local	  communities	  may	  be	  ensured	  at	  the	  various	  levels	  of	  REDD	  decision-­‐making:	  for	  example,	  through	  participatory	  mapping	  of	   land	   tenure	   rights,	   provisions	   for	   social	   and	   environmental	   impact	  assessment,	   and	   the	  establishment	  of	   independent	   complaints	  mechanisms.	  In	   addition,	   NGOs	   are	   putting	   forward	   a	   number	   of	   substantive	   demands	  which	  are	  of	  great	  importance	  to	  indigenous	  peoples:	  the	  recognition	  of	  their	  rights	   to	   traditional	   lands,	   territories	   and	   resources	   and	   ways	   of	   life,	  compensation	   for	   ecological	   services	   provided	   by	   indigenous	   communities,	  and	   guarantees	   that	   local	   communities	   get	   to	   benefit	   from	   the	   REDD	  proceeds.	  	  	  CAN	   stresses	   that	   “any	   approach	   to	   REDD	   must	   ensure	   full	   and	   effective	  participation	   by	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   local	   communities	   in	   all	   stages	   of	  decision-­‐making”	   (CAN	   2009a).	   Provisions	   for	   participation	   within	   the	  UNFCCC	   should	   be	   modelled	   on	   those	   employed	   by	   the	   Convention	   on	  Biological	  Diversity	  and	  the	  UN	  Permanent	  Forum	  on	  Indigenous	  Issues	  (CAN	  2009a).	  The	  parties	  are	  called	  upon	  to	  integrate	  the	  specific	  principles	  set	  out	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in	  the	  UN	  Declarations	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  (UNDRIP)	  into	  the	  REDD	  mechanism.	  These	  include	  –	  most	  crucially	  –	  the	  right	  to	  free	  and	  prior	  informed	  consent	   (FPIC)	  and	   the	   right	   to	  participate	   in	  decision-­‐making	  on	  matters	   that	   affect	   them,	   but	   also	   the	   recognition	   of	   their	   rights	   to	   their	  traditional	   lands	  and	  the	  right	  to	  seek	  redress.	  NGOs	  advocate	  the	  inclusion	  of	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   local	   communities	   at	   both	   the	   level	   of	  international	  decision-­‐making	  as	  well	  as	  within	  those	  countries	  that	  decide	  to	  implement	  REDD	  projects.	  Internationally,	  participation	  should	  be	  facilitated	  in	   “all	   relevant	   workshops,	   meeting	   and	   submissions	   on	   REDD	  methodologies”	   and	   “Parties	   should	   be	   encouraged	   to	   include	  representatives	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   local	   communities	   in	   their	  delegations”	   (FoEI	   2009a).	   Furthermore,	   indigenous	   peoples	   “must	   be	  afforded	  a	  formal	  structure	  within	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiation	  process	  that	  not	  only	  allows	  for	  the	  full,	  direct	  and	  active	  participation	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  but	   also	  provides	   funding	   and	   support	   for	   this	  participation”	   (Coordinating	  Body	  of	  Indigenous	  Organisations	  of	  the	  Amazon	  Basin	  2009).	  At	  the	  national	  level,	   NGOs	   “recommend	   the	   establishment	   of	   national	   multi-­‐stakeholder	  REDD	   groups,	   involving	   rights	   holders	   and	   stakeholders,	   particularly	  indigenous	  peoples,	   local	   communities	   and	  civil	   society,	   to	   engage	   in	  REDD	  ‘readiness’,	   including	   developing	   national	   REDD	   plans	   and	   systems	   for	  monitoring	   and	   verification”	   (Global	   Witness	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   Ecosystem	  Alliance	   2009).	   They	   also	   argue	   that	   “(m)apping	   and	   clarifying	   land	   tenure	  and	  rights	  to	  land,	  territories	  and	  resources	  in	  a	  participatory	  manner	  must	  be	   a	   prerequisite	   for	   establishing	   REDD	   schemes”	   and	   that	   REDD	   projects	  need	   to	   be	   accompanied	   by	   participatory	   social	   impact	   monitoring	   and	  include	   conflict	   resolution	   mechanisms	   that	   are	   accessible	   to	   local	  communities	  (CAN	  2009a).	  	  	  	  While	   most	   of	   the	   NGO	   submissions	   consistently	   link	   “indigenous	   peoples	  
and	   local	   communities”,	   the	   identity	   of	   these	   non-­‐indigenous	   communities	  remains	  unspecified.	  Moreover,	  the	  frequent	  references	  to	  the	  UN	  Permanent	  Forum	   on	   Indigenous	   Issues	   and	   the	   UN	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	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Indigenous	   Peoples	   as	   appropriate	   guidelines	   for	   developing	   participation	  norms	  and	  mechanisms	  within	  REDD	  also	  indicate	  that	  the	  primary	  concern	  lies	   with	   protecting	   the	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   specifically.	   It	   is,	  however,	  not	  unreasonable	  to	  suggest	  that	  REDD	  will	  also	  impact	  other	  local	  communities	   who	   do	   not	   identify	   themselves	   as	   ‘indigenous’	   and	   whose	  interests	  may	  in	  some	  cases	  even	  conflict	  with	  those	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  in	  the	   area.	   The	   emphasis	   in	   the	  NGO	   submissions	   on	   the	   need	   to	   ensure	   the	  participation	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   as	   opposed	   to	   other	   potentially	   affected	  communities	   suggests	   perhaps	   that	   NGOs	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   particularly	  responsive	   to	   the	   demands	   of	   groups	   who	   have	   already	   succeeded	   in	  achieving	  a	  level	  of	  political	  mobilisation	  and	  visibility.	  	  	  The	   NGO	   positions	   on	   REDD	   mirror	   many	   of	   the	   demands	   raised	   by	  indigenous	   peoples’	   organisations	   (IPOs)	   themselves,	   in	   both	   their	   own	  submissions	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   and	   in	   indigenous	   peoples’	   declarations	   on	  climate	   change	   and	   forest	   policies	   (Indigenous	   Peoples	   Global	   Summit	   on	  Climate	   Change	   2009).	   These	   similarities	   may	   be	   largely	   because	   the	  
language	   of	   participation	   has	   by	   now	   reached	   the	   highest	   levels	   of	   policy-­‐making	   in	   the	   context	   of	   climate	   change	   and	   is	   increasingly	   becoming	  accepted	   as	   part	   of	   the	   dominant	   elite	   discourses	   on	   climate	   change.	   A	  comparison	   of	   the	  NGO	   positions	   as	   outlined	   in	   their	   UNFCCC	   submissions	  and	   the	   submissions	   made	   by	   IPOs	   shows	   significant	   overlap	   in	   the	  procedural	  principles	  espoused,	  such	  as	  the	  issue	  of	  FPIC,	  participation	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  decision-­‐making,	  and	  independent	  redress	  mechanisms.	  	  	  Although	   the	   support	   for	   formal	   participation	   rights	   by	   indigenous	  communities	   is	   found	   across	   the	   NGO	   community,	   there	   are	   important	  differences	  when	   it	  comes	   to	  more	   fundamental	  worldviews.	  The	   IPOs	   tend	  to	   emphasize	   the	   larger	   political	   and	   economic	   context	   constraining	   the	  struggle	   for	   their	   rights.	   They	   highlight	   their	   experience	   of	   historical	  exploitation	   and	   racism	   at	   the	   hand	   of	   governments	   and	   corporations	   and	  present	   the	   recognition	   of	   their	   rights	   (i.e.	   the	   recognition	   of	   indigenous	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peoples	   as	   rights-­‐holders	   and	   not	   as	   stakeholders)	   as	   the	   essential	   pre-­‐requisite	  for	  their	  participation	  in	  any	  REDD-­‐related	  processes:	  “Indigenous	  peoples’	  rights	  and	  resource	  rights	  must	  be	  recognised	  prior	  to	  the	  inclusion	  of	  our	  lands,	  territories	  and	  forests	  in	  REDD	  schemes”	  (International	  Alliance	  of	  Indigenous-­‐Tribal	  Peoples	  of	  the	  Tropical	  Forests	  2009).	  Moreover,	  many	  indigenous	   peoples	   organisations	   reject	   market-­‐based	   solutions	   such	   as	  carbon	   trading,	   the	   CDM	   and	   REDD	   in	   principle	   and	   present	   their	   own	  relationship	   to	   Nature	   and	   “unique	   ‘global’	   and	   ‘social’	   knowledges”	   (Fogel	  2004,	   118;	   also	   see	   discussion	   by	   Smith	   2007)	   as	   viable	   alternatives	   of	  human-­‐nature	  co-­‐existence:	  	  “IIPFCC	   (International	   Indigenous	   Peoples’	   Forum	   on	   Climate	  Change)	   continues	   to	   oppose	   the	   commercialisation	   and	  commodification	   of	   forests	   and	   recommends	   that	   Parties	   and	  other	   key	   actors	   to	   be	   educated	   to	   understand	   the	   different,	  holistic	   world	   view	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   to	   understand	  the	   different	   values	   that	   forests	   have	   for	   indigenous	   peoples	  and	   for	   humankind”	   (International	   Alliance	   of	   Indigenous-­‐Tribal	  Peoples	  of	  the	  Tropical	  Forests	  2009).	  	  The	   extent,	   to	   which	   environmental	   NGOs	   share	   this	   sceptical	   view	   of	  markets	  and	  are	  open	  to	  alternative	  paradigms,	  such	  as	  that	  put	  forward	  by	  indigenous	   peoples,	   varies	   across	   the	   NGO	   community.	   Some	  environmentalists	   are	   questioning	   the	   very	   legitimacy	   of	   market-­‐based	  mechanisms	   per	   se	   “as	   part	   of	   a	   more	   general	   critique	   of	   any	   perceived	  marketization	   or	   commodification	   of	   nature”	   while	   others	   are	   concerned	  about	   the	   potential	   for	   distortions	   and	   misuse,	   including	   “scandals	   and	  loopholes	   in	   existing	   markets,	   rent-­‐seeking	   and	   windfall	   profits,	   to	  questioning	  their	  lack	  of	  long-­‐term	  effectiveness	  and	  uptake”	  (Bernstein	  et	  al	  2012,	  5).	  These	  variations	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  more	  depth	  in	  chapters	  VI	  and	  VII	  of	  the	  thesis.	  It	  is	  in	  particular	  those	  groups	  that	  work	  closely	  with	  social	  movements	   and	   the	   climate	   justice	   movement	   that	   are	   more	   naturally	  aligned	   with	   the	   positions	   put	   forward	   by	   the	   IPOs.	   Moreover,	   certain	  governments	   in	   the	   climate	   negotiations,	   notably	   Bolivia,	   have	   to	   some	  degree,	   also	   espoused	   the	   perspectives	   of	   indigenous	   peoples.	   Most	   of	   the	  large	   international	   NGOs,	   however,	  with	   perhaps	   the	   exception	   of	   FoEI,	   do	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not	   reject	   market-­‐based	   solutions	   in	   principle	   and	   often	   consider	   these	  essential	  for	  successful	  climate	  action.	  This	  is	  especially	  the	  case	  for	  the	  US-­‐based	   conservation	   groups	   such	   as	   The	   Nature	   Conservancy	   (TNC)	   who	  argue	   in	   favour	   of	   “a	   system	   of	   financial	   incentives,	   carbon	   credit	  markets	  and	  technical	  assistance	  that	  would	  allow	  developing	  nations	  to	  generate	  the	  funds	  needed	  to	  conserve	  forests,	  reduce	  emissions,	  protect	  biodiversity	  and	  improve	  local	  livelihoods”	  (The	  Nature	  Conservancy	  2009).	  	  	  Alternative	   perspectives	   emanating	   from	   civil	   society	   groups	   find	   it	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  be	  listened	  to	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  context	  where	  market-­‐based	  solutions	  are	  now	  considered	  cornerstones	  of	  global	  action	  on	  climate	  change.	  Speaking	  about	   the	   issue	  of	   forest	  carbon	  markets,	  one	   interviewee	  remarked	   that	   alternative	  voices	   are	  also	  marginalised	  due	   to	   a	   concurrent	  bias	   by	   funders:	   “alternatives	   are	   being	   squeezed	   about	   because	   that’s	   not	  where	   the	   funding	   is	   going”	   (interview	   with	   director	   of	   Global	   Forest	  Coalition,	  07.04.2010).	  	  
	  
Participation	  deficits	  and	  NGO	  responses:	  the	  CBD	  The	   participation	   by	   indigenous	   peoples	   in	   the	   CBD	   is	   often	   heralded	   as	  exemplary,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  many	  of	   the	  NGO	  submissions	   in	   the	  context	  of	  the	   climate	   negotiations	   discussed	   above.	   According	   to	   a	   guide	   to	   the	   CBD	  published	   by	   the	   United	   Nations	   University,	   “indigenous	   and	   local	   peoples	  have	  created	  considerable	  political	  space	  to	  participate	   in	  and	  influence	  the	  CBD	   process”	   (UNU	   2008,	   7).	   The	   convention’s	   provisions	   relating	   to	  indigenous	   peoples	   and	   local	   communities	   and	   its	   corresponding	  participatory	  mechanisms	  are	  largely	  a	  reflection	  of	  their	  essential	  role	  in	  the	  conservation	   of	   biological	   diversity	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   impacts	   of	  biodiversity	   loss	   and	   habitat	   destruction	   are	   most	   acutely	   felt	   at	   the	   local	  level.	   In	   many	   parts	   of	   the	   world	   –	   and	   particularly	   in	   the	   mega-­‐diverse	  countries	   mentioned	   above	   –	   local	   communities,	   indigenous	   peoples,	  fisherfolk,	  small	  farmers,	  forest	  dwellers	  and	  pastoralists	  directly	  depend	  on	  biodiversity	   for	   their	   livelihoods.	   Moreover,	   many	   indigenous	   peoples	   also	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attach	   great	   spiritual	   value	   to	   particular	   sites,	   species	   and	   ecosystems	   and	  are	  often	  guardians	  of	  a	  wealth	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  on	  how	  to	  conserve	  and	  use	  biodiversity	  in	  a	  sustainable	  manner.	  	  	  In	   particular	   the	   convention’s	   article	   8(j)	   makes	   it	   stand	   out	   from	   other	  international	  environmental	  conventions,	   including	  the	  UNFCCC.	  The	  article	  encourages	   parties	   to	   respect	   the	   knowledge	   and	   practices	   of	   indigenous	  peoples	   and	   local	   communities,	   and	   to	   work	   with	   them	   to	   enable	   the	  equitable	   sharing	  of	   the	  benefits	  of	   this	  knowledge.	  LePrestre	   suggests	   that	  article	   8(j)	   “has	   become	   one	   of	   the	   more	   powerful	   instruments	   that	  indigenous	  populations	  have	  at	   their	  disposal	   for	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  their	   rights	   relative	   to	   those	  of	   the	  state	  and	  civil	   society	  at	   large,	  although	  article	   15	   emphasizes	   the	   rights	   of	   governments	   over	   their	   population”	  (LePrestre	  2002,	  314).	  	  The	   importance	   of	   biodiversity	   to	   indigenous	   peoples,	   the	   provisions	   of	  Article	   8(j)	   relating	   to	   the	   need	   to	   “respect,	   preserve	   and	   maintain”	  traditional	   and	   indigenous	   knowledge,	   and	   the	   desirability	   of	   “equitable	  sharing	   of	   the	   benefits	   arising	   from	   the	   utilisation	   of	   such	   knowledge,	  innovations	  and	  practices”	  are	  issues	  that,	  according	  to	  Arts,	  were	  addressed	  in	   all	   successive	   drafts	   of	   the	   convention,	   indicating	   a	   shared	   awareness	  among	   governments	   of	   their	   importance	   (Arts	   1998,	   177).	   Arts	   shows	   that	  the	  CBD’s	  early	  references	  to	  indigenous	  peoples	  were	  not	  brought	  about	  by	  NGO	   lobbying	   and	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   have	   been	   taken	   from	   UNEP’s	  preparatory	  documents	  for	  the	  negotiations	  (Arts	  1998,	  183).	  	  One	   of	   the	  major	   innovations	   about	   the	   CBD	  was	   the	   creation	   of	   an	   open-­‐ended	  working	  group	  on	  Article	  8(j)	  in	  1998,	  which	  also	  included	  indigenous	  participants.	   Indigenous	   peoples	   are	   also	   engaged	   in	   the	   CBD	   processes	  through	   the	   International	   Indigenous	   Forum	  on	  Biosafety	   (IIFB),	   formed	   at	  COP-­‐3	   in	   Buenos	   Aires	   in	   1996.	   According	   to	   one	   observer,	   the	   process	   of	  indigenous	   peoples’	   participation	   in	   the	   CBD	   “has	   created	   remarkable	   new	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precedents	   for	   United	   Nations	   negotiating	   forums”	   (Herity	   2004,	   25).	   He	  notes	  the	  following	  ways	  in	  which	  meetings	  have	  been	  adapted	  to	  allow	  for	  better	  input	  by	  indigenous	  participants:	  	  “Caucus	   space	   is	   provided	   for	   them,	   as	   well	   as	   basic	   office	  equipment.	   The	  meeting	   room	   is	   arranged	   so	   that	   aboriginal	  representatives	   share	   the	   space	   from	   front	   to	   back	   with	   the	  government	   Party	   representatives	   instead	   of	   being	   delegated	  to	   the	   back	   row.	   A	   regionally	   balanced	   number	   of	   them	   are	  invited	   to	  participate	   in	  Bureau	  meetings.	  They	  are	   invited	   to	  co-­‐chair	   working	   group	   sessions.	   They	   are	   able	   to	   speak	   in	  sequence	  with	  government	  representatives,	  rather	  then	  having	  to	  wait	  until	  all	  Parties	  have	  spoken”	  (Herity	  2004,	  25).	  While	  the	  rights	  of	   indigenous	  peoples	  are	  thus	  enshrined	   in	  the	  text	  of	   the	  CBD	  and	  a	  number	  of	  mechanisms	  exist	   to	  enable	   their	  participation	  at	   the	  global	   level,	   it	   is	  –	  as	  was	  also	  noted	  in	  the	  discussion	  on	  REDD	  above	  -­‐	  not	  clear	   to	  what	  extent	   these	  participatory	  norms	  and	  practices	  also	  extend	  to	  the	  more	  amorphous	  category	  of	   ‘local	  communities’.	  On	  paper,	  at	   least,	   the	  convention’s	   documents	   consistently	   refer	   to	   ‘indigenous	   peoples	   and	   local	  communities’.	   In	   practice,	   however,	   it	   is	  much	   easier	   for	   the	   secretariat	   to	  identify	  legitimate	  representatives	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  organisations	  than	  to	   explain	   who	   would	   constitute	   an	   appropriate	   local	   community	  representative.	  	  	  The	   –	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	  UNFCCC	   –	   relatively	   strong	   position	   of	   indigenous	  groups	   within	   the	   CBD	   means	   that	   demands	   for	   more	   participation	   by	  affected	   communities	   have	   not	   featured	   as	   prominently	   among	   the	  biodiversity	   NGOs	   as	   among	   the	   climate	   NGOs.	   Indeed,	   the	   survey	   of	   NGO	  submissions	   and	   position	   papers	   on	   CBD-­‐related	   issues	   reveals	   very	   few	  references	   to	   the	   need	   to	   further	   strengthen	   participation	   by	   societal	  stakeholders	   in	   the	  CBD’s	  policy-­‐making	  processes	  beyond	  expressing	   their	  support	   for	   the	   already	   existing	   provisions	   of	   article	   8(j)	   and	   similar	  participation	  rights	  in	  the	  convention.	  Exceptions	  to	  this	  are	  the	  submissions	  by	  the	  Forest	  Peoples	  Programme,	  which	  “works	  to	  secure	  the	  rights	  of	  forest	  peoples	   to	   control	   their	   lands	   and	   destinies”	   (Forest	   Peoples	   Programme	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2009b).	   In	   its	   submissions	   on	   the	   revision	   of	   the	   CBD’s	   strategic	   plan	   FPP	  repeatedly	  calls	   for	  the	  more	  frequent	   inclusion	  of	  terms	  like	   ‘participatory’	  and	  ‘participation’	  by	  indigenous	  and	  local	  communities,	  and	  more	  emphasis	  on	  human	  rights	  and	  rights-­‐based	  approaches	  (ibid).	  	  	  However,	   given	   the	   costs	   of	   participating	   in	   the	   COPs	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  CBD	   does	   not	   provide	   funding	   for	   Southern	   civil	   society	   organisations	   to	  come	  to	  the	  meetings,	  there	  are	  nonetheless	  practical	  obstacles	  to	  equitable	  participation	   by	   civil	   society	   organisations.	   While	   the	   large	   international	  conservation	  organisations	  are	  able	  to	  send	  large	  delegations	  to	  the	  meetings	  of	  the	  parties,	  the	  ability	  of	  Southern	  organisations	  to	  participate	  is	  subject	  to	  serious	  funding	  shortages.	  However,	  a	  number	  of	  influential	  Northern-­‐based	  NGOs	   such	   as	   WWF	   and	   Greenpeace	   claim	   to	   have	   deliberately	   sought	   to	  increase	  the	  participation	  of	  their	  own	  campaigners	  based	  in	  the	  global	  South	  and	   to	  bring	   staff	   from	   their	  national	   offices	   in	  developing	   countries	   to	   the	  meetings	   of	   the	   COP.	   These	   organisations	   are	   also	   sometimes	   funding	   the	  attendance	   of	   local	   communities	   representatives,	   who	   are	   often	   given	   the	  chance	  to	  articulate	  their	  positions	  and	  talk	  about	  their	  experiences	  in	  face-­‐to-­‐face	   meetings	   with	   governmental	   delegates,	   at	   side	   events	   and	   during	  press	  conferences.	  	  While	  these	  efforts	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  steps	  in	  the	  right	  direction,	  they	  are	  not	  sufficient	  to	  overcome	  structural	   inequalities.	  Especially	  civil	  society	  groups	  from	   the	   global	   South	   are	   critical	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   large	   conservation	  groups	   yield	   enormous	   influence	   in	   the	   CBD.	   An	   important	   source	   of	  influence	  for	  large	  and	  well-­‐resourced	  conservation	  NGOs	  such	  as	  WWF,	  TNC	  and	   the	   Sierra	   Club	   are	   their	   financial	   contribution	   to	   global	   conservation	  programmes,	   especially	   protected	   areas.	   According	   to	   one	   interviewee	  representing	  a	  network	  of	  predominantly	  Southern	  NGOs	  the	  close	  working	  relationship	   between	   a	   small	   number	   of	   large	   conservation	   NGOs	   and	   the	  CBD	   secretariat	   has	   further	   intensified	   over	   recent	   years	   and	   is	   making	   it	  harder	   for	  poorly-­‐resourced	  groups	   to	  make	   their	   voices	  heard	   in	   the	  CBD.	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Many	   Southern	   groups	   and	   indigenous	   peoples’	   groups	   are	   particularly	  sceptical	   of	   the	   market-­‐friendly	   attitudes	   of	   some	   European	   and	   North	  American	  conservation	  organisations	  and	  their	  links	  with	  business.	  One	  NGO	  interviewee	   remarked	   that	   relations	   among	   the	   CBD	   NGOs	   are	   sometimes	  characterised	  by	  “mistrust”	  and	  “tensions	  because	  of	  the	  role	  of	  larger	  NGOs	  that	  work	  a	  lot	  with	  industry.”	  This	  mirrors	  findings	  by	  academic	  observers	  on	  the	  role	  of	  a	  small	  number	  of	  extremely	  well	  connected	  and	  wealthy	  non-­‐governmental	  groups	  that	  are	  able	  to	  exert	  considerable	  influence	  on	  policy	  as	  part	  of	  a	  “transnational	  conservation	  elite”	  (Holmes	  2011).	  	  	  
Access	  and	  benefit	  sharing	  (ABS)	  The	  third	  and	  final	  objective	  of	  the	  CBD	  is	  the	  access	  to	  genetic	  resources	  and	  the	  fair	  and	  equitable	  sharing	  of	  the	  benefits	  arising	  from	  their	  use.	  This	  issue	  is	  commonly	  shortened	  to	  ‘access	  and	  benefit	  sharing’	  or	  ABS.	  While	  article	  3	  of	  the	  CBD	  confirms	  that	  states	  have	  the	  sovereign	  right	  to	  exploit	  their	  own	  resources,	  article	  15	  calls	  on	  Parties	  “to	  create	  conditions	  to	  facilitate	  access	  to	   genetic	   resources	   for	   environmentally	   sound	   uses	   by	   other	   Contracting	  Parties”	   (CBD,	  Article	  15	  (2)).	  The	  same	  article	  states	   that	  access	   to	  genetic	  resources	  will	  be	  on	  “mutually	  agreed	  terms”	  and	  “subject	  to	  prior	  informed	  consent”	  (CBD	  Article	  15	  (5)),	  and	  that	  parties	  will	  take	  measures	  to	  enable	  “sharing	  in	  a	  fair	  and	  equitable	  way	  the	  results	  of	  research	  and	  development	  and	  the	  benefits	  arising	  from	  the	  commercial	  and	  other	  utilisation	  of	  genetic	  resources	  with	  the	  Contracting	  Party	  providing	  such	  resources”	  (CBD	  Article	  15	  (7)).	  	  The	   fact	   that	   an	   international	   regime	   on	  ABS	  was	   only	   adopted	   in	  October	  2010,	  17	  years	  after	  the	  entry	  into	  force	  of	  the	  convention,	  shows	  that	  it	  has	  been	   extremely	   difficult	   to	   find	   common	   ground	   among	   a	   wide	   range	   of	  different	  stakeholders.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  CBD	  has	  not	  had	  a	  wider	  regulatory	   and	   perhaps	   normative	   effect	   on	   ABS	   practices	   by	   a	   range	   of	  actors,	   both	   governmental	   and	   private:	   many	   scientific	   institutions	   and	  private	   corporations	   have	   used	   the	   principles	   articulated	   by	   the	   CBD	   to	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develop	   their	   own	   codes	   of	   conduct	   in	   relation	   to	   ABS	   or	   to	   support	   the	  elaboration	   of	   legislation	   in	   provider	   countries	   (Siebenhuener,	  Dedeurwaerdere	   and	   Brousseau	   2005,	   440).	   While	   a	   number	   of	   these	  countries	   (mainly	   developing	   countries)	   have	   adopted	   national	   ABS	  legislation	   since	   the	   entry	   into	   force	   of	   the	   CBD,	   no	   developed	   country	   has	  done	  so	  (Rosendal	  2006,	  440).	  Developing	  countries	  are	  also	  those	  who	  have	  long	  argued	   in	   favour	  of	  a	   legally	  binding	  multilateral	  protocol,	  while	  many	  developed	  countries	  preferred	  a	  non-­‐binding	  regime.	  	  	  At	  the	  COP	  5	  in	  2000,	  the	  parties	  decided	  to	  set	  up	  the	  Ad-­‐Hoc	  Open-­‐ended	  Working	  Group	  on	  Access	  and	  Benefit-­‐Sharing	  (WG	  ABS).	  Initially,	  the	  Group	  focused	  its	  efforts	  on	  producing	  a	  set	  of	  voluntary	  guidelines	  on	  ABS,	  which	  became	  known	  as	  the	  2002	  ‘Bonn	  Guidelines’.	  Since	  2004,	  the	  working	  group	  has	  concentrated	  its	  efforts	  on	  coming	  up	  with	  a	  viable	  international	  regime	  on	  access	  to	  genetic	  resources	  and	  benefit	  sharing.	  Although	  the	  COP	  decided	  to	  mandate	  the	  WG	  ABS	  to	  negotiate	  the	  international	  regime	  in	  collaboration	  with	   the	   Ad-­‐Hoc	  Open-­‐Ended	   Intersessional	  Working	   Group	   on	  Article	   8(j)	  (WG	   8(j)),	   thus	   “ensuring	   the	   participation	   of	   indigenous	   and	   local	  communities,	   non-­‐governmental	   organisations,	   industry	   and	   scientific	   and	  academic	   institutions,	   as	   well	   as	   intergovernmental	   organisations”	   (COP	  decision	   VII/	   19D),	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   local	   communities	   enjoy	  much	  more	  restricted	  participation	  rights	  in	  the	  WG	  ABS	  than	  in	  the	  WG	  8(j).	  While	  they	   are	   able	   to	   participate	   on	   a	   similar	   footing	   to	   governments	   in	   the	  WG	  8(j),	  the	  WG	  ABS	  permits	  them	  to	  attend	  as	  observers	  only.	  Hence,	  one	  major	  challenge	   for	   civil	   society	   organisations	   fighting	   for	   the	   participation	   of	  indigenous	  peoples	  in	  the	  ABS	  negotiations	  has	  been	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  two	  working	  group	  processes	  are	  linked	  (interview	  with	  director	  of	  Global	  Forest	  Coalition,	  07.04.2010).	  	  	  The	   debate	   on	   ABS	   is	   a	   good	   example	   of	   how	   a	   number	   of	   NGOs	   and	  indigenous	  peoples	  organisations	  have	  tried	  to	  promote	  a	  community-­‐based	  interpretation	  of	  property	  rights	  over	  a	  purely	  governmental	  one.	  The	  CBD’s	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recognition	   of	   states’	   sovereign	   rights	   over	   their	   resources	   (article	   3)	   is	   an	  important	  stance	  against	  the	  century-­‐old	  practice	  of	  free	  access	  to	  Southern	  countries’	  genetic	  resources	  without	  sharing	  the	  benefits.	  The	  fact	  that	  large	  corporations	  based	  in	  rich	  countries	  had	  in	  the	  past	  often	  profited	  from	  the	  exploitation	   of	   the	   genetic	   resources	   of	   developing	   countries	   (and	   local	  communities)	   without	   adequate	   compensation	   for	   the	   original	   ‘owners’	   of	  these	  resources	  contributed	  to	  accusations	  of	   ‘biopiracy’	  by	  these	  corporate	  actors.	  The	  problem	  is,	  however,	  that	  a	  narrow	  interpretation	  of	  sovereignty	  fails	   to	   recognise	   the	   rights	   of	   local	   communities	   over	   local	   resources.	  Indigenous	   peoples	   organisations	   and	   a	   number	   of	   NGOs	   have	   emphasised	  that	   the	   requirement	   of	   FPIC	   of	   local	   communities	   (not	   only	   governments)	  needs	   to	   be	   incorporated	   in	   the	   international	   agreement	   and	   that	   these	  communities	  are	  entitled	  to	  the	  benefits	  from	  genetic	  materials	  and	  forms	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  sourced	  from	  their	  territories.	  	  	  A	   number	   of	   submissions	   (largely	   by	   indigenous	   peoples	   groups	   and	   their	  supporters)	   emphasize	   the	   need	   to	   enshrine	   the	   principle	   of	   FPIC	   of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	   local	   communities.	  They	  also	  want	  clear	   references	  to	   UNDRIP,	   ILO	   Convention	   169	   and	   other	   international	   legal	   instruments	  that	  emphasise	  the	  rights	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  their	  participation	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	   processes	   that	   affect	   them.	   Indigenous	   peoples’	  representatives	  are	  demanding	  that	  	  “any	  decision-­‐making	  about	  the	  rules	  to	  regulate	   the	   buying	   and	   selling	   of	   those	   genes	   and	   Indigenous	   knowledge	  must	  include	  our	  right	  to	  make	  our	  own	  decisions	  about	  what	  will	  be	  the	  best	  path	   for	   our	   future	   generations	   based	   on	   our	   own	   cultural	   and	   spiritual	  beliefs	   and	   related	   customary	   and/or	   codified	   laws”	   (Kanehe	   2008).	   It	   is	  interesting	   to	   note	   the	   submission	   of	   the	   research	   institutes	   such	   as	   the	  International	   Institute	   for	   Environment	   and	   Development	   (IIED)	   and	   a	  number	  of	   Southern	   research	   and	   community	   associations.	  The	   submission	  contains	   the	   findings	   of	   an	   action-­‐research	   project	   that	   “entailed	  participatory	   studies	   with	   indigenous	   and	   local	   communities	   in	   areas	   of	  important	   biological	   diversity”	   (IIED	   et	   al	   2009,	   1).	   They	   demand	   that	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“governments	  wishing	  to	  effectively	  implement	  the	  CBD	  should	  rethink	  their	  interpretation	   of	   ‘state	   sovereignty’	   of	   genetic	   resources	   to	   ensure	   that	  customary	   rights	   are	   also	   recognised”	   (IIED	   et	   al	   2009,	   4)	   and	   that	   “those	  seeking	   access	   need	   to	   obtain	   the	   PIC	   of	   the	   community	   through	   the	  appropriate	   and	   recognised	   community	   structures	   and	   institutions,	   e.g.	  traditional	  authorities	  and	  elders,	  as	  identified	  by	  the	  community”	  (IIED	  et	  al	  2009,	  5).	  While	   less	  specific	   in	   their	  demands,	  WWF	  also	  calls	  on	  parties	   to	  further	   elaborate	   and	   eventually	   include	   the	   principle	   of	   prior	   informed	  consent	   of	   holders	   of	   traditional	   knowledge	   and	   community-­‐level	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  arising	  out	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  (WWF	  2008c).	  	  Similar	  to	  the	  case	  of	  REDD,	  a	  number	  of	  key	  differences	  between	  indigenous	  peoples	   and	   these	   types	   of	   NGO	   demands	   remain,	   however.	   Some	   IPOs	  fundamentally	   oppose	   the	   use	   of	   patents	   for	   genetic	   resources	   on	   the	  grounds	   that	   “life	   cannot	   be	   bought,	   owned,	   sold,	   discovered	   or	   patented”	  (Indigenous	  Peoples	  Council	  on	  Bio-­‐colonialism	  1995	  quoted	  in	  Swiderska	  et	  al	   2008,	   61).	   These	   groups	   are	   opposed	   on	   principle	   to	   any	   international	  regime	   that	   legitimises	   patents,	   even	   if	   it	   manages	   to	   protect	   the	   rights	   of	  local	   communities.	  Moreover,	   according	   to	  Boisvert	  and	  Caron	   (2002,	  154),	  the	  central	  role	  ascribed	  to	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  in	  the	  CBD	  implies	  a	  strong	  ideological	  commitment	  to	  private	  property	  rights	  over	  the	  concept	  of	  common	   resources.	   As	   such,	   the	   CBD	   adopts	   a	   view	   similar	   to	   Hardin’s	  ‘Tragedy	   of	   the	   Commons’,	   according	   to	   which	   overexploitation	   is	   an	  inevitable	  consequence	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  private	  ownership.	  This	  means	  that,	  	  “even	   if	   the	   text	  of	   the	  Convention	  seems	   to	  pave	   the	  way	   for	  the	   claims	   of	   autonomy	   of	   the	   South	   and	   of	   rural	   and	  indigenous	  communities,	  the	  prevailing	  context	  does	  not	  allow	  defining	  of	   really	   innovative	  solutions.	   In	  spite	  of	   their	   strong	  opposition	   to	   the	   commoditization	   of	   life	   forms	   and	   related	  knowledge,	   the	  NGOs	  and	   countries	  of	   the	   South	   intending	   to	  promote	  community	   rights	  are	   constrained	   to	   formulate	   their	  propositions	  within	  a	  market	  framework”	  (Boisvert	  and	  Caron	  2002,	  162).	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It	  appears	  that	  these	  more	  fundamental	  critiques	  of	  intellectual	  property	  are	  relatively	  marginalised	  in	  the	  ABS	  discussions	  and	  they	  are	  not	  espoused	  by	  the	  international	  NGOs.	  	  	  
Participation	  deficits	  and	  NGO	  responses	  in	  the	  two	  conventions	  Again,	  the	  written	  submissions	  by	  NGOs	  are	  relatively	  more	  concerned	  with	  demands	  for	  more	  participation	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  than	  in	  the	  CBD.	  This	  might	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  design	  of	  new	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	   finance	   mechanism	   or	   REDD	   is	   still	   under	   discussion	   in	   the	   climate	  convention;	   consequently	   there	   is	   potentially	   more	   scope	   for	   including	  participatory	   provisions	   from	   the	   outset.	   Moreover,	   the	   biodiversity	  convention,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  UNFCCC,	  is	  already	  often	  held	  up	  as	  exemplary	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  direct	  participation	  of	  indigenous	  peoples:	  their	  right	  to	  participation	   is	   enshrined	   in	   the	   text	   of	   the	   convention	   and	   they	   have	  succeeded	   in	   carving	   out	   a	   number	   of	   important	   mechanisms	   for	  participation.	   IPOs	   –	  with	  wide	   support	   from	  across	   the	  NGO	   community	   –	  are	  keen	  to	  ensure	  the	   integration	  of	  similar	  participatory	  provisions	   in	  the	  new	  ABS	  regime.	  	  	  
v. Conclusion	  This	  chapter	  has	  tried	  to	  offer	  an	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  what	  was	  previously	  introduced	  as	  the	  “external	  dimension”	  (Marchetti	  2008;	  della	  Porta	  2009)	  of	  the	   democratic	   contribution	   of	   NGOs	   to	   institutions	   of	   global	   governance:	  NGO	  critiques	  of	  representation	  and	  participation	  deficits	  and	  their	  demands	  for	  more	  equitable	  and	  participatory	  governance	  structures.	  Many	  of	  the	  NGO	  documents	   surveyed	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   climate	   convention	   include	  demands	   for	   ‘fair’	   representation	   by	   governments;	   the	   NGOs	   are	   also	  concerned	  with	  drawing	  attention	  to	  issues	  that	  are	  of	  particular	  relevance	  to	  potentially	   underrepresented	   countries	   in	   the	   negotiations.	   In	   practice,	  procedural	   demands	   for	   equity	   tend	   to	   go	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   these	  substantive	  demands	  although	   this	  analysis	  has	   focused	  on	   the	   former.	  The	  analysis	  has	  been	  skewed	   towards	   the	  demands	  articulated	  by	  NGOs	   in	   the	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context	  of	  global	  climate	  governance	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  questions	  of	  democracy	   feature	  much	  more	   prominently	   in	   the	  NGO	   submissions	   to	   the	  UNFCCC	  than	  in	  the	  NGO	  submissions	  to	  the	  CBD.	  This	  relative	  difference	  in	  emphasis	  is	  not	  immediately	  obvious	  given	  that	  the	  two	  conventions	  have	  the	  same	   formal	   voting	   rights	   for	   members	   (‘one-­‐country	   one-­‐vote’	   although	  decisions	  are	  usually	  taken	  by	  consensus),	  are	  part	  of	  the	  UN	  system	  which	  is	  said	   “to	   be	   infused	   by	   a	   participatory	   norm	   of	   governance”	   (Jönsson	   and	  Tallberg	  2010,	  242)	  and	  are	  both	  important	  institutions	  in	  the	  field	  of	  global	  environmental	  politics,	  a	  field	  where	  participatory	  norms	  are	  also	  relatively	  well	  established.	  	  	  A	  number	  of	   factors	  were	  discussed	   in	  order	   to	  explain	   this	  difference.	  The	  issue	   characteristics	   of	   the	   global	   environmental	   problems	   the	   conventions	  were	   set	   up	   to	   address	   give	   a	   first	   indication.	   Climate	   change	   is	   often	  presented	   in	   relatively	   mono-­‐causal	   terms:	   global	   warming	   is	   the	   direct	  result	   of	   anthropogenic	   CO2	   emissions	   (and	   other	   greenhouse	   gases)	   and	  thus	   constitutes	   a	   direct	   product	   of	   fossil-­‐fuelled	   industrialisation.	   For	  countries	  that	  are	  still	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  fossil	  fuels	  for	  economic	  growth,	  emission	   reductions	   are	   perceived	   to	   carry	   a	   heavy	   price	   and	   to	   weaken	  economic	   competitiveness.	   The	   ‘cost’	   of	   preserving	   biodiversity	   is	   not	   as	  immediately	   apparent	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   reducing	   CO2	   emissions.	   Countries’	  economic	   interests	   are	   –	   in	   light	   of	   the	   global	   dependency	   on	   fossil	   fuels	   –	  larger	   and	   more	   tangible	   in	   the	   case	   of	   climate	   than	   conservation	   policy.	  Debates	   around	   responsibility,	   justice	   and	   equity	   have	   also	   proved	   more	  contentious	   in	   the	   case	   of	   climate	   policy.	   	   As	   a	   result	   the	   political	   and	  economic	   stakes	   are	   perceived	   to	   be	   higher	   –	  making	   the	   question	   of	  who	  gets	   to	   say	   what	   more	   pertinent.	   Moreover,	   due	   to	   the	   focus	   on	   emission	  reductions	   in	   the	   international	   negotiations	   it	   is	   the	   largest	   emitters	   –	   the	  industrialised	   and	   major	   developing	   countries	   -­‐	   that	   have	   the	   power	   to	  sabotage	  a	  global	  agreement.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  biodiversity	  loss,	  by	  contrast,	  the	  cooperation	   of	   the	   mega-­‐diverse	   countries	   of	   the	   global	   South	   is	   key	   to	  progress,	  a	  constellation	  that	  strengthens	  their	  bargaining	  power	  in	  this	  field.	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Another	   explanation	   lies	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   design	   of	   important	   new	  institutions	  is	  still	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  climate	  negotiations	  whereas	  the	  CBD	  is	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  ABS)	  more	  heavily	  focussed	  on	  implementation.	  This	  is	  reflected	   in	   the	   NGO	   submission	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   where	   the	   eventual	  governance	   structure	   of	   the	   proposed	   climate	   facility	   and	   the	   REDD	  mechanism	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  demands	  for	  more	  equitable	  representation.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  participation	  by	  societal	  stakeholders,	  the	  CBD’s	  provisions	  for	  the	  participation	  by	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  generally	  heralded	  as	  exemplary	  whereas	   the	   lack	   of	   similar	   structures	   in	   the	   UNFCCC	   constitutes	   a	   major	  point	  of	  criticism	  among	  IPOs	  and	  NGOs.	  Finally,	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  change	  has	  brought	  together	  a	  more	  diverse	  set	  of	  NGOs	  over	  recent	  years.	  Many	  of	  these	   groups	   are	   not	   from	   a	   traditional	   ‘green’	   background	   and	   are	   more	  actively	  engaging	  with	  questions	  of	  democracy	  and	  justice	  than	  some	  of	  the	  conservation-­‐focussed	  groups	  that	  work	  with	  the	  CBD.	  The	  main	  explanatory	  factors	  for	  the	  difference	  in	  emphasis	  are	  summarised	  in	  the	  following	  table.	  	  	  
	   145	  
	   UNFCCC	   UNCBD	  Climate	  change	  inextricably	  linked	  to	  economic	  growth	   Biodiversity	  loss	  perceived	  as	  largely	  technical	  and	  scientific	  issue	  during	  negotiations	  (Arts	  1998)	  Historical	  responsibility	  for	  climate	  change:	  question	  of	  global	  justice	   Equity	  concerns	  are	  partly	  addressed	  in	  third	  objective	  of	  convention	  (relating	  to	  fair	  and	  equitable	  sharing	  of	  benefits)	  
Issue	  
characteristics	  
Major	  emitters	  need	  to	  be	  on	  board:	  strengthens	  their	  bargaining	  power	   Mega-­‐diverse	  countries	  in	  Global	  South	  hold	  most	  of	  world’s	  biodiversity:	  strengthens	  their	  bargaining	  power	  
Stage	  of	  policy	  
cycle	  
Decision-­‐making:	  debate	  around	  design	  of	  new	  institutions	  (climate	  finance	  facility	  and	  REDD)	  
Focus	  on	  implementation:	  recognition	  of	  need	  to	  include	  range	  of	  stakeholders	  (Exception:	  ABS)	  
Participation	  
rights	  for	  IPs	  
No	  separate	  provision	  for	  the	  participation	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	   Participation	  rights	  are	  enshrined	  in	  CBD	  (Art.	  8	  (j)),	  UN	  Perm.	  Forum	  on	  Indigenous	  Issues	  NGOs	  come	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  backgrounds	  (development,	  human	  rights,	  environment,	  churches	  etc.).	  ‘Climate	  justice’	  acts	  as	  umbrella	  concept	  
Predominantly	  environmental	  NGOs	  and	  groups	  with	  conservation	  focus	  Composition	  
of	  NGOs	  	  
Pursue	  both	  engagement	  and	  confrontation	   Hardly	  any	  protest	  activities	  
Impact	  on	  
NGO	  demands	  
Strong	  emphasis	  on	  
democratic	  demands	  
Weak	  emphasis	  on	  
democratic	  demands	  	  
Table	  1:	  Main	   factors	   shaping	  prevalence	  of	   democratic	  demands	  by	  NGOs	   in	  
the	  UNFCCC	  and	  UNCBD	  
	   146	  
	  It	   is	   notable,	   however,	   that	   –	   although	   relatively	   prevalent	   -­‐	   the	  representation	  demands	  articulated	  by	  the	  NGOs	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  context	  are	  not	  especially	  innovative	  or	  radical.	  In	  fact,	  most	  of	  these	  demands	  are	  voiced	  in	  a	  similar	  form	  by	  developing	  countries	  themselves	  so	  that	  it	  is	  easy	  for	  the	  NGOs	   to	   bandwagon.	   More	   value	   may	   be	   added	   by	   the	   NGO	   demands	   for	  greater	   participation	   by	   societal	   stakeholders.	   Here,	   the	   NGO	   demands	  concern	  participation	  at	  both	  the	  national	  and	  international	  level.	  Particular	  emphasis	   is	   given	   to	   creating	   institutions	   at	   the	   national	   level	   that	   would	  strengthen	   principles	   of	   country	   ownership	   and	   subsidiarity	   and	   offer	  opportunities	  for	  participation	  by	  national	  and	  local	  stakeholders.	  The	  need	  to	  ensure	  the	  participation	  by	  indigenous	  peoples	  is	  most	  frequently	  referred	  to	  while	  other	  stakeholder	  groups	  are	  rarely	  specifically	  mentioned	  (besides	  the	  amorphous	  category	  of	  local	  communities).	  The	  support	  for	  the	  principle	  of	   FPIC	   in	   the	   proposed	   ABS	   regime	   but	   also	   in	   REDD	   constitutes	   a	  particularly	  notable	  participation	  demands.	  	  	  What	  has	  also	  emerged	  in	  the	  discussion	  above,	  especially	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  participation	  demands,	  is	  the	  importance	  of	  ‘reference	  institutions’.	  There	  is	  a	  clear	  pattern	  whereby	  NGOs	  link	  many	  of	  their	  proposals	  and	  demands	  to	  existing	   institutions	   that	   they	   consider	   exemplary	   in	   terms	   of	  representativeness	   or	   participation.	   The	   design	   of	   the	   Adaptation	   Fund	  Board	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  for	  instance,	  is	  considered	  exemplary	  in	  terms	  of	  developing	  country	  representation.	  Country-­‐level	  coordination	  bodies	  might	  –	  according	  to	  the	  NGOs	  –	  be	  modelled	  on	  similar	  mechanisms	  employed	  by	  the	   Global	   Fund.	   While	   these	   bodies	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   strengthening	  country	   ownership	   and	   subsidiarity	   and	   hence	   would	   allow	   for	   more	  influence	   by	   developing	   countries	   in	   many	   climate	   policy	   related	   decision,	  the	   NGO	   proposals	   stress	   that	   these	   national-­‐level	  mechanisms	   need	   to	   be	  accessible	   to	  national	   and	   local	   stakeholders.	  Both	   the	  Global	  Fund	  and	   the	  WCD	   guidelines	   are	   heralded	   as	   models	   for	   participation.	   In	   fact,	   the	   very	  existence	  of	  these	  reference	  institutions	  may	  in	  turn	  shape	  the	  content	  of	  the	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democratic	   demands	   formulated	   by	   NGOs.	   It	   is	   evident,	   for	   instance,	   that	  most	   of	   the	   participation	   demands	   refer	   to	   the	   need	   to	   include	   provisions	  that	   guarantee	   the	   participation	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   in	   the	   relevant	  decision-­‐making	   processes.	   Here,	   the	   existing	   range	   of	   institutional	  recognitions	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  has	  clearly	  impacted	  the	  NGO	  discourse	  and	   lends	  weight	   to	   their	  demands.	   It	  may	  be	  suggested	  that	   it	   is	  harder	   to	   formulate	   specific	   demands	   for	   participation	   by	   other	   societal	  groups	   where	   such	   reference	   institutions	   are	   less	   well	   developed,	   for	  instance	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  participation	  of	  women	  or	  small-­‐scale	  farmers.	  	  	  The	   following	   table	   provides	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   procedural	   democratic	  demands	  made	  by	  NGOs	   that	  were	   identified	   in	   the	  analysis,	   together	  with,	  what	  has	  been	  termed	  here,	  ‘reference	  institutions’.	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   Target	  institution	   Desired	  outcome	   Reference	  
institutions	  UNFCCC	   Participation	   CBD,	  UN	  Convention	  to	  Combat	  Desertification	  Climate	  finance	  facility	   Equitable	  representation	   Kyoto	  Protocol	  Adaptation	  Fund	  Board	  Country-­‐level	  coordinating	  bodies	   Country	  ownership	  &	  subsidiarity	  	  Participation	  	  
Global	  Fund,	  	  	  WCD	  
UNFCCC	  
REDD	   Participation,	  FPIC	   UNDRIP,	  CBD	  (Art.	  8	  (j)),	  UN	  Perm.	  Forum	  on	  Indigenous	  Issues	  	  
CBD	  
ABS	  regime	   Participation,	  	  	  FPIC	   UNDRIP,	  CBD	  (Art.	  8	  (j)),	  UN	  Perm.	  Forum	  on	  Indigenous	  Issues,	  ILO	  Convention	  169	  	  
Table	   2:	   Overview	   of	   recurrent	   NGO	   procedural	   democratic	   demands	   in	   the	  
UNFCCC	  and	  CBD	  	  The	   frequent	   references	   to	   what	   has	   been	   termed	   here	   ‘reference	  institutions’	   underscores	   that	   successful	   practices	   of	   democracy	   can	   act	   as	  useful	  discursive	  tools	  for	  NGO	  advocacy.	  A	  discussion	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  institutions	   such	   as	   the	   Adaptation	   Fund	   Board	   of	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol,	   the	  Global	  Fund	  or	  the	  WCD	  really	  live	  up	  to	  these	  democratic	  ideals	  goes	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  analysis.	  However,	   it	  might	  be	  worth	  briefly	  pointing	  out	  a	  few	  points	  based	  on	  other	  assessments,	  which	  seem	  to	  indicate	  that	  there	  are	  limits	   to	   such	  a	   ‘copy	  and	  paste’	   approach.	  The	  Adaptation	  Fund	  Board,	   for	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instance,	  which	  is	  repeatedly	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  template	  for	  the	  design	  of	  the	  governance	   structure	   of	   a	   new	   finance	   fund,	   appears	   to	   score	   high	   on	  representation	  but	   low	  on	  participation	  –	  an	  outcome	  that	   the	  NGOs	  would	  certainly	  not	  welcome.	  According	  to	  Abbott	  and	  Gartner,	  the	  Adaptation	  Fund	  Board	   of	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   “marks	   a	   significant	   retreat”	   from	   previous	  participatory	   practices	   environmental	   institutions	   and	   offers	   only	   limited	  participation	   opportunities	   for	   civil	   society	   at	   the	   Board	   meetings.	   While	  projects	   are	   supposed	   to	   be	   “country-­‐driven”,	   “the	   AF	   interprets	   that	  principle	   to	   emphasize	   the	   role	   of	   governments,	   with	   no	   meaningful	  participation	  by	  stakeholders”	  (Abbott	  and	  Gartner	  2011,	  6).	  	  	  The	   analysis	   has	   shown	   that	   there	   is	  widespread	   support	   among	  NGOs	   for	  “vertical”	  and	  “horizontal	  reforms”	  (Falk	  2005)	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  UNFCCC.	  Determining	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  formal	  demands	  translate	  into	  actual	  influence	  would	  require	  substantial	  further	  empirical	  research	  which	  cannot	  be	  accommodated	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Besides,	  the	  overall	  democratic	  legitimacy	  of	  an	  institution	  is	  also	  a	  function	  of	  that	  of	  the	  participating	  actors	  (Erman	  and	  Uhlin	  2010,	  4).	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  therefore	  shift	  the	  focus	  to	  the	  level	  of	  international	   NGOs	   to	   explore	   to	   what	   extent	   these	   organisation	   can	  legitimately	   act	   as	   ‘representatives’	   of	   local	   communities	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  international	  institutions.	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V. The	   internal	   dimension:	   NGOs	   as	   democratic	  
links	   between	   affected	   communities	   and	  
international	  institutions	  The	  idea	  that	  the	  engagement	  with	  civil	  society	  actors	  can	  help	  to	  overcome	  some	  of	  the	  democratic	  deficits	  found	  in	  the	  institutions	  of	  global	  governance	  is	  not	  only	  attractive	  from	  a	  theoretical	  perspective,	  but	  also	  holds	  practical	  appeal.	  As	   ‘intermediaries’	  between	  affected	  communities	  and	   international	  organisations	  NGOs	  might	  contribute	  to	  bringing	  local	  voices	  to	  global	  policy-­‐making	  processes,	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  contribute	  to	  more	  legitimate	  institutions	  and	  policies.	   Such	  an	  approach	  could	   ‘supplement’	   the	   traditional	  modes	  of	  preference	   transmission	   through	   intergovernmental	   processes	   (Bäckstrand	  2006,	  MacDonald	  2008).	  The	  often	  cited	  democratic	  norm	  that	  those	  affected	  by	   a	   decision	   should	   be	   included	   in	   the	   corresponding	   decision-­‐making	  processes	   presents,	   of	   course,	   a	   challenging	   ideal	   in	   a	   constantly	   changing	  international	   system	  characterised	  by	  multiple	   loci	   of	   authority	   and	  diffuse	  lines	  of	  affectedness	  and	  responsibility.	  Nonetheless,	  this	  norm	  may	  be	  used	  as	  an	  ideal	  for	  approximation	  –	  do	  existing	  and	  emerging	  linkages,	  processes	  and	  practices	  bring	  global	  governance	  closer	  to	  meeting	  this	  ideal	  or	  not?	  	  	  The	   purpose	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   shed	   further	   light	   on	   the	   potential	   for	  international	  NGOs	   to	  act	   as	  democratic	   links	  between	  affected	  publics	  and	  international	   decision-­‐making	   processes.	   Having	   explored	   the	   “external	  dimension”	  in	  the	  form	  of	  NGO	  demands	  for	  more	  democratic	  global	  policies	  and	  governance	  structures	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  this	  chapter	  turns	  to	  the	  
intrinsic	   potential	   of	   NGOs	   for	   bringing	   the	   voices	   of	   affected	   publics	   to	  international	  organisations,	  as	  evident	  in	  the	  internal	  workings	  of	  the	  NGOs.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  clarity,	  it	  is	  worth	  stating	  again	  the	  fundamental	  assumption	  of	  this	  thesis	  that	  international	  NGOs	  are	  not	  (necessarily)	  synonymous	  with	  communities	   affected	   by	   the	   decisions	   of	   international	   institutions.	   The	  question	   of	   how	   large	   and	   influential	   transnational	   NGOs	   relate	   to	  communities	  on	  the	  ground	  presents	  an	  important	  field	  of	  enquiry.	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  The	   notion	   that	   international	   NGOs	   might	   act	   as	   democratic	   channels	   or	  “transmission	  belts”	  (Steffek	  and	  Nanz	  2008)	  between	  local	  communities	  and	  international	  organisations	  implies	  a	  particular	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  role	  of	  NGOs.	   The	   objective	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   investigate	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  thinking	  about	  the	  practice	  of	  democratic	  representation	  can	  help	  to	  create	  a	  more	   specific	   account	   of	   NGOs	   as	   “links”	   (Princen	   1994)	   or	   “transmission	  belts”	  than	  implied	  by	  these	  and	  similar	  terms.	  It	  should	  be	  acknowledged	  at	  the	   outset,	   however,	   that	   this	   particular	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   role	   of	  international	   NGOs	   is	   not	   uncontested	   –	  many	   observers	   and	   practitioners	  see	   the	  main	   functions	  of	   international	  NGOs	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   institutions	  of	   global	  governance	   very	   differently.	   Chapter	   II	   and	   III	   of	   the	   thesis	   have	   already	  provided	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  various	  functions	  of	  NGOs	  in	  global	  governance,	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  global	  environmental	  politics.	  NGOs	  assume	  a	  wide	  variety	   of	   functions	   and	   roles	   in	   global	   governance,	   not	   all	   of	   which	   are	  relevant	   from	   a	   democratic	   perspective.	   However,	   these	   different	   roles	   are	  not	   necessarily	   mutually	   exclusive	   (although	   conflicts	   may	   arise	   between	  them)	  and	  NGOs	  are	  likely	  to	  fulfil	  more	  than	  one	  function	  concurrently.	  	  	  The	   chapter	   proceeds	   as	   follows.	   It	   will	   start	   by	   introducing	   a	   classical	  account	   of	   representation	   as	   developed	   by	   Hanna	   Fenichel	   Pitkin	   in	   her	  seminal	   1967	   work	   ‘The	   Concept	   of	   Representation’	   (i).	   Pitkin	   provides	   a	  good	  grounding	  against	  which	  the	  notion	  of	  NGOs	  as	  representatives	  can	  be	  further	   explored.	   Section	   (ii)	   discusses	   the	   limits	   of	   and	   problems	   with	  applying	   too	   rigid	   an	   account	   of	   representation	   to	   transnational	   non-­‐state	  actors	   such	   as	   international	  NGOs.	  Against	   the	  backdrop	  of	   these	   concerns,	  section	  (iii)	  takes	  the	  plunge	  and	  attempts	  to	  draw	  a	  number	  of	  conclusions	  and	  develop	  ways	  forward	  for	  how	  the	  concept	  of	  democratic	  representation	  can	   be	   adapted	   to	   the	   role	   of	   international	   NGOs	   as	   links	   between	   local	  communities	   and	   international	   organisations.	   A	   number	   of	   research	  questions	   to	  guide	   the	   subsequent	  empirical	   analysis	  of	   international	  NGOs	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(in	  chapters	  VI	  and	  VII)	  will	  be	  set	  out	   in	  section	  (iv).	  This	   is	   followed	  by	  a	  short	  conclusion	  in	  section	  (v).	  	  
i. What	  is	  representation?	  Theories	  of	  representation	  are	  traditionally	  squarely	  rooted	  in	  the	  domestic	  context.	   While	   we	   may	   come	   across	   terms	   such	   as	   ‘representative’	   and	  ‘unrepresentative’	  or	   ‘to	  represent’	   in	  accounts	  of	   international	  politics,	   it	   is	  generally	   taken	   for	  granted	   that	   the	  meaning	  of	   these	   terms	   is	  uncontested	  and	  does	  not	  warrant	  critical	  discussion.	  However,	  the	  same	  term	  may	  carry	  slightly	   different	   meanings	   whether	   we	   are	   talking	   about	   the	   fact	   that	   a	  government	  is	  unrepresentative	  of	  its	  citizens	  (not	  democratically	  elected	  or	  acting	  against	  the	  interests	  and	  wishes	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  people),	  that	  an	  international	  organisation	  is	  mainly	  representative	  of	  rich	  countries	  (yielding	  most	   influence),	   or	   that	   a	   particular	   civil	   society	   group	   represents	   the	  interests	   of	   future	   generation	   (speaks	   for	   future	   generations).	   In	   order	   to	  gain	  a	  clearer	  understanding	  of	  what	  the	  concept	  of	  representation	  actually	  entails	   and	   how	   –	   if	   at	   all	   –	   it	   may	   be	   applied	   to	   the	   roles	   assumed	   by	  international	   NGOs,	   it	   is	   worth	   going	   back	   to	   those	   thinkers	   who	   have	  discussed	  it	  most	  thoroughly	  in	  relation	  to	  domestic	  politics.	  	  Pitkin’s	  book	  on	  ‘The	  Concept	  of	  Representation’	  presents	  an	  extraordinarily	  in-­‐depth	   conceptual	   analysis	   of	   what	   ‘representation’	   means.	   Her	   careful	  dissection	   of	   the	   concept	   into	   the	   different	   elements	   of	   representation	   and	  the	   implications	  of	   the	  various	  views	  of	  representation	  for	  political	  practice	  provides	  a	  good	  starting	  point	  for	  investigation.	  	  
	  	  In	  the	  introduction	  to	  “The	  Concept	  of	  Representation”,	  Pitkin	  describes	  the	  general	   understanding	   of	   representation	   as	   “the	   making	   present	   in	   some	  
sense	   of	   something	   which	   is	   nevertheless	   not	   present	   literally	   or	   in	   fact”	  (Pitkin	  1967,	  8).	  She	  points	  out	  that	  this	  understanding	  immediately	  leads	  us	  to	  ask	  how	  the	  absent	  thing	  is	  made	  present	  and	  who	  considers	  it	  so	  (Pitkin	  1967,	   9).	   Different	   answers	   to	   these	   questions	   have	   led	   theorists	   of	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representation	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  range	  of	  definitions	  for	  the	  concept.	  Pitkin	  attempts	   to	   classify	   and	   differentiate	   these	   and	   she	   identifies	   “formalistic	  representation”,	  “descriptive	  representation”,	  “symbolic	  representation”	  and	  representing	   as	   “acting	   for”	   (or	   “substantive	   representation”).	   Out	   of	   these	  four	   views	   of	   representation,	   she	   argues	   that	   formalistic,	   descriptive	   and	  substantive	   representation	   are	   most	   suited	   to	   explaining	   the	   theoretical	  underpinnings	   and	   empirical	   realities	   of	   political	   representation	   from	   a	  democratic	   perspective.	   Applying	   symbolic	   representation	   to	   the	   political	  sphere	  means	  viewing	  the	  ruler	  as	  a	  symbol	  and	  representative	  only	  “to	  the	  extent	  that	  those	  he	  rules	  and	  represents	  believe	  in	  him;	  representing	  means	  being-­‐believed-­‐in	  or	  accepted-­‐as	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  nation	  by	  the	  represented”	  (Pitkin	   1967,	   104).	   The	   fact	   that	   this	   view	   presents	   the	   representative	   as	  essentially	   passive	   and	  without	   special	   obligations	  makes	   it	   hard	   to	   pass	   a	  qualitative	   judgment	   on	   the	   representative’s	   role	   and	   thus	   renders	   it	   ill-­‐suited	   to	   the	   context	   of	   democratic	   political	   representation:	   “It	   makes	   no	  sense	  to	  ask	  whether	  a	  symbol	  represents	  well,	  for	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  mis-­‐symbolising”	  (Pitkin	  1967,	  110).	  	  	  
Formalistic	  views	  of	  representation	  Formalistic	   views	   of	   representation	   focus	   on	   the	   institutional	   mechanisms	  that	  designate	  a	  representative.	  Pitkin	  distinguishes	  between	  two	  dimensions	  of	   the	   formalistic	   view	   of	   representation:	   the	   “authorisation	   view”	   and	   the	  “accountability	   view”.	   At	   the	   international	   level	   this	   would	   apply	   to	   a	  government	  delegate	  who	  has	  been	  sent	  to	  attend	  international	  negotiations	  by	   her	   government	   and	   is	   acting	   as	   an	   authorised	   representative.	  Authorisation	  means	  that	  she	  has	  been	  given	  a	  right	  to	  act	  which	  she	  did	  not	  have	   before,	   while	   the	   government	   has	   become	   responsible	   for	   the	  consequences	  of	  her	  actions.	  The	  accountability	  view	  is	  also	  relevant	  in	  this	  example	   even	   though	   the	   two	   are	   conceptually	   distinct	   (and	   according	   to	  Pitkin,	   “diametrically	   opposed”	   (1967,	   55)):	   the	   representative	   must	   be	  responsible	   to	   the	   represented	   for	   her	   actions	   and	   may	   be	   subject	   to	  sanctions	  if	  she	  does	  not	  act	  as	  expected	  of	  her.	  	  
	   154	  
Formalistic	   representation	   can	   thus	   also	   be	   conceptualised	   as	   a	   simple	  principal-­‐agent	   relationship	   whereby	   authorisation	   and	   accountability	  constitute	  the	  means	  through	  which	  the	  principal	  can	  exert	  control	  over	  the	  agent.	  While	  authorisation	  grants	  a	  representative	  new	  authority	  and	  rights	  and	   frees	   her	   “from	   the	   usual	   responsibility	   for	   one’s	   actions”	   as	   it	   is	   the	  principal	   who	   assumed	   responsibility	   for	   the	   agent’s	   actions	   (Pitkin	   1967,	  55),	  accountability	  has	  the	  opposite	  effect.	  It	  acts	  as	  a	  corrective	  to	  granting	  the	   representative	   too	  much	   freedom	  of	   action	   and	   emphasizes	   obligations	  and	   controls	   (Pitkin	   1967,	   57).	   Both	   have	   as	   “their	   defining	   criterion	   for	  representation	   [something	   that]	   lies	   outside	   the	   activity	   of	   representing	  itself”:	   the	  act	  of	  authorisation	  before	   it	  begins	  or	  the	  being	  held	  to	  account	  after	  it	  ends	  (Pitkin	  1967,	  59).	  Looked	  at	  individually,	  the	  two	  dimensions	  of	  formalistic	   representation	   give	   rise	   to	   different	   accounts	   of	   political	  representation.	   Authorisation	   is,	   according	   to	   an	   account	   of	   representation	  that	  builds	  on	  Pitkin’s	  analysis,	  the	  action	  “through	  which	  Y	  selects/	  directs	  X	  with	  respect	  to	  (good)	  Z,	  and	  that	  responsibility	  over	  actions/	  decisions	  of	  X	  rests	  with	  Y.”	   Accountability	   on	   the	   other	  hand,	  means	   that	   “X	  provides,	   or	  could	  provide,	  an	  account	  of	  his/her	  decisions	  or	  actions	  to	  Y	  with	  respect	  to	  Z,	  and	  that	  Y	  has	  a	  sanction	  over	  X	  with	  regard	  to	  Z”	  (Castiglione	  and	  Warren	  2006,	  6).	  	  	  Pitkin’s	  criticism	  of	  the	  narrow	  formalistic	  views	  concerns	  their	  emphasis	  on	  institutional	  mechanisms	  while	  not	  providing	  clear	  guidance	  or	  standards	  on	  how	   the	   representative	   is	   supposed	   to	   act	   while	   carrying	   out	   the	   task	   of	  representing.	   She	   argues	   that	   relying	   on	   these	   views	   alone	   makes	   it	  impossible	   to	   judge	   the	   quality	   of	   representation.	   This	   assertion	  may	   seem	  initially	  counter-­‐intuitive	  with	  respect	  to	  how	  the	  concept	  of	  accountability	  is	  commonly	  used	  but	  Pitkin	  maintains	  that	  based	  on	  the	  logic	  of	  accountability	  a	   bad	   representative	   “could	   not	   be	   criticized	   as	   long	   as	   he	   let	   himself	   be	  removed	  from	  office	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  term”	  (Pitkin 1967, 58).	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Descriptive	  views	  of	  representation	  Descriptive	  representation	  is	  the	  view	  of	  representation	  that	  corresponds	  to	  the	  notion	  of	   “standing	   for”.	  Unlike	   the	   formalistic	  view,	   this	  view	  does	  not	  conceptualise	  representation	  as	  acting	  once	  authorised	  or	  before	  being	  held	  to	  account.	   Instead	   the	  emphasis	   is	  on	   “the	   representative’s	   characteristics,	  on	  what	   he	   is	  or	   is	   like,	   on	   being	   something	   rather	   than	   doing	   something”	  (Pitkin 1967, 61).	   The	   representative	   “stands	   for”	   others	   “by	   virtue	   of	   a	  correspondence	   or	   connection	   between	   them,	   a	   resemblance	   or	   reflection”	  (ibid.)	  In	  this	  view	  representation	  is	  achieved	  if	  the	  members	  of	  the	  relevant	  decision-­‐making	  body	  (be	  it	  the	  legislature	  or	  otherwise)	  mirror	  –	  ideally	  in	  a	  proportional	  relationship	  –	  the	  make-­‐up	  of	  society	  at	  large.	  A	  body	  that	  fails	  to	  accurately	  reflect	  society	  in	  this	  way	  is	  thus	  not	  considered	  representative.	  It	   is	   according	   to	   this	   logic	   that	   Beatrice	   and	   Sidney	  Webb	   condemned	   the	  House	  of	  Lords	  as	  “the	  worst	  representative	  assembly	  ever	  created,	  in	  that	  it	  contains	   absolutely	   no	  members	   of	   the	  manual	   working	   class;	   none	   of	   the	  great	  class	  of	  shopkeepers,	  clerks	  and	  teachers;	  none	  of	  the	  half	  of	  all	  citizens	  who	  are	  of	  the	  female	  sex”	  (Sydney and Beatrice Webb, 1896, quoted in Pitkin 
1967, 61). 	  	  Pitkin,	  however,	  warns	  against	  relying	  on	  descriptive	  forms	  of	  representation	  in	  a	  democratic	  context.	  Understanding	  the	  function	  of	  representation	  as	  one	  of	   supplying	   information	   about	   the	   represented	   inevitably	   raises	   the	  question	   of	   what	   kind	   of	   information	   about	   the	   represented	   is	   relevant	  (Pitkin	  1967,	  87).	  The	   identification	  of	  politically	   relevant	   characteristics	   is	  influenced	  by	  prevailing	  social	  and	  political	  norms	  that	  are	  subject	  to	  change	  and	   may	   always	   be	   contested.	   Furthermore,	   descriptive	   representation	  carries	   the	   risk	   of	   essentialism,	   or	   tendency	   to	   assume	   that	   people’s	  characteristics	  are	  a	  guide	  to	  their	  actions	  (Pitkin	  1967,	  89).	  Why	  should	  we	  assume	  that	  a	  female	  representative	  would	  necessarily	  act	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  women?	   Another	   problem	   with	   descriptive	   representation	   is	   that	   the	  represented	   may	   not	   actually	   desire	   representatives	   in	   their	   own	   image.	  Instead	   they	  may	   feel	  more	   effectively	   represented	   by	   representatives	   that	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have	  very	  different	   characteristics	  or	  qualities	   to	   their	  own,	  perhaps	   in	   the	  form	   of	   superior	   knowledge	   or	   expertise	   or	   simply	   higher	   talent.	   Very	  importantly,	  Pitkin	  also	  maintains	  that,	  “the	  descriptive	  view	  has	  no	  room	  for	  representation	  as	  accountability”	  (Pitkin	  1967,	  89),	  or	  only	  a	  very	  weak	  form	  of	  it	  that	  is	  limited	  to	  giving	  accurate	  information	  about	  the	  constituents.	  	  In	   contrast	   to	   Pitkin,	   Mansbridge	   offers	   a	   more	   optimistic	   assessment	   of	  descriptive	   representation,	   arguing	   that	   it	   can	   offer	   substantial	   democratic	  benefits	   in	   specific	   circumstances	   (Mansbridge	   1999).	   Despite	   carrying	   a	  number	  of	  costs,	   including	  lesser	  talent,	  reduced	  accountability	  and	  the	  risk	  of	   essentialism,	   descriptive	   representation	   may,	   according	   to	   Mansbridge,	  still	  succeed	  in	  promoting	  the	  interests	  of	  disadvantaged	  groups	  in	  situations	  of	  deliberative	  representative	  democracy.	  These	  benefits	  are	  contingent	  and	  most	  likely	  to	  outweigh	  the	  costs	  of	  descriptive	  representation	  in	  (i)	  contexts	  of	  mistrust	  and	  (ii)	  when	  interests	  are	  uncrystallised.	  She	  argues	  that	  in	  these	  specific	   circumstances	   shared	   experience	   lowers	   the	   barriers	   to	  communication	   between	   representatives	   and	   constituents	   and	   can	   thus	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  deliberation.	  Furthermore,	  descriptive	  representation	  may	  fulfil	  two	  other	  functions:	  that	  of	  “creating	  a	  social	  meaning	  of	  ‘ability	  to	  rule’	   for	   members	   of	   a	   group	   in	   historical	   contexts	   where	   that	   ability	   has	  been	  seriously	  questioned”	  and	  “increasing	  the	  polity’s	  de	  facto	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  contexts	  of	  past	  discrimination”	  (Mansbridge	  1999,	  628).	  Because	  of	  the	  contingent	  nature	  of	   these	  benefits,	  Mansbridge	  advocates	   institutionalising	  fluid	  forms	  of	  representation	  (Mansbridge	  1999,	  652).	  	  
Representation	  as	  ‘acting	  for’	  According	   to	  Pitkin,	   none	  of	   the	   views	  of	   representation	  discussed	   thus	   far	  offer	   a	   substantive	   picture	   of	   the	   actual	   activity	   of	   representing,	   “of	   the	  substance	   or	   content	   of	   acting	   for	   others,	   as	   distinct	   from	   its	   external	   and	  formal	   trappings”	   (Pitkin	   1967,	   114).	   Central	   to	   her	   discussion	   of	  representation	  as	  “acting	  for”	  is	  what	  she	  terms	  the	  “mandate-­‐independence	  controversy”	   (Pitkin	   1967,	   145).	   This	   forces	   us	   to	   consider	   whether	   a	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representative	   ought	   to	   act	   in	   strict	   accordance	   with	   his	   constituents’	  preferences	  or	  whether	  he	  should	  employ	  his	  own	  independent	  judgment,	  as	  to	   what	   actions	   and	   policies	   are	   most	   likely	   to	   further	   the	   constituents’	  interests	  in	  the	  long	  term	  –	  should	  he	  act	  as	  delegate	  or	  trustee?	  Taken	  to	  the	  extreme,	  both	  views	  appear	  to	  diverge	  from	  what	  representation	  is	  actually	  about:	   the	   paradoxical	   requirement	   that	   the	   represented	   must	   be	   both	  present	  and	  not	  present.	  Nevertheless,	  Pitkin	  maintains	  that	  the	  delegate	  and	  trustee	   concepts	   respectively	   are	   helpful	   in	   terms	   of	   setting	   the	   external	  parameters	  of	  what	  constitutes	  the	  activity	  of	  representation,	  or	  substantive	  representation.	  It	  is	  this	  view	  that	  “we	  invoke	  wherever	  we	  see	  representing	  without	   any	   formalities	   –	   without	   the	   exercise	   of	   another’s	   rights	   or	   the	  ascription	   of	   normative	   consequences,	   without	   an	   ‘official’	   representer”	  (Pitkin	  1967,	  142).	  	  Pitkin	   also	   notes	   that	   the	   “mandate-­‐independence	   controversy”	   only	   arises	  when	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  the	  representation	  of	  human	  beings	  (rather	  than	  abstract	   concepts),	   where	   the	   “represented	   must	   also	   be	   (conceived	   as)	  capable	  of	   independent	  action	  and	   judgment”	   and	  hence	   there	  exists	   at	   the	  least	   the	   potential	   for	   “conflict	   between	   representative	   and	   represented	  about	  what	  is	  to	  be	  done”	  (Pitkin	  1967,	  209).	  The	  representative	  ought	  to	  act	  in	   the	   interest	   of	   the	   represented,	   which	   –	   and	   this	   is	   key	   to	   democratic	  representation	   -­‐	   must	   include	   some	   element	   of	   responsiveness	   to	   the	  represented.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   he	   or	   she	   must	   also	   display	   a	   degree	   of	  independent	  judgment	  –	  substantive	  representation	  is	  more	  than	  acting	  as	  a	  passive	  mouthpiece.	  The	  concept	  of	   ‘interest’	  itself	  may	  be	  used	  to	  illustrate	  this	  tension.	  Pitkin	  points	  out	  that	  there	  are	  two	  different	  understandings	  of	  interest	  –	  the	  first	  corresponding	  to	  having	  an	  interest/	  a	  stake	  in	  (welfare)	  and	   the	   second	   closer	   to	   what	   we	   mean	   when	   we	   talk	   about	   taking	   an	  interest	   in	   or	   finding	   something	   interesting	   (attention/	   concern)	   (Pitkin	  1967,	   156).	   In	   theory	   at	   least,	   the	   first	   may	   be	   objectively	   determined	  whereas	   the	   second	   understanding	   is	   subjective.	   The	   two	   interpretations	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may	   therefore	   be	   in	   conflict	  with	   each	   other	   although	  people	   are	   generally	  assumed	  to	  care	  about	  the	  issues	  they	  have	  a	  stake	  in.	  	  	  	  Pitkin	   appears	   to	   be	   the	   first	   modern	   political	   scientist	   to	   provide	   such	   a	  detailed	   and	   comprehensive	   account	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   representation.	  As	   a	  result,	   her	   work	   continues	   to	   be	   referenced	   in	   many	   (if	   not	   most)	   later	  scholarly	  analyses	  of	  political	  representation.	  The	  point	  here	  is	  not	  to	  provide	  a	   detailed	   discussion	   or	   critique	   of	   Pitkin’s	   work	   but	   use	   her	   very	   clear	  dissection	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   representation	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   further	   thinking	  about	  what	  elements	  of	  this	  concept	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  international	  NGOs	  as	  intermediaries	   between	   affected	   communities	   and	   international	  organisations.	   However,	   applying	   Pitkin’s	   insights	   in	   order	   to	   explore	  whether	   international	  NGOs	  can	  and	  do	  assume	  representative	   functions	  as	  intermediaries	   between	   affected	   communities	   and	   international	  organisations	   constitutes	   an	   obvious	   departure	   from	   at	   least	   two	   key	  premises	  underpinning	  Pitkin’s	  analysis.	  Firstly,	  it	  would	  mean	  extracting	  the	  concept	   of	   democratic	   representation	   from	   a	   pure	   domestic-­‐level	   analysis,	  centred	  on	  the	  institution	  of	  elections,	  and	  applying	  it	  to	  the	  sphere	  of	  global	  governance.	   Secondly,	   the	   types	   of	   actors	   engaging	   in	   activities	   of	  representation	  would	  change.	  While	  formally	  designated	  representatives	  are	  easily	   identified	   in	   traditional	   accounts	   of	   representation,	   ‘informal’	  representatives	   such	  as	  NGOs	  are	  harder	   to	  pinpoint.	  The	  question	   then	   is:	  can	  we	  really	   just	   take	   representation	   theory	   for	  a	  walk	   to	   such	  a	  different	  context?	  	  	  
ii. The	  challenge	  of	  ‘taking	  representation	  for	  a	  walk’	  The	  purpose	   of	   this	   section	   is	   to	   identify	   some	   of	   the	  main	   challenges	   that	  arise	  when	  using	  ‘traditional’	  representation	  insights	  to	  think	  about	  the	  role	  of	  private	  actors,	   including	  NGOs,	  which	  operate	  beyond	  the	  confines	  of	   the	  nation-­‐state.	   The	   focus	   will	   be	   on	   three	   sets	   of	   concerns	   with	   regards	   to	  exploring	   representation	   by	   civil	   society	   actors:	   the	   absence	   of	   democratic	  elections;	   the	   fact	   that	   representation	   might	   be	   an	   inappropriate	   role	   for	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NGOs;	   and	   the	   question	   of	  whether	   in	   this	   case	   it	   is	   not	  more	   plausible	   to	  speak	   about	   the	   representation	   of	   ideas	   or	   discourses	   rather	   than	   the	  representation	  of	   individuals.	  This	   list	   is	  certainly	  not	  exhaustive.	  However,	  since	  the	  overall	  objective	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  take	  the	  plunge	  and	  draw	  some	  conclusions	   about	  NGOs	   as	   representatives,	   the	   focus	  will	   be	   on	   explaining	  why	   these	   challenges	   are	   not	   as	   severe	   as	   they	   may	   first	   appear	   and	   on	  highlighting	  ways	  forward.	  	  	  Democracy	  involves	  giving	  those	  affected	  by	  political	  decisions	  the	  chance	  to	  participate	   in	   the	   making	   of	   them.	   However,	   in	   most	   accounts,	   this	   basic	  requirement	   is	  coupled	  with	   the	  need	   for	  political	  equality.	   In	  a	  democratic	  system,	  citizens	  should	  be	  able	   to	  enjoy	  equal	  representation.	  At	   the	   formal	  level,	   the	   requirement	   for	   equality	   is	  most	   easily	  met	   through	   a	   system	   of	  universal	   franchise	   where	   each	   citizen	   holds	   the	   same	   number	   of	   votes,	  coupled	  with	  free	  and	  fair	  elections.	  Elections	  are	  the	  cornerstone	  of	   liberal	  democracies;	  the	  	  “formality,	  regularity,	  equality,	  publicity	  and	  transparency	  of	   free	   and	   fair	   elections	   remain	   a	   profound	   source	   of	   strength	   for	  representative	  claims	  for	  the	  duly	  elected”	  (Saward	  2009,	  4).	  Representative	  claims	   made	   by	   unelected	   actors	   such	   as	   NGOs	   can	   never	   fall	   into	   this	  category.	   In	   fact,	   talking	   about	   ‘representation’	   without	   the	   central	  requirement	  for	  democratic	  elections	  carries	  a	  number	  of	  dangers.	  A	  crucial	  one	   is	   the	  potential	  neglect	  of	   the	  principle	  of	  democratic	  equality:	  without	  an	  “equivalent	  equality	  of	  influence	  of	  voice	  in	  the	  non-­‐electoral	  domain	  (…)	  advantages	  of	  education,	   income,	  and	  other	  unequally	  distributed	  resources	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  translate	  into	  patterns	  of	  over-­‐	  and	  underrepresentation”	  (Warren	   2001,	   Cain	   et	   al.	   2003,	   Strolovitch	   2006	   cited	   in	   Urbinati	   and	  Warren	  2008,	  405).	  	  	  The	  requirement	  of	  equal	  access	  to	  decision-­‐making	  is,	  however,	  rarely	  met	  in	  practice.	  The	   fact	   that	  each	  citizen	  holds	   the	  same	  number	  of	  votes	  does	  not	  protect	  a	  democratic	  system	  against	  the	  exercise	  of	  undue	  influence	  due	  to	   “advantages	   of	   education,	   income,	   and	   other	   unequally	   distributed	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resources”	   (ibid.).	   In	   fact,	   even	   in	   a	   functioning	   democracy,	   there	   are	  concerns	  that	  citizens	  are	  marginalised	  from	  political	  debates	  and	  decisions	  due	   to	   educational	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   constraints.	   It	   is	   part	   of	   the	  democratic	  responsibility	  of	  political	   leaders	  and	  civil	  society	  to	  proactively	  reach	  out	  to	  these	  communities	  and	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  facilitate	  and	  encourage	  their	  participation.	  Moreover,	  as	  the	  discussion	  of	  global	  democratic	  deficits	  in	   chapter	   II	   already	   illustrated,	   problems	   of	   unequal	   access	   are	   further	  amplified	  if	  decisions	  are	  taken	  at	  the	  global	  rather	  than	  the	  domestic	   level.	  There	   would	   be	   little	   need	   for	   NGOs	   to	   act	   as	   democratic	   intermediaries	  between	   marginalised	   communities	   and	   international	   policymaking	  processes	  if	  conditions	  of	  equal	  access	  were	  indeed	  met.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  the	   case	   in	   practice	   and	   it	   is	   against	   the	   democratic	   deficiencies	   of	   global	  institutions	   –	   against	   the	   reality	   of	   unequal	   access	   -­‐	   that	   the	   potential	  contribution	   of	   civil	   society	   actors	  must	   be	   assessed.	   This	   requires	   a	  more	  thorough	  understanding	  of	  the	  various	  –	  non-­‐electoral	  -­‐	  mechanisms	  through	  which	   civil	   society	   organisations	  might	   help	   to	   overcome	  participation	   and	  representation	  asymmetries	  at	  the	  global	  level.	  	  Moreover,	   in	   a	   highly	   complex	   international	   system	   with	   multiple	   loci	   of	  authority	   and	   lines	   of	   responsibility,	   resulting	   in	   various	   forms	   of	  ‘affectedness’	   for	   highly	   diverse	   constituencies	   with	   very	   different	  possibilities	  for	  democratic	  control,	  representation	  without	  formal	  elections	  may	   actually	   offer	   certain	   benefits.	   As	   potential	   advantages	   of	   “unelected	  representative	   claimants”	   Saward	   notes	   that	   they	   “don’t	   have	   to	   represent	  the	   whole	   person’s	   interests	   or	   wants”,	   but	   can	   stand	   for	   “a	   continuous,	  evolving	   sense	   of	   us”	   and	   “can	   be	   temporary	   representatives	   as	  circumstances	   demand	   in	   a	   fast-­‐changing	   political	   world.”	   Moreover,	   they	  “are	  not	  spatially	  challenged	  by	  the	  borders	  of	  nations,	  but	  can	  claim	  to	  speak	  for	  interests	  (or	  would-­‐be	  constituencies)	  that	  span	  different	  countries	  with	  a	   greater	   freedom	   than	   elected	   actors	   can”	   and	   “have	   to	  make	   their	   claims	  explicit”	   –	   meaning	   that	   they	   “have	   to	   work	   harder	   to	   make	   their	  representative	   claims	   convincing	   because	   the	   symbolic	   architecture	   of	   our	  
	   161	  
political	  system	  doesn’t	  do	  that	  work	  for	  them.”	  These	  features	  of	  unelected	  representatives	  mean	  that	  they	  can	  “open	  up	  new	  patterns	  of	  representation	  that	  are	  alternatives	  to	  elective	  pattern”	  (Saward	  2009,	  8).	  	  	  A	   second	   line	  of	  arguments	   levelled	  against	   the	   idea	   that	  NGOs	  can	  assume	  representative	   functions	   in	   global	   politics	   maintains	   that	   the	   focus	   on	   this	  role	  is	  an	  inappropriate	  one.	  A	  ‘weak’	  variant	  of	  this	  argument	  merely	  holds	  that	   other	   sources	   of	   NGO	   legitimacy	   are	   more	   important,	   either	   their	  contributions	   to	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   global	   policymaking,	   or	   –	   with	   an	  emphasis	  on	  strengthening	  democracy	  –	  the	  “democratic	  output	   legitimacy”	  (Uhlin	   2010)	   of	   NGOs	   themselves.	   In	   this	   latter	   view,	   it	   does	   not	   matter	  whether	   the	   NGOs	   themselves	   engage	   in	   forms	   of	   representation	   or	   are	  internally	  democratic	  as	   long	  as,	   through	   their	  activities,	   they	  contribute	   to	  the	   democratisation	   of	   global	   governance.	   This	   may	   be	   achieved	   through	  their	   role	   in	   the	   “construction	  and	  diffusion	  of	  democratic	  norms”	   in	  global	  governance	  (Uhlin	  2010,	  32).	  The	  previous	  chapter	  provided	  some	  examples	  of	   the	   types	   of	   democratic	   norms	   espoused	   by	   NGOs	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  climate	  change	  and	  biodiversity	  regimes.	  	  A	   stronger	   form	   of	   the	   inappropriateness	   argument	   holds	   that	   NGOs	   that	  come	   to	   define	   their	   own	   role	   as	   one	   of	   representing	   particular	  constituencies	   or	   a	   wider	   public	   may	   actually	   have	   a	   counter-­‐productive	  effect	   on	   democracy.	   Peruzzotti	   (2010)	   for	   instance,	   distinguishes	   between	  the	  “mirror-­‐logic”	  of	  representation	  and	  the	  “creative”	  side	  of	  representation.	  According	   to	   the	   mirror-­‐logic,	   “good	   representation	   entails	   properly	  reflecting	  the	  structure	  of	  interests	  and	  opinions	  that	  prevails	  in	  society	  at	  a	  certain	   time”	   (Peruzotti	   2010,	   160).	   What	   he	   calls	   the	   “creative”	   side	   of	  representation	   refers	   to	   “claims	   that	   are	   abstract	   and	   normative	   and	   that	  might	  not	  necessarily	   reflect	   existing	   constituencies”	   (Peruzotti	  2010,	  160).	  Advocacy	  NGOs	  constitute	  a	  special	  category	  of	  actors	  who	  sometimes	  “claim	  to	   express	   the	   interests	   of	   constituencies	   that	   do	   not	   yet	   exist”	   in	   order	   to	  “bring	   about	   a	   new	   constituency	   or	   to	   empower	   and	   organise	   voiceless	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groups”	   (Peruzotti	   2010,	   162).	   He	   argues	   that	   this	   creative	   side	   of	  representation	   is	   “at	   odds	   with	   the	   standard	   account	   of	   political	  accountability,	   which	   is	   predicated	   on	   the	   notion	   that	   representatives	   are	  responsive	  to	  constituents	  who	  are	  already	  constituted	  and	  thus	  are	  able	  to	  delegate	  their	  power	  to	  them”	  (Peruzotti	  2010,	  163).	  Peruzotti	  cautions,	  that	  “the	  development	  of	  a	  civil	  society	  that	  is	  too	  accountable	  and	  representative	  of	  different	  stakeholders	  or	  groups	  would	  undermine	  the	  creative	  dimension	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  democratic	  representation”	  (Peruzotti	  2010,	  155).	  	  	  Peruzotti’s	   argument	   is	   particularly	   salient	   in	   the	   case	   of	   environmental	  NGOs	  who	   are	   often	   portrayed	   as	   representatives	   of	   future	   generations	   or	  non-­‐human	   species	   who	   cannot	   speak	   for	   themselves.	   There	   is	   indeed	   the	  risk	   than	   an	   overemphasis	   on	   accountability	   to	   living	   stakeholders	  undermines	  the	  ability	  of	  NGOs	  to	  defend	  the	  interests	  of	  future	  generations.	  In	   most	   cases,	   NGOs	   will	   probably	   move	   between	   the	   two	   roles:	   they	   will	  both	  make	  claims	  about	  “the	  interests	  of	  constituencies	  that	  do	  not	  yet	  exist”	  as	  well	  as	  claims	  reflecting	  existing	  constituencies.	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  the	  NGOs	  have	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  employ	  their	  own	  judgement	  as	  to	  what	  those	  interests	  constitute	  –	  which	  overlaps	  with	  the	  role	  of	  trusteeship	  discussed	  before.	  In	  the	  second	  case,	  the	  claim	  to	  represent	  a	  particular	  constituency	  needs	  to	  be	  substantiated	  with	  forms	  of	  responsiveness	  in	  order	  to	  qualify	  as	  democratic.	  Except	  in	  very	  clear-­‐cut	  cases	  (such	  as	  that	  of	  future	  generations)	  there	  is	  a	  risk	   of	   confusion:	   the	   “creative”	   form	   of	   representation	   identified	   by	  Peruzotti	   can	   easily	   be	   misconstrued	   when,	   for	   example,	   the	   “voiceless	  groups”	  are	  not	  as	  voiceless	  as	  made	  out	  by	  the	  NGOs.	  While	  Peruzotti	  argues	  that,	  “It	  is	  the	  force	  of	  their	  arguments,	  their	  track	  record	  in	  certain	  areas,	  the	  expertise	  they	  have	  accumulated	  on	  certain	  issues,	  rather	  than	  their	  ability	  to	  effectively	  mirror	  certain	  groups,	  that	  provides	  the	  source	  of	  their	  legitimacy	  and	   credibility”	   (Peruzotti	   2010,	   166),	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   pinpoint	   what	   exactly	  these	  NGO	  roles	  tell	  us	  about	  their	  contribution	  to	  more	  democratic	  forms	  of	  governance.	  In	  fact,	  Peruzotti	  himself	  returns	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  examining	  the	  relationship	  between	  represented	  and	  representatives	  in	  his	  conclusion,	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arguing	  that	  “the	  quality	  of	  democratic	  representation	  largely	  depends	  on	  the	  existence	   of	   adequate	   institutional	   bridges	   between	   represented	   and	  representatives	   that	   could	   establish	   a	   generalized	   situation	   of	   political	  responsiveness”	  	  (Peruzotti	  2010,	  167).	  	  	  Anderson	  and	  Reiff	  (2004)	  make	  their	  case	  even	  more	  fervently:	  they	  declare	  to	  be	  “unmoved	  by	  the	  claims	  of	  representativeness”	  made	  by	   international	  NGOs	  and	  argue	  that	  “salvation	  for	  the	  international	  NGO	  movement	  lie(s)	  in	  giving	   up	   the	   pretension,	   however	   seductive,	   of	   the	   ideology	   of	   global	   civil	  society”	  (Anderson	  and	  Rieff	  2004,	  38).	  In	  the	  domestic	  setting,	  they	  argue,	  it	  is	   precisely	   because	   NGOs	   are	   not	   expected	   to	   be	   representative	   in	   the	  electoral	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  free	  to	  put	  forward	  their	  own	  interpretation	  of	  the	  common	  good.	  While	  domestic	  NGOs	  can	  thus	  play	  an	  important	  role	   in	  terms	  of	  contributing	  to	   the	  quality	  of	  public	  discourse,	   they	  cannot	  and	  do	  not	  claim	  to	  be	  representative	  and	  as	  such,	  “do	  not	  stand	  between	  the	  people	  and	   their	   elected	   representatives,	   because	   the	   ballot	   box	   does”	   (Anderson	  and	  Rieff	  2004,	  30).	  A	  democratic	  setting	  provides	  the	  legitimate	  context	  and	  the	   institutional	   constraints	   within	   which	   civil	   society	   can	   push	   their	   own	  ideas	   and	   ideals.	   This	   condition	   does	   not	   hold	   in	   an	   undemocratic	  international	   system.	  According	   to	   the	   authors,	   international	  NGOs’	   “claims	  to	  intermediation	  and	  representation”	  are	  exactly	  what	  domestic	  civil	  society	  can	  afford	   to	  eschew	  because	  of	   the	  existence	  of	  elections	  (ibid).	  Moreover,	  because	  international	  NGOs	  are	  permitted	  to	  get	  away	  with	  such	  claims,	  they	  can	  escape	  the	  need	  to	  “prove	  their	  expertise	  and	  competence”	  and	  avoid	  the	  requirements	   of	   practical	   accountability	   (Anderson	   and	   Rieff	   2004,	   34).	  International	   NGOs	   should,	   the	   authors	   advise,	   “give	   up	   their	   dreams	   of	  representing	   the	   people	   of	   the	   world	   –	   indeed,	   devote	   fewer	   resources	   to	  advocacy	  and	  to	  creating	  a	  system	  of	  global	  governance	  and	  more	  time	  and	  care	  to	  the	  actual	  needs	  of	  their	  actual	  constituencies,	  and	  re-­‐establish	  their	  claims	  of	  expertise	  and	  competence”	  (Anderson	  and	  Rieff	  2004,	  36).	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Anderson	   and	   Rieff’s	   argument	   exaggerates	   the	   “claims	   of	  representativeness”	  made	  by	  international	  NGOs.	  Contrary	  to	  their	  assertion,	  it	   is	   not	   true	   that	   international	   NGO	   are	   able	   to	   get	   away	   with	   claims	   of	  ‘representing	  global	   civil	   society’:	   these	   claims	  have	  been	   subject	   to	   critical	  scrutiny	   in	  academic	  and	  policy	  circles	   for	  some	  time	  now.	  The	   ‘false	  claim’	  (allegedly	  made	  by	  international	  NGOs	  and	  their	  supporters)	  that	  Anderson	  and	  Rieff	  attack	  is	  that	  international	  NGOs	  can	  play	  a	  role	  comparable	  to	  that	  of	   elected	   representatives	   in	   the	  domestic	   context.	  This	   threshold	   is	   clearly	  too	   high	   and	   therefore	   easily	   dismissed.	   Little	   insight	   can	   be	   gained	   by	  passing	  a	  verdict	  of	  ‘representativeness’	  or	  the	  lack	  of	  it,	  based	  on	  standards	  directly	  derived	  from	  democratic	  domestic	  representation.	  It	  seems	  sensible	  to	  heed	  Keohane’s	  warning	  that	  it	  is	  	  “crucial	   to	   evaluate	   institutions	   according	   to	   dynamic	   rather	  than	  static	  criteria.	  Being	  forced	  to	  make	  static	  judgments	  –	  is	  an	  institution	  legitimate	  or	  not?	  –	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  Hobson’s	  choice	  between	   simply	   accepting	   institutions	   that	   are	   in	   many	  respects	   unjust,	   or	   rejecting	   institutions	   that	   are	   better	   than	  the	  feasible	  alternatives”	  (Keohane	  2011,	  103).	  	  A	  similar	  response	  to	  the	  charge	  of	  unrepresentativeness	  is	  made	  by	  Dryzek	  who	  asks	  	  “Unrepresentative	  compared	  to	  what?	  Compared	  to	  some	  ideal	  model	   of	   egalitarian	   democracy,	   global	   civil	   society	   may	   do	  badly.	  Compared	  to	  other	  realities	  in	  a	  global	  order	  dominated	  by	   large	   corporations,	   hegemonic	   states,	   neoliberal	   market	  thinking,	   secretive	   and	   unresponsive	   international	  organizations,	   low-­‐visibility	   financial	   networks,	   and	   military	  might,	   global	   civil	   society	   does	   rather	   well.	   The	   criticisms	   of	  unrepresentativeness	  do	  not	  do	  justice	  to	  what	  is	  possible	  and	  what	   is	   not	   in	   global	   politics.	   The	   egalitarian	   democracy	   in	  whose	   name	   the	   criticisms	   are	   made	   has	   never	   existed	   in	  global	   politics,	   and	   there	   are	   good	   reasons	   for	   that.”	   (Dryzek	  2012,	  107)	  	  The	  way	   forward	   lies	   in	   adopting	   a	  more	  nuanced	  approach	   to	   explore	   the	  idea	   of	   NGOs	   as	   ‘representing’	   actors	   and	   understand	   the	   activity	   of	  representation	  as	  a	  continuum	  that	  will	  vary	  across	  contexts	  and	   functions.	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Such	   an	   understanding	   of	   ‘representing’	   as	   opposed	   to	   ‘representative’	   (in	  static	  or	  absolute	  terms)	  helps	  to	  gain	  insight	  into	  how	  NGOs	  may	  act	  for	  the	  “actual	  needs	  of	  their	  actual	  constituencies”	  (Anderson	  and	  Rieff	  2004,	  36)	  in	  a	  responsive,	  legitimate	  and	  effective	  manner.	  It	  allows	  us	  to	  move	  beyond	  an	  ideological	   debate	   around	   whether	   or	   not	   international	   NGOs	   are	  synonymous	  with	  ‘global	  civil	  society’	  (the	  existence	  of	  which	  Anderson	  and	  Rieff	   also	   dispute)	   and	   leads	   us	   to	   ask	  more	   specifically	  whether	   and	   how	  NGOs	  are	  able	  to	  make	  a	  practical	  contribution	  to	  the	  better	  representation	  of	  marginalised	  communities,	  for	  whom	  the	  ballot	  box	  is	  not	  an	  option.	  	  	  The	   question	   of	   ‘who’	   gets	   represented	   can	   –	   at	   least	   formally	   -­‐	   be	   solved	  relatively	   easily	   in	   the	   classical	   interpretation	   of	   representation	  within	   the	  nation-­‐state.	  Domestic	  level	  accounts	  of	  representation	  have	  as	  their	  point	  of	  departure	  a	  territorially	  defined	  constituency.	  This	  is	  obviously	  not	  the	  case	  when	  trying	  to	  apply	  representation	  insights	  to	  a	  transnational	  setting.	  Here,	  constituencies	  are	  spread	  across	  borders	  and	  individuals	  do	  not	  necessarily	  share	  clear	  defining	  characteristics	   such	  as	  a	   common	  nationality,	   language	  or	   culture.	   In	   fact,	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   clearly	   delineated	   ‘demos’	   at	   the	  international	   level	   is	   often	   held	   up	   as	   a	   primary	   reason	   for	   why	   global	  democracy	   is	   impossible.	   The	   problem	   with	   viewing	   representative	  democracy	   as	   intrinsically	   and	   exclusively	   linked	   to	   the	   nation-­‐state,	  however,	  is	  that	  “Non-­‐geographical	  constituencies	  –	   those	  emerging	   from	  race,	  ethnicity,	  class,	  gender,	  environment,	  global	  trade,	  and	  so	  on	  –	  are	   represented	   only	   insofar	   as	   they	   intersect	   with	   the	  circumstances	   of	   location,	   producing	   only	   an	   accidental	  relationship	   between	   democratic	   autonomy	   (particularly	   the	  distributions	   of	   opportunities	   necessary	   for	   self-­‐determination)	   and	   forms	   of	   representation”	   (Bohman	   2007;	  cf.	  Gould	  2004,	  Held	  &	  Koenig-­‐Archibugi	  2005	  cited	  in	  Urbinati	  and	  Warren	  2008,	  396).	  	  Moreover,	   once	  we	   start	   disaggregating	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘constituency’	   in	   any	  political	   setting	   (domestic	   or	   transnational),	   new	   complexities	   arise.	   Any	  democratic	   constituency	   is,	   of	   course,	   made	   up	   of	   individuals	   –	   but	   what	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aspects	  of	   these	   individuals	  do	  ultimately	   get	   ‘represented’	   in	   a	  democratic	  representative	   system?	   Saward	   points	   out	   that	   the	   “representation	   of	   our	  interests	  and	  identities	  in	  politics	  is	  always	  incomplete	  and	  partial”	  (Saward	  2009,ƒ	   3)	   and	   that	   “the	   variety	   and	   range	   of	   our	   interests	   are	   subject	   to	  more-­‐or-­‐less	   constant	   change”	   (Saward	   2009,	   4).	   This	   means	   that	  representatives	   “invariably…highlight	   particular,	   selective,	   aspects	   of	   us,	  their	  constituents,	  and	  downplay	  others	  that	  don’t	  suit	  them”	  (Saward	  2009,	  4).	  A	  similar	  point	  is	  made	  by	  Castiglione	  and	  Warren	  (2006),	  who	  argue	  that,	  “from	   the	   perspective	   of	   those	   who	   are	   represented,	   what	   is	  represented	  are	  not	  persons	  as	  such,	  but	  some	  of	  the	  interests,	  identities,	  and	  values	  that	  persons	  have	  or	  hold.	  Representative	  relationships	  select	  for	  specific	  aspects	  of	  persons,	  by	  framing	  wants,	  desires,	  discontents,	  values	  and	  judgments	  in	  ways	  that	  they	   become	   publicly	   visible,	   articulated	   in	   language	   and	  symbols,	   and	   thus	  politically	   salient”	   (Castiglione	  and	  Warren	  2006,	  13).	  Given	  then	  that	  it	  is	  not	  a	  person	  in	  his	  or	  her	  entirety	  that	  gets	  represented	  in	  a	  representative	  relationship,	  the	  focus	  turns	  to	  identifying	  those	  features	  of	  a	  group	  of	  individuals,	  which	  can	  get	  represented.	  Again,	  this	  allows	  us	  to	  work	  with	   an	  understanding	  of	   representation,	  which	   is	  more	   fluid	   than	   in	  very	  traditional	  accounts.	  It	  also	  means	  that	  representative	  relationships	  are	  not	  necessarily	  mutually	  exclusive	  –	  different	  facets	  of	  one’s	  personality	  may	  be	  represented	  in	  different	  ways	  and	  through	  different	  representatives.	  Some	  observers	   have	   argued	   that,	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   transnational	   politics,	   it	   is	  easier	   and	   more	   practical	   to	   leave	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   representation	   of	  individuals	   behind	   and	   focus	   instead	   on	   the	   representation	   of	   ideas	   or	  discourses.	  Dryzek	  and	  Nyemeyer,	  for	  example,	  make	  the	  case	  for	  “discursive	  representation”,	   arguing	   that	   it	   is	   “one	   way	   to	   redeem	   the	   promise	   of	  deliberative	  democracy	  when	  the	  deliberative	  participation	  of	  all	  affected	  by	  a	   decision	   is	   infeasible”	   (Dryzek	   and	   Nyemeyer	   2008,	   481).	   Referring	   to	  Pitkin’s	   definition	   of	   representation	   as	   the	   “substantive	   acting	   for	   others”,	  they	  hold	  that	  “’others’	  may	  be	  captured	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  discourses	  to	  which	  they	  subscribe”	  (Dryzek	  and	  Nyemeyer	  2008,	  481).	  In	  order	  to	  operationalise	  “discursive	   representation”	   they	   propose	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   “Chamber	   of	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Discourses”	   which	   would	   contain	   carefully	   selected	   representatives	   of	  relevant	  discourses	  on	  an	  issue	  (Dryzek	  and	  Nyemeyer	  2008,	  485).	  	  To	   sum	   up,	   as	   evident	   from	   the	   various	   arguments	   presented	   above,	  detaching	   the	  concept	  of	   representation	   from	  the	  context	  of	   the	  democratic	  nation-­‐state	   is	   not	   without	   problems	   and	   raises	   a	   number	   of	   challenges.	  However,	  some	  of	  these	  challenges	  are	  not	  as	  severe	  as	  they	  may	  appear	  at	  first	  sight.	  For	  one,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  apply	  the	  right	  yardstick	  when	  speaking	  about	  the	  democratic	  legitimacy	  of	  NGOs.	  Of	  course,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  dismiss	  the	  idea	   of	   NGOs	   as	   representatives	   if	   measured	   against	   the	   democratic	  credentials	   of	   elected	   governments.	   NGOs	   will	   not	   and	   cannot	   act	   as	  ‘substitutes’	   for	   democratically	   elected	   governmental	   representatives.	   This	  should	  not	  be	  required	  of	  them	  for	  the	  governance	  powers	  and	  influence	  over	  policy	   outcomes	   of	   NGOs	   are	   unlikely	   to	   rival	   that	   of	   governments.45	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  preclude	  the	  idea	  that	  they	  can	  play	  a	  valuable	  role	  in	  making	   up	   certain	   shortfalls	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	   participation	   and	  representation	   of	   affected	   but	  marginalised	   communities	   in	   global	   politics.	  This	   may	   mean,	   however,	   that	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   representation	   by	   NGOs	  domestic-­‐level	   standards	  will	   have	   to	   be	   calibrated	   to	   fit	   the	   very	  different	  context	   and	   it	   may	   be	   that,	   as	   Keohane	   pointed	   out	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  democratic	   legitimacy	   of	   global	   governance,	   “the	   threshold	   of	   acceptability	  that	  is	  appropriate	  to	  use	  should	  be	  lower	  than	  it	  would	  be	  in	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  domestic	  society”	  (Keohane	  2011,	  100).	  	  	  The	  way	   forward,	   as	  will	  be	   set	  out	   in	  more	  detail	   in	   the	   following	  section,	  lies	  in	  disaggregating	  the	  concept	  of	  representation	  into	  its	  constituent	  parts	  to	  see	  which	  elements	  can	  be	  applied	  –	  in	  what	  form	  –	  to	  international	  NGOs.	  This	   involves	   a	   distinction	   “between	   generic	   norms	   of	   democracy	   and	   the	  institutions	   and	   practices	   through	  which	   the	   norms	   are	   realised”	   (Urbinati	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Where	  private	  actors	  are,	  in	  fact,	  able	  to	  constrain	  the	  autonomy	  of	  democratically	  elected	  governments	  –	  which	  in	  practice,	  has	  been	  more	  of	  a	  danger	  with	  market-­‐based	  actors	  than	  CSOs	  –	  this	  does	  indeed	  create	  problems	  in	  terms	  of	  democracy	  (Coleman	  and	  Porter	  2000).	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and	   Warren	   2008,	   395).	   Roughly	   following	   Pitkin’s	   classification,	   we	   can	  point	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   authorisation	   and	   accountability	   in	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  represented	  and	  the	  representative;	  the	  potential	  –	  but	  not	  uncontroversial	  –	  contribution	  of	  descriptive	  representation;	  and	  the	  tension	  –	  but	  also	  interdependency	  -­‐	  between	  trusteeship	  and	  delegation.	  It	  is	   likely	   that	   these	   various	   elements	   emerge	   in	   some	   form	   or	   another	  whenever	  we	  talk	  about	  political	  representation,	  although	  they	  coexist	  in	  an	  unstable	  equilibrium	  and	  are	  not	  clearly	  distinct	  in	  practice.	  The	  next	  section	  will	  attempt	  to	  apply	  these	  key	  elements	  of	  representation	  to	  the	  activities	  of	  international	  NGOs.	  	  
iii. Conceptualising	  NGOs	  as	  representatives	  in	  global	  governance	  There	   are,	   of	   course,	   a	   number	   of	   fundamental	   differences	   between	  suggesting	   that	   international	   NGOs	   may	   act	   as	   representatives	   and	  traditional	   understandings	   of	   political	   representation	   in	   a	   domestic	   setting.	  The	   most	   obvious	   distinction	   is	   that	   NGOs	   can	   never	   have	   a	   democratic	  mandate	   that	   corresponds	   to	   that	   of	   democratically	   elected	   governments.	  Since	   elections	   constitute	   the	   primary	   means	   of	   authorisation	   and	  accountability	   in	   any	   democratic	   system,	   other	   representative	   claims	   can	  only	   ever	   be	   supplementary	   and	   do	   not	   possess	   the	   same	   democratic	  legitimacy.	   This	   fact	   is,	   of	   course,	   recognised	   in	   the	   very	   structure	   of	  intergovernmental	   processes:	   NGOs	   are	   generally	   only	   ever	   accorded	   a	  ‘voice’,	  not	  a	  ‘vote’.46	  	  	  At	   the	   same	   time	   the	   notion	   that	   NGOs	   can	   informally	   ‘stand	   in’	   for	   the	  interests	  and	  concerns	  of	  marginalised	  groups	  already	  pervades	  much	  of	  the	  discourse	   on	   the	   democratising	   potential	   of	   global	   civil	   society	   (see	  discussion	   in	   section	   iii.	   of	   chapter	   II).	  A	   systematic	  exploration	  of	   this	   role	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	   The	   tripartite	   governing	   structure	   of	   the	   International	   Labour	   Organisation	   (ILO)	   is	  frequently	  pointed	  to	  as	  a	  notable	  departure	  from	  this	  state	  of	  affairs.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  ILO,	  (national)	  employers’	  and	  workers’	  representatives	  are	  able	  to	  vote	  alongside	  governmental	  delegates.	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that	   goes	   beyond	   ideal-­‐type	   theorising	   and	   also	   tries	   to	   explore	   the	  associated	   practical	   challenges	   and	   constraints	   is,	   however,	   still	  missing.	   A	  number	   of	   theorists	   have	   pointed	   out	   that	   representation	   occurs	   in	   the	  transnational	  arena	  and	  that	  theories	  of	  representation	  need	  to	  be	  adapted	  to	  adequately	   capture	   these	   dynamics	   (Kuper	   2004;	   Castiglione	   and	   Warren	  2006;	  MacDonald	  2008;	  Saward	  2009).	  These	  authors	  suggest	  looking	  for	  the	  “functional	  equivalents”	  (Castiglione	  and	  Warren	  2006,	  15)	  to	  domestic-­‐level	  views	  of	  representation	  at	  the	  transnational	  level.	  	  This	  section	  tries	  to	  develop	  some	  insights	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  various	  elements	   of	   democratic	   representation	   –	   authorisation	   and	   accountability,	  descriptive	  representation,	  and	  trusteeship	  and	  delegation	  –	  to	  the	  activities	  of	   international	  NGOs.	   In	  doing	   so,	   it	   also	  draws	  on	   the	  work	  of	   a	   range	  of	  further	  scholars	  (besides	  Pitkin)	  who	  have	  discussed	  political	  representation	  in	   both	   traditional	   and	   non-­‐traditional	   terms.	   MacDonald	   (2008)	   offers	   an	  excellent	   theoretical	   account	   of	   NGOs	   as	   representatives	   in	   a	   “global	  stakeholder	  democracy”,	  and	  develops	  a	  number	  of	  extremely	  useful	  points,	  which	   are	   highly	   relevant	   for	   the	   approach	   taken	   in	   this	   thesis.	   There	   are,	  however,	   a	   number	   of	   key	   differences	   to	   her	   argument	   that	   because	  NGOs	  exercise	   substantial	   public	   power	   of	   their	   own,	   they	   need	   to	   subject	   to	  democratic	  control	  by	  the	  constituencies	  impacted	  by	  this	  particular	  form	  of	  (NGO)	  public	  power.	  The	  point	  of	  departure	  in	  this	  thesis,	  in	  contrast,	  is	  not	  the	   exercise	   of	   public	   power	   by	   the	   NGOs	   themselves	   but	   their	   ‘voice	  contributions’	   to	   international	   policymaking	   processes.	   Ultimately	   –	   as	  will	  be	   further	   argued	   below	   –	   the	   representative	   potential	   of	   NGOs	   under	  investigation	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	   limited	   to	   their	   deliberative	   contributions	   in	  global	  politics	  and	  not	  related	  to	  any	  executive	  function.	  	  
Authorisation	  and	  accountability	  of	  international	  NGOs	  A	   first	   obvious	   observation	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   formalistic	   view	   of	  representation	  is	  that	  the	  classical	  principal-­‐agent	  model	  that	  underpins	  it	  is	  only	  inadequately	  suited	  to	  capturing	  the	  empirical	  reality	  of	  the	  relationship	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between	   NGOs	   and	   citizens.	   Especially	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   relationship	  between	  international	  NGOs	  and	  affected	  communities	  we	  are	  usually	  hard-­‐pressed	   to	   identify	   either	   an	   act	   of	   authorisation	   or	   mechanisms	   for	  accountability	  in	  the	  sense	  understood	  by	  Pitkin.	  This	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  asymmetrical	  power	  relationship	  between	  NGOs	  and	  affected	  communities	  –	  it	   is	   difficult	   to	   speak	   of	   a	   principal-­‐agent	   relationship	   if	   the	   potential	  principal	  essentially	  lacks	  mechanisms	  for	  exerting	  control	  over	  the	  agent.	  At	  the	   same	   time,	   in	   both	   policy	   and	   academic	   circles	   NGOs	   are	   frequently	  encouraged	  to	  ‘become	  more	  accountable’	  or	  ‘strengthen	  their	  accountability	  to	   beneficiaries’.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   language	   of	   formalistic	   representation	   is	  employed	  in	  this	  context	  may	  be	  explained	  in	  two	  ways.	  Firstly,	  the	  language	  of	   accountability	   with	   respect	   to	   NGOs	   makes	   more	   sense	   if	   –	   instead	   of	  focusing	  on	   the	   relationship	  between	  NGOs	  and	  affected	   communities	  –	  we	  substitute	   different	   groups	   as	   principals,	   such	   as	   members,	   donors	   or	  regulatory	  authorities,	  who	  maybe	  in	  a	  position	  to	  exert	  a	  degree	  of	  control	  over	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  NGO	  ‘agent’.	  A	  second	  explanation	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	   term	   ‘accountability’	   is	   frequently	   used	   in	   a	   way	   that	   Pitkin	   would	  probably	  not	  recognise:	   it	   is	  given	  a	  voluntaristic	  connotation	  that	  relies	  on	  the	   concept	   of	   ‘providing	   an	   account’	   and	   largely	   avoids	   the	   problem	   of	  sanctioning	  mechanisms.	  	  	  The	  notion	  of	  accountability	  –	  albeit	  conceptually	  more	  loosely	  defined	  than	  Pitkin’s	  –	  is	  therefore	  already	  a	  recurrent	  theme	  in	  many	  discussions	  of	  NGO	  legitimacy	   and	   effectiveness.	   Practical	   mechanisms	   for	   strengthening	   NGO	  accountability	   in	   this	   sense	   focus	  on	   regulatory	   initiatives	  designed	   to	  hold	  NGOs	  to	  account	  (such	  as	  the	  financial	  reporting	  requirements	  to	  the	  Charity	  Commission	   in	   the	   UK),	   reporting	   requirements	   to	   bilateral	   or	   private	  donors,	   or	   internal	   governance	   structures	   of	   NGOs.	   NGOs	   are	   also	  increasingly	   undertaking	   a	   range	   of	   voluntary	   initiatives	  with	   the	   declared	  objective	  of	   strengthening	   their	  own	  accountability.	   In	  2006,	   for	  example,	  a	  group	  of	   large	   international	   advocacy	  NGOs	  adopted	   the	   International	  NGO	  Accountability	   Charter	   (‘INGO	   Accountability	   Charter’)	   and	   collectively	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pledged	   to	   enhance	   their	   accountability	   and	   transparency	   through	  implementing	  principles	  of	  good	  governance,	  regular	  reporting	  on	  activities	  and	   achievements,	   defining	   effective	   evaluation	   procedures	   and	  communicating	  with	  stakeholders.	  The	  main	  focus	  of	  most	  of	  these	  initiatives	  continues	   to	   be	   on	   strengthening	   transparency,	   performance	   and	   financial	  accountability	   rather	   than	   enabling	   the	   democratic	   participation	   of	   citizens	  (both	  members	  and	  non-­‐members)	  in	  NGO	  decision-­‐making	  processes.	  These	  are	   important	   objectives	   but	   they	   do	   not	   necessarily	   lend	   support	   to	   NGO	  claims	  to	  be	  speaking	  for	  communities	  on	  the	  ground.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  these	  initiatives	   –	   though	   largely	   designed	   to	   strengthen	   ‘upward’	   rather	   than	  ‘downward’	   accountability	   to	   beneficiaries	   –	   should	   not	   be	   dismissed	  outright	   from	   a	   democratic	   perspective.	   The	   first	   group	   of	   stakeholders	  identified	   by	   the	   signatories	   of	   the	   INGO	   Accountability	   Charter	   is	   the	  “peoples	   –	   including	   future	   generations	   –	  whose	   rights	  we	   seek	   to	   protect	  and	   advance”	   (INGO	   Accountability	   Charter	   2005).	   Moreover,	   reporting	  requirements	  to	  donors	  may	  include	  information	  on	  how	  NGOs	  have	  worked	  in	  partnership	  with	  local	  communities	  and/or	  indigenous	  peoples,	  especially	  in	  the	  area	  of	  conservation	  (Chapin	  2004).	  	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  elections,	  a	  number	  of	  authors	  have	  suggested	  approaching	  the	  notion	  of	  NGO	  representation	  by	   looking	   for	   the	  “functional	  equivalents	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  authorisation	  and	  accountability	  that	  is	  at	  work	  in	   election	   cycles”	   (Castiglione	   and	   Warren	   2006,	   15)	   or	   “non-­‐electoral	  mechanisms	   of	   authorisation	   and	   accountability”	   (MacDonald	   2008,	   165).	  Since	  the	  term	  ‘equivalents’	  can	  be	  misleading	  in	  this	  context,	  the	  thesis	  will	  mainly	  refer	  to	  ‘forms’	  or	  ‘mechanisms’	  of	  authorisation	  and	  accountability.	  It	  is	   possible	   to	  detect	   traces	   of	   authorisation,	   for	   example,	   in	   the	   ability	   of	   a	  group	   to	   attract	   a	   following,	   either	   through	   membership	   entrance	  (individuals	  or	  other	  groups	   joining)	   (Van	  Rooy	  2004)	  or	   large-­‐scale	  public	  mobilisation	   (such	   as	   the	   climate	   protests	   leading	   up	   to	   Copenhagen),	   or	  perhaps	   in	  an	   increase	   in	   financial	   resources	  –	  especially	   if	   those	  reflect	  an	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increase	   in	   public	   support	   more	   broadly.47	   Again,	   one	   needs	   to	   be	   careful	  about	   linking	   these	   mechanisms	   to	   the	   potential	   existence	   of	   an	   NGO’s	  mandate	   to	   speak	   for	   the	   most	   affected	   and	   marginalised	   communities.	  Where	   membership	   entrance	   and	   an	   increase	   in	   individual	   contributions	  take	   place	   in	   only	   a	   few	   European	   or	   Northern	   countries,	   this	   would	   not	  make	  the	  organisation	  better	  suited	  to	  represent,	   for	   instance,	  communities	  affected	   by	   climate	   change	   in	   the	   developing	   world.	   By	   contrast,	   if	   an	  organisation	  can	  point	  to	  a	  growth	  in	  membership	  in	  developing	  countries	  or	  among	   those	   communities	   likely	   to	   be	   particularly	   affected	   by	   a	   global	  problem	  or	  policy	  (for	  example,	  impacts	  linked	  to	  climate	  change	  or	  REDD),	  it	  would	  have	  a	  stronger	  claim	  to	  represent	  the	  communities	  in	  question.	  	  	  Other	   potential	   mechanisms	   that	   could	   fulfil	   functions	   similar	   to	  authorisation	   and	   accountability	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	   affected	  communities	   and	   international	   NGOs	   may	   be	   found	   in	   the	   ‘internal’	  democratic	   practices	   and	   structures	   of	   NGOs.	   Possible	   examples	   include	  consultations	   with	   local	   communities	   linked	   to	   the	   development	   of	   those	  policy	   positions	   that	   concern	   these	   communities	   –	   in	   other	   words,	  participatory	  deliberative	  processes	  that	  enable	  local	  communities	  to	  engage	  in	   a	   form	   of	   “stakeholder	   signalling”	   (MacDonald	   2008).	   It	   may	   be	   wrong,	  however,	   to	  overemphasize	   the	  distinction	  between	   ‘internal’	   and	   ‘external’	  stakeholders	   that	   is	   sometimes	   made	   in	   the	   literature.	   A	   number	   of	  international	  NGOs	  –	  such	  as	  FoEI,	  for	  example	  –	  are	  structured	  as	  networks,	  so	   that	   their	   member	   organisations	   themselves	   are	   actually	   community-­‐based	   groups.	   Hence,	   the	   distinction	   between	   local	   or	   national	   member	  groups	   of	   international	   NGOs	   and	   affected	   communities	   themselves	   can	  sometimes	   be	   difficult	   to	   draw	   in	   practice,	   especially	   in	   the	   case	   of	   more	  loosely	  structured	  networks	  with	  close	   links	  to	  the	  grassroots.	  The	  relevant	  point	  here	  is	  that	  local	  communities	  are	  not	  necessarily	  only	  included	  in	  NGO	  policy	   and	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   as	   ‘externals’	   or	   non-­‐members	   but	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	   A	   substantial	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   or	   size	   of	   individual	   donations	   could	   constitute	   a	  form	  of	  democratic	  authorisation	  whereas	  a	  large	  one-­‐off	  donation	  by	  a	  company	  would	  not.	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that,	   depending	   on	   the	   rootedness	   of	   the	   member	   groups	   in	   their	   local	  environment,	   internal	   democratic	   processes	   may	   also	   contribute	   to	   the	  development	   of	   an	   international	   NGO’s	   mandate	   to	   represent	   local	  communities.	  	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   ‘stakeholder	   consultations’	   and	   other	  participatory	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   within	   NGOs	   conflate	   the	  mechanisms	   of	   authorisation	   and	   accountability.	   These	   more	   deliberative	  mechanisms	  and	  structures	  also	  involve	  a	  shift	  of	  emphasis	  in	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	   accountability	   from	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘being	   held	   to	   account’	   in	   favour	   of	  ‘giving	  account’.	  At	   first	  glance	  this	  may	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  much	  weaker	   form	  of	  accountability,	   offering	   far	   less	   control	   to	   the	   represented.	   It	   is,	   however,	  worth	   reminding	   ourselves	   of	   Pitkin’s	   warning	   that	   the	   concept	   of	  accountability	   by	   itself	   offers	   no	   guidance	   as	   to	   how	   the	   representative	  should	   act	   and	   behave	  while	   carrying	   out	   his	   role	   –	   it	   only	   focuses	   on	   the	  consequences	  he	  is	  likely	  to	  suffer	  post	  facto,	  if	  the	  represented	  consider	  him	  to	   have	   failed	   as	   a	   representative.	   It	   is	   conceivable	   that	   ‘giving	   an	   account’	  constitutes	   not	   a	   one-­‐off	   event	   but	   an	   ongoing	   process	   that	   prompts	   the	  representative	  to	  reconcile	  his	  account	  with	  his	  own	  expectations	  of	  the	  role,	  with	   the	   expectations	   of	   the	   represented	   and	   also	   to	   measure	   it	   by	   the	  standards	  set	  by	  his	  peers	  and	  donors.	  	  	  Authorisation	   and	   accountability	   are	   the	   two	   formal	   mechanisms	   that	  together	  shape	  the	  democratic	  mandate	  of	  a	  representative.	  As	  such,	  they	  are	  essential	   prerequisites	   for	   democratic	   representation.	   Representation	   as	  ‘acting	   for’,	   however,	   also	   includes	   provisions	   for	   trusteeship	   –	   the	  representative	   is	   more	   than	   just	   a	   passive	   delegate	   responding	   to	   the	  preferences	  of	  the	  represented.	  The	  implications	  of	  this	  dichotomy	  inherent	  in	   the	   concept	   of	   representation	   for	   the	   role	   of	   international	   NGOs	  will	   be	  discussed	   below,	   following	   a	   brief	   look	   at	   the	   role	   of	   descriptive	  representation.	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Descriptive	  representation	  by	  international	  NGOs	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  discussion	  it	  is	  worth	  following	  Pitkin’s	  classification	  that	  sees	  descriptive	  representation	  as	  an	  independent	  category	  rather	  than	  merely	   treating	   it	   as	   a	   functional	   equivalent	   to	   authorisation	   at	   the	  transnational	   level	   as	   Castiglione	   and	   Warren	   (2006)	   do.	   Interestingly,	  despite	   the	   widely	   recognised	   shortcomings	   of	   descriptive	   views	   of	  representation	  –	  the	  risk	  of	  essentialism,	  the	  danger	  of	  ignoring	  what	  type	  of	  information	  about	  the	  represented	  is	  relevant,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  accountability	  mechanisms	   –	   it	   is	   on	   this	   basis	   that	   international	   NGOs	   are	   often	   found	  wanting.	   For	   example,	   many	   of	   the	   large	   international	   NGOs	   have	   their	  supporter	   base	   in	   wealthy	   industrialised	   countries,	   are	   likely	   to	   have	   a	  predominance	  of	  staff	  (at	  least	  in	  senior	  positions)	  who	  have	  been	  educated	  in	  European	  and	  US	  universities	   and	   their	  main	   source	  of	   funding	   is	   either	  from	   donations	   by	   wealthy	   supporters	   (sometimes	   corporations)	   or	   from	  governments	  of	  industrialised	  states.	  Much	  of	  the	  critical	  academic	  and	  policy	  discourse	  holds	  the	  underlying	  assumption	  that	  because	  of	  these	  descriptive	  discrepancies	  between	  large	  NGOs	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  world’s	  population	  who	   live	   in	   very	   different	   socioeconomic	   and	   cultural	   circumstances,	  international	  NGOs	  cannot	  be	  truly	  representative	  of	   the	  world’s	  citizens	  or	  the	  poor.	  	  The	   concept	   of	   descriptive	   representation	   is	   central	   to	   many	   discussions	  around	   how	   marginalised	   groups	   can	   be	   more	   effectively	   represented	   in	  national	   legislatures.	  Phillips,	   for	  example,	  distinguishes	  between	  a	  “politics	  of	  ideas”	  and	  a	  “politics	  of	  presence”	  (Phillips	  1995).	  The	  difference	  is	  that	  a	  politics	   of	   ideas	   can	   be	   detached	   from	   the	   descriptive	   identity	   of	   the	  represented	  while	  a	  politics	  of	  presence	  relies	  on	  shared	  experience	  between	  the	   represented	   and	   the	   representative.	   In	   domestic	   and	   international	  politics,	   demands	   for	   greater	   political	   participation	   by	   different	   societal	  groups	   are	   justified	   as	   a	   form	   of	   “politics	   of	   presence”.	   For	   example,	   the	  reasoning	   behind	   the	   participation	   of	   ‘major	   groups’	   in	   international	  environmental	  negotiations	  is	  that	  these	  groups	  have	  unique	  experiences	  and	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perspectives	  that	  shape	  their	  approach	  to	  the	  issue	  under	  discussion.	  Major	  group	   representatives	   claim	   to	   be	   speaking	   on	   behalf	   of	   those	   whose	  characteristics	  they	  share	  (e.g.	  women,	  indigenous	  peoples,	  youth),	  thus	  they	  are	  assuming	  the	  role	  of	  descriptive	  representatives.	  	  	  It	  is	  not	  unreasonable	  to	  suggest	  that	  even	  international	  NGOs	  try	  to	  engage	  in	   a	   “politics	   of	   presence”.	   Insofar	   as	   policymakers	   and	   IGOs	   place	   greater	  emphasis	   on	   including	  more	   diverse	   perspectives	   in	   their	   decision-­‐making	  procedures,	   providing	   information	   about	   the	   ‘authentic	   experiences’	   of	  affected	  communities	  become	  a	  potentially	  important	  source	  of	  influence	  for	  NGOs.	   Those	   organisations	   that	   have	   access	   to	   such	   ‘experience-­‐derived’	  knowledge	  may	  be	  able	  to	  use	  it	  strategically	  in	  their	  interactions	  with	  IGOs.	  One	   common	   approach	   for	   international	   NGOs	   is	   to	   use	   the	   resources	   and	  standing	  at	  their	  disposal	  to	  support	  the	  attendance	  of	  community	  members	  at	  international	  conferences	  which	  otherwise	  –	  largely	  for	  financial	  and	  other	  capacity	  reasons	  –	  they	  would	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  go	  to.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  role	   of	   international	   NGOs	   is	   perhaps	   best	   understood	   as	   facilitators	   that	  enable	  the	  direct	  participation	  of	  community	  spokespersons	  in	  international	  fora.	  Yet	  another	  strategy	  is	  that	  of	  bringing	  community	  testimonies	  not	  only	  to	  international	  political	  negotiations	  but	  also	  to	  a	  global	  public.	  By	  providing	  local	   communities	   with	   an	   opportunity	   to	   speak	   about	   their	   experiences	  before	  a	   large	  audience,	  NGOs	  are	  not	  only	   targeting	  policy-­‐makers	  directly	  but	  are	  also	  attempting	  to	  create	  a	  greater	  awareness	  of	  the	  concrete	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	   impacts	  of	   environmental	   challenges	  and	  policies	   among	  citizens	   in	  less	   vulnerable	   regions.	   The	   underlying	   expectation	   is	   that	   this	   knowledge	  will	  mobilise	  citizens	  to	  take	  and	  push	  for	  political	  action	  –	  even	  if	   they	  are	  not	  personally	  impacted	  themselves.	  	  	  Descriptive	  representation	  is	  not	  without	  shortcomings.	  The	  fact	  –	  as	  pointed	  out	   by	   Pitkin	   and	   others	   –	   that	   it	   does	   not	   rely	   on	   authorisation	   and	  accountability	   presents	   one	   problem	   from	   a	   democratic	   perspective.	   There	  are	   also	   practical	   considerations:	   it	   is	   not	   necessarily	   obvious	   that	   local	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groups	   should	   favour	   a	   representative	   (an	   individual	   or	   an	   organisation)	  because	  this	  representative	  shares	  their	  characteristics	  or	  experiences.	  From	  the	   perspective	   of	   the	   represented,	   the	   relationship	   between	   them	   and	   the	  representative	  is	  only	  one	  side	  of	  the	  coin.	  A	  second	  –	  and	  potentially	  more	  important	   aspect	   -­‐	   is	  whether	   the	   representative	   is	   in	   a	   strong	   position	   to	  exercise	   influence	   in	   the	   organisation	  where	   they	   seek	   representation.	   The	  choice	  of	  an	  appropriate	  representative	  is	  thus	  also	  a	  function	  of	  who	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  able	  to	  exert	  influence	  in	  their	  favour	  in	  the	  target	  organisation.	  A	  representative	   who	   shares	   their	   descriptive	   qualities	   but	   lacks	   influence	  within	  the	  target	  organisation	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  an	  ineffective	  representative.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  represented	  may	  consider	  someone	  who	  is	  not	  very	  much	  ‘like’	   them	   but	   has	   a	   good	   standing	   within	   the	   organisation	   a	   desirable	  representative.	  There	  are	  thus	  (at	  least)	  two	  criteria	  involved	  in	  determining	  an	   effective	   representative	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   represented:	   Does	  she/he	  share	  our	  interests?	  Does	  he/she	  have	  opportunities	  for	  influence?	  A	  degree	  of	  compromise	  may	  be	  acceptable	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  first	  criteria	   if	  the	   second	   is	   strong	  enough	   to	   compensate.	  This	  observation	   is	   interesting	  because	  it	  directs	  our	  attention	  back	  to	  the	  relevant	  political	  and	  institutional	  context	   in	   which	   the	   represented	   seek	   representation.	   International	  organisations	   attract	   closely	   networked	   individuals	  who	   frequently	   share	   a	  common	  educational	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  background	  (or	  at	  least	  bond	  over	  after-­‐work	  drinks	   in	  their	  regular	  haunts).	  Certain	  NGOs	  and	  those	  working	  for	   them	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   better	   connected	   in	   that	   environment	   than	   other	  groups	  that	  find	  it	  harder	  to	  establish	  personal	  contacts	  due	  to	  differences	  in	  culture	  and	  language,	  or	  for	  financial	  or	  geographic	  reasons.	  
	  
Responsiveness	  -­	  the	  key	  to	  democratic	  representation	  As	   explained	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	   substantive	   representation,	   or	  representing	   as	   ‘acting	   for’,	   involves	   elements	   of	   both	   responsiveness	   and	  independent	   judgement	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   representative.	   This	   dualistic	  aspect	   of	   representation	   is	   also	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   mandate-­‐independence	  controversy	  (Pitkin	  1967,	  209).	  The	  activity	  of	  representing	  is	  thus	  perhaps	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better	  understood	  as	  a	  continuum	  of	  roles	  that	  are	  limited	  on	  either	  side	  by	  the	  ‘pure’	  forms	  of	  trusteeship	  and	  delegation	  respectively.	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  Pitkin	  and	  others,	  both	   trustee	  and	  mandate	  versions	   taken	   to	   the	  extreme	  contradict	   the	   core	   assumption	   of	   what	   representation	   is	   about:	   the	  paradoxical	  requirement	  that	  the	  represented	  must	  be	  both	  present	  and	  not	  present.	  	  	  The	   elements	   of	   representation	   discussed	   so	   far	   –	   authorisation,	  accountability	   and	   even	   the	   “politics	   of	   presence”	   (Philips	   1995)	   –	   do	   not	  address	  the	  need	  for	  independent	   judgment	  by	  the	  representative,	  although	  this	  feature	  also	  constitutes	  a	  crucial	  condition	  of	  substantive	  representation.	  It	   is,	   in	   fact,	   because	   the	   representative	   has	   the	   capacity	   to	   employ	  independent	   judgment	   that	   substantive	   representation	   is	   compatible	   with	  democratic	  deliberation.	  Deliberative	  democracy	  is	  a	  “process	  through	  which	  initial	  preferences	  are	  transformed	  in	  order	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  points	  of	  views	  of	  the	  others”	  (Miller	  1993,	  75	  cited	  in	  della	  Porta	  2009,	  2).	  It	  requires	  that	  participants	  are	  able	  to	  evaluate	  –	  and	  amend	  –	  their	  judgments	  in	  light	  of	  the	  reasons	  presented	  by	  other	  participants	  (MacDonald	  2008,	  117).	  This	  is	  only	  possible	  if	  representatives	  are	  more	  than	  “mere	  agents”	  (Pitkin	  1967,	  122),	   who	   are	   completely	   bound	   by	   the	   mandate	   determined	   by	   their	  principals,	  i.e.	  the	  represented.	  	  	  Let	  us	  assume	  for	  a	  moment	  that	  NGOs	  act	  as	   ‘pure’	   trustees.	  The	  notion	  of	  trusteeship	  is,	  according	  to	  Pitkin,	  often	  associated	  with	  the	  Burkean	  model	  of	  interest	  representation	  according	  to	  which	  “representation	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  obeying	  popular	  wishes,	  but	  means	  enactment	  of	   the	  national	  good	  by	  a	  select	  elite”	  (Pitkin	  1967,	  170).	  The	  conception	  of	  NGOs	  as	  trustees	  relies	  on	  them	  being	  able	  to	  discern	  ‘objectively’	  what	  is	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  people	   they	   claim	   to	   speak	   for.	   The	   different	   levels	   of	   expertise	   held	   by	  different	   NGOs	   would	   then	   constitute	   one	   of	   the	   main	   mechanisms	   for	  determining	   the	   respective	   validity	   of	   claims	   of	   trusteeship	   (i.e.	   an	  organisation	  is	  better	  at	  discerning	  what	  is	  in	  the	  public	  good	  because	  it	  has	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more	   knowledge	   on	   the	   issue).	   These	   ‘objective’	   interests	   may	   not	   be	   the	  same	   as	   the	   subjective	   preferences	   or	   interests	   held	   by	   particular	  constituents	   and	   they	  may	   even	   conflict	   with	   these	   attached	   interests.	   For	  instance,	  NGOs	  may	  argue	   that	   substantial	   changes	   in	   current	   consumption	  and	  production	  patterns	  are	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  cut	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  in	  wealthy	   countries.	  The	  publics	  potentially	   affected	  by	   these	   changes	  are,	  however,	   likely	   to	   oppose	   them,	   partly	   as	   a	   result	   of	   an	   insufficient	  understanding	  of	   the	  contribution	  of	   their	  daily	  practices	   to	   the	  problem	  of	  climate	  change,	  and	  partly	  because	  they	  prioritise	  short-­‐term	  gains	  over	  any	  potential	  benefits	  in	  the	  distant	  future.	  Yet	  another	  example	  is	  NGO	  support	  for	   the	   establishment	   of	   protected	   areas	   in	   order	   to	   protect	   particular	  species,	   which	   may	   be	   opposed	   by	   the	   communities	   living	   in	   these	   sites.	  There	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   –	   in	   particular	   circumstances	   -­‐	   it	   is	   precisely	   their	  ability	  to	  push	  these	  kinds	  of	  ‘objective’	  values	  without	  being	  constrained	  by	  a	   ‘popular	   mandate’,	   which	  makes	   NGOs	   valuable	   participants	   in	   domestic	  and	  global	  political	  processes.	  Election	  cycles	  and	  other	  short-­‐term	  feedback	  mechanisms	   designed	   to	   ensure	   accountability	   in	   democratic	   political	  systems	   limit	   the	   capacity	   and	   willingness	   of	   governments	   to	   respond	   to	  environmental	  challenges	  with	  long	  horizons.	  NGOs	  do	  not	  work	  under	  these	  constraints	   to	   the	   same	   extent	   and	   are	   therefore	   in	   a	   good	   position	   to	  advocate	   long-­‐term	   strategies	   that	   may	   prove	   unpopular	   at	   present.	  Moreover,	   they	  are	  thus	   in	  a	  stronger	  position	  to	  propose	  and	  support	  new	  norms,	   values	   and	  practices	   that	   are	   not	   yet	   accepted	   by	   the	   population	   at	  large	   but	  may	   gain	   growing	   support	   over	   time	   (Peruzotti	   2010).	   Finally,	   a	  ‘trustee’	  function	  for	  NGOs	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  valuable	  mechanism	  for	  protecting	  the	   interests	   of	   ‘stakeholders’	   that	   are	   –	   a	   priori	   -­‐	   unable	   to	   participate	   in	  democratic	   processes	   at	   the	   national	   and	   global	   level,	   such	   as	   future	  generations	  (or	  maybe	  animals).	  	  	  In	   fact	   –	   given	   that	   NGOs	   lack	   a	   formal	   democratic	   mandate	   based	   on	  elections	  –	  the	  concept	  of	  trusteeship	  probably	  captures	  the	  actual	  roles	  and	  activities	  of	  many	  NGOs	  in	  world	  politics	  more	  easily	  than	  the	  notion	  of	  NGOs	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as	  democratic	  representatives.	  However,	   trusteeship	   in	   its	   ‘pure’	   form	  lacks	  the	   element	   of	   responsiveness,	   which	   constitutes	   the	   essential	   feature	   of	  democratic	  representation.	  As	  such,	  the	  central	  argument	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  the	  conception	  of	   the	  role	  of	  NGOs	  as	   trustees	  does	  not	  adequately	  address	  the	   problem	   of	   democratic	   exclusion	   outlined	   previously:	   the	   fact	   that	  international	   NGOs	   may	   have	   access	   to	   sites	   of	   public	   power	   from	   which	  affected	  local	  communities	  are	  effectively	  excluded.	  The	  question	  of	  whether	  these	  insider	  NGOs	  are	  able	  to	  speak	  for	  these	  marginalised	  communities	  in	  a	  
democratic	   way	   hinges	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  NGOs	  and	  the	  communities	  in	  question.	  In	  particular,	  we	  need	  to	  detect	  some	  evidence	   of	   responsiveness	   by	   NGOs	   to	   these	   communities	   in	   order	   to	  substantiate	  the	  view	  that	  they	  are	  indeed	  working	  to	  advance	  the	  attached	  interests	  of	  these	  communities.	  	  	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  not	  on	  investigating	  forms	  of	  trusteeship.	  The	  fact	  that	   such	   claims	   exist	   is	   taken	   as	   a	   given	   –	   by	   their	   very	   nature,	  NGOs	   are	  likely	  to	  espouse	  their	  own	  version	  of	  the	  public	  good.48	  Instead	  the	  focus	  of	  the	   following	   chapters	   will	   be	   on	   the	   element	   of	   responsiveness	   that	  characterises	  the	  mandate	  form	  of	  representation:	  what	  evidence	  is	  there	  for	  ‘participation’	  by	  those	  most	  affected	  by	  global	  problems	  and	  policies	  in	  the	  development	   of	   NGO	   positions?	   To	   what	   extent	   and	   in	   what	   ways	   do	  international	   NGOs	   display	   responsiveness	   towards	   the	   interests,	  preferences	   and	   values	   of	   these	   local	   communities?	   Are	   they	   able	   to	   bring	  their	  interests,	  values	  and	  preferences	  to	  the	  loci	  of	  global	  power,	  which	  they	  try	   to	   influence?	  The	   fact	   that	   trusteeship	  –	  and	   independent	   judgement	  on	  the	  part	   of	   the	  NGOs	  –	   coexists	  with	   such	  mechanisms	  of	  participation	  and	  responsiveness	   does	   not	   preclude	   the	   possibility	   of	   NGOs	   acting	   as	  representatives.	   It	   does	   mean,	   however,	   that	   substantive	   representation	  cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   a	   simple	   congruency	   test	   between	   the	   	   ‘original	  interests’	   of	   the	   represented	   constituency	   and	   those	   put	   forward	   by	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Note	   the	   reference	   to	  public	  good	   rather	   than	  private	  good	  since	   the	  assumption	   is	   that	  NGOs	  are	  by	  and	  large	  altruistically	  motivated	  actors.	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representative.	  It	  also	  creates	  the	  potential	  for	  conflict	  between	  the	  attached	  interests	  of	  local	  communities	  and	  their	  unattached	  interests,	  as	  interpreted	  by	  the	  NGOs.	  	  	  	  Already	  briefly	   referred	   to	  above	  and	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter,	  MacDonald’s	  (2008)	   concept	   of	   NGO	   representatives	   in	   a	   global	   stakeholder	   democracy	  builds	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  NGOs	  exercise	  considerable	  public	  power	  in	  their	  own	  right.	  The	  public	  power	  of	  NGOs	  manifests	  itself	  in	  two	  main	  ways:	  their	  role	   in	   creating	   regulative	   social	   norms	   (MacDonald	   2008,	   63)	   and	   the	  imposition	   of	   material	   constraints	   upon	   people	   on	   the	   ground	   (2008,	   71).	  MacDonald	   sees	   evidence	   of	   NGO	   public	   power	   in,	   for	   example,	   the	  contribution	   of	   NGOs	   to	   the	   development	   of	   UN-­‐generated	   norms,	   or	   to	  private	   initiatives	   such	   as	   the	   Ethical	   Trading	   Initiative	   or	   the	   Global	  Reporting	  Initiative	  (2008,	  68).	  She	  also	  points	  to	  the	  imposition	  of	  material	  constraints	   by	   NGOs,	   arguing	   that	   these	   can	   arise	   in	   situations	   when	   NGO	  actions	   “are	   materially	   facilitated	   and	   enforced	   through	   the	   violence	   of	  armies	   and	   police-­‐forces”	   (2008,	   73),	   when	   “international	   laws	   and	   key	  policy	   decisions	   that	   they	   have	   played	   a	   significant	   part	   in	   producing	   are	  enforced	   through	   economic	   sanctions	   or	   other	   forms	   of	   economic	   pressure	  and	  coercion”	  (ibid),	  or	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  opportunity	  costs	  of	  NGO	  resource	  allocation	  in	  developing	  countries	  (2008,	  79).	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	   these	   forms	   of	   NGO	   power	   “impacts	   in	   some	   problematic	  way	   upon	   the	  capacity	   of	   a	   group	   of	   individuals	   to	   lead	   autonomous	   lives”,	   it	   should	   be	  subject	  to	  democratic	  control	  (2008,	  35).	  	  	  MacDonald	  argues	  that	  non-­‐electoral	  authorisation	  needs	  to	  be	  constituted	  of	  two	  distinct	  elements	  (corresponding	  to	  the	  functional	  elements	  of	  electoral	  authorisation):	  “mechanisms	  of	  delegation	  for	  specifying	  the	  range	  of	  public	  political	   tasks	   that	   the	   representative	   is	   entitled	   to	   perform”	   and	  “mechanisms	   for	   empowerment”	   (MacDonald	   2008,	   180).	   Non-­‐electoral	  accountability	   consists	   of	   mechanisms	   of	   transparency	   and	  mechanisms	   of	  public	   empowerment	   (2008,	   185).	   In	   light	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   those	   groups	   of	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individuals	   whose	   lives	   are	   problematically	   impacted	   by	   the	   activities	   of	  NGOs	   tend	   to	   lack	   the	   ability	   to	   empower	   or	   disempower	   the	   NGOs,	  MacDonald	  suggests	  that	  other	  actors	  (governments,	  donors)	  may	  do	  this	  in	  lieu.	  She	  considers	  this	  acceptable	  from	  a	  democratic	  perspective	  as	   long	  as	  these	  alternative	  authorisation	  and	  accountability	  relationships	  are	  linked	  to	  stakeholder	   delegation	   mechanisms.	   For	   instance,	   donors	   may	   stipulate	  stakeholder	  participation	  as	  a	  condition	  for	  NGO	  funding	  (MacDonald	  2008,	  208).	  	  	  Despite	  MacDonald’s	  claim	  to	  be	  able	   to	  “identify	  a	  more	  pragmatic	  path	   to	  global	   democratisation,	   which	   can	   be	   accommodated	   within	   the	   existing	  institutional	  structures	  of	  global	  politics”	  (MacDonald	  2008,	  32),	  it	  is	  far	  from	  clear	   that	   NGOs	   actually	   do	   exercise	   public	   power	   to	   the	   potentially	  concerning	   degree	   that	   her	   model	   requires	   in	   order	   to	   justify	   democratic	  controls	   on	   NGOs.	   Most	   of	   MacDonald’s	   examples	   of	   NGO	   public	   power	   –	  some	  of	  which	  were	  listed	  above	  –	  relate	  to	  situations	  where	  the	  contribution	  of	   NGOs	   to	   specific	   outcomes	   is	   actually	   questionable	   and	   the	   actions	   of	  other,	   more	   powerful	   actors,	   are	   likely	   to	   matter	   more.	   For	   instance,	   the	  imposition	  of	  economic	  sanctions	  as	  well	  as	  the	  material	   facilitation	  of	  NGO	  actions	   by	   armies	   and	   police	   forces	   are	   examples	   of	   the	   exercise	   of	   state	  power	   rather	   than	   NGO	   power.	   While	   there	   is	   some	   evidence	   of	   NGOs	  contributing	  to	  the	  development	  of	  global	  regulative	  social	  norms	  (relating	  to	  human	   rights	   or	   corporate	   accountability,	   for	   example),	   these	   norms	   are	  ‘operationalised’	  by	  other	  actors	  (namely	  governments	  or	  corporations)	  and	  the	   extent	   to	   which	   they	   have	   a	   problematic	   and	   autonomy-­‐constraining	  impact	  on	  citizens	  is	  questionable.	  	  	  Of	  course,	  MacDonald	  is	  right	  in	  suggesting	  that	  NGOs	  should	  be	  accountable	  to	  those	  individuals	  whose	  lives	  they	  affect	  in	  a	  problematic	  way.	  Moreover,	  while	   she	   focuses	   her	   analysis	   on	   NGOs	   and	   their	   ‘stakeholder	  constituencies’,	   she	   suggests	   that	   the	   same	   mechanisms	   (i.e.	   non-­‐electoral	  authorisation	   and	   accountability)	   may	   be	   applied	   to	   other	   actors,	   such	   as	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corporations.	   However,	   MacDonald’s	   model	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   capture	   the	  possibility	  for	  NGOs	  to	  act	  as	  democratic	  links	  between	  affected	  communities	  and	  other	  agents	  of	  public	  power.	  She	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  only	  those	  individuals	  who	   suffer	   “problematic	   impacts	   on	   their	   autonomous	   capacities”	  (MacDonald	   2008,	   85)	   as	   a	   result	   of	  NGO	  actions	   that	   should	   be	   entitled	   to	  wield	  democratic	  control	  over	  NGOs.	  Yet,	  this	  is	  not	  what	  the	  idea	  of	  NGOs	  as	  representatives	  of	  local	  communities	  or	  as	  ‘stakeholder	  representatives’	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   international	   organisations	   (or	   businesses	   for	   that	   matter)	   usually	  implies.	   This	   point	   is	   well	   illustrated	   in	   the	   case	   of	   a	   particular	   group	   of	  communities	   who	   are	   often	   marginalised	   in	   international	   policy-­‐making	  processes.	  In	  fact,	  MacDonald	  herself	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  to	   show	   the	   democratic	   shortcomings	   of	   nation-­‐state	   representation.	  Indigenous	   peoples	   are	   systematically	   underrepresented	   because	   their	  “territorial	   concentration	   in	   particular	   territorial	   states	   is	   insufficient	   to	  provide	   proportional	   representation	   in	   global	   society”	   (MacDonald	   2008,	  130).	   It	   is	   not	   clear,	   however,	   how	   MacDonald’s	   account	   of	   ‘global	  stakeholder	  democracy’	  would	  address	  this	  problem	  in	  global	  politics.	  	  	  	  By	  contrast,	  the	  democratic	  ‘objective’	  investigated	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  render	  international	  institutions	  more	  accountable	  to	  the	  communities	  they	  affect	  –	  through	   the	   help	   of	   NGOs.	   The	   ultimate	   point	   of	   reference	   is	   therefore	  different	   to	   that	   of	   MacDonald.	   Moreover,	   rather	   than	   arguing	   that	   NGOs	  
should	   be	   subject	   to	   democratic	   control	   by	   affected	   communities	   (through	  forms	   of	   authorisation	   and	   accountability),	   the	   starting	   point	   here	   is	   their	  potential	   for	   doing	   so.	   There	   is	   also	   a	   different	   understanding	   of	  who	   is	   in	  need	   of	   more,	   or	   better,	   representation	   by	   NGOs	   in	   global	   politics.	   While	  MacDonald	  argues	  that	  these	  can	  only	  be	  those	  groups	  of	  individuals	  directly	  impacted	  by	  the	  exercise	  of	  NGO	  power,	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  present	  work	  is	  on	  those	  groups	  (potentially)	  most	  impacted	  by	  the	  exercise	  of	  IGO	  power.	  The	  exercise	  of	  public	  power	  by	  NGOs	  (as	  defined	  by	  MacDonald)	  is	  therefore	  not	  a	  necessary	  precondition	  for	  them	  acting	  as	  representatives	  of	  these	  groups	  in	   international	  organisations	  –	  what	  matters	  more	   is	   the	  practical	   fact	  that	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international	   NGOs	   have	   a	   louder	   voice	   than	   marginalised	   communities	   in	  world	  politics.	  The	  question	  of	  whether	  NGOs	  are	  responsible	  for	  particular	  outcomes	   (impact	   of	   public	   power)	   remains	   open,	   but	   can	   be	   conceptually	  distinguished	  from	  what	  Warren	  has	  termed	  “accountability	  for	  interest	  and	  value	  representation”	  (Warren	  2008,	  61).	  
	  
iv. Research	  questions	  Having	  outlined	  the	  particular	  understanding	  employed	  in	  this	  thesis	  of	  how	  NGOs	   may	   act	   as	   democratic	   links	   between	   affected	   communities	   and	  international	   organisations,	   this	   section	   will	   set	   out	   a	   number	   of	   specific	  research	  questions	  to	  guide	  further	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  how	  this	  could	  (and	  does)	  work	   in	   practice.	   Broadly	   speaking,	   the	   empirical	   analysis	  will	   try	   to	  explore	  the	  following	  issues:	  	   1. What	  are	   the	  structures	  and	  processes	  allowing	   for	   the	  participation	  by	  and	  responsiveness	  to	  local	  communities	  that	  can	  be	  found	  within	  international	  NGOs?	  	  2. What	   drives	   or	   motivates	   NGOs	   to	   act	   as	   ‘representatives’	   of	   local	  communities	  in	  international	  organisations?	  3. What	   are	   the	   potential	   conflicts	   and	   challenges	   that	   NGOs	   face	   in	  pursuing	  this	  role?	  4. What	   are	   the	   effects	   and	   consequences	   of	   NGOs	   acting	   as	  representatives	  in	  this	  way?	  
	  The	  following	  will	  set	  out	  a	  number	  of	  possible	  factors,	  which	  may	  help	  us	  to	  approach	  each	  question.	  	  
1.	  Structures	  and	  processes	  The	  geographical	  spread	  of	  an	  organisation	  constitutes	  a	  basic	  but	  important	  determinant	   of	   the	   degree	   of	   potential	   contact	   with	   and	   exposure	   to	  communities	   affected	   by	   global	   policies,	   especially	   in	   the	   global	   South.	  However,	   it	   is	  not	  only	  the	  organisational	  presence	  around	  the	  world	  in	  the	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form	  of	  offices	  or	  national	  member	  organisations	  which	  counts,	  but	  also	  the	  degree	   to	   which	   these	   offices	   can	   shape	   the	   NGO’s	   global	   positions.	   The	  formal	   governance	   structure	   of	   the	  NGO	  might	   provide	   important	   clues	   for	  sketching	   the	   opportunities	   for	   influence	   available	   to	   the	   NGO’s	   member	  offices	   or	   affiliates.	   The	   availability	   and	   quality	   of	   internal	   democratic	  structures	  and	  processes	  will	  determine	  the	  ability	  of	  member	  organisations	  and	   individual	  members	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   of	  the	  global	  organisation.	  In	  addition,	  it	  is	  worth	  enquiring	  into	  the	  existence	  of	  institutionalised	  mechanisms	  for	  direct	  consultation	  with	  local	  communities	  and	   local	   community	   organisations	   that	   cannot	   be	   classified	   as	  ‘organisational	  members’.	   A	   comprehensive	   assessment	  would	   also	  have	   to	  consider	   the	  existence	  of	  alliances	  or	  partnerships	  with	  Southern	  CSOs	  and	  community-­‐based	   organisations.	   More	   difficult	   to	   assess	   are	   ‘soft’	   factors	  such	   as	   the	   importance	   attached	   to	   deliberation	   processes	   and	   reaching	  consensus	  within	  the	  organisation.	  	  	  
2.	  Drivers	  and	  motives	  The	   spread	   of	   participatory	   norms	   in	   the	   broader	   fields	   of	   sustainable	  development	  and	  environmental	  politics	   is	   likely	  to	  shape	  the	  motivation	  of	  NGOs	   to	   develop	   their	   responsiveness	   to	   local	   communities.	   This	   might	  happen	  both	   through	   an	   acceptance	   of	   these	   values	   for	   their	   own	   sake	  but	  also	  for	  more	  pragmatic	  reasons	  in	  instances	  where	  participatory	  processes	  are	  expected	  to	  lead	  to	  better	  results.	  The	  dominant	  values	  within	  individual	  NGOs,	   such	   as	   their	   commitment	   to	   a	   social	   justice	   agenda,	   will	   probably	  determine	   their	   receptiveness	   to	   participatory	   ideas.	   In	   addition,	   material	  pressure	   by	   other	   actors	   may	   come	   into	   play:	   for	   example,	   when	   donors	  insist	  on	  evidence	  of	   stakeholder	  participation	  or	   IGOs	  demand	  a	  degree	  of	  ‘representativeness’	   as	   a	   condition	   for	   participation.	   Reputational	   concerns	  might	   lead	   Northern	   NGOs	   to	   reach	   out	   more	   proactively	   to	   community-­‐based	   organisations	   in	   the	   global	   South	   in	   order	   to	   pre-­‐empt	   or	   react	   to	  criticisms	  of	  an	  alleged	  lack	  of	  representativeness.	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3.	  Conflicts	  and	  challenges	  Enquiring	   into	   the	   conflicts	   and	   challenges	   associated	   with	   implementing	  forms	  of	  responsiveness	  to	  local	  communities	  necessitates	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  potential	   trade-­‐offs	   between	   more	   participatory	   practices	   and	   the	  effectiveness	   of	   decision-­‐making.	   There	   may	   also	   be	   trade-­‐offs	   with	   other	  organisational	  values	  in	  instances	  where	  interests	  of	  local	  communities	  clash	  with	   the	   values	   of	   the	   organisation	   or	   other	   organisational	   stakeholders,	  including	  donors	  or	  members.	  An	  exploration	  of	  the	  conflicts	  and	  challenges	  of	  representative	  functions	  will	  help	  to	  understand	  the	  limits	  thereof.	  	  	  	  
4.	  Effects	  of	  representative	  practices	  Finally,	  it	  is	  worth	  trying	  to	  determine	  the	  effects	  of	  representative	  practices.	  What	  impact	  do	  these	  actually	  have	  –	  on	  the	  substantive	  content	  of	  the	  NGO’s	  policy	  positions,	   on	   relations	  among	   the	  NGO’s	  organisational	  members,	   on	  relations	  with	  other	  NGOs,	  and	  on	  relations	  with	  international	  organisations?	  
	  
v. Conclusion	  The	  preceding	  discussion	  has	   shown	   that	   a	   thorough	   investigation	   into	   the	  concept	   of	   representation,	   such	   as	   that	   offered	   by	   Pitkin,	   offers	   a	   good	  starting	  point	  for	  thinking	  about	  how	  certain	  elements	  of	  representation	  may	  be	  applied	  in	  new	  contexts.	  Detaching	  the	  concept	  of	  representation	  from	  its	  traditional	  reference	  points	  of	  democracy	  within	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  a	  bordered	  constituency	   and	   the	   institution	   of	   elections,	   presents	   a	   number	   of	  challenges.	   A	   possible	   way	   to	   proceed	   lies	   in	   focusing	   on	   those	   aspects	   of	  representation	  that	  are	  both	  ‘detachable’	  and	  ‘transferable’	  to	  different	  types	  of	   representative	   relationships.	   Representing	   as	   an	   activity	   is	   then	   more	  accurately	   understood	   as	   a	   spectrum	   of	   relationships	   between	   the	  represented	   and	   the	   representative.	   The	   key	   feature	   of	   all	   democratic	  representative	   relationships	   is,	   however,	   responsiveness	   by	   the	  representative	   towards	   those	   that	   he	   or	   she	   claims	   to	   represent.	   To	   what	  extent	   does	   the	   relationship	   between	   international	   NGOs	   and	   local	  communities	  show	  evidence	  of	  such	  mechanisms	  for	  responsiveness?	  This	  is	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the	  question,	  which	  will	  be	  tackled	  in	  the	  following	  two	  chapters	  through	  an	  empirical	   investigation	   into	   the	   internal	   democratic	   practices	   and	   the	  relationships	  with	  external	  stakeholders	  of	  several	  major	  international	  NGOs	  and	  NGO	  networks	  active	  in	  field	  of	  global	  environmental	  politics.	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VI. Responsiveness	   in	   centralised	   NGOs:	   WWF	   and	  
Greenpeace	  	  The	   purpose	   of	   this	   chapter	   and	   the	   next	   is	   to	   give	   a	   more	   practical	  illustration	   of	   how	   international	   environmental	   NGOs	   and	   NGO	   networks	  may	  be	  able	  to	  act	  as	  democratic	  links	  between	  local	  communities	  and	  global	  public	   policy-­‐making	   processes.	   The	   following	   analysis	   therefore	   tries	   to	  address	   the	   challenge	   set	   out	   in	   chapter	   two	   of	   the	   thesis:	   if	   NGOs	   that	  participate	  in	  global	  public	  policy-­‐making	  processes	  are	  to	  be	  conceptualised	  as	  “transmission	  belts”	  between	  affected	  citizens	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  the	  sites	  of	  global	  public	  power,	  we	  need	  to	  have	  a	  clearer	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  structures,	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   and	   values	   espoused	   by	   these	   NGOs	  allow	  them	  to	  play	  this	  role.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  objective	  is	  to	  peek	  inside	  the	  ‘black	  box’	  and	  find	  out	  how	  particular	  NGOs	  work	  in	  practice.	  	  	  The	  NGOs	  analysed	  in	  this	  and	  the	  following	  chapter	  are	  transnational	  in	  that	  they	   have	   offices	   in	   many	   countries	   around	   the	   world	   and	   share	   a	   global	  outlook	   in	   the	   focus	  of	   their	  policies	   and	   campaigns.	  They	   are	   also	  broadly	  acknowledged	   to	   be	   among	   the	  most	   influential	  NGOs	   in	   the	   field	   of	   global	  environmental	  politics.	  Scholars	  like	  Wapner	  (1996)	  and	  Rootes	  (2006)	  have	  already	  undertaken	  comparative	  analyses	  of	  the	  Worldwide	  Fund	  for	  Nature,	  Greenpeace	   and	   Friends	   of	   the	   Earth	   as	   these	   groups	   are	   considered	   to	  represent	  an	  interesting	  cross-­‐section	  of	  distinct	  characteristics	  and	  different	  approaches	   among	   environmental	   NGOs.	   The	   decision	   to	   group	   together	  WWF	  and	  Greenpeace	  in	  this	  chapter	  and	  to	  look	  at	  FoEI,	  together	  with	  two	  convention-­‐centred	   networks	   (CAN	   and	   the	   CBD	   Alliance)	   in	   the	   next	  chapter,	  can	  be	   justified	   in	   light	  of	   the	  different	  organisational	  structures	  of	  these	  groups.	  While	  WWF	  and	  Greenpeace	  are	  relatively	  centralised	  and	  ‘top-­‐down’	   organisations,	   FoEI	   is	   better	   described	   as	   a	   ‘flat’	   network.	   These	  structural	   characteristics	   present	   very	   different	   points	   of	   departure	   for	  exploring	   their	   role	   as	   links	   between	   local	   communities	   and	   global	  institutions.	  While	  the	  analysis	  of	  this	  small	  sample	  of	  organisations	  does	  not	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necessarily	  allow	  us	   to	  draw	  general	   conclusions	  about	   the	  myriad	  of	   local,	  national	  and	  international	  groups	  active	  on	  global	  environmental	  issues,	  the	  organisations	   appear	   to	   be	   valuable	   starting	   points	   for	   further	   exploring	  some	  of	  the	  ideas	  set	  out	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters.	  The	  selection	  of	  the	  NGOs	  is,	   however,	   biased	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   particular	   conceptual	   perspective	  adopted	  in	  this	  research:	  their	  legitimacy	  is	  not	  principally	  derived	  from	  the	  production	   of	   scientific	   knowledge	   (such	   as,	   for	   example,	   the	   International	  Institute	   for	   Sustainable	  Development	   (IISD)),	   nor	   can	   they	   be	   classified	   as	  organisations	  with	   a	   predominately	   eco-­‐centric	   outlook	   (such	   as	   the	   Earth	  First!	  Groups).	  	  	  Yet	  another	  disclaimer	  is	  warranted.	  The	  description	  of	  the	  organisations	  as	  set	   out	   below	   reflects	   the	   most	   accurate	   portrayal	   possible	   as	   of	   summer	  2010,	  given	  the	  practical	  constraints	  relating	  to	  accessibility	  and	  verifiability.	  What	   is	   important	   to	   note,	   however,	   is	   that	   these	   organisations	   are	  continually	   evolving	   and	   that	   some	   of	   the	   observations	  made	   here	  may	   no	  longer	  be	  applicable	   in	  a	   few	  years’	   time.	  FoEI	  –	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	   in	  the	  next	  chapter	  -­‐	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  an	  organisation	  that	  has	  undergone	  a	  radical	   process	   of	   restructuring	   and	   ideological	   reorientation	   over	   time	  (Doherty	  2006),	   to	   the	   extent	   that	  Wapner’s	  1996	  analysis	   is	  only	  partially	  applicable	   to	   the	   network	   today.	  WWF	   underwent	   a	   number	   of	   important	  changes	  in	  its	  governance	  structure	  while	  this	  particular	  research	  was	  being	  undertaken	   and	   the	   description	   below	   tries	   to	   reflect	   these.	   Greenpeace	   –	  which	  in	  the	  past	  had	  often	  been	  portrayed	  as	  a	  Northern	  and	  elitist	  group	  –	  appointed	  a	  new	  executive	  director	  in	  late	  2009.	  Kumi	  Naidoo	  is	  the	  former	  head	  of	  CIVICUS	  –	   the	  so	  called	  “world’s	  citizen	  assembly”	  –	  and	  one	  of	   the	  pioneers	  of	  citizen	  participation	  in	  world	  politics.	  When	  most	  of	  the	  empirical	  research	  on	  Greenpeace	  was	  concluded	   in	   summer	  2010,	   it	   remained	   to	  be	  seen	  to	  what	  extent	  he	  would	  bring	  to	  bear	  his	  ideas	  and	  former	  experiences	  on	  the	  organisation.	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The	  analysis	  of	  each	  organisation	  will	   first	   try	   to	   identify	  different	   forms	  of	  responsiveness,	  as	  set	  out	  in	  the	  research	  questions	  introduced	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  previous	  chapter	  (“structures	  and	  processes”).	  This	  will	  be	  followed	  by	  a	  comprehensive	  discussion	  that	  will	  try	  address	  the	  three	  remaining	  research	  questions	  and	  consider	  drivers	  and	  motives,	  challenges	  and	  conflicts,	  as	  well	  as	   possible	   consequences	   of	   these	   structures	   and	   processes.	   Particularly	  interesting	  issues	  arising	  from	  the	  analysis	  of	  individual	  organisations	  will	  be	  given	   more	   attention,	   especially	   where	   these	   relate	   to	   challenges	   and	  conflicts	  the	  organisations	  have	  encountered	  in	  becoming	  more	  responsive	  to	  their	   members	   and	   to	   local	   communities.	   This	   is	   therefore	   not	   a	  straightforward	   comparison	   –	   the	   objective	   is	   more	   to	   discern	   existing	  ‘representation	  practices’	  within	  particular	  ENGOs	  and	  to	  discuss	  how	  these	  are	  facilitated	  or	  constrained	  by	  the	  organisations’	  characteristics.	  Moreover,	  the	  various	  elements	  are	  linked	  in	  practice,	  so	  that	  an	  “organisation’s	  identity	  shapes	   its	   structure	   and	   strategy,	   but	   the	   relationships	   among	   these	  dimensions	  are	  not	  simply	   linear;	   they	  are,	   to	  varying	  extents,	   recursive,	  as	  choices	   concerning	   structure	   and	   strategy	   feed	   back	   upon	   organisational	  identity”	  (Rootes	  2006,	  779).	  	  	  
i. WWF:	  a	  global	  conservation	  organisation	  	  WWF	  was	   formed	  as	   the	  World	  Wildlife	  Fund	   in	  1961	  but	  changed	   its	   legal	  name	   to	  WWF	   -­‐	  World	  Wide	   Fund	   for	   Nature	   (keeping	   the	   old	   initials)	   in	  1986.	  It	  was	  originally	  set	  up	  as	  a	  fundraising	  organisation	  by	  a	  small	  group	  of	   mainly	   British	   conservationists,	   who	   had	   connections	   with	   existing	  conservation	   organisations.	   In	   its	   early	   fundraising	   campaigns,	   the	  organisation	  adopted	  a	   ‘crisis	  narrative’:	  human	  interference	  was	  portrayed	  as	  posing	  a	  potentially	  irrevocable	  threat	  to	  natural	  habitats	  and	  campaigns	  singled	  out	  particular	  (high-­‐profile)	  species	   in	  urgent	  need	  of	  protection.	   In	  later	  years,	  WWF	  expanded	   the	  scope	  of	   its	  activities,	   implementing	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  conservation	  projects	  around	  the	  world,	  and	  placing	  more	  emphasis	  on	  sustainable	  development	  and	  the	  involvement	  of	  local	  communities	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  protected	  areas	  for	  conservation.	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  WWF	  International	  is	  an	  independent	  foundation,	  registered	  under	  Swiss	  law	  and	   governed	   by	   an	   international	   board	   of	   trustees,	   with	   its	   headquarters	  located	   in	   Gland,	   Switzerland.	   The	   organisation	   has	   over	   5000	   staff	  worldwide	   and	   over	   five	   million	   supporters	   (WWF	   2011,	   48).	   In	   2010,	  WWF’s	  global	  (i.e.	  network	  wide)	  income	  was	  €525	  million.	  Around	  57%	  of	  this	   came	   from	   individual	   contributions,	   17%	   from	   governments	   and	   aid	  agencies,	  6%	  from	  foundations	  and	  11%	  from	  corporations;	  8%	  was	  earned	  income	   	   (WWF	   2011,	   42/43).	   The	   organisation	   has	   offices	   in	   over	   80	  countries	  around	   the	  world,	  whereby	   it	  distinguishes	  between	   independent	  national	  offices,	  with	  their	  own	  board	  of	  trustees,	  which	  “can	  raise	  funds	  and	  carry	  out	  work	  autonomously”	   (WWF	  n.d.	   ‘How	   is	  WWF	  run?’),	   and	  offices,	  which	  are	  “outposts”	  of	  WWF	  International	  and	  managed	  by	  the	  international	  secretariat	  (interview	  with	  director	  of	  network	  relations,	  WWF	  International,	  21.01.2010).	  The	  independent	  offices	  have	  contractual	  licensing	  agreements	  with	  WWF	  International	  that	  enable	  them	  to	  use	  the	  WWF	  “brand”,	  but	  also	  require	   them	   to	   “march	   in	   step	   and	   play	   the	   same	   tune”	   (ibid).	  WWF	   also	  maintains	   offices	   in	   Brussels	   and	   Washington	   that	   carry	   out	   lobby	   work	  directed	   at	   the	   European	   Union	   and	   the	   Bretton	   Woods	   institutions	  respectively.	  	  	  WWF	  claims	  that	  it	  tries	  to	  achieve	  change	  through	  constructive	  engagement	  with	  key	  governmental	  and	  business	  actors,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  maxim	  that	  ‘you	  can’t	  bake	  a	  cake	  if	  you’re	  not	  in	  the	  kitchen’.	  These	  forms	  of	  engagement	  go	  beyond	  trying	  to	  influence	  the	  attitudes	  and	  behaviours	  of	  these	  actors	  from	  the	  ‘outside’	  and	  involve	  working	  in	  partnership	  with	  governmental	  agencies	  and	  companies.	  WWF’s	  work	  with	  IGOs	  involves	  both	  lobbying	  and	  advocacy	  work	   on	   particular	   issues	   at	   the	   policy	   level	   (notably	   biological	   diversity,	  fisheries,	   forests,	   climate	   change)	   and	   a	   number	   of	   on-­‐the-­‐ground	  conservation	   partnerships.	   Working	   at	   the	   policy	   level,	   WWF	   produces	   a	  wide	   range	   of	   scientific	   background	   papers	   and	   analyses,	   position	   papers,	  joint	  statements	  with	  other	  NGOs,	  and	  specific	  documents	  targeting	  national	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governments	   and	  delegates	   at	   international	   conferences	   and	  COPs	   (such	   as	  those	   of	   the	   UNFCCC	   and	   the	   CBD).	  WWF	   staff	   are	   also	   sometimes	   able	   to	  attend	   these	   international	   meetings	   as	   part	   of	   the	   official	   delegations	   of	  friendly	   governments	   –	   a	   reflection	   of	   the	   considerable	   recognition	   and	  standing	  the	  organisation	  enjoys	  among	  policymakers.	  In	  addition,	  WWF	  has	  established	  itself	  as	  an	   important	   implementing	  partner	   in	   its	  own	  right	   for	  international	   environmental	   agencies	   such	   as	   UNEP,	   running	   training	  programmes	  and	  managing	  protected	  areas	  and	  other	  conservation	  projects	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  	  The	  fact	  that	  WWF	  proactively	  seeks	  out	  engagement	  and	  partnerships	  with	  business	  organisations	  and	  accepts	  corporate	  funding	  is	  one	  large	  difference	  between	   this	   organisation	   and	   Greenpeace	   or	   FoEI,	   who	   both	   refuse	   any	  corporate	   donations.49	   With	   regards	   to	   Alcock’s	   (2008)	   classification	   of	  ENGOs,	   WWF	   can	   be	   found	   on	   the	   “sustainability-­‐efficiency	   interface”,	   as	  evidenced	  by	  its	  attitude	  to	  corporate	  actors,	  the	  research	  conducted	  as	  part	  of	   its	   macroeconomics	   programme	   and	   the	   support	   for	   self-­‐regulatory	  initiatives	  by	  business.	  According	  to	  its	  website,	  WWF	  works	  with	  business	  in	  a	   number	   of	   ways	   ranging	   from	   campaigning	   and	   lobbying	   on	   issues	   of	  production,	   consumption	   and	   regulation;	   engaging	   in	   on-­‐the-­‐ground	  conservation	   partnerships;	   offering	   companies	   the	   chance	   to	   join	   its	  ‘Corporate	   Club’;	   accepting	   corporate	   support	   for	   conservation	   activities;	  entering	   into	   licensing	   agreements	   that	   allow	   companies	   to	   use	   the	   WWF	  logo	   on	   products;	   and	   working	   with	   media	   associations	   to	   carry	   WWF’s	  messages	   to	   a	   wider	   audience	   (WWF	   n.d.	   ‘How	  we	  work’).	  WWF	  was	   also	  centrally	  involved	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  two	  important	  international	  certification	  bodies:	   the	   Forest	   Stewardship	   Council	   (FSC)	   and	   the	  Marine	   Stewardship	  Council	   (MSC).	   Furthermore,	   WWF	   participates	   in	   the	   Roundtable	   on	  Sustainable	   Palm	   Oil	   and	   the	   Roundtable	   for	   Responsible	   Soy.	   WWF’s	  engagement	  with	  business	   in	  some	  of	  these	  fora	  has	  attracted	  criticism,	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Although	  Greenpeace	  does	  occasionally	  work	  with	  business	   it	  does	  not	  accept	  corporate	  funding.	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only	   from	   other	   environmental	   groups	   but	   also	   in	   the	   mainstream	   media	  (Roth	  2009;	  Vidal	  2011;	  Langenau	  2011).	  	  
ii. Exploring	  forms	  of	  responsiveness	  in	  WWF	  	  
Responsiveness	  to	  member	  organisations	  and	  supporters	  The	  WWF	  network	  is	  present	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  through	  its	  national	  offices.	  While	  most	  of	  the	  early	  national	  organisations	  set	  up	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  early	   1970s	   were	   based	   in	   Western	   Europe	   and	   Canada/	   North	   America,	  WWF	   had	   also	   opened	   offices	   in	   South	   Africa,	   India,	   Pakistan,	   Japan	   and	  Malaysia	   by	   the	   early	   1970s.	   The	   trend	   towards	   internationalisation	  intensified	  during	  the	  1990s	  and	  after	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  millennium,	  especially	  in	   Central	   and	   Eastern	   Europe,	   although	  WWF	   had	   already	   maintained	   an	  office	  in	  Russia	  since	  1995.50	  As	  of	  June	  2010,	  the	  WWF	  International	  website	  lists	  23	  offices	  in	  Europe	  (including	  Russia	  and	  Turkey),	  19	  offices	  in	  Asia,	  14	  offices	  in	  the	  Americas,	  8	  in	  Africa	  and	  3	  in	  Oceania.	  	  	  WWF	   claims	   to	   have	   five	   million	   members	   worldwide.	   As	   noted	   above,	  individual	   contributions	   are	   the	   most	   important,	   although	   not	   the	   only,	  source	   of	   funding	   for	  WWF.	  These	   individual	   contributions	   are	  made	  up	  of	  both	   regular	   membership	   fees	   and	   irregular	   donations	   from	   individuals.	  Individual	   members	   join	   their	   national	   WWF	   organisation.	   Most	   of	   the	  individual	   supporters	   of	   WWF	   come	   from	   the	   Netherlands,	   the	   United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  Membership	  essentially	  involves	  setting	  up	  a	  regular	  payment	  to	  WWF	  and	  comes	  with	  certain	  benefits	  such	  as	  receiving	  regular	   publications	   and	   updates	   from	  WWF.	   In	   the	   case	   of	  WWF,	   as	  with	  most	   other	   membership	   based	   international	   NGOs,	   individual	   membership	  can	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   way	   of	   ‘signalling’	   one’s	   support	   for	   the	   wider	  objectives	  and	  values	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  WWF;	  it	  is	  not	  a	  way	  of	  directly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	   These	   dates	   are	   taken	   from	   the	   individual	   national	   offices’	   websites.	   However,	   the	  founding	  dates	  were	  not	  available	  for	  all	  of	  them.	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participating	   or	   inputting	   into	   the	   development	   of	  WWF’s	   policies.	  WWF’s	  members	   have	   traditionally	   been	   attracted	   to	   the	   organisation	   out	   of	   a	  concern	   over	   the	   threat	   of	   extinction	   of	   particular	   high-­‐profile	   species	   and	  many	  of	  them	  make	  use	  of	  the	  possibility	  to	  ‘adopt’	  an	  animal	  through	  WWF.	  There	  are	  also	  deliberate	  efforts	  on	  the	  part	  of	  many	  national	  offices	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  young	  supporters,	  offering	  special	  membership	  packages	  for	  children	  or	  teenagers.	  	  The	  very	  focus	  of	  WWF’s	  early	  work	  –	  preserving	  single	  high-­‐profile	  species	  in	   their	   natural	   habitats	   –	   required	   the	   organisation	   to	   operate	  internationally	   from	   the	   start.	   According	   to	   Rootes,	   WWF	   has	   managed	   to	  escape	   “the	   local/	   global	   dilemma	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   it	   has	   always	   had	   an	  unambiguously	  transnational	  identity	  and	  remit,	  with	  a	  primary	  commitment	  to	   practical	   conservation	   work	   abroad”	   (Rootes	   2006,	   781).	   The	  organisation’s	  growth	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s	  put	  increasing	  pressure	  on	  the	  very	  hierarchical	  and	  top-­‐down	  governance	  structure	  that	  WWF	  had	  adopted	  in	  1961.	  In	  1993,	  the	  international	  board	  of	  WWF	  therefore	  ratified	  new	   statutes	   that	   would	   allow	   a	   greater	   number	   of	   national	   office	  representatives	   to	   be	   present	   on	   the	   international	   board	   than	   before	  (interview	   with	   director	   of	   network	   relations,	   WWF	   International,	  21.01.2010).	   In	   this	   arrangement,	   the	   national	  member	   organisations	  were	  divided	   into	   different	   groups	   (based	   on	   a	   combination	   of	   criteria	   including	  geographic	   balance	   and	   financial	   strength),	   with	   each	   group	   nominating	   a	  trustee	  for	  a	  period	  of	  four	  years	  (One	  World	  Trust	  2006).	  The	  three	  largest	  national	   member	   organisations	   	   (Netherlands,	   United	   Kingdom,	   United	  States)	   were	   given	   permanent	   seats	   on	   the	   board.	   The	   1993	   statutes	  stipulated	  that	  the	  international	  board	  should	  be	  made	  up	  of	  no	  more	  than	  20	  trustees,	  the	  majority	  of	  which	  should	  be	  “members	  of	  the	  Boards	  of	  National	  Organisations	   (…)	   nominated	   by	   National	   Organisations.”51	   The	   new	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  The	  1993	  statutes	  also	  stipulated	  that	  the	  number	  of	  trustees	  might	  be	  increased	  to	  25	  if	  voted	   upon	   by	   the	   board	   and	   that	   the	   “Trustees	   not	   nominated	   by	  National	  Organisations	  shall	  be	  co-­‐opted	  by	  the	  Board”	  (WWF	  Statutes	  ratified	  in	  1993).	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arrangement	   seemed	   to	   work	   well	   for	   some	   time	   but	   in	   December	   2009,	  following	   a	   thorough	   internal	   review	   of	   its	   governance	   structure	   WWF	  decided	  once	  more	   to	  make	   a	   number	   of	   formal	   changes	   and	   subsequently	  adopted	   revised	   statutes	   and	   bylaws.	   The	   2009	   changes	   were	   designed	   to	  limit	  “internal	  democracy”	  within	  the	  network	  in	  order	  to	  enhance	  the	  vigour	  and	   effectiveness	   of	   decision-­‐making	   (interview	   with	   director	   of	   network	  relations,	  WWF	  International,	  21.01.2010).	  	  	  According	  to	  the	  new	  statutes,	   fewer	  national	  organisations	  than	  before	  are	  directly	  represented	  on	  the	  international	  board.	  Instead,	  a	  newly	  established	  council	   has	   been	   specifically	   designated	   as	   a	   forum	   for	   deliberation	   among	  the	   national	   organisations.	   The	   council	   is	   made	   up	   of	   the	   chairpersons	   or	  presidents	   of	   the	   boards	   of	   national	   organisations	   (and	   WWF	   associates),	  together	  with	  presidents	   and	  vice-­‐presidents	   emeriti.	   It	   is	   the	   international	  council	  that	  now	  appoints	  a	  smaller	  international	  board	  (the	  size	  of	  the	  board	  has	   been	   reduced	   from	  20	   to	   13	   trustees).52	   The	   nomination	   and	   selection	  process	   within	   the	   council	   combines	   a	   ‘ranking’	   method	   whereby	   national	  chairs	  are	  able	  to	  list	  their	  preferred	  candidates	  in	  order	  of	  preference,	  with	  an	  evaluation	  of	  other	  criteria	  such	  as	  geographical	  spread,	  skills	  and	  gender	  balance	   by	   a	   nomination	   committee	   within	   the	   council	   (interview	   with	  director	  of	  network	  relations,	  WWF	  International,	  21.01.2010).	  As	  before,	  the	  three	   largest	   national	   offices	   have	   permanent	   seats	   on	   the	   international	  board,	   which	   means	   that	   the	   council’s	   power	   of	   nomination	   and	   selection	  apply	  to	  the	  remaining	  seats	  only.	  Out	  of	  these,	  3-­‐6	  are	  allocated	  to	  external	  representative	   and	   3-­‐6	   are	   held	   by	   further	   national	   board	   members	   (the	  precise	  numbers	  are	  unspecified	  as	  a	  result	  of	  disagreements	  over	  whether	  ‘internal’	   trustees	   should	   constitute	   a	   majority)	   (ibid).	   The	   new	   board	  includes	  more	   external	   representatives	   than	  before	   to	   avoid	   the	   “danger	  of	  the	   organisation	   becoming	   too	   inward-­‐looking”	   (ibid).	   These	   external	  representatives	   are	   primarily	   selected	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   skills	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  This	  description	  applies	  to	  the	  WWF	  Statutes	  ratified	  in	  2009.	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competencies	  they	  bring	  to	  the	  organisation.	  Overall,	  WWF	  appears	  to	  have	  accepted	  decreased	  responsiveness	  to	  its	  national	  members	  organisations	  at	  the	   governance	   level	   in	   order	   to	   promote	   greater	   network-­‐wide	  effectiveness.	  	  The	   formal	   governance	   structure	   offers	   only	   a	   partial	   picture	   of	   how	  decisions	   around	   specific	   policy	   issues	   and	   advocacy	   positions	   are	   made	  within	   the	   organisation.	   According	   to	   the	   director	   of	   global	   policy,	   policies	  are	   generally	   “consulted	   broadly	   around	   the	   network.”	  When	   developing	   a	  
new	  policy	  (rather	  than	  merely	  making	  some	  changes	  or	  updating	  an	  existing	  one)	  the	  network	  follows	  “a	  more	  formal	  process,	  probably	  getting	  a	  steering	  group	   together	   involving	   people	   from	   the	   various	   disciplines	   that	   might	  cover	  it.”	  The	  objective	  of	  the	  process	  is	  to	  identify	  –	  via	  the	  national	  offices	  –	  the	  “people	  with	  the	  experience	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  discussion	  on	  a	  position.”	  On	  occasion,	   this	   needs	   to	   be	   based	   on	   the	   prior	   development	   of	   expertise,	  knowledge	   and	   experience	   in	   some	   regional	   and	   national	   offices	   that	   have	  not	  worked	  on	  a	  particular	   issue	  before.	   In	   the	  early	  stages	  of	  WWF’s	  work	  on	   climate	   change,	   for	   example,	   the	  organisation	  had	   to	  undertake	   internal	  capacity	  building	  to	  develop	  climate	  expertise,	  specifically	  in	  Asia	  (interview	  with	  WWF	  International	  director	  of	  global	  policy,	  11.02.2010).	  	  	  What	  is	  notable	  about	  this	  account	  of	  WWF’s	  policy	  development	  processes	  is	  the	  value	  placed	  on	  specialist	  and	  expert	  knowledge	  within	  the	  organisation.	  This	   reflects	   one	   of	  WWF’s	   main	   sources	   of	   legitimacy	   and	   influence	   with	  governments	   and	   IGOs:	   the	   organisation’s	   ability	   to	   provide	   high-­‐calibre	  expert	   assessment	   and	   policy	   analysis.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   emphasis	   in	  WWF’s	  internal	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   is	   on	   informed	   participation	   –	   by	  individuals	  with	  an	  in-­‐depth	  understanding	  and	  knowledge	  about	  the	  issues	  at	  stake	  –	  rather	  than	  participation	  open	  to	  all.	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  infer	  from	  the	  value	  attached	  to	  scientific	  expertise	  within	  the	  organisation	  that	   local	   realities	   and	   voices	   are	   ignored.	   Drawing	   a	   rigid	   dichotomy	  between	  ‘participatory’	  and	  ‘expert-­‐led’	  processes	  is	  misleading.	  Instead,	  it	  is	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important	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  understanding	  of	  expertise	  has	  evolved	  in	  the	  wider	  conservation	  arena	  to	  become	  more	  open	  to	   local	   interpretations	  of	   problems	   and	   solutions.	   In	   order	   to	   be	   credible	   and	   legitimate,	   ‘expert’	  voices	  –	  those	  within	  the	  organisation	  but	  also	  the	  organisation	  as	  a	  whole	  in	  its	  communications	  towards	  the	  outside	  world	  –	  have	  to	  demonstrate	  an	  in-­‐depth	   understanding	   of	   the	   situation	   on	   the	   ground.	   In	   recognition	   of	   this,	  WWF	   has	   increasingly	   attempted	   to	   devolve	   project-­‐level	   decision-­‐making	  powers	  to	  the	  local	  level	  since	  the	  1990s	  and	  has	  “increased	  staff	  capacity	  in	  countries	  where	  it	  works,	  and	  gives	  them	  more	  responsibility	  in	  developing,	  negotiating,	   funding	   and	   administering	   the	   programme”	   (Jeanrenaud	   2002,	  31).	  	  	  
Responsiveness	  to	  local	  communities	  In	   the	   development	   and	   implementation	   of	   its	   conservation	   projects,	  WWF	  claims	  to	  subscribe	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  stakeholder	  participation.	  According	  to	  its	   website,	   WWF	   adopted	   a	   revised	   mission	   and	   strategy	   in	   1990	   which	  aimed	  “to	  decentralise	  WWF’s	  decision-­‐making	  and	  to	  increase	  co-­‐operation	  with	   local	   people”	   (WWF	   n.d.	   ‘WWF	   in	   the	   1990s’).	   One	   of	  WWF’s	   guiding	  principles	   is	   to	   “involve	   local	   communities	   and	   indigenous	   peoples	   in	   the	  planning	  and	  execution	  of	   its	   field	  programmes,	   respecting	   their	  cultural	  as	  well	  as	  economic	  needs”	  (WWF	  n.d.	   ‘WWF’s	  mission,	  guiding	  principles	  and	  goals’).	   In	   fact,	   key	   documents	   intended	   to	   provide	   practical	   guidance	   to	  WWF	   staff	   include	   references	   to	   “stakeholder	   analysis”,	   “disadvantaged	  groups”,	  “effective	  participation	  and	  information-­‐sharing”,	  etc.	  (WWF	  2007).	  WWF	  defines	  a	  stakeholder	  as	  	  “Any	  individual,	  group,	  or	  institution	  who	  has	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	   the	   natural	   resources	   of	   the	   project	   area	   and/or	   who	  potentially	   will	   be	   affected	   by	   project	   activities	   and	   have	  something	   to	   gain	   or	   lose	   if	   conditions	   change	   or	   stay	   the	  same”	  (WWF	  2005,	  1).	  The	  ‘WWF	  Standards	  of	  Conservation	  Project	  and	  Programme	  Management’,	  together	  with	  a	  range	  of	  other	  operational	  guidelines,	  apply	  both	   to	  project	  and	   programme	   level	   and	   encourage	   conservation	   practitioners	   “to	   make	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sure	   you	   identify,	   and	   as	   appropriate,	   engage	   key	   stakeholders,	   paying	  particular	   attention	   to	   indigenous,	   marginalised	   and	   overly	   powerful	  peoples”	  (WWF	  2007,	  2).	  As	   the	  definition	  above	  shows,	  however,	   the	   term	  stakeholder	  is	  used	  broadly	  and	  refers	  not	  only	  to	  those	  (potentially)	  affected	  by	   the	   project	   but	   also	   those	   with	   the	   power	   to	   determine	   its	   chances	   of	  success	  and	  would	  include	  governmental	  and	  business	  actors	  as	  well	  as	  local	  communities.	  The	  underlying	  rationale	  of	  undertaking	  a	  stakeholder	  analysis	  (and	   developing	   a	   stakeholder	   strategy)	   is	   therefore	   mainly	   presented	   as	  strategic	   –	   their	   engagement	   is	   not	   necessarily	   seen	   as	   a	   goal	   in	   itself	   but	  instrumental	  to	  achieving	  sustainable	  conservation	  success.	  	  	  Of	  particular	  interest	  for	  this	  study	  is	  WWF’s	  policy	  on	  indigenous	  peoples.53	  The	   WWF	   policy	   acknowledges	   that	   indigenous	   peoples	   “are	   among	   the	  earth’s	   most	   important	   stewards,	   as	   evidenced	   by	   the	   high	   degree	   of	  correspondence	   between	   the	   lands,	   waters	   and	   territories	   of	   indigenous	  peoples	   and	   the	   remaining	   high-­‐biodiversity	   regions	   of	   the	   world”	   (WWF	  2008b,	   i).	   In	  1996,	  WWF	  became	  “the	   first	  major	  conservation	  organisation	  to	   formally	   adopt	   a	   policy	   recognising	   the	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   peoples”	  (WWF	   2008b,	   iii).	   It	   acknowledged	   “their	   rights	   to	   their	   traditional	   ‘lands,	  territories	   and	   resources’	   and	   endorsed	   the	   key	   principle	   of	   ‘free,	   prior	  informed	  consent’”	  (Springer	  and	  Alcorn	  2007,	  i).	  Its	  original	  1996	  policy	  was	  updated	  in	  2008	  and	  published	  as	  the	  ‘Indigenous	  Peoples	  and	  Conservation:	  WWF	   Statement	   of	   Principles’	   (WWF	   2008b),	   together	   with	   a	   separate	  analysis	  and	  guidance	  to	  mainstreaming	  the	  policy	  in	  project	  and	  programme	  management	  (Larsen	  and	  Springer	  2008).	  	  The	  ‘Statement	  of	  Principles’	  commits	  the	  organisation	  to	  “identify,	  seek	  out,	  and	   consult	  with	   legitimate	   representatives	  of	   relevant	   indigenous	  peoples’	  organisations	  at	  the	  earliest	  stages	  of	  programme	  development”	  and	  “provide	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  As	  argued	  in	  chapter	  II,	  the	  case	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  constitutes	  an	  important	  example	  of	   a	   constituency	   that	   is	   often	   underrepresented	   through	   intergovernmental	   systems	   of	  representation.	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fora	  for	  consultation	  between	  WWF	  and	  affected	  peoples,	  so	  that	  information	  can	  be	   shared	  on	  an	  ongoing	  basis,	   and	  problems,	   grievances,	   and	  disputes	  related	  to	  the	  partnership	  can	  be	  resolved	  in	  a	  timely	  manner”	  (WWF	  2008b,	  5).	  WWF	  also	  pledges	  to	  support	  indigenous	  peoples	  in	  instances	  where	  their	  rights	  are	  contested	  by	  other	  stakeholders,	  to	  “seek	  out	  and/or	  invest	  in	  the	  development	  of	   legitimate	  and	   transparent	  mechanisms	   to	   resolve	   conflicts	  at	  local,	  regional,	  national,	  and	  international	  levels”	  and	  “seek	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  primary	  rights	  and	  interests	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  are	  well	  represented	  in	  such	  fora,	  including	  investment	  to	  inform	  and	  prepare	  indigenous	  peoples’	  representatives	  to	  take	  part	  in	  negotiations”	  (WWF	  2008b,	  6).	  	  Although	   it	   certainly	   sounds	   impressive	   on	   paper,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   to	   what	  extent	  WWF	  staff	  are	  aware	  of	  and	  able	  to	  work	  with	  indigenous	  peoples	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  principles	  in	  their	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  operations.	  In	  an	  evaluation	  published	   in	   2007	   (i.e.	   prior	   to	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   revised	   principles),	   the	  authors	   found	   that	   awareness	   and	   implementation	   of	   the	   principles	   were	  uneven	  across	  the	  surveyed	  programmes	  and	  that	  WWF	  “does	  not	  currently	  have	   systems	   to	   support	   and	  monitor	   policy	   implementation	   at	   a	   Network	  level,	  and	  responses	  indicated	  that	  formal	  mechanisms	  are	  also	  not	   in	  place	  at	  country/programme	  levels”	  (Springer	  and	  Alcorn	  2007,	  6).	   Interviews	  by	  the	  authors	  with	  indigenous	  peoples’	  representatives	  also	  showed	  that	  they	  felt	  “that	  WWF	  needs	  to	  do	  more	  to	  ensure	  that	  people	  are	  involved	  as	  rights	  holders	   and	   key	   decision	   makers”	   and	   that	   the	   current	   wide-­‐spread	  participatory	   approaches	   employed	   in	   WWF	   programmes	   do	   not	   always	  meet	   indigenous	   groups’	   “expectations	   for	   collaboration	   based	   on	   shared	  decision-­‐making”	  (Springer	  and	  Alcorn	  2007,	  iv).	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  main	  recommendations	  made	  by	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  2007	  review	  of	  WWF’s	  partnerships	  with	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  local	  communities	  was	  to	  develop	   a	   “WWF	   policy	   to	   address	   key	   elements	   of	   socially	   responsible	  conservation	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  local	  communities”	  (Springer	  and	  Alcorn	  2007,	  v).	   Furthermore,	   the	   authors	   also	   found	   that	  WWF	   staff	   “would	  welcome	   a	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policy	   addressing	   work	   with	   local	   communities”,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	  organisation’s	  policy	  on	   indigenous	  peoples	   (Springer	  and	  Alcorn	  2007,	   iv).	  Nonetheless,	   the	   revised	  2008	  policy	   is	   explicitly	   titled	   ‘Indigenous	  Peoples	  and	  Conservation:	  WWF	  Statement	  of	  Principles’	  and	  WWF	  does	  not	  have	  a	  similarly	   developed	   international	   policy	   relating	   to	   local	   communities	  (besides	   the	   more	   general	   references	   to	   local	   communities	   as	   one	  stakeholder	  group	  of	  many	  that	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  the	  design	  and	   implementation	  of	   conservation	  project	   and	  programme	  management).	  The	   director	   of	   global	   policy	   acknowledges	   that	   the	   existence	   of	   an	  international	   legal	   framework	   designed	   to	   protect	   the	   rights	   of	   indigenous	  peoples	  motivated	  WWF	  “to	  look	  at	  what	  we	  were	  doing	  at	  the	  national	  level	  and	   pull	   it	   together	   at	   a	   policy	   level”	   (interview	   with	   WWF	   International	  director	   of	   global	   policy,	   11.02.2010).	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   specific	  international	  framework	  on	  local	  communities,	  WWF	  lacked	  the	  incentive	  to	  adopt	  a	  comparable	  policy	  on	  local	  communities	  throughout	  the	  network	  	  	  
iii. Responsiveness	  in	  WWF:	  	  motives,	  challenges	  and	  effects	  One	  of	   the	  most	   interesting	  points	   arising	   from	   the	  discussion	  above	   is	   the	  fact	  that	  the	  very	  recent	  changes	  to	  WWF’s	  formal	  governance	  structure	  have	  the	   effect	   of	   reducing	   the	   presence	   of	   national	   organisations	   on	   the	  international	   board	   –	   thus	   limiting	   one	   important	   mechanism	   of	  ‘responsiveness’	   by	   the	   international	   organisation	   to	   the	   national	   member	  organisations.	  According	  to	  the	  director	  of	  network	  relations,	  “the	  model	  that	  WWF	  has	  adopted	  is	  a	  combination:	  democracy	  in	  the	  council,	  rigour	   in	  the	  international	   board”	   (interview	   with	   director	   of	   network	   relations,	   WWF	  International,	  21.01.2010).	   In	   light	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  council	   is	  set	  to	  meet	  only	   once	   a	   year	   its	   function	   is	   largely	   supervisory.	   More	   direct	   decision-­‐making	  power	  lies	  with	  the	  board,	  which	  –	  according	  to	  the	  statutes	  -­‐	  meets	  at	  least	  four	  times	  a	  year.	  While	  it	  was	  also	  the	  case	  before	  that	  only	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  national	  organisations	  had	  a	   representative	  on	   the	   international	  board	   (normally	   the	   national	   office	   chairperson),	   a	   system	   of	   rotation	  nonetheless	   ensured	   that	   all	   autonomous	   offices	   would	   be	   directly	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represented	  on	  the	  board	  at	  some	  point.	  In	  the	  new	  (2009)	  model,	  this	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  case.	  Why	  did	  WWF	  decide	  to	  restrict	  responsiveness	  to,	  or	   limit	  the	  direct	  influence	  of,	   its	  national	  member	  organisations	  at	  the	  governance	  level?	  	  	  	  It	   appears	   that	   the	  more	   participatory	   governance	  model	   adopted	   in	   1991	  did	  not	  prove	  as	  successful	  as	  hoped	  in	  the	  long	  term.	  One	  problem	  that	  the	  network	  encountered	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  rather	  than	  encouraging	  deliberation	  about	   what	   was	   “in	   the	   best	   interest	   of	   the	   network	   as	   a	   whole”,	   those	  trustees	  who	  were	  also	  the	  chairpersons	  of	  the	  national	  organisations	  would	  sometimes	   be	   more	   concerned	   with	   protecting	   the	   interests	   of	   their	   own	  national	   organisations	   and,	   rather	   than	   working	   towards	   a	   consensus,	  discussions	   on	   the	   board	   were	   characterised	   by	   positional	   bargaining	  (interview	   with	   director	   of	   network	   relations,	   WWF	   International,	  21.01.2010).	   Perhaps	   as	   a	   result	   of	   this,	   network-­‐wide	   decision-­‐making	  proved	   cumbersome	   and	   was	   judged	   to	   be	   ineffective	   at	   times.	   Decisions	  would	  sometimes	  boil	  down	  to	  the	  “lowest	  common	  denominator”	  among	  the	  trustees	   (ibid).	   It	   is	   clearly	   desirable	   from	   a	   democratic	   representation	  perspective	  to	  have	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  national	  offices	   input	   into	  the	  decision-­‐making	  and	  policy	  formulation	  process,	  especially	  if	  those	  national	  offices	  are	  based	   in	   regions	   of	   the	  world	  where	   citizens	   are	   particularly	   vulnerable	   to	  environmental	   degradation	   and	   if	   the	   views	   of	   the	   national	   offices	   are	  informed	  by	  the	   interests	  and	  perspectives	  of	   these	  affected	  communities.54	  However,	  the	  case	  of	  WWF	  also	  illustrates	  the	  price	  of	  broadly	  participatory	  forms	  of	  decision-­‐making:	  a	  potential	  lack	  of	  effectiveness	  and	  the	  danger	  of	  sliding	   towards	   forms	   of	   zero	   sum	   bargaining	   rather	   than	   pursuing	   the	  ‘common	  good’.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Of	  course,	  this	  assumption	  would	  require	  further	  empirical	  analysis.	  We	  cannot	  infer	  from	  geographical	   proximity	   alone	   that	   the	   positions	   and	   interests	   of	   the	   national	   offices	   are	  indeed	   informed	   by	   local	   communities.	   However,	   national	   offices	   in	   developing	   countries	  will	  be	  most	  directly	  involved	  in	  projects	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  working	  with	  local	  communities;	  moreover,	  through	  employing	  local	  staff,	  they	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  local	  realities.	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Achieving	   effectiveness	   and	   ensuring	   coherence	   –	   getting	   the	   constituent	  units	  to	  ‘march	  to	  the	  same	  tune’	  –	  is	  a	  challenge	  for	  most	  large	  organisations,	  especially	  global	  and	  diverse	  networks.	  In	  particular,	  it	  can	  be	  challenging	  to	  combine	   broadly	   participatory	   and	   democratic	   forms	   of	   decision-­‐making	  with	   the	   requirements	   of	   organisational	   effectiveness.	   This	   potential	   trade-­‐off	   applies	   to	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   organisations	   –	   including	   IGOs	   –	   and	   is	  certainly	  not	  unique	  to	  the	  NGO	  sector.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  an	  organisation	  is	  likely	   to	   prioritise	   output-­‐legitimacy	   orientated	   values	   (relating	   to	  effectiveness,	   speed	   of	   decision-­‐making,	   the	   benefits	   of	   speaking	  with	   ‘one	  voice’)	   over	   input-­‐legitimacy	   orientated	   values	   (democratic	   deliberation,	  including	   all	   members	   and	   affected	   stakeholders	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	  processes,	   trying	   to	   address	   power	   asymmetries	   among	   participants)	   will	  vary	   depending	   on	   the	   particular	   normative	   and	   strategic	   context	   the	  organisation	  finds	  itself	  in.	  Unlike	  some	  of	  the	  groups	  closely	  associated	  with	  the	   global	   justice	  movement	   (including	   FoEI),	  WWF	   is	   not	   an	   organisation	  that	  prioritises	  democratic	  values	  in	  their	  own	  right	  but	  generally	  sees	  them	  as	  instrumental	  to	  achieving	  other	  policy	  objectives.	  	  	  WWF	  also	  differs	   from	  some	  of	   the	  more	   informal	   and	  deliberately	  diverse	  networks	  in	  that	  the	  organisation	  is	  more	  constrained	  by	  the	  need	  to	  protect	  the	  highly	   recognisable	  WWF	   ‘brand’.	   The	   value	  of	   the	   global	  WWF	   ‘brand’	  could	  easily	  be	  undermined	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  an	  individual	  national	  member	  organisation	   or	   even	   an	   individual	   employee	   claiming	   to	   speak	   for	   WWF,	  especially	  if	  they	  were	  to	  put	  forward	  positions	  that	  the	  global	  organisation,	  or	  even	  particular	  national	  organisations,	  would	  find	  difficult	  to	  defend	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   wider	   public.	   WWF	   Germany,	   for	   instance,	   has	   been	   at	   pains	   to	  publicly	   distance	   itself	   from	   the	   pro-­‐GMO	   claims	   made	   by	   Dr	   Jason	   Clay,	  whose	   job	   position	   is	   ‘Senior	   Vice	   President	   of	   Market	   Transformation’	   at	  WWF	   USA.	  While	  WWF	   International	   has	   a	   clear	   anti-­‐GMO	   position,	  WWF	  Germany	   also	   acknowledges	   that	   “individual	   country	   organisations	   hold	   a	  divergent	   opinion”,	   especially	   in	   “states	   where	   genetically	   modified	   plants	  already	  constitute	  a	  very	   large	   share	  of	  agriculture,	   such	  as	   in	   the	  USA	  and	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Argentina.	  Those	   countries	   take	   a	  neutral	   but	  not	  opposing	   stance	   towards	  genetic	  engineering.	  WWF	  Germany	   in	  contrast	  rejects	  genetic	  engineering”	  (WWF	  Germany	  n.d.	  ‘TV	  Doku	  im	  Detail:	  Gentechnik’.	  Own	  translation).	  	  Differences	   in	  opinion	  such	  as	   these	  can	  also	  complicate	   the	  more	   informal	  decision-­‐making	   processes.	   Interviewees	   at	   WWF	   pointed	   to	   a	   number	   of	  further	  issue	  areas	  where	  conflicts	  between	  the	  national	  organisations	  have	  occurred	   and	   acknowledged	   that	   the	   network	   is	   not	   immune	   to	   tensions	  between	   Northern	   and	   Southern	   offices,	   sometimes	   aggravated	   by	  differences	  in	  income	  and	  resources.	  These	  potentially	  difficult	  issues	  include	  the	   sustainable	   use	   of	   wildlife,	   in	   particular	   in	   situations	   where	   individual	  countries	   have	   a	   tradition	   of	   hunting	   a	   particular	   (threatened)	   specie,	   or	  where	  this	  represents	  an	  important	  sector	  of	  the	  economy.	  Specific	  examples	  that	  have	  created	  tensions	  in	  the	  network	  in	  the	  past	  include	  whaling,	  the	  use	  of	   elephant	   ivory,	   and	   seal	   and	   polar	   bear	   hunting.	   However,	   such	   debates	  cannot	  be	  explained	  in	  simplistic	  North-­‐South	  terms:	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  elephant	  ivory,	  for	  example,	  while	  the	  South	  African	  office	  supports	  a	  sustainable	  use	  approach,	  the	  West	  African	  office	  is	  strongly	  opposed	  to	  this	  (interview	  with	  director	  of	  network	  relations,	  WWF	  International,	  21.01.2010).	  	  	  The	   network	   does,	   however,	   strive	   to	   overcome	   these	   internal	   differences	  through	  further	  discussions	  and	  meetings,	  sometimes	  by	  enlisting	  the	  help	  of	  an	  external	   facilitator	   (interview	  with	  WWF	  International	  director	  of	  global	  policy,	  11.02.2010).	  The	  parties	  in	  the	  debate	  are	  also	  called	  upon	  to	  focus	  on	  common	  ground	  and	  on	  the	  good	  of	  the	  network	  as	  a	  whole	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  “it’s	  rare	  that	  there	  is	  an	  outright	  conflict	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day;	  most	  people	  have	  an	  acceptance	  of	  and	  an	  understanding	  that	  within	  a	  network	  there	  are	  things	   that	   you	   have	   to	   compromise	   on	   for	   the	   overall	   objective	   of	   the	  network	  itself”	  (ibid).	  Moreover,	  the	  network	  is	  able	  to	  draw	  lessons	  from	  its	  own	  disagreements	  and	  can	  use	  these	  constructively	  to	  strengthen	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  international	  negotiations	  on	  the	  issue:	  “The	  advantage	  that	  we	  would	  have	   is	   that	   by	   engaging	   the	   offices	   around	   the	   world	   we	   have	   already	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anticipated	  quite	  a	  few	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  will	  arise	  when	  the	  governments	  get	  together	   and	   have	   found	  ways	   around	   them	   and	   can	   help	   them	   get	   round	  them	  as	  well”	  (ibid).	  This	  quote	  underlines	  the	  point	  made	  before	  that	  WWF	  considers	  participatory	  processes	  largely	  in	  light	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  enable	  the	  organisation	  to	  strengthen	  the	   impact	  of	   its	  projects	  and	  consolidate	   its	  influence	   with	   other	   policymakers.	   This	   is	   also	   supported	   by	   the	  organisation’s	   emphasis	   on	   ‘informed’	   participation,	   which	   may	   require	  concurrent	  internal	  capacity	  building	  in	  relation	  to	  particular	  issues	  (see	  the	  point	  on	  climate	  change	  raised	  above).	  	  	  Although	  WWF	   today	  emphasises	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   engages	   closely	  with	   local	  communities	  and	  indigenous	  peoples	  in	  its	  conservation	  work	  on	  the	  ground,	  this	  has	  not	  always	  been	  a	  priority	   for	   the	  organisation.	  A	   common	   type	  of	  discourse	   among	   environmentalists	   in	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s	   was	   to	   pit	  ‘nature’	  against	  ‘man’	  and	  portray	  humans	  as	  the	  ‘problem’.	  Many	  warned	  of	  the	  danger	  of	  population	  growth	  in	  the	  developing	  world	  and	  the	  concurrent	  threat	   of	   a	   “tragedy	   of	   the	   commons”	   (Hardin	   1968).	   Accordingly,	  many	   of	  WWF’s	  publications	  from	  this	  period	  focussed	  on	  poaching	  of	  wildlife,	  over-­‐grazing,	  and	  the	  degradation	  of	  vegetation	  in	  key	  habitats	  (Jeanrenaud	  2002,	  112).	   These	   preservationist	   ideas	   and	   strategies	   tended,	   according	   to	  Jeanrenaud	   (2002,	   112),	   to	   dominate	   over	   those	   who	   advocated	   more	  anthropocentric	   approaches	   to	   conservation.	   As	   thinking	   about	   sustainable	  development	   progressed	   throughout	   the	   1980s	   and	   1990s,	   WWF’s	   work	  evolved	  accordingly	  and	  the	  organisation	  started	  to	  place	  more	  emphasis	  on	  participatory	  and	  rights-­‐based	  approaches	  in	  its	  conservation	  work.	  	  	  WWF	   first	   introduced	   the	   term	   ‘sustainable	  development’	   in	  1980	   (Denton,	  1993	   cited	   in	   Rootes	   2006,	   771).	   The	   work	   with	   other	   NGOs,	   including	  development	   and	   humanitarian	   groups,	   in	   the	   run-­‐up	   to	   the	   1992	   Earth	  Summit	   further	   influenced	   the	   organisation’s	   thinking	   on	   sustainable	  development	   (Rootes	   2006,	   771).	   WWF’s	   strategy	   and	   thinking	   about	  conservation	  work	  today	  is	  closely	  linked	  to	  this	  concept	  and	  also	  recognises	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the	  importance	  of	  working	  in	  partnership	  with	  local	  communities	  rather	  than	  treating	   them	   as	   obstacles	   to	   successful	   conservation	   work	   (an	   attitude	  prevalent	  in	  earlier	  preservationist	  thinking).	  This	  is	  not	  only	  reflected	  in	  the	  organisation’s	  publications	  directed	  at	  external	  audiences	  but	  also	  in	  some	  of	  the	  internal	  policies	  WWF	  subscribes	  to,	  notably	  the	  ‘Statement	  of	  Principles’	  discussed	   above.	   This	   shift	   reflects	   a	   broader	   trend	   towards	   more	  participatory	   approaches	   in	   the	   conservation	  and	  development	   community,	  which,	   in	  the	   late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s,	   led	  to	  a	  groundswell	  of	   initiatives	  such	   as	   “’community-­‐based	   natural	   resource	   management’,	   ‘community-­‐based	   conservation’,	   ‘sustainable	   development	   and	   use’,	   ‘grassroots	  conservation’,	   ‘devolution	   of	   resource	   rights	   to	   local	   communities’,	   and	   –	  perhaps	   most	   commonly	   –	   ‘integrated	   conservation	   and	   development	  programs’	  (ICDPs)”	  (Chapin	  2004,	  20).	  According	  to	  Jeanrenaud	  (2002),	   the	  adoption	   by	   WWF	   of	   the	   term	   ‘community	   conservation’	   was	   not	   only	   a	  response	  to	  feedback	  from	  the	  field	  but	  also	  “to	  pressure	  to	  include	  the	  label	  in	   project	   proposals	   to	   donors	   because,	   post-­‐UNCED,	   it	   was	   becoming	  increasingly	   important	   for	   fundraising	   purposes”	   (Jeanrenaud	   2002,	   113).	  More	  recently,	  however,	  concerns	  have	  been	  raised	  about	  the	  consequences	  of	   conservation	   groups,	   including	   WWF,	   returning	   to	   a	   “protectionist	  conservation	   paradigm	   (which)	   views	   human	   use	   of	   nature	   as	   inimical	   to	  biodiversity	   conservation”	   (Beymer-­‐Farris	   and	   Bassett	   2012,	   333)	   in	   the	  implementation	  of	  carbon	  forestry	  programmes	  linked	  to	  REDD.	  	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  conservation	  groups	  such	  as	  WWF	  are	  indeed	  prepared	  to	   listen	   to,	   strengthen	   and	   elevate	   the	   voices	   of	   local	   communities	   is	   thus	  subject	   to	   debate.	   Wapner	   (1996),	   for	   instance,	   sees	   WWF’s	   work	   as	   an	  important	  contribution	  to	  “world	  civic	  politics”	  and	  argues	  that,	  by	  engaging	  in	   “eco-­‐development”	   projects	   on	   the	   ground,	   WWF	   empowers	   local	  communities	   to	   participate	   directly	   in	   safeguarding	   the	   environments	   they	  live	   in.	  He	  refers	  to	  this	  as	  a	  “strategy	  of	   localism”,	   fundamental	   to	  which	   is	  that	   “political	   strategies	   are	   forged	   by	   actual	   people	   in	   the	   context	   of	   their	  concrete	   struggles	   for	   economic	   and	   environmental	   well-­‐being.	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Transnational	   activists	   listen	   to	   local	   inhabitants	   and	   try	   to	   articulate	   their	  visions.	  This	  entails,	  as	  mentioned,	   local	  participation”	  (Wapner	  1996,	  115).	  Localism,	  according	  to	  Wapner,	  “finds	  its	  conceptual	  origins	  in	  the	  grassroots	  traditions	   that	   emphasize	   local	   organisation	   as	   a	   form	   of	   larger	  transformation”	  (ibid).	  Jeanrenaud,	  however,	  questions	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  participatory	  rhetoric	  really	  reflects	  a	  fundamental	  change	  in	  organisational	  values	   from	   the	   preservationist	   tradition	   and	   argues	   that	   “mainstream	  conservation	   discourses	   have	   been	   reworked	   in	   less	   radical	   ways,	   framing	  people	  as	   ‘a	   resource’	   for	  conservation	  as	  defined	   from	  above”	   (Jeanrenaud	  2002,	  117).	  	  Chapin’s	  (2004)	  verdict	  is	  even	  more	  critical.	  In	  an	  explosive	  2004	  article	  in	  World	   Watch,	   he	   accused	   the	   large	   US-­‐based	   conservation	   organisations	  (such	   as	   Conservation	   International,	   The	   Nature	   Conservancy,	   Wildlife	  Conservation	  Society	  but	  also	  WWF)	  of	  ignoring	  and	  even	  violating	  the	  rights	  of	   indigenous	   peoples,	   partly	   as	   result	   of	   their	   competition	   for	   the	   large	  amounts	   of	   cash	   coming	   from	   governmental	   agencies	   and	   corporations	  (Chapin,	   2004).55	   Although	   funders	   increasingly	   prioritised	   programs	  designed	   to	   work	   with	   local	   and	   indigenous	   communities,	   the	  conservationists	  lacked	  the	  experience	  of	  working	  with	  these	  groups	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  community-­‐based	  conservation	  projects	  “were	  generally	  paternalistic,	  lacking	   in	   expertise,	   and	   one-­‐sided”	   (Chapin	   2004,	   20).	   Even	   worse,	   he	  argues,	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  global	  conservation	  organisations	  use	  their	  enormous	  resources	  to	  suppress	  local	  alternatives:	  “In	  dealing	  with	  smaller	  organisations,	  either	  they	  tend	  to	  use	  their	   sheer	   heft	   to	   press	   their	   agendas	   unilaterally	   or	   they	  exclude	   the	   smaller	   groups	   altogether.	   A	   common	   tactic	   is	   to	  create	   new	   organisations	   out	   of	   whole	   cloth	   in	   foreign	  countries,	  implanting	  local	  bodies	  as	  extensions	  of	  themselves”	  (Chapin	  2004,	  25).	  Although	   WWF	   countered	   many	   of	   Chapin’s	   allegations,	   the	   organisation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Chapin	  acknowledges,	  however,	  that	  some	  of	  his	  criticisms	  are	  probably	  more	  applicable	  to	  WWF-­‐US	  than	  WWF	  International	  (Chapin	  2004,	  28).	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subsequently	   –	   and	   in	   response	   to	   the	   criticisms	   -­‐	   pledged	   to	   “openly	   re-­‐evaluate	   the	   WWF	   policy	   on	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   strengthen	   its	  enforcement	   and	   monitoring	   mechanisms”,	   “examine	   WWF’s	   large	   scale	  conservation	   programmes	   as	   they	   relate	   to	   indigenous	   and	   local	  communities”,	  and	  to	  “listen	  more	  closely	  to	  the	  voice	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	   ensure	   that	   their	   concerns	   are	   addressed	   in	   the	   design	   and	  implementation	   of	   WWF	   field	   projects.”56	   The	   ‘Indigenous	   Peoples	   and	  Conservation:	  WWF	  Statement	  of	  Principles’	  (2008)	  discussed	  above	  are	  the	  outcome	   of	   these	   commitments.	   There	   is	   little	   doubt,	   however,	   that	   the	  enforcement	   of	   network-­‐wide	   standards	   across	   all	   of	   WWF’s	   conservation	  work	  on	  the	  ground	  presents	  a	  considerable	  challenge	  for	  an	  organisation	  as	  large	  as	  WWF.	  	  	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  pass	  a	  firm	  verdict	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  participatory	  norms	  and	   practices	   are	   truly	   entrenched	   and	   consistently	   implemented	   in	  WWF.	  There	   is	   little	   doubt	   that	   WWF	   practices	   various	   forms	   of	   stakeholder	  participation	  on	   the	  ground.	  This	   is,	  however,	   largely	   to	   implement	  policies	  developed	   by	   conservation	   and	   sustainable	   development	   ‘experts’,	   and	  informed	  by	   scientific	   evaluations.	  Nevertheless,	   Jeanrenaud	  maintains	   that	  “the	   notions	   of	   community	   and	   participation	   should	   not	   be	   dismissed	  altogether,	  not	  least	  because	  they	  provide	  important	  room	  for	  manoeuvre	  for	  local	   groups	   and	   means	   for	   articulating,	   negotiating	   and	   legitimising	   their	  concerns”	   (Agrawal	  1997;	  Li	  1996	  cited	   in	   Jeanrenaud	  2002,	  117).	  When	   it	  comes	  to	  global	  policy	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  project	  level	  –	  WWF’s	  support	  for	  more	   ‘people-­‐centred’	   solutions	   and	  a	   sustainable	  development	   agenda	   can	  perhaps	  be	  seen	  as	  “a	  logical	  development	  from	  its	  analysis	  of	  the	  promotion	  of	   its	   initial	   objectives”	   (Rootes	   2006,	   772).	   This	   is	   because	   of	   the	  organisation’s	   acknowledgement	   that	   “poverty	   and	   over-­‐consumption”	  constitute	  the	  greatest	  threats	  to	  the	  environment	  (WWF-­‐UK	  Annual	  Review	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  World	  Wildlife	  Fund	  Response	   to	  Mac	  Chapin’s	  article	   (2005).	  Letter	  signed	  by	  Carter	  S.	  Roberts,	   Chief	   Conservation	   Officer	   WWF-­‐US,	   and	   Chris	   Hails,	   Programme	   Director	   WWF	  International.	  Reprinted	  in	  World	  Watch	  (January/	  February	  2005).	  ‘From	  Readers’.	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2003-­‐4:	  3	  quoted	  in	  Rootes	  2006,	  772).	  Despite	  this	  recognition,	  addressing	  these	   two	   problems	   directly	   are	   not	   central	   features	   of	   WWF’s	   work	   and	  despite	   taking	   on	   new	   issues	   such	   as	   climate	   change	   WWF	   continues	   to	  subscribe	  to	  a	  relatively	  ‘green’	  agenda.	  	  	  The	  case	  of	  WWF	  also	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  reliance	  on	  certain	  funding	  sources	  may	  affect	  the	  potential	  for	  the	  organisation	  to	  act	  as	   a	   “transmission	   belt”	   between	   local	   communities	   and	   international	  organisations.	   The	   first	   concerns	   WWF’s	   close	   relationship	   with	   the	  international	  agencies	  themselves	  and	  its	  role	  in	  implementing	  donor-­‐funded	  programmes	   on	   the	   ground;	   the	   second	   relates	   to	   WWF’s	   willingness	   to	  accept	   corporate	   donations.	   One	   key	   trend	   in	   international	   environmental	  politics	  has	  been	   that	   large	   international	  NGOs	  such	  as	  WWF	  have	   in	  many	  cases	  become	  implementing	  partners	  for	  international	  organisations	  and	  are	  receiving	   a	   substantial	   share	   of	   funding	   from	   public	   sources,	   i.e.	   from	  governmental	  agencies.	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  NGOs	  are	  increasingly	   themselves	   becoming	   parts	   of	   the	   “environmental	   governance	  state”	  (Doyle	  and	  Doherty	  2006,	  883).	  The	  fact	  that	  their	  interests	  (especially	  financial)	  are	  so	  closely	  enmeshed	  with	  the	   interests	  of	  donor	  governments	  may	  put	  into	  doubt	  that	  they	  are	  still	  able	  and	  willing	  to	  question	  or	  oppose	  official	  policies,	   the	  priorities	  of	  key	  governments,	  and	  dominant	  discourses	  at	   the	   international	   level.	  Rootes	  believes	   that	  WWF	  has	  been	  able	   to	  avoid	  becoming	   co-­‐opted	   despite	   working	   increasingly	   closely	   with	   public	  international	  agencies:	  	  “Institutionalisation	   does	   not	   necessarily	   imply	   de-­‐radicalisation.	  WWF	  widened	   its	   political	   (rather	   than	   simply	  conservationist)	   scope,	   even	   as	   it	   became	   more	  institutionalised	   and	   professionalised,	   becoming	   a	   prominent	  critic	  of	  environmentally	  damaging	  oil	  pipeline	  projects	   in	  the	  Caucasus	   and	   Siberia,	   and	   playing	   a	   leading	   role	   in	   NGO	  resistance	   to	   proposed	   trade	   rules	   at	   the	   WTO	   meeting	   in	  Cancun	   in	   2003,	   as	  well	   as	   being	   a	   vociferous	   lobbyist	   of	   the	  World	   Bank	   and	   other	   international	   agencies”	   (Rootes	   2006,	  777).	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A	  similar	  issue	  is	  raised	  by	  WWF’s	  pro-­‐business	  attitude,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  its	  willingness	  to	  engage	  with	  corporations	  and	  accept	  corporate	  funding.	  At	  the	  risk	   of	   not	   doing	   full	   justice	   to	   the	   wide	   range	   of	   pragmatic,	   principled	   or	  innovate	   positions	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   markets	   within	   the	   environmental	   NGO	  community,	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  –	  on	  balance	  –	  many	  Southern	  groups	  tend	  to	  be	  more	   critical	   of	  market	   actors	   and	   that	   indigenous	  peoples	   in	  particular	  display	  a	  relatively	  high	  level	  of	  distrust	  towards	  multinational	  corporations	  (no	  doubt	  informed	  by	  a	  history	  of	  conflicts	  and	  exploitation).	  While	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	   for	   local	   communities	   or	   local	   community	   organisations	   and	  international	  NGOs	  such	  as	  WWF	  to	  always	  see	  eye	   to	  eye	  on	  policy	   issues,	  diverging	  attitudes	  towards	  business	  may	  in	  certain	  instances	  constitute	  such	  a	  fundamental	  point	  of	  disagreement	  (in	  the	  eyes	  of	  market-­‐critical	  groups)	  that	  it	  would	  preclude	  the	  establishment	  of	  close	  relations	  between	  market-­‐critical	  local	  groups	  and	  market-­‐friendly	  NGOs	  such	  as	  WWF.	  	  	  
iv. Greenpeace:	  getting	  the	  world	  to	  take	  notice	  Committed	   and	   fearless	   activists,	  who	   are	   prepared	   to	   take	   on	  much	  more	  powerful	  corporate	  interests	  and	  governments,	  sometimes	  risking	  their	  own	  lives	  in	  the	  process:	  this	  is	  the	  image	  many	  people	  associate	  with	  Greenpeace.	  Greenpeace’s	  story	  starts	  with	  a	  handful	  of	  activists	  who	  in	  1971	  decided	  to	  sail	  a	  boat	  to	  Amchitka,	  a	  small	  island	  off	  the	  West	  Coast	  of	  Alaska,	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  preventing	  the	  nuclear	  tests	  that	  were	  being	  conducted	  there	  by	  the	  US	  government.	  This	  mission	  (albeit	  unsuccessful	  at	  stopping	  the	  tests	  at	  the	  time)	  set	   the	  tone	  for	  subsequent	  campaigns.	  Although	  the	  organisation	  soon	  expanded	  its	  focus	  beyond	  the	  anti-­‐nuclear	  agenda	  to	  encompass	  a	  wide	  range	   of	   environmental	   issues,	   risky	   and	   highly	   visible	   acts	   of	   protest	   –	  ‘spectacular	  actions’	  -­‐	  continue	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  Greenpeace	  today.	  	  Throughout	   the	   1980s	   and	   1990s	   Greenpeace	   ran	   high-­‐profile	   campaigns	  against	   whaling,	   toxins	   and	   pollution,	   acid	   rain,	   ozone	   depletion,	   genetic	  engineering,	   deforestation	   and	   climate	   change.	   The	   organisation	   has	  therefore	   largely	   continued	   to	   prioritise	   ‘green’	   (as	   well	   as	   human	   health	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related)	  issues	  over	  the	  sustainable	  development	  agenda	  in	  its	  campaigns.	  Its	  main	  targets	  have	  been	  governments	  and	  corporations.	  The	  1995	  Brent	  Spar	  episode	  –	  Greenpeace’s	  campaign	  against	  Shell,	  which	  ultimately	   forced	   the	  company	  to	  abandon	  its	  plan	  of	  disposing	  of	  the	  disused	  oil	  storage	  facility	  at	  sea	  –	   is	  often	  held	  up	  as	  emblematic	  of	  Greenpeace’s	  approach.	  Greenpeace	  has	   also	   played	   a	   pivotal	   role	   in	   the	   Stop	  Climate	   Chaos	  Coalition	   of	  NGOs,	  whose	  climate	  protests	  prior	  to	  the	  2009	  Copenhagen	  summit	  were	  attended	  by	  thousands	  of	  concerned	  citizens	  worldwide.	  	  	  The	  organisation	  Greenpeace	  consists	  of	  Greenpeace	  International	  (Stichting	  Greenpeace	   Council)	   based	   in	   Amsterdam	   and	   of	   28	   national	   and	   regional	  offices	   around	   the	  world	   (as	   some	   of	   these	   offices	  work	   in	  more	   than	   one	  country,	   the	   organisations	   claims	   to	   have	   a	   presence	   in	   40	   countries).	   In	  November	  2008,	  Greenpeace	  opened	  its	  first	  offices	  on	  the	  African	  continent	  (Greenpeace	   2009a,	   25).	   Back	   in	   Amsterdam,	   Greenpeace	   International	   is	  responsible	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  organisation’s	  international	  positions	  and	  campaigns	  and	  for	  maintaining	  contacts	  with	  supporters	  and	  donors	   in	  countries	   where	   Greenpeace	   does	   not	   have	   an	   office.	   Greenpeace	  International	   also	   monitors	   the	   development	   and	   performance	   of	   national	  and	   regional	   Greenpeace	   offices.	   According	   to	   the	   website,	   the	   “national/	  regional	  offices	  are	  largely	  autonomous	  in	  carrying	  out	  jointly	  agreed	  global	  campaign	  strategies	  within	  the	   local	  context	  they	  operate	   in,	  and	  in	  seeking	  the	  necessary	  financial	  support	  from	  donors	  to	  fund	  this	  work”	  (Greenpeace	  2011a).	   Their	   licensing	   agreement	   with	   Greenpeace	   International	   allows	  them	   to	  use	   the	  name	   ‘Greenpeace’;	   in	   return	   they	   contribute	   financially	   to	  Greenpeace	   International	   and	   help	   develop	   and	   participate	   in	   the	  international	  campaigns	  program.	  	  Greenpeace	   prides	   itself	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   does	   not	   accept	   funding	   from	  governments	   or	   corporations.	   The	   organisation’s	   fundraising	   income	  (amounting	  to	  197	  million	  Euros	  in	  2008)	  comes	  from	  individual	  supporters	  and	  trusts,	  with	  the	  Greenpeace	  offices	  in	  Germany,	  the	  Netherlands,	  USA,	  UK	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and	   Switzerland	   raising	   58%	   of	   the	   global	   income	   in	   2008	   (Greenpeace	  2009a,	   26).	   Interestingly,	   Greenpeace	   Argentina	   and	   Greenpeace	   Southeast	  Asia	  were	  the	  fastest	  growing	  offices	  in	  2008	  (in	  terms	  of	  fundraising	  income	  relative	   to	   2007).	   Globally,	   Greenpeace	   employs	   over	   2400	   people	   in	  more	  than	  40	  countries	  (Greenpeace	  2009a,	  28),	  with	  150	  working	  for	  Greenpeace	  International.	  	  	  Greenpeace	  pursues	   ‘outsider’	  and	   ‘insider’	  strategies	  simultaneously:	  while	  it	  seeks	  confrontation	  and	  holds	  powerful	  actors	  to	  account	  through	  its	  high-­‐profile	   campaigns,	   it	   also	   lobbies	   decision-­‐makers	   directly	   and	   pursues	  constructive	   engagement	  with	   governments	   and	   business.	   For	   Greenpeace,	  these	  two	  strategies	  complement	  each	  other	  and	  are	  deployed	  as	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  its	  environmental	  objectives:	  “In	  pursuing	  our	  mission,	  we	  have	  no	  permanent	  allies	  or	  enemies”	  (Greenpeace,	  n.d.,	  ‘About	  Greenpeace’).	  As	  part	  of	   the	   climate	   campaign,	   for	   example,	   Greenpeace	   activists	   pursue	   non-­‐violent	   direct	   action,	   which	   may	   involve	   blocking	   the	   entrance	   to	   the	  headquarters	   of	   energy	   firms	   and	   forming	   human	   chains	   to	   prevent	   the	  constructions	  of	  new	  coal	  power	  stations.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  organisation	  works	  with	   IT	  companies	   to	  reduce	   their	  ecological	   footprints	  as	  part	  of	   its	  ‘Cool	   IT	  Campaign’	   launched	   in	  2009.	   ‘Outsider’	   and	   ‘insider’	   strategies	   can	  literally	   take	  place	   simultaneously	   such	   as	  when	  Greenpeace	   activists	  were	  protesting	   outside	   a	   World	   Business	   Council	   for	   Sustainable	   Development	  side	   event	   to	   the	   UNFCCC	   meeting	   in	   Durban	   in	   December	   2011	   (with	   a	  banner	  reading	  “Listen	  to	  the	  people,	  not	  the	  polluters”),	  while	  Kumi	  Naidoo,	  the	   executive	   director	   of	   GPI,	   was	   inside,	   lobbying	   the	   participants	   of	   that	  same	  meeting.57	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  This	  situation	  is	  described	  in	  a	  New	  York	  Times	  article	  about	  Kumi	  Naidoo,	  published	  in	  December	  2011	  (Broder	  2011).	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v. Exploring	  forms	  of	  responsiveness	  in	  Greenpeace	  	  
Responsiveness	  to	  member	  organisations	  and	  supporters	  High-­‐level	   strategic	   decision-­‐making	  within	   Greenpeace	   International	   takes	  place	  among	  the	  executive	  directors	  of	  the	  national	  offices,	  not	  at	  board	  level.	  Greenpeace’s	   board	   of	   directors	   has	   a	   largely	   supervisory	   function;	   it	  approves	   the	   annual	   budget	   of	   the	   organisations	   and	   the	   audited	   accounts,	  and	  appoints	  and	  supervises	  the	  executive	  director.	  The	  board	  directors	  are	  individuals	   selected	   from	   outside	   the	   organisation	   (“they	   must	   be	  independent	   of	   Greenpeace’s	   internal	   affairs”)	   and	   chosen	   to	   collectively	  “provide	   the	   skill,	   input	   and	   experience	   representing	   the	   world	   at	   large”	  (Greenpeace	  2009a,	  4).58	  	  	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  Greenpeace	  has	  28	  national	  and	  regional	  offices	  around	  the	  world.	   Until	   1987,	   Greenpeace	   was	   present	   only	   in	   developed	   countries,	  notably	   in	  North	  America,	   Europe,	   Australia	   and	  New	  Zealand	   (Eden	  2004,	  600).	  Argentina	  was	  the	  organisation’s	  first	  office	  in	  a	  developing	  country;	  it	  opened	  in	  1987.	  Since	  then,	  Greenpeace	  has	  gradually	  expanded	  its	  presence	  around	   the	  world:	   first	   on	   the	  American	   continent	  with	   the	   opening	   of	   the	  Brazilian	   office	   in	   1991	   in	   the	   run-­‐up	   to	   UNCED,	   and	   Mexico	   and	   Chile	   in	  1993.	   The	   Chinese	   office	   opened	   in	   1997,	   Greenpeace	   Southeast	   Asia	  (Philippines	  and	  Thailand)	  in	  2000	  and	  Greenpeace	  India	  was	  set	  up	  in	  2001	  (Eden	  2004,	  600).	  In	  late	  2008	  Greenpeace	  opened	  its	  first	  office	  in	  Africa	  –	  located	   in	   Johannesburg	   –	   followed	   by	   a	   second	   office	   in	   the	   Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  (DRC)	  and	  a	  third	  office	  in	  Senegal	   in	  2010.	  According	  to	  Greenpeace	   insiders,	   the	  organisation	  and	   its	  policy-­‐making	  processes	  have	  benefitted	  from	  having	  more	  global	  input	  through	  its	  national	  offices:	  	  “Especially	   over	   the	   last	   few	   years,	   we	   have	   seen	   a	   real	  strengthening	   of	   our	   offices	   in	   places	   like	   China,	   India,	  Indonesia,	  we	  just	  opened	  Greenpeace	  Africa	  in	  Johannesburg.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Other	   aims	   include	  a	   “wide	  geographical	   representation	  and	  gender	  balance”,	   as	  well	   as	  “good	   spread	   of	   expertise	   in	   areas	   such	   as	   activism,	   the	   environment,	   communications,	  management,	  finance	  and	  law”	  (Greenpeace	  2009a,	  4).	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And	   these	   places	   carry	   equal	  weight	   around	   the	   organisation	  when	  we	  do	  things	  like	  policy	  setting,	  campaigns.	  I	  feel	  that	  we	  are	  in	  a	  much	  stronger	  and	  more	  global	  position	  now	  than	  we	  were	   ten	   years	   ago	   or	   something”	   (interview	   with	   climate	  campaigner,	  Greenpeace	  International,	  08.03.2010).	  Although	   Greenpeace	   has	   sometimes	   been	   described	   as	   a	   very	   centralised,	  tightly	   structured	   and	   top-­‐down	  organisation	   (Eden	  2004;	  Rootes	   2006),	   it	  consisted	   of	   little	   more	   than	   multiple	   groups	   of	   committed	   activists	   in	  various	  countries	  during	  its	  early	  years.	  The	  organisation	  can	  trace	  its	  roots	  to	   the	   Make	   a	   Wave	   Committee	   (later	   to	   adopt	   the	   name	   Greenpeace)	   in	  British	  Columbia	  in	  the	  early	  1970s.	  Their	  actions	  inspired	  similar	  protests	  in	  other	  countries	  by	  groups	  who	  also	  adopted	  the	  name	  ‘Greenpeace’	  but	  often	  without	   clearly	   defined	   institutional	   linkages	   to	   the	   Canadian	   group.	   This	  unstructured	   expansion	   triggered	   an	   intense	   discussion	   between	   different	  individuals	  within	  Greenpeace	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  organisation	  should	  adopt	  a	  top-­‐down	   centralised	   structure	   or	   continue	   to	   exist	   as	   a	   loose	   affiliation	   of	  activists	   in	   different	   countries,	   carrying	   out	   autonomous	   campaigns	   under	  the	   (unprotected)	  name	   ‘Greenpeace’	   (Weyler	  2004;	  Connolly	  2008).	  Those	  in	   favour	   of	   a	   centralised	   model	   –	   whereby	   the	   Amsterdam	   headquarters	  would	  coordinate	   the	  global	  strategy	  of	   the	  organisation	  –	  won	  out	  and	  the	  organisation	  has	  essentially	  maintained	  the	  same	  structure	  since	  1979	  (Eden	  2004).	   Rootes	   (2006)	   describes	   Greenpeace’s	   organisational	   structure	   as	  very	   top-­‐down,	   whereby	   Greenpeace	   International	   “licenses	   national	   or	  regional	  branches	  to	  use	  the	  Greenpeace	  name	  only	  so	  long	  as	  they	  pursue	  a	  centrally	   determined	   agenda.”	   This	   “may	   make	   for	   a	   more	   coherent	  campaigning	   and	   minimise	   inter-­‐national	   wrangling,	   but	   it	   does	   not	  encourage	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  diversity	  of	  national	  and	  regional	  views	  from	  which	  other	  partners	  might	  learn”	  (Rootes	  2006,	  783).	  The	  nature	  of	  much	  of	  Greenpeace’s	   ‘core	   business’	   –	   high-­‐visibility	   campaigning	   and	   spectacular	  actions	  –	  certainly	  requires	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  centralisation	  and	  tight	  control	  over	  the	  public	  image	  of	  the	  organisation.	  However,	  these	  constraints	  do	  not	  prevent	  the	  national	  offices	  from	  responding	  to	  the	  specific	  characteristics	  of	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their	  localities	  and	  regions	  and	  adapting	  their	  campaigns	  to	  the	  context	  they	  operate	  in.	  	  	  According	   to	   the	   Greenpeace	   website,	   the	   organisation’s	   decision-­‐making	  process	   with	   respect	   to	   strategy	   and	   policy	   formulation	   is	   supported	   by	   a	  “consultative	   international	   decision	  making	   process	   in	  which	   the	  National/	  Regional	   Offices	   are	   the	   main	   stakeholders”	   (Greenpeace	   2011a).	   Global	  campaigns	  are	  developed	  by	  campaign	  committees	  made	  up	  of	  campaigners	  from	   various	   national	   offices,	   working	   on	   the	   same	   issues	   (for	   example,	  climate	   change,	   deforestation,	   etc)	   (interview	   with	   climate	   campaigner,	  Greenpeace	   International,	   08.03.2010;	   interview	   with	   executive	   director,	  Greenpeace	   Africa,	   03.07.2010).	   However,	   there	   is	   no	   further	   information	  available	   on	   what	   precisely	   this	   process	   entails	   and	   the	   organisation	  acknowledges	   elsewhere	   that	   it	   does	   not	   have	   a	   formal	   written	   policy	   for	  adopting	  or	  implementing	  its	  decisions.	  Interviewees	  at	  Greenpeace	  point	  to	  a	  number	  of	  consultative	  and	  participatory	  elements	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  but	  the	  examples	  are	  of	  a	  general	  nature	  and	  relatively	  vague.	  They	  stress,	   for	   instance,	   that	   policy	   documents	   are	   circulated	   in	   draft	   form	   “so	  that	  everyone	  can	  have	  an	  opportunity	  to	  participate	  and	  put	  their	  ideas	  into	  it”	   (interview	   with	   climate	   campaigner,	   Greenpeace	   International,	  08.03.2010).	   Electronic	   communications	   in	   particular	   have	   made	   “it	   much	  easier	   to	   communicate	   with	   your	   colleagues	   around	   the	   world	   (on	   policy	  development).	   It	   is	   much	   quicker	   to	   get	   input	   from	   your	   colleague	   in	   the	  Amazon	  or	  the	  Congo”	  (interview	  with	  biodiversity	  campaigner,	  Greenpeace	  International,	   05.03.2010).	   Campaign	   teams	   (who	   will	   also	   be	   attending	  international	  meetings	  in	  their	  respective	  issue	  fields)	  are	  selected	  to	  include	  campaigners	   from	   various	   national	   and	   regional	   offices	   (interview	   with	  biodiversity	   campaigner,	   Greenpeace	   International,	   08.03.2010).	   It	   is,	  however,	  the	  programme	  director	  “who	  gets	  the	  final	  say	  on	  a	  specific	  policy	  approach”	   and	  who	  will	   take	   an	   executive	   decision	   if	   no	   consensus	   can	   be	  reached	   on	   “one	   or	   two	   outstanding	   issues”	   (interview	   with	   climate	  campaigner,	   Greenpeace	   International,	   08.03.2010).	   Professional	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campaigners	  are	  the	  key	  decision-­‐makers	  within	  Greenpeace	  and	  one	  activist	  in	   Canada	   describes	   them	   as	   “a	   highly	   professionalised	   vanguard	   in	  which	  general	  directions	  flow	  from	  the	  top	  down	  while	  specific	  tactics	  are	  devised	  within	  local	  cells”	  (Greenpeace	  activist	  quoted	  in	  Eden	  2006,	  599).	  	  It	   is	   worth	   noting,	   however,	   that	   even	   where	   Greenpeace	   has	   a	   global	  position	  on	  a	  particular	  issue,	  it	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  all	  the	  national	  offices	  are	  running	   national	   campaigns	   on	   this	   issue.	   The	   campaigning	   choices	   by	   the	  individual	   offices	   appear	   to	   be	   somewhat	   less	   “coherent”	   or	   “centrally	  determined”	   than	   suggested	   in	  Rootes’	   analysis	   and	   are	   also	   responding	   to	  the	   particular	   ecological,	   political	   and	   economic	   context	   the	   national	   office	  operates	  in.	  While,	  for	  example,	  most	  of	  the	  European	  offices	  have	  an	  active	  campaign	  on	  genetically	  modified	  organisms	  (GMOs),	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  for	  Greenpeace	   US.59	   The	   newly	   opened	   Greenpeace	   office	   in	   South	   Africa	   has	  decided	   to	   adopt	   climate	   change	   as	   its	   campaign	   priority	   due	   to	   the	   South	  African	   economy’s	   dependence	   on	   coal,	  while	   the	  DRC	  office	   is	   focusing	   on	  the	   problem	   of	   deforestation	   and	   the	   challenge	   of	   protecting	   the	   DRC’s	  rainforest	   (interview	   with	   executive	   director,	   Greenpeace	   Africa,	  03.07.2010).	   This	   observation	   is	   also	   supported	   by	   Eden	   (2004)	   who	  compares	  the	  campaign	  priorities	  of	  a	  number	  of	  national	  Greenpeace	  offices	  and	  finds	  that	  “campaigning	  choices	  are	  sometimes	  opportunistic	  as	  well	  as	  highly	  dynamic	  and,	  although	  strategy	  is	  coordinated	  globally,	  it	  is	  very	  much	  shaped	  by	  national	  interests”	  (Eden	  2004,	  604).	  	  Individual	   supporters	   are	   particularly	   significant	   for	   Greenpeace.	   Although	  Rootes	  describes	  Greenpeace	  as	  a	  “tightly-­‐run	  organisation,	  the	  decisions	  of	  whose	  directors	  are	  made	  in	  relative	  isolation	  from	  the	  supporters”	  (Rootes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  particular	  divergence	  is	  apparently	  a	  tactical	  response	  to	  the	  prevailing	  domestic	   political	   context	   in	   the	   United	   States	   (interview	   biodiversity	   campaigner,	  Greenpeace	  International,	  08.03.2010).	  Although	  the	  interviewee	  claims	  that	  there	  is	  a	  broad	  consensus	  around	  GMOs	  within	  Greenpeace,	   it	   is	  notable	   that	   the	  organisation	  was	  heavily	  criticised	  –	  by	  scientists,	  development	  NGOs	  and	  many	  Southern	  civil	  society	  groups	  –	  for	  its	  complete	   rejection	   of	   all	   forms	   of	   genetically	   modified	   food,	   including	   golden	   rice	   (Bond	  2001)	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2006,	  782),	   it	   is	   important	   to	   remember	   that	  Greenpeace	   is	  almost	  entirely	  funded	   by	   individual	   contributions	   (as	   well	   as	   by	   trusts)	   and	   refuses	   to	  accept	   corporate	   and	   government	   funding.	   This	   gives	   Greenpeace	   a	   much	  stronger	  claim	  to	  speak	  “for	  2.8	  million	  supporters	  worldwide”	  (Greenpeace	  n.d.	   ‘About	   Greenpeace’)	   than	   other	   NGOs	   who	   enjoy	   substantial	   financial	  backing	  from	  business	  and	  government	  agencies.	  The	  reliance	  on	  individual	  contributions	   also	   makes	   it	   particularly	   important	   for	   the	   organisation	   to	  protect	   its	   public	   image,	   to	   gauge	   the	   expectations	   of	   its	   supporters	   and	   to	  support	  policies	  that	  they	  care	  about.	  However,	  while	  membership	  entry	  and	  exit	   and	   the	   granting	   and	   withdrawal	   of	   financial	   support	   are	   obviously	  important	  mechanisms	  of	   ‘authorisation’	   by	   individual	   supporters,	   they	   are	  also	  relatively	  blunt	  ones.	  The	  organisation	  itself	  acknowledges	  that	  there	  are	  only	   limited	  means	   through	  which	  Greenpeace’s	   supporters	   can	  participate	  in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   within	   the	   organisation	   other	   than	   by	  signalling	  their	  support	  through	  financial	  contributions	  and	  their	  disapproval	  through	   the	   withdrawal	   thereof:	   “one	   of	   the	   primary	   ways	   in	   which	  Greenpeace	   supporters	   can	   voice	   complaints	   about	   the	   organisation’s	  advocacy	  activities,	  after	  learning	  about	  them	  from	  our	  own	  publications	  and	  the	  media,	  is	  by	  cancelling	  membership	  and	  related	  donations”	  (Greenpeace	  2009b,	  10).	  	  From	   time	   to	   time	   there	   are	   signs	   that	   some	   Greenpeace	   supporters	   feel	  disenfranchised	  by	  their	  lack	  of	  voice	  within	  the	  organisation.	  An	  example	  of	  this	   is	   the	  controversy	  sparked	  by	   the	  appointment	  of	  Tzeporah	  Berman	  as	  co-­‐head	   of	   GPI’s	   energy	   and	   climate	   campaign	   in	   early	   2010.60	   In	   order	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  The	  decision	  to	  hire	  her	  caused	  dismay	  among	  a	  small	  group	  of	  vocal	  Greenpeace	  activists	  and	   supporters,	   mainly	   based	   in	   British	   Columbia,	   who	   argued	   that	   because	   of	   her	   track	  record	  of	  pursuing	  a	  collaborative	  approach	  towards	  a	  number	  of	   large	  corporations	  in	  BC,	  she	  represented	  the	   face	  of	   ‘corporate	  sell	  out’.	  Much	  of	   the	  controversy	  was	  played	  out	   in	  online	   discussion	   fora	   and	   blogs:	  http://www.vanmag.com/News_and_Features/Tzeporah_Berman_s_Green_Idea+?page=0%2C7;	   http://www.straight.com/article-­‐298791/vancouver/tzeporah-­‐berman-­‐dismisses-­‐online-­‐campaign-­‐against-­‐her-­‐new-­‐greenpeace-­‐job;	   http://www.straight.com/article-­‐215030/tzeporah-­‐berman-­‐responds-­‐critics-­‐bc-­‐environmental-­‐movement;	  http://desmogblog.com/canabalizing-­‐environmentalism-­‐tzeporah-­‐berman-­‐under-­‐attack.	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protest	   against	   her	   appointment	   –	   and	   to	   highlight	   the	   lack	   of	   internal	  democracy	   within	   Greenpeace	   –	   a	   small	   group	   of	   disgruntled	   supporters	  launched	  the	  website	  www.savegreenpeace.org.	  The	  site	  claimed	  to	  present	  a	  number	  of	   anonymous	  quotes	   from	  current	  Greenpeace	   staff	   and	   long-­‐time	  supporters,	   many	   of	   whom	   linked	   their	   anger	   at	   this	   particular	   hiring	  decision	  by	  Greenpeace	  International	  to	  the	  organisation’s	  lack	  of	  democratic	  and	  participatory	  structures:	  “if	  Greenpeace	  was	  a	  democratic	  membership-­‐based	   organisation,	   like	   so	   many	   other	   large	   environmental	   organisations,	  problems	   like	   the	   hiring	   of	   Tzeporah	   Berman	   would	   be	   averted”;	   “we	   are	  completely	   disenfranchised	   from	   any	   consultation	   into	   decisions	   made	   by	  Greenpeace	  International.	  There	  is	  no	  transparency,	  and	  we	  don’t	  feel	  like	  we	  can	  do	  anything”;	  “no	  consultation	  with	  activists	  and	  organisers	  in	  Canada”;	  “I	   am	   concerned	   with	   the	   lack	   of	   consultation	   from	   GPI”.	   Of	   course,	   the	  authenticity	   of	   these	   anonymous	   quotes	   cannot	   be	   verified.	   Moreover,	   it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  draw	  general	  conclusion	  from	  one	  specific	  case	  –	  and	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  website’s	  petition	  opposing	  her	  recruitment	  only	  listed	  around	  160	  signatories	  (as	  of	  July	  2010),	  most	  of	  whom	  were	  based	  in	  BC,	   and	   that	   the	   website	   has	   been	   taken	   down	   since.	   Nonetheless,	   the	  supporters’	  complaints	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  internal	  democracy	  are	  notable	  and	  seem	   to	   support	   Rootes’	   claim	   that	   “there	   is	   no	  mechanism	   by	  which	   they	  might	   influence	   policy.	   Greenpeace	   remains	   an	   elite-­‐directed	   campaign	  organisation”	  (Rootes	  2006,	  781).61	  	  	  In	   1991,	   Greenpeace	   counted	   over	   4.8	   million	   supporters	   worldwide.	   This	  number	  declined	  throughout	  the	  1990s	  to	  a	  low	  of	  around	  2.4	  million	  in	  1999	  and	  picked	  up	  thereafter	  (Eden	  2004,	  598).	  However,	  the	  formal	  number	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  A	   few	  months	  after	  Berman	  assumed	  her	   job,	   the	  website	  was	  re-­‐launched	  (in	  early	   July	  2010)	  with	   the	   broader	  mission	   to	   encourage	   discussion	   on	   how	   to	   “democratise	   existing	  environmental	   organisations	   and	   create	   organisations	   that	   are	   accountable,	   solidarity-­‐driven,	  transparent,	  and	  funded	  in	  ways	  that	  do	  not	  compromise	  their	  missions.”	  Visitors	  to	  the	   site	  were	   invited	   to	   add	   their	   comments	   on	   how	   to	   democratise	  Greenpeace,	  which	   is	  described	   as	   a	   “canary	   in	   the	   coal	   mine	   of	   corporate	   environmentalism.	   If	   we	   can	  democratise	  Greenpeace	  and	  get	  it	  back	  on	  track,	  that	  will	  show	  the	  way	  for	  other	  ENGOs.”	  (www.savegreenpeace.org,	   last	   accessed	   on	   02.07.2010).	   The	   website	   was	   subsequently	  deactivated	  and	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  accessed	  (as	  of	  December	  2011).	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financial	  supporters	  is	  only	  a	  partial	  indicator	  of	  the	  level	  of	  public	  ideational	  support	   for	   Greenpeace.	   In	   fact,	   over	   recent	   years	   Greenpeace	   has	  made	   a	  deliberate	  effort	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  a	  new	  breed	  of	  supporter,	  using	  emails,	  social	  networking	   sites	   and	   online	   petitions.	   These	   media	   allow	   individuals	   to	  express	   their	   support	   for	   particular	   Greenpeace	   campaigns	   without	  necessarily	   becoming	   financial	   supporters.	   Others	   are	   prepared	   to	   take	  action	   ‘offline’	   when	   called	   upon	   by	   Greenpeace:	   individually,	   for	   example	  through	   their	   purchasing	   choices,	   or	   by	   participating	   in	   Greenpeace-­‐coordinated	   campaigns	   and	   protests.	   In	   fact,	   the	   organisation’s	   ability	   to	  mobilise	  large	  numbers	  of	  concerned	  citizens	  around	  the	  world	  –	  by	  joining	  online	   protests,	   boycotting	   particular	   companies	   or	   participating	   in	   street	  protests	   –	   is	   becoming	   increasingly	   important.	   This	   became	   particularly	  apparent	   during	   the	   large	   climate	   demonstrations	   around	   the	  world	   in	   the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  Copenhagen	  summit	  at	   the	  end	  of	  2009,	   in	  which	  Greenpeace	  (together	  with	  a	  number	  of	  other	  NGOs)	  played	  a	  major	  part.	  	  	  
Responsiveness	  to	  local	  communities	  It	   is	  difficult	   to	  detect	  clear	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  Greenpeace	  may	  be	  responsive	   to	   local	  communities	  –	   in	  particular	   in	  developing	  countries	   -­‐	   in	  the	  formulation	  of	  its	  policy	  positions	  and	  campaign	  priorities.	  Greenpeace’s	  supporter	  base	  is	  predominantly	  located	  in	  Europe	  and	  North	  America,	  with	  most	   financial	   contributions	   (in	   descending	   order)	   coming	   from	   Germany,	  the	   Netherlands,	   United	   States,	   Scandinavia,	   United	   Kingdom	   and	   France.	  However,	  the	  organisation	  claims	  that	  its	  offices	  in	  Brazil,	   India,	  Africa,	  East	  Asia	  and	  Southeast	  Asia	  are	  seeing	  strong	  growth	  (Greenpeace	  2011b,	  20).	  As	  a	  global	  campaigning	  organisation,	  Greenpeace	  has	  not	  traditionally	  thought	  of	   itself	   as	   an	   organisation	   in	   need	   of	   developing	   mechanisms	   of	  responsiveness	  and	  accountability	  to	  local	  communities.	  However,	  there	  are	  –	   relatively	   recent	   -­‐	   signs	   that	   Greenpeace	   is	   starting	   to	   develop	   its	  community-­‐level	  work	   in	   particular	   regions	   and	   is	   increasingly	   prioritising	  people-­‐centred	   solutions,	   as	  well	   as	   poverty	   and	   social	   equity	   issues	   at	   the	  global	  level.	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  As	   a	   founding	   member	   and	   signatory	   to	   the	   INGO	   Accountability	   Charter,	  Greenpeace	  has	  started	  to	  assess	  its	  compliance	  with	  the	  charter	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  set	  of	   reporting	  standards	  developed	   for	   the	  charter	  signatories	  by	   the	  Global	   Reporting	   Initiative.	   One	   of	   the	   issues	   the	   charter	   signatories	   are	  asked	   to	   report	   on	   is	   whether	   the	   NGO’s	   programmes	   are	   conducted	   in	  genuine	   partnership	   with	   local	   communities,	   whether	   its	   programmes	   aim	  for	   sustainable	   development	   and	   whether	   they	   are	   appropriate	   for	   local	  needs	   and	   conditions.	   In	   its	   interim	   report	   Greenpeace	   argues	   that	   these	  specific	   requirements	   are	   not	   applicable	   to	   the	   organisation	   based	   on	   the	  following	  rationale:	  “These	  questions	  are	  in	  their	  current	  form	  not	  applicable	  to	  the	  Greenpeace	  International	  advocacy/	  campaigning	  programme.	  Greenpeace	   does	   not	   execute	   local	   development	   projects.	  There	   where	   we	   do	   interact	   and	   cooperate	   with	   local	  communities	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   campaign,	   this	   work	   is	   of	   a	  strategic	  coalition/	  alliance	  nature.	  As	  it	  is	  critically	  important	  to	  the	  potential	  success	  of	  a	  project,	  assessment	  of	  the	  potential	  impact	   of	   such	   work	   is	   carefully	   integrated	   in	   the	   project	  objective	  setting,	   research	  and	  development	  stage.	  Because	  of	  the	  incidental	  and	  widely	  varying	  nature	  of	  such	  co-­‐operations,	  it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   define	   standard	   GP	   criteria	   for	   this”	  (Greenpeace	  International	  2009b).	  It	   is	   true	   that,	   unlike	  WWF,	   Greenpeace	   does	   not	   conduct	   conservation	   or	  sustainable	   development	   projects	   on	   the	   ground	   and	   is	   in	   this	   sense	   not	  involved	   in	   operational	   partnerships	   with	   community-­‐based	   organisations.	  The	   same,	   however,	   applies	   to	   some	   of	   the	   other	   INGO	  Charter	   signatories	  such	   as	   Amnesty	   International	   or	   Transparency	   International.	   While	  Amnesty	   acknowledges	   that	   it	   is	   only	   partially	   in	   compliance	   with	   the	  partnership	   indicators,	   it	   states:	   “we	   are	   working	   to	   strengthen	   these	  (policies	   to	   support	   partnerships)	   and	   their	   implementation	   through	   our	  planning	  and	  operational	  processes”	  (Amnesty	  2008).	  TI	  claims	  to	  be	  fully	  in	  compliance	  with	  this	   indicator.	  The	  inapplicability	  of	  these	  indicators	  to	  the	  work	   of	   Greenpeace	   may	   therefore	   not	   be	   as	   obvious	   as	   the	   organisation	  makes	  out	  in	  its	  interim	  report.	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  “Bearing	  witness”	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  strategies	  that	  Greenpeace	  uses	  to	  deepen	  the	   ecological	   sensibility	   of	   citizens	   and	   policy-­‐makers	   around	   the	   world	  (Wapner	   1996).	   “Bearing	   witness”	   often	   involves	   spectacular	   and	   media-­‐savvy	  forms	  of	  direct	  action,	  such	  as	  when	  the	  ships	  of	  Greenpeace	  activists	  confront	  much	   larger	  whaling	   vessels	   on	   the	  high	   seas.	   In	   these	   cases,	   it	   is	  Greenpeace	   campaigners	   who	   are	   willing	   to	   confront	   environmental	  wrongdoers	   and	   bring	   their	   actions	   to	   the	   world’s	   attention.	   A	   somewhat	  different	   but	   related	   strategy	   that	   similarly	   relies	   on	   the	   power	   of	  witness	  testimonies	   to	   sway	   the	   opinions	   of	   citizens	   and	   key	   decision-­‐makers	   is	   to	  bring	   individuals	   who	   are	   directly	   suffering	   the	   consequences	   of	  environmental	   degradation	   either	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   with	   policymakers	   or	   to	   the	  attention	  of	  a	  wider	  public	  (and	  especially	  publics	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  United	  States).	   The	   following	   quotes	   provide	   some	   examples	   of	   how	   Greenpeace	  employs	   this	   strategy	   to	   try	   to	   influence	   international	   policy-­‐making	  processes:	  “We	  took	  one	  of	  our	  ships	  down	  to	  the	  Pacific	  islands	  to	  work	  with	   islanders	   to	   give	   testimonies	   on	   climate	   change,	  what	   it	  means	  for	  them	  and	  their	  future,	  and	  make	  sure	  that	  these	  are	  out	  in	  the	  public	  domain”	  (interview	  with	  climate	  campaigner,	  Greenpeace	  International,	  08.03.2010).	  “we	  bring	  some	  of	  the	  testimonies	  on	  climate	  change	  into	  one-­‐on-­‐one	  meetings	  with	  a	  minister	  or	  even	  head	  of	  state”	  (ibid).	  “we	  bring	  people	   from	  the	  different	   regions,	   local	  partners	  or	  people	   who	   are	   particularly	   affected,	   for	   example	   by	  deforestation	   or	   logging,	   to	   have	   them	   talk	   about	   the	   issues.	  For	  example,	  someone	  from	  Papua	  New	  Guinea	  may	  be	  coming	  to	   talk	   about	   what’s	   happening	   there,	   companies	   are	   cutting	  down	  ancient	  forests”	  (interview	  with	  biodiversity	  campaigner,	  Greenpeace	  International,	  05.03.2010).	  	  By	  making	  it	  possible	  for	  these	  community	  members	  to	  attend	  international	  conferences	   (or	   at	   least	   the	   side	   events)	   and	   giving	   them	   a	   platform	   to	  express	  their	  concerns,	  Greenpeace	  is	  working	  directly	  to	  bring	  the	  voices	  of	  affected	   communities	   to	   international	   policy-­‐making	   processes.	   For	  Greenpeace,	   the	   main	   value	   of	   these	   testimonies	   is	   strategic	   –	   decision-­‐
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makers,	   the	  media	   and	   the	   public	   in	   developed	   countries	  will	   hopefully	   be	  stirred	  by	  these	  very	  personal	  accounts	  and	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  take	  action	  or	  create	   pressure	   for	   change.	   The	   potential	   democratic	   ‘side-­‐effects’	   of	   this	  strategy	   consist	   in	   offering	   marginalised	   communities	   the	   chance	   to	   get	  somewhat	  closer	  to	  the	  sites	  of	  power	  and	  allowing	  their	  voices	  to	  be	  heard	  more	  loudly	  at	  the	  international	  level.	  	  	  The	   degree	   to	   which	   the	  mobilisation	   of	   local	   communities	   matters	   varies	  with	  the	  different	  national	  offices.	  The	  African	  executive	  director	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  crucial	  “to	  take	  the	  community	  mobilisation	  angle	  in	  all	  our	  campaigns”	  but	   acknowledges	   that	   the	   African	   offices	   differ	   in	   that	   respect	   from	  most	  other	  Greenpeace	  offices	  around	  the	  world.	  According	  to	  her,	  Greenpeace	  can	  only	  establish	  its	  relevance	  in	  the	  African	  continent	   if	   it	   focuses	  on	  working	  directly	   with	   communities,	   while	   tapping	   into	   the	   global	   network	   to	   bring	  their	   stories	   and	   concerns	   to	   the	   attention	   of	   policy-­‐makers	   and	   the	  public	  abroad	   (interview	  with	   executive	   director,	   Greenpeace	   Africa,	   03.07.2010).	  Since	  the	  Greenpeace	  offices	   in	  Africa	  are	  a	  relatively	  recent	  addition	  to	  the	  organisation,	  however,	   it	   still	   remains	   to	  be	  seen	   to	  what	  extent	   their	  work	  with	  local	  communities	  will	  inform	  and	  shape	  Greenpeace’s	  global	  priorities	  over	  time.	  	  	  
vi. Responsiveness	  in	  Greenpeace:	  motives,	  challenges	  and	  effects	  	  At	  first	  glance,	  the	  notion	  that	  NGOs	  can	  act	  as	  democratic	  links	  between	  local	  communities	   and	   global	   environmental	   policymaking	   processes	   appears	  especially	   unsuitable	   to	   an	   organisation	   such	   as	   Greenpeace.	   Unlike	  WWF,	  Greenpeace	   does	   not	  work	  with	   local	   communities	   in	   the	   context	   of	   actual	  conservation	   work	   on	   the	   ground	   and	   is	   therefore	   not	   exposed	   to	   local	  realities	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  Unlike	  FoEI,	  who	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  chapter,	  Greenpeace	  does	  not	  unite	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  local	  community	  groups	  from	   around	   the	   world	   within	   its	   network.	   Instead,	   Greenpeace’s	  characteristics	   seem	   to	   render	   it	   ill-­‐suited	   to	   ‘represent’	   local	   communities:	  the	  primary	  focus	  on	  effective	  global	  campaigning,	  the	  overriding	  importance	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(in	   resource	   and	   capacity	   terms)	   of	   a	   small	   number	   of	   developed	   country	  national	   offices	   within	   the	   global	   network,	   and	   the	   organisation’s	   financial	  dependence	   on	   contributions	   from	   supporters	   in	   Northern	   countries.	  However,	   the	   global	   structure	   of	   the	   organisation,	   the	   use	   of	   ‘community	  testimonies’,	  a	  growing	  recognition	  of	  the	  need	  to	  develop	  partnerships	  with	  a	   range	   of	   different	   organisations	   to	   pursue	   an	   effective	   global	   climate	  campaign,	   and	   a	   greater	   focus	   on	   the	   links	   between	   poverty,	   justice	   and	  climate	   change	   are	   all	   factors	   that	   hold	   some	   promise	   of	   a	   ‘representative	  role’	   for	   Greenpeace,	   as	   set	   out	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter.	   Nonetheless,	  considerable	  limitations	  remain.	  	  	  	  Let	   us	   first	   consider	   the	   nature	   of	   Greenpeace’s	   relationship	   with	   its	  supporters.	   In	   the	   interim	   report	   on	   its	   compliance	   with	   the	   NGO	  Accountability	  Charter,	  Greenpeace	  makes	  the	  obvious	  point	   that	   individual	  supporters	   can	   stop	   their	   financial	   contributions	   if	   they	   are	   unhappy	  with	  Greenpeace’s	  work.	  There	   is	  no	  doubt	   that	   the	  number	  of	   individual	  paying	  supporters	   is	   a	   key	   measure	   for	   gauging	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   concerned	  citizens	  ‘authorise’	  Greenpeace’s	  actions	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  their	  own	  values.	  This	   is	   important	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Greenpeace	   as	   the	   organisation	   refuses	  governmental	   and	  corporate	  donations.	  One	  problem	  with	   this	   assertion	   is,	  however,	  that	  no	  corresponding	  voice	  mechanism	  exists	  for	  those	  individuals	  around	   the	  world	   that	   are	   not	   supporting	   the	   organisation	   financially	   (and	  may	  not	  be	   in	   a	  position	   to	  do	   so).	   Since	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	  Greenpeace’s	  fundraising	   income	  comes	  from	  Europe,	  North	  America	  and	  Canada,	   the	  2.9	  million	   supporters	   that	   Greenpeace	   International	   could	   justifiably	   claim	   to	  represent	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  financial	  ‘authorisation’	  do	  not	  exactly	  present	  a	   global	   constituency,	   nor	   do	   they	   include	  members	   of	   those	   communities	  who	  are	  most	  vulnerable	   to	   the	   impacts	  of	  environmental	   change	  and	   least	  able	   to	   exert	   democratic	   control	   over	   the	   global	   policy	   decisions	   affecting	  their	  lives.	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  criticise	  Greenpeace	  on	  this	  count	  as	  the	  organisation	  never	  –	  contrary	  to	  what	  NGO	  critics	  often	  assert	  –	  makes	  the	  explicit	  claim	  to	  represent	  poor	  communities	  in	  developing	  countries.	  In	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fact,	  interviewees	  at	  Greenpeace	  are	  clearly	  uncomfortable	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  speaking	   for	   or	   on	   behalf	   of	   local	   communities:	   “we	   are	   always	   a	   bit	  uncomfortable	  representing	  other	  people	  or	  communities’	  views;	  it’s	  always	  better	   if	   the	  person	  or	   community	   can	   represent	   their	   own	  views	   although	  that’s	  not	  always	  practically	  possible	   (...).	   I	   think	   that	   speaking	  on	  behalf	  of	  individuals	  is	  difficult,	  speaking	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  global	  common	  and	  greater	  good	   is	   something	   we	   can	   be	   comfortable	   with”	   (interview	   with	   climate	  campaigner,	  Greenpeace	  International,	  08.03.2010).	  	  Many	   of	   Greenpeace’s	   stunts	   are	   highly	   professional	   affairs	   designed	   to	  achieve	  maximum	   impact	   in	   terms	  of	  media	   coverage	   and	  public	   attention.	  This	   may	   require	   getting	   activists	   into	   locations	   from	   which	   they	   would	  otherwise	  be	  barred	  from	  entering	  (such	  as	  the	  heads	  of	  states	  dinner	  during	  the	   Copenhagen	   summit),	   taking	   personal	   risks,	   using	   methods	   deemed	  morally	  objectionable	  by	  some,	  and	  even	  facing	  the	  possibility	  of	  legal	  action	  (court	  cases,	  of	  course,	  can	  provide	  an	  excellent	  opportunity	  for	  Greenpeace	  to	   further	  amplify	   the	  message	   it	  wants	   to	  get	  across).	   It	   is	   clear	   that	   these	  types	   of	   spectacular	   actions’	   call	   for	   decisions	   to	   be	  made	   in	   an	   executive,	  centralised,	  and	  sometimes	  secretive	  manner.	  As	  a	  campaigning	  organisation	  Greenpeace	   is	  also	  able	   to	  react	  quickly	   to	  new	  environmental	  and	  political	  developments	  and	  can	  use	  this	  agility	  to	  make	  the	  most	  of	  any	  new	  windows	  of	   opportunity.	   This	   in	   turn	   means	   that	   campaigning	   choices	   are	   often	  opportunistic:	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  made	  in	  response	  to	  external	  events	  than	   developed	   through	   a	   broadly	   participatory	   and	   deliberative	   (and	  probably	  more	  lengthy)	  process.	  	  	  A	   similar	   point	   can	   be	   made	   about	   Greenpeace’s	   attitude	   towards	  partnerships	  and	  alliance-­‐formation	  –	  the	  organisation	  acknowledges	  on	  the	  website	   that	   “in	   pursuing	   our	   mission	   we	   have	   no	   permanent	   allies	   or	  enemies.”	  While	  Greenpeace	  undoubtedly	  values	  this	  flexibility	  as	  a	  key	  asset	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  effective	  campaigning,	  it	  could	  also	  mean	  that	  it	  is	  less	  likely	  to	   invest	  money,	   time	   and	   staff	   resources	   in	   developing	   close	   relationships	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with	   local	   community	   organisations	   and	   other	   civil	   society	   organisations.	  Greenpeace	  has	  been	  characterised	  as	  an	  organisation	  that,	  on	  balance,	  tends	  to	  prefer	  to	  act	  alone	  rather	  than	  engage	  in	  joint	  campaigns	  with	  other	  NGOs	  (Rootes	   2006,	   784).	  While	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   networking	   presents	   a	   lower	  priority	   for	  Greenpeace	   than	   for	   some	  of	   the	  NGO	  peers,	   alliance	  work	  has	  been	   a	   crucial	   feature	   of	   the	   organisation’s	   climate	   campaign.	   Over	   recent	  years	   Greenpeace	   has	   not	   only	   reached	   out	   to	   new	   partners	   such	   as	   the	  International	  Trade	  Union	  Congress	  in	  its	  climate	  work,	  but	  was	  also	  closely	  involved	   in	   the	   Global	   Campaign	   for	   Climate	   Action	   (GCCA)	   and	   its	   ‘public	  face’,	  the	  TckTckTck	  Campaign,	  which	  brought	  together	  a	  diverse	  coalition	  of	  NGOs,	   including	  groups	  such	  as	  Oxfam,	  CIVICUS	  and	  IndyACT,	   in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  Copenhagen	  summit.	  In	  fact,	  the	  new	  executive	  director	  Kumi	  Naidoo	  was	   already	   the	   GCCA’s	   board	   chair	   before	   assuming	   his	   position	   at	  Greenpeace	  International	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2009.	  	  	  There	   are	   also	   some	   indications	   that	  Greenpeace	   is	   increasingly	   starting	   to	  integrate	   poverty	   and	   social	   justice	   issues	   into	   its	   campaigns	   (O’Neill	   and	  VanDeever	  2005).	  Again,	  this	  is	  a	  departure	  from	  earlier	  assessments	  of	  the	  organisation,	  which	   find	   that	  Greenpeace	  has	   traditionally	   shied	  away	   from	  the	  development	  agenda	  and	  social	  justice	  issues	  in	  the	  North-­‐South	  context,	  even	   during	   the	   Earth	   Summit	   (Lamb	   1996	   cited	   in	   Rootes	   2006,	   782).	  Greenpeace	   does	   not	   embrace	   these	   concerns	   to	   the	   same	   degree	   as	  many	  other	   organisations	   (FoEI,	   for	   example)	   and	   its	   global	   climate	   campaign	  continues	   to	   focus	   on	   ‘solutions’	   to	   the	   climate	   crisis.	   However,	   the	   Global	  Campaign	  for	  Climate	  Action’s	  vision	  of	  a	  ‘Fair,	  Ambitious	  and	  Binding’	  treaty	  clearly	  acknowledges	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  global	  deal	  needs	  to	  include	  substantial	  financial	  transfers	  from	  developed	  to	  developing	  countries	  and	  is	  supported	  not	   only	   by	   Greenpeace	   but	   also	   by	   a	   diverse	   coalitions	   of	   other	   NGOs,	  including	   groups	   with	   a	   primary	   focus	   on	   poverty	   alleviations,	   health	   or	  social	   justice	   issues.	  While	   the	   issue	   characteristics	   of	   climate	   change	   have	  undoubtedly	   brought	   the	   linkages	   between	   environment,	   equity	   and	  development	  more	  clearly	  to	  the	  forefront	  than	  some	  of	  the	  ‘older’	  campaign	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issues	   (e.g.	   oceans,	   acid	   rain,	   whale-­‐hunting),	   it	   has	   also	   encouraged	  Greenpeace	   to	   seek	   alliances	   with	   new	   partners	   and,	   through	   these	   new	  connections,	   brought	   the	   organisation	   into	   closer	   contact	   with	   the	   global	  justice	  movement.	  Greenpeace	  campaigners	  also	  attended	  the	  World	  People’s	  Conference	  on	  Climate	  Change	  and	  the	  Rights	  of	  Mother	  Earth	  held	  in	  Bolivia	  in	  April	  2010.62	  	  	  Two	   other	   recent	   developments	   within	   the	   organisation	   are	   noteworthy,	  although	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  to	  what	  extent	  these	  will	  shape	  Greenpeace’s	  values,	  strategies	  and	  priorities	  over	  time.	  As	  was	  already	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  new	  Greenpeace	  offices	  in	  South	  Africa,	  the	  DRC	  and	  Senegal	  exemplify	  a	  greater	  focus	  within	  the	  organisation	  on	  the	  African	  continent.	  The	  executive	  director	  of	  Greenpeace	  Africa	  considers	  it	  important	  for	  the	  African	  offices	  to	  go	   beyond	   campaigning	   and	  work	   to	   “address	   people’s	   needs”.	   This	   entails	  empowering	  local	  communities	  and	  making	  them	  aware	  of	  their	  rights	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  governments	  and	  corporations,	  providing	  practical	  support,	   for	  example	  through	   solar	   energy	   projects,	   as	   well	   as	   mobilising	   communities	   to	   take	  action	   themselves.	   At	   the	   same	   time	   –	   again,	   necessitated	   by	   the	   regional	  context	  and	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  people	  on	  the	  ground	  –	  Greenpeace	  Africa	  will	  be	   focussing	   more	   on	   poverty	   and	   development	   issues	   than	   many	   of	   the	  other	   Greenpeace	   offices	   around	   the	   world:	   “this	   gives	   a	   development	  dimension	  that	  you	  don’t	  have	  in	  other	  countries	  where	  Greenpeace	  operates	  and	   that’s	   what	   makes	   us	   different”	   (interview	   with	   executive	   director,	  Greenpeace	   Africa,	   03.07.2010).	   While	   the	   African	   offices’	   work	   on	  environment,	   poverty	   and	   development,	   as	   well	   as	   on	   community	  empowerment,	   does	   not	   in	   itself	   signify	   a	   broader	   organisational	   shift	  towards	   these	   issues	   and	   approaches,	   it	   may	   offer	   practical	   learning	  opportunities	   for	   the	   entire	   organisation	   on	   working	   with	   and	   mobilising	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   Greenpeace	   website:	  	  http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/Blogs/makingwaves/greenpeace-­‐at-­‐the-­‐world-­‐peoples-­‐conference-­‐on/blog/11651/	  .	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  accessed	  5.1.2013	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local	   communities	   in	   developing	   countries	   (interview	   with	   executive	  director,	  Greenpeace	  Africa,	  03.07.2010).	  	  	  In	   late	   2009	   the	   board	   of	   Greenpeace	   International	   announced	   that	   Kumi	  Naidoo	  would	  be	   the	  organisation’s	  new	  executive	  director.	  Kumi	  Naidoo	   is	  South	  African	  by	  birth	  but	  had	  to	  leave	  the	  country	  and	  settled	  in	  the	  UK	  as	  a	  result	   of	   his	   involvement	   in	   the	   anti-­‐Apartheid	   struggle.	   As	   a	   life-­‐long	   civil	  and	   human	   rights	   activist,	   former	   secretary	   general	   and	   CEO	   of	   CIVICUS:	  World	  Alliance	  for	  Citizen	  Participation	  (which	  is	  dedicated	  to	  strengthening	  global	  citizen	  action	  and	  civil	  society),	  and	  founding	  chair	  of	  the	  Global	  Call	  to	  Action	   Against	   Poverty,	   Kumi	   Naidoo	   is	   not	   from	   a	   typically	   ‘green’	  background.	  He	  is	  clear	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  considers	  the	  climate	  issue	  to	  be	   inextricably	   linked	   to	   the	   fight	   against	   poverty	   and	   global	   justice,	   as	  evidenced	   in	   these	   extracts	   from	   a	   commentary	   he	   wrote	   for	   the	   BBC	   the	  week	  he	  assumed	  his	  new	  position:	  “I	  see	  a	  need	  to	  bring	  together	  the	  poverty	  movement	  and	  the	  environmental	   movement	   as	   we	   face	   up	   to	   the	   greatest	  challenge	   of	   our	   time:	   climate	   change.	   (…)	   I	   believe	   the	  struggles	   against	   poverty	   and	   climate	   change	   are	   inextricably	  linked,	   while	   the	   solutions	   are	   the	   same.	   (...)	   Justice	   is	  applicable	  to	  all	  of	  life:	  human,	  plant	  and	  animal.	  This	  is	  why	  I	  came	  to	  Greenpeace	  -­‐	  for	  climate	  justice”	  (Naidoo	  2009).	  It	   is,	  at	   the	   time	  of	  writing,	   too	  early	   to	   judge	  Kumi	  Naidoo’s	   impact	  on	   the	  development	   of	   Greenpeace’s	   campaign	   priorities,	   the	   organisation’s	  willingness	  to	  engage	  more	  closely	  with	  the	  global	  justice	  movement,	  and	  the	  extent	   to	   which	   he	   will	   bring	   his	   former	   experiences	   with	   citizen	  participation	  to	  bear	  on	  Greenpeace’s	  modus	  operandi.	  However,	  the	  timing	  of	   his	   appointment	   indicates	   a	   clear	   willingness	   at	   the	   governing	   level	   of	  Greenpeace	   International	   to	   deepen	   the	   links	   between	   the	   organisation’s	  climate	  work	  and	  the	  global	  poverty	  and	  justice	  agendas.	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vii. Conclusion	  Greenpeace	   and	   WWF	   have,	   in	   different	   ways,	   become	   two	   of	   the	   most	  prominent	   organisations	   associated	   with	   the	   modern	   environmental	  movement	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  ‘green	  conscience’	  since	  the	  1960s.	  Nonetheless,	  as	  this	  chapter	  has	  shown,	  the	  two	  organisations	  differ	  both	  in	  the	  specifics	  of	  what	   they	  want	   to	  achieve	  and	  –	  more	  succinctly	   -­‐	   in	  how	  they	  go	  about	   it.	  What	   these	   two	  organisations	   have	   in	   common,	   however,	   is	   that	   they	  have	  evolved	   according	   to	   a	   ‘top-­‐down	   logic’:	   they	   are	   both	   characterised	   by	   a	  relatively	   hierarchical	   organisational	   structure.	   Before	   turning	   to	   a	   more	  systematic	   comparative	  discussion	  of	  both	   the	  potential	  and	   the	   limitations	  of	  these	  two	  organisations	  for	  acting	  as	  conduits	  between	  marginalised	  local	  communities	  and	  global	  policymaking	  processes,	  it	  is	  therefore	  instructive	  to	  also	   focus	   on	   a	   different	   category	   of	   environmental	   NGOs.	   The	   following	  chapter	  will	  investigate	  the	  cases	  of	  FoEI	  and	  CAN	  (with	  a	  somewhat	  briefer	  comparative	  look	  at	  the	  CBD	  Alliance)	  who	  differ	  from	  both	  Greenpeace	  and	  WWF	   in	   that	   they	   operate	   based	   on	   a	   ‘bottom-­‐up	   logic’	   and	   are	   better	  characterised	  as	  networks.	  The	  final	  chapter	  of	  the	  thesis	  (chapter	  VIII)	  will	  then	  adopt	   a	   comparative	  perspective	   to	   look	  at	   the	   respective	   factors	   that	  facilitate	   or	   inhibit	   the	   ability	   of	   these	   organisations	   to	   assume	  representative	  functions	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  global	  environmental	  institutions.	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VII. Responsiveness	   in	   networks:	   Friends	   of	   the	  
Earth	   International,	   the	   Climate	  Action	  Network	   and	  
the	  CBD	  Alliance	  Friends	   of	   the	   Earth	   International	   and	   the	   Climate	   Action	   Network	   differ	  from	   both	   WWF	   and	   Greenpeace	   in	   that	   they	   are	   better	   described	   as	  networks	   of	   organisations,	   that	   is	   to	   say	   their	   members	   are	   relatively	  autonomous	   groups	   that	   by	   and	   large	   join	   the	   network	   as	   pre-­‐existing	  organisations.63	   In	   the	   case	   of	  WWF	   and	   Greenpeace,	   new	  member	   groups	  are	   generally	   set	   up	   by	   the	   central	   organisation.	   This	  means	   that	   FoEI	   and	  CAN	  are	  characterised	  by	  a	  more	  horizontal	  structure	  and	  have	  much	  more	  heterogeneous	  memberships.	   It	   is	   not	   surprising	   then	   that	   groups	   such	   as	  FoEI	   also	  display	  more	  open	   ‘arguing’	   than	   the	   relatively	  more	  hierarchical	  NGOs	  where	  values,	  positions	  and	  strategy	  can	  more	  easily	  be	  determined	  in	  a	   top-­‐down	  fashion.	  Sociologists	   talk	  about	   the	  challenge	  of	  negotiating	  and	  re-­‐negotiating	  group	  identities	  (Smith	  2002;	  Doherty	  2006).	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  be	   especially	   challenging	   for	   transnational	   networks	   that	   bring	   together	   a	  highly	   diverse	   range	   of	   organisations	   from	   very	   different	   cultural,	   political	  and	  material	  contexts.	  The	  three	  networks	  portrayed	  here	  have	  responded	  to	  this	  challenge	  in	  different	  ways.	  	  
	  
i. Friends	  of	  the	  Earth	  International:	  building	  global	  solidarity	  On	   its	   website	   FoEI	   introduces	   itself	   as	   the	   “world’s	   largest	   grassroots	  environmental	  network”	  (FoEI	  n.d.	   ‘FoEI	  homepage’).	  FoEI	  differs	  from	  both	  Greenpeace	   and	   WWF	   in	   the	   particularly	   democratic	   and	   participatory	  nature	   of	   its	   internal	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   and	   its	   relatively	   radical	  agenda	   (both	   aspects	   will	   be	   discussed	   below).	   Its	   approach	   is	   firmly	  anchored	   within	   the	   ‘environmental	   justice’	   tradition	   of	   environmental	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  The	  CBD	  Alliance	  presents	  a	  ‘special	  case’	  in	  that	  it	  does	  not	  have	  formal	  members	  but	  sees	  its	  role	  as	  a	  ‘platform’	  or	  ‘broker’	  to	  support	  the	  CSOs	  working	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  CBD.	  In	  this	   chapter,	   a	   brief	   overview	   of	   the	   CBD	   Alliance	   is	   mainly	   provided	   as	   a	   basis	   for	  comparison	  with	  CAN.	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thought:	   it	   criticizes	   the	   neoliberal	   underpinnings	   of	   the	   current	   system	   of	  global	  governance	  and	   treats	  environmental	  progress	  as	   inextricably	   linked	  to	   social	   justice,	   human	   rights	   and	   the	   empowerment	   and	   participation	   of	  marginalised	   communities.	   FoEI	   makes	   a	   direct	   connection	   between	   the	  values	  it	  espouses	  internally	  and	  the	  change	  it	  seeks	  in	  the	  world:	  its	  mission	  statement	  includes	  “living	  the	  change	  we	  wish	  to	  see	  and	  working	  together	  in	  solidarity”	  (FoEI	  n.d.	  ‘Our	  mission	  and	  vision’).	  	  Friends	  of	  the	  Earth	  was	  founded	  in	  San	  Francisco	  in	  1969	  by	  David	  Brower,	  who	  had	   just	   resigned	   from	  his	   position	   as	   executive	  director	   of	   the	   Sierra	  Club	   (Carmin	   and	   Bast	   2009,	   356).	   Frustrated	   by	  what	   he	   perceived	   to	   be	  serious	  flaws	  in	  the	  Sierra	  Club’s	  organisational	  model	  and	  approach,	  Brower	  envisaged	   the	   new	   organisation	   to	   be	   transnational,	   decentralised	   and	  overtly	  political.	  Together	  with	  environmental	   activists	   from	   four	   countries	  (France,	  Sweden,	  England	  and	  USA),	  he	  established	  the	  international	  layer	  of	  Friends	   of	   the	   Earth,	   FoEI,	   in	   1971	   (Doherty	   2006,	   863).	   Brower	   used	   the	  image	   of	   the	   Californian	   ‘bristlecone	   pine’	   to	   explain	   his	   vision	   of	   FoEI’s	  organisational	  structure:	  there	  would	  be	  “no	  hierarchical	  coordinator	  and	  no	  highly	   organised	   bureaucratic	   structure”	   but	   “each	   bristlecone,	   given	   a	  chance,	   knew	   exactly	  what	   to	   do,	   and	   can	   last	   far	   longer	   than	   anything	  we	  ever	   dreamed	   up”	   (Brower	   1985	   quoted	   in	   Timmer	   2007,	   5).	  Decentralisation,	   the	  autonomy	  of	  member	  groups	  and	   flat	  decision-­‐making	  structures	  were	  thus	  integral	  elements	  of	  the	  network	  from	  the	  start.	  	  Soon	  after	  the	  organisation	  had	  been	  created,	  FoEI	  became	  an	  active	  player	  in	  the	  anti-­‐nuclear	  movement.	  It	  also	  lobbied	  hard	  to	  ban	  whaling	  in	  the	  1970s	  (thus	   contributing	   to	   the	   1982	   moratorium	   on	   commercial	   whaling)	   and	  turned	   its	   focus	   to	   ozone-­‐depleting	   substances,	   tropical	   rainforests	   and	  pesticides	  in	  the	  1980s.	  During	  this	  time	  FoEI	  started	  to	  welcome	  more	  and	  more	  member	  groups	  from	  the	  global	  South	  into	  the	  network.64	  That	  decade	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  See	  appendix	  in	  Doherty	  2006,	  878-­‐880	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the	   organisation	   also	   began	   campaigning	   for	   the	   adoption	   of	   social	   and	  environmental	   standards	  by	   the	  World	  Bank.	   In	   the	  1990s,	  FoEI	   intensified	  its	  efforts	  directed	  at	  international	  organisations	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank,	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  WTO,	  calling	  attention	  to	  the	  anti-­‐environmental	  record	  of	  these	  institutions.	  While	   FoEI	   has	   always	   pursued	   a	   dual	   strategy	   of	   protest	   and	  ‘inside’	   lobbying,	   the	   network	   appears	   to	   have	   shifted	   towards	   a	   greater	  emphasis	   on	   ‘resistance’	   over	   recent	   years.	   Today	   FoEI	   stands	   for	   a	   highly	  political	  and	  socially	  progressive	  form	  of	  environmentalism	  whereby	  ‘green’	  issues	  and	  questions	  of	  equity	  and	  justice	  are	  inextricably	  linked.	  This	  is	  well	  illustrated	   by	   FoEI’s	   six	   international	   programmes	   and	   campaigns	   in	   2009:	  climate	   justice	   and	   energy;	   food	   sovereignty;	   agrofuels;	   forests	   and	  biodiversity;	  economic	  justice	  –	  resisting	  neoliberalism;	  and	  gender.	  	  	  
ii. Exploring	  forms	  of	  responsiveness	  within	  FoEI	  	  	  
Responsiveness	  to	  members	  FoEI	   is	   structured	   as	   a	   federation,	   made	   up	   of	   77	   Friends	   of	   the	   Earth	  member	   groups	   and	   13	   affiliates	   around	   the	   world	   in	   2009	   (FoEI	   2010b).	  Anheier	  and	  Themudo	  define	  a	   federation	  as	  an	  organisation	   “based	  on	   the	  principle	   of	   subsidiarity,	   whereby	   power	   rests	   with	   the	   local	   units	   rather	  then	   the	   coordinating	   centre”	   (2002,	   204).	   Through	   its	   national	   groups	  (which	   are	   often	   umbrella	   groups	   bringing	   together	   other	   local	  organisations),	   the	  network	  unites	  more	   than	  5000	   local	  groups	  and	  claims	  to	  have	  over	  two	  million	  members	  and	  supporters	  (FoEI	  n.d.	   ‘Who	  we	  are’).	  The	  network	  has	  an	  international	  secretariat	  based	  in	  Amsterdam,	  which	  was	  set	   up	   in	   1981.	   Its	   small	   size	   relative	   to	   the	   international	   headquarters	   or	  secretariats	   of	   WWF	   and	   Greenpeace	   –	   it	   employed	   around	   20	   staff	   and	  volunteers	  in	  2009	  (FoEI	  2010b)	  –	  is	  a	  good	  indicator	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  FoEI	  is	  not	   a	   ‘top-­‐heavy’	   organisation	   and	   that	   power	   resides	   with	   the	   member	  groups.	  According	  to	  the	  2009	  financial	  report,	  FoEI’s	  annual	  income	  was	  2.7	  million	   Euros,	   of	   which	   only	   12%	   came	   from	   membership	   fees	   from	   the	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member	  groups,	  and	  the	  majority	  (86%)	  from	  other	  donors	  (FoEI	  2010a).65	  FoEI’s	  most	   important	   donors	   in	   2009	  were	   the	  Dutch	  Ministry	   of	   Foreign	  Affairs,	   the	   Isvara	  Foundation,	  Novib	  and	   the	  European	  Union.	  The	  work	  of	  the	   international	   secretariat	   is	   overseen	  by	   the	   executive	   committee	  which	  meets	   several	   times	   a	   year	   and	   is	   elected	   by	   the	   member	   groups	   at	   the	  biannual	  general	  meeting	  (BGM).	  	  	  FoEI	   is	   very	   decentralised:	   the	   national	   members	   are	   autonomous	  organisations	  that	  comply	  with	  the	  guidelines	  established	  by	  the	  federation.	  Unlike	   in	   the	  case	  of	  WWF	  or	  Greenpeace,	  which	   ‘set	  up’	  national	  offices	   in	  new	   countries,	   already	   existing	   local	   groups	   apply	   for	   membership	   to	   the	  FoEI	  network.	  So,	  for	  instance,	  Citizens	  for	  Justice	  is	  also	  Friends	  of	  the	  Earth	  Malawi,	   and	   Otros	   Mundos,	   a	   Mexican	   community-­‐based	   organisation	  working	   with	   people	   from	   cooperatives,	   communities	   and	   social	  organisations,	   constitutes	   Friends	   of	   the	   Earth	   Mexico.	   New	   members	   are	  encouraged	  but	  not	  obliged	  to	  adopt	  the	  name	  ‘Friends	  of	  the	  Earth’	  in	  their	  own	  languages	  and	  only	  about	  half	  of	  them	  have	  done	  so.	  Potential	  members	  should	  meet	  a	  number	  of	  criteria,	  for	  example,	  alignment	  “with	  FoEI’s	  vision	  (of	  both	  the	  federation	  and	  the	  world),	  core	  values	  and	  mission”;	  they	  should	  “have	   participatory	   democracy	   or	   other	   forms	   of	   participatory	   decision-­‐making	  processes”;	  and	  “work	  effectively	  on	  both	  the	  national	  and	  grassroots	  levels,	  and	  work	  to	  strengthen	  social	  movements	  in	  their	  local,	  national	  and	  international	   contexts”	   (FoEI	  n.d.	   ‘Criteria	   for	  membership’).	  New	  members	  have	  to	  be	  approved	  by	  the	  BGM	  and	  are	  first	  accorded	  ‘associate’	  status	  for	  a	  couple	  of	  years	  before	  they	  are	  upgraded	  to	  full	  members	  (also	  at	  the	  BGM).	  Not	   all	   applicants	  make	   it	   to	   full	  membership	   status	   and	   those	  who	  do	   can	  still	  be	  “expelled	  for	  corruption,	  other	  infringements	  of	  rules	  or	  for	  failure	  to	  maintain	  effective	  campaigning”	  (Doherty	  2006,	  864).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Note	   that	   these	   figures	   are	   for	   the	   international	  body	  only,	   not	   the	  network	  as	   a	  whole.	  Contributions	  by	  individual	  supporters	  are	  made	  the	  national	  member	  groups	  for	  whom	  this	  constitutes	  a	  main	  source	  of	  income.	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The	  BGM	   is	   the	  main	  global	  decision-­‐making	  body	  within	   the	  network.	  The	  meeting	   lasts	   one	   week	   and	   allows	   delegates	   from	   the	   member	   groups	   to	  strengthen	   their	   personal	   bonds	   and	   engage	   in	   in-­‐depth	   discussions	   about	  the	   network’s	   values	   and	   priorities,	   about	   current	   campaigns	   and	   future	  strategic	   direction,	   and	   the	   most	   appropriate	   forms	   of	   interaction	   and	  coordination	   among	   the	   groups.	  Besides	   the	   global	  BGM,	   regional	  meetings	  also	  provide	  important	  venues	  for	  bringing	  together	  more	  limited	  groupings	  of	   members.	   Representatives	   report	   at	   the	   BGM	   on	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	  regional	   discussions.	   Although	   the	   network	   only	   had	   two	   formal	   regional	  structures	   in	  2009	  (FoE	  Europe	  and	  FoE	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean),	  similar	   but	   less	   formalised	   groupings	   also	   exist	   elsewhere.	   Further	  strengthening	   regional	   cooperation	   and	  delegating	   “more	  development	   and	  decision-­‐making	   processes	   to	   the	   regional	   structures”	   are	   considered	  important	  elements	  of	  FoEI’s	  membership	  development	  strategies.	  This	  also	  implies	  creating	   “space	   for	  regions	   to	   take	  on	  additional	  political	  objectives	  and	  strategies	  that	  are	  more	  regionally	  relevant”	  (FoEI	  2010b).	  Exchanges	  at	  the	  regional	  level	  are	  considered	  particularly	  valuable	  because	  they	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  hampered	  by	  language	  and	  cultural	  differences	  and	  members	  can	  jointly	   “map	   out	   the	   political	   landscape	   facing	   the	   region”	   (interview	   with	  climate	  campaigner,	  FoEI,	  06.05.2010)	  	  Timmer	   finds	   that	   the	   BGM	   constitutes	   the	   “lifeblood	   of	   the	   organisation”	  (2007,	   166),	   thanks	   to	   the	   vibrant	   exchange	   that	   takes	   place	   among	   the	  members.	  All	  members	  enjoy	  an	  equal	  vote	  at	   the	  BGM	  (although	  decisions	  are	  usually	  taken	  by	  consensus	  rather	  than	  voted	  upon),	  irrespective	  of	  their	  financial	   contributions	   to	   the	   network	   or	   the	   size	   of	   their	   own	   member	  constituencies.	   Due	   to	   FoEI’s	   geographical	   spread,	   Southern	   member	  organisations	  hold	  the	  majority	  of	  votes	  at	  the	  BGM.	  One	  consequence	  of	  this	  is	  that	  individual	  members	  in	  the	  North	  are	  formally	  underrepresented	  in	  the	  network	   since	   the	   Northern	   based	   groups	   tend	   to	   have	   much	   larger	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individual	   membership	   bases	   (Anheier	   and	   Themudo	   2002,	   212).66	   FoE	  Germany	   (Bund	   für	   Umwelt	   und	   Naturschutz),	   for	   instance,	   with	   350,000	  individual	  members	  has	   the	   same	   formal	   voting	   strength	  as	  FoE	  Chile	  with	  4,450	   members	   (Doherty	   2006,	   appendix).67	   These	   differences	   reflect	   the	  organisational	   diversity	   within	   the	   network:	   member	   groups	   are	   not	  required	  to	  conform	  to	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  organisation	  and	  do	  not	  have	  to	  have	  a	  large	  base	  of	  individual	  members.	  	  	  Because	  FoEI	  values	  the	  diversity	  of	  its	  member	  groups	  and	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  present	  a	   ‘unified	   front’	   to	   the	  outside	  world,	   its	  website	   includes	  relatively	  open	   descriptions	   of	   the	   tensions	   and	   disagreements	   that	   can	   occur	   in	   the	  process	   of	   searching	   for	   consensus	   within	   the	   network.	   This	   is,	   without	   a	  doubt,	   an	   important	  difference	   to	  more	   ‘brand-­‐oriented’	  organisations	   such	  as	   WWF	   and	   Greenpeace.	   One	   consequence	   of	   FoEI’s	   commitment	   to	   a	  decentralised	   structure,	   bottom-­‐up	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   and	   respect	  for	  the	  wide	  diversity	  among	  the	  members	  is	  that	  the	  network	  is	  sometimes	  slow	  to	  come	  up	  with	  global	  positions	  and	  that,	  “any	  claim	  about	  the	  identity	  or	  strategy	  shared	  by	  the	  Federation	  is	  (...)	  recognised	  as	  potentially	  difficult”	  (Doherty	  2006,	  872).	  FoEI	  develops	  global	  positions	  in	  response	  to	  demands	  by	   members:	   “if	   national	   member	   groups	   want	   us	   to	   have	   a	   stronger	   or	  different	   position	   at	   the	   international	   level”	   (interview	   with	   climate	  campaigner,	  FoEI,	  06.05.2010).	  The	  process	  can	  be	  “long	  and	  arduous”	  since	  the	   network	   tries	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   the	   relevant	   documents	   are,	   where	  possible,	  available	  to	  groups	  in	  their	  own	  language	  and	  that	  there	  is	  sufficient	  time	   for	   discussion	   in	   “national	   and	   regional	   spaces”	   (ibid).	   Rather	   than	  working	   for	   the	   international	   secretariat	   in	   Amsterdam,	   the	   campaign	  coordinators	  are	  often	  based	  with	  national	  member	  groups.	  Unless	  members	  have	  jointly	  agreed	  on	  a	  specific	  position,	  campaigners	  will	  shun	  away	  from	  making	   statements	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   federation	   on	   these	   issues.	   Individual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  However,	  due	  to	  the	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  reaching	  consensus	  through	  deliberation	  within	  the	  network,	  formal	  voting	  power	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  of	  secondary	  importance.	  	  67	  The	  number	  of	  individual	  members	  relates	  to	  the	  year	  2002.	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member	   groups	   are,	   however,	   still	   entitled	   to	   put	   forward	   their	   own	  positions	  as	  long	  as	  they	  do	  not	  claim	  to	  speak	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  federation	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  	  In	  2006,	  the	  network	  adopted	  –	  for	  the	  first	  time	  –	  a	  strategic	  plan	  for	  FoEI.	  FoEI	   emphasize	   that	   the	   process	   of	   arriving	   at	   the	   plan	   was	   “bottom-­‐up,	  inclusive	   and	   participatory,	   and	  was	   based	   on	   our	   engagement	   at	   the	   local	  level	  and	  with	  grassroots	  communities.”	  The	  outcome	  is,	  according	  to	  FoEI,	  a	  “powerful	  and	  profound	  reshaping”	  of	  their	  international	  work,	  with	  the	  aim	  to	   	   “transition	   from	  a	   lobbying	  and	  advocacy	  organisation	   into	  a	  worldwide	  environmental	   movement	   that	   supports	   the	   grassroots	   activities	   of	   its	  member	   groups,	  mobilises	   people	   to	   act	   in	   solidarity	  with	   each	   other,	   and	  promotes	   socially	   just	   and	   environmentally	   sustainable	   societies”	   (FoEI	  2007,	  3).	  The	  new	  strategic	  plan	  consists	  of	  four	  key	  strategic	  themes	  for	  the	  next	   ten	   years:	   “mobilise”,	   “resist”,	   “transform”,	   and	   “strengthen	   Friends	   of	  the	  Earth	  International”.	  The	  objectives	  covered	  by	  these	  themes	  include:	  “to	  continue	   the	   gradual	   shift	   of	   our	   network	   towards	   a	   truly	   grassroots	  environmental	  movement”	  and	  expanding	  links	  with	  other	  social	  movements	  (‘mobilise’);	  the	  grounding	  of	  all	  work	  in	  local	  realities	  while	  using	  influence	  at	   the	   international	   level	   to	   challenge	   the	  global	  economic	   system	  (‘resist’);	  promoting	   more	   sustainable	   production	   and	   consumption	   patterns	  (‘transform’);	   and	   building	   the	   capacity	   of	   member	   groups	   at	   all	   levels	  (‘strengthen	   Friends	   of	   the	   Earth	   International’)	   (FoEI	   2008).	   According	   to	  Doherty’s	   (2006)	   excellent	   analysis	   the	   strategic	   plan	   is	   the	   outcome	   of	   a	  challenging	   process	   of	   “negotiating	   a	   transnational	   identity”	   to	   overcome	   a	  number	   of	   ideological	   fissures	   that	   brought	   FoEI	   close	   to	   breaking	   point	  around	  2002/2003.	  One	  outcome	  of	  this	  process	  was	  a	  stronger	  embrace	  of	  Southern	   positions	   by	   the	   network	   as	   a	   whole;	   another	   was	   the	   re-­‐affirmation	  of	  the	  value	  of	  diversity	  among	  members.	  This	  is	  well	  illustrated	  in	  this	  quote	  from	  the	  2008	  Annual	  Report:	  “FoEI	  has	  become	  strong	  enough	  to	  allow	  for	  disagreement	  and	  uncertainty.	   We	   can	   accept	   that	   immediate	   solutions	   aren’t	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always	   available;	   and	   that	   processes	   themselves	   are	   an	  essential	   part	   of	   the	   solutions.	   These	   solutions	   do	   not	  determine	  who	  is	  right	  and	  who	  is	  wrong;	  they	  are	  founded	  in	  the	   process	   of	   respecting	   different	   realities	   and	   perspectives	  and	  building	  the	  answers	  together”	  (FoEI	  2009b).	  FoEI’s	   crisis	   started	   when	   Accion	   Ecologica	   (FoE	   Ecuador)	   announced	   its	  departure	  from	  the	  network	  due	  to	  what	  they	  considered	  to	  be	  unbridgeable	  differences	   between	   the	   network’s	   Northern	   and	   Southern	   members.	  Doherty	  argues	  that	  it	  was	  the	  2002	  WSSD	  which	  brought	  many	  of	  the	  North-­‐South	   tensions	   among	   FoEI’s	   member	   groups	   to	   the	   foreground	   (Doherty	  2006,	  868);	   these	  had,	  however,	   already	  been	   simmering	  prior	   to	   this.	   In	   a	  2000	  edition	  of	  FoEI’s	  newsletter,	  for	  instance,	  Kevin	  Dunion,	  former	  chair	  of	  FoEI,	   refers	   to	  a	  number	  of	   “deep-­‐rooted	  concerns”	  within	   the	  network.	  He	  particularly	   points	   to	   the	   different	   positions	   among	  members	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	  ‘environmental	  space’	  versus	   ‘ecological	  debt’	  debate68;	  unhappiness	  among	  Southern	   groups	   about	   campaign	   planning	   being	   too	   influenced	   by	   short-­‐term	  tactical	  considerations	  such	  as	  getting	  media	  coverage	  and	  fundraising,	  whereas	   they	   would	   like	   more	   emphasis	   on	   structural	   causes	   in	   FoEI’s	  campaigns;	   and	   concerns	   among	   some	   Southern	   groups	   regarding	   the	  willingness	  of	  Northern	  members	  to	  engage	  with	  corporations	  and	  promote	  various	  forms	  of	  corporate	  accountability	  (Dunion	  2000).	  	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  apparent	  North-­‐South	  dimension,	  Doherty	  points	  out	  that	  the	  debate	  was,	   in	   fact,	  more	  nuanced	  and	   that	  both	  among	   the	  developed	  and	  the	  developing	  country	  member	  groups	  there	  were	  differences	  in	  opinion	  as	  to	  how	  radical	  a	  stance	  FoEI	  should	  adopt	  in	  its	  rejection	  of	  capitalism	  and	  its	  strategy	   to	   support	   this	   goal	   (Doherty	   2006,	   860).	   As	   the	   debates	   became	  more	  heated,	  FoEI	  members	  decided	  to	  embark	  on	  a	  process	  of	  reconciliation	  and	  to	  focus	  on	  redefining	  and	  acknowledging	  the	  bonds	  holding	  the	  network	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  The	  concept	  of	  ‘environmental	  space’	  implies	  “equal	  rights	  to	  resource	  consumption	  for	  all	  peoples	   of	   the	  world	  within	   the	   carrying	   capacity	   of	   the	   planet”	   (FoE	   Netherlands	   1992),	  whereas	  ‘ecological	  debt’	  also	  encompasses	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  historical	  responsibility	  of	  industrialised	   countries:	   “the	   cumulative	   debt	   of	   northern	   industrialised	   nations	   to	   Third	  World	   countries	   for	   resource	  plundering,	  biodiversity	   loss,	   environmental	  damage	  and	   the	  free	  occupation	  of	  environmental	  space	  to	  deposit	  wastes”	  (FoEI	  n.d.	  ‘Ecological	  debt).	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together.	  To	  this	  end	  FoEI	  convened	  an	  extraordinary	  general	  meeting	  (EGM)	  in	  Cartagena	  in	  September	  2003	  where	  they	  experimented	  with	  a	  number	  of	  new	  forms	  of	  dialogue	  among	  members	  groups.	  Doherty	  highlights	  the	  use	  of	  the	   ‘Open	   Space’	   method,	   whereby	   “participants	   were	   assumed	   to	   be	  individuals,	   not	   representatives	   of	   groups”	   and	   “to	   have	   no	   differentiating	  commitments	   or	   responsibilities”	   (Doherty	   2006,	   873).	   This	   observation	   is	  interesting,	  as	  it	  suggests	  that	  FoEI	  was	  keen	  to	  discourage	  participants	  from	  understanding	  their	  role	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘speaking	  for’	  a	  wider	  constituency	  –	  be	  it	  their	  colleagues	  back	  home,	  the	  members	  of	  their	  national	  organisation,	  or	  the	   grassroots	   they	   may	   be	   working	   with.	   However,	   the	   point	   does	   not	  necessarily	   apply	   to	   the	   other	   forms	   of	   communication	   employed	   at	   and	  around	   the	   2003	   EGM,	   including	   an	   internet	   discussion	   forum	   and	   an	  inner/outer	  circle	  method,	  “which	  uses	  a	  delegate	  system	  to	  make	  debating	  and	   decision-­‐making	   about	   issues	   among	   68	   member	   groups	   more	  manageable”	  (FoEI	  2004,	  6).	  	  In	  2004	  the	  network	  started	   to	  undergo	  a	   “strategic	  visioning	  and	  planning	  process”	   designed	   to	   “address	   issues	   such	   as	   solidarity,	   alliance	   building,	  political	   differences,	   decision-­‐making,	   internal	   leadership,	   identity	   and	  participation”	  (FoEI	  2005,	  3).	  In	  2005	  this	  process	  led	  the	  network	  to	  adopt	  a	  new	  mission	  statement.	  The	  new	  mission	  statement	  consists	  of	  six	  principles	  that	  demonstrate	  clearly	   the	  central	   importance	  of	  environmental	   justice	   to	  the	  values	  espoused	  by	  FoEI.	  In	  fact,	  only	  one	  of	  the	  six	  principles	  is	  devoted	  to	  purely	  ecological	  objectives	  (“halt	  and	  reverse	  environmental	  degradation	  and	   the	   depletion	   of	   natural	   resources”),	   while	   all	   others	   emphasize	   social	  justice,	   the	   need	   for	   societal	   change,	   democratic	   empowerment,	   grassroots	  participation	   and	   solidarity.	   The	   adoption	   of	   the	   strategic	   plan	   mentioned	  above	  is	  another	  outcome	  from	  this	  process.	  	  	  
Responsiveness	  to	  local	  communities	  Strengthening	   the	   participation	   by	   communities	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	  processes	  (at	  the	  local,	  national	  and	  international	  level)	  that	  affect	  them	  is	  a	  
	   236	  
core	   element	   and	   objective	   of	   FoEI’s	   work.	   Among	   the	   many	   examples	   of	  member	   groups’	   projects	   designed	   to	   support	   this	   aim	   is	   the	  work	   by	   FoE	  groups	   in	   Indonesia	   and	   Papua	   New	   Guinea	   with	   mining-­‐affected	  communities	   so	   that	   these	  were	  better	   able	   to	   input	   into	   the	  World	  Bank’s	  Extractive	  Industries	  Review	  (FoEI	  2004);	  FoE	  Columbia’s	  efforts	  to	  build	  the	  capacity	  of	  local	  communities	  to	  actively	  participate	  in	  the	  national	  debate	  on	  water	   privatisation	   (FoEI	   2008);	   and	   the	   exchanges	   between	   communities	  affected	  by	  the	  West	  African	  Gas	  Pipeline	  project	  organised	  by	  FoE	  groups	  in	  Nigeria,	  Ghana	  and	  Togo	  (FoEI	  2007).	  In	  this	  work,	  the	  network	  is	  guided	  by	  the	  objective	  to	  empower	  local	  communities	  and	  to	  “(open)	  up	  spaces	  so	  that	  they	   can	   speak	   for	   themselves”	   (interview	   with	   climate	   campaigner,	   FoEI,	  06.05.2010).	   The	   closeness	   to	   the	   grassroots	   –	   through	   its	   own	   member	  groups	   and	   through	   alliances	   with	   social	   movements	   –	   is	   an	   absolutely	  integral	  part	  of	  FoEI’s	  self-­‐understanding	  and	  the	  network	  prides	  itself	  in	  the	  fact	  that:	  “Our	  international	  positions	  are	  informed	  and	  strengthened	  by	  our	  work	  with	  communities,	  and	  our	  alliances	  with	  indigenous	  peoples,	  farmers'	  movements,	  trade	  unions,	  human	  rights	  groups	  and	  others”	  (FoEI	  n.d.	  ‘About	  Friends	  of	  the	  Earth	  International’).	  	  Although	  FoEI	  describes	   itself	   as	   a	   ‘grassroots	  network’,	   there	  are	  different	  conceptions	   among	   its	   members	   of	   who	   the	   ‘grassroots’	   actually	   are,	   how	  member	  groups	  relate	  to	  the	  grassroots,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  their	  position	  can	  and	  should	  be	  informed	  by	  their	  work	  with	  the	  grassroots.	  At	  the	  2008	  BGM,	  FoEI	  member	  groups	  discussed	  these	  questions	  and	  agreed	  to	  use	   the	   term	  ‘grassroots’	   to	  refer	   to	  “communities	  affected	  by	   injustices	  or	  unsustainable	  development.	  Also,	  people	  who	  are	  coming	  from	  those	  communities,	  who	  are	  organising	   themselves	   and	   are	   working	   for	   change,	   are	   considered	  ‘grassroots’.	   This	   includes	   both	   people	   from	   the	   North	   and	   South.”	   They	  acknowledged,	  however,	  the	  difficulties	  associated	  with	  any	  claims	  to	  ‘speak	  for’	  grassroots	  communities	  and	  came	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that,	  “To	  ensure	  the	  integrity	   of	   our	   work,	   we	   also	   emphasised	   the	   need	   to	   recognise	   that	   the	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priorities	   of	   the	   grassroots	   inform	   our	   work,	   but	   they	   do	   not	   define	   our	  political	  agenda	  or	  campaigns”	  (FoEI	  2009b).	  
	  At	   the	  BGM	   in	  Croatia	   in	   2004,	  Ricardo	  Navarro,	   the	   retiring	   chair	   of	   FoEI,	  called	   the	   organisation	   a	   social	  movement	   as	   opposed	   to	   an	  NGO	   (Doherty	  2006,	  867).	  FoEI	  has	   since	  distanced	   itself	   from	   this	  description,	   again	  as	  a	  result	  of	  an	  internal	  discussion	  on	  its	  role	  in	  the	  broader	  political	  context	  of	  different	  social	  movements:	  “It	  is	  clear	  that	  FoEI	  is	  not	  a	  movement.	  We	  are	  an	  international	  network	  of	  grassroots	  organisations.	  In	  the	  broader	  context,	  FoEI	  acts	  as	  a	  social	  change	  organisation	  which	  aims	  to	  move	  a	  movement	  of	  people	  in	  support	  of	  our	  vision	  and	  mission,	  which	  is	  based	  upon	  principles	  of	   social	   justice	   and	   environmental	   sustainability”	   (FoEI	   2010b).	   What	   is	  clear	  is	  that	  the	  network’s	  alliances	  with	  a	  number	  of	  social	  movements	  are	  an	  important	  facet	  of	  FoEI’s	  work	  and	  are	  continuing	  to	  shape	  FoEI’s	  identity.	  These	  alliances	  also	  present	  key	  components	  of	  FoEI’s	  strategic	  plan,	  which	  states	  under	  the	  theme	  ‘mobilise’:	  “Our	  members	  want	  to	  proactively	  expand	  our	   alliances	   with	   other	   movements,	   including	   labour,	   women,	   and	  indigenous	   peoples,	   and	   to	   build	   broad	   public	   support	   for	   our	   activities”	  (FoEI	   2008).	   Of	   particular	   importance	   to	   FoEI	   is	   the	   alliance	   with	   La	   Via	  Campesina.	   La	   Via	   Campesina,	   “the	   international	   movement	   which	   brings	  together	   millions	   of	   peasants,	   small	   and	   medium-­‐size	   farmers,	   landless	  people,	   women	   farmers,	   indigenous	   people,	   migrants	   and	   agricultural	  workers	   from	   around	   the	  world,”	   has	   around	   150	   organisational	  members	  from	  70	  countries	  in	  Asia,	  Africa,	  Europe	  and	  the	  Americas	  (La	  Via	  Campesina	  2011).	  Besides	  La	  Via	  Campesina,	  FoEI	  is	  also	  working	  to	  establish	  a	  similar	  relationship	  with	  the	  World	  March	  of	  Women.	  	  
iii. Responsiveness	  in	  FoEI:	  motives,	  challenges	  and	  effects	  Many	  of	  FoEI’s	   international	  positions	  are	   influenced	  by	   its	  work	  with	   local	  communities	  and	  social	  movements	  in	  the	  global	  South.	  This	  is	  the	  result	  of	  both	   FoEI’s	   commitment	   to	   decentralisation	  within	   the	   network	   (“ensuring	  the	  programme	  strategies	   are	   rooted	   in	   local	   realities,	   and	   that	  FoEI	  policy	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proposals	   reflect	   the	   priorities	   of	   those	   communities	   most	   affected	   by	  unsustainable	  development”	  (FoEI	  2010))	  and	  its	  strategy	  of	  working	  closely	  with	  social	  movements	  at	  the	  level	  of	  strategy	  development	  and	  in	  organising	  joint	   activities.	   For	   instance,	   La	   Via	   Campesina	   developed	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘food	  sovereignty’	   in	   the	   run-­‐up	   to	   the	   World	   Food	   Summit	   in	   1996.	   FoEI’s	  international	  food	  sovereignty	  programme	  works	  to	  further	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	   ‘Nyeleni	   Forum’	   (the	   first	   World	   Forum	   for	   Food	   Sovereignty)	   held	   in	  Mali	  in	  2007	  and	  organised	  by	  La	  Via	  Campesina	  and	  other	  social	  movements	  from	   the	   global	   South.	   Many	   of	   FoEI’s	   activities	   in	   the	   food	   sovereignty	  programme	   are	   organised	   jointly	   with	   La	   Via	   Campesina.	   Similar	  relationships	  exist	  in	  FoEI’s	  climate	  justice	  and	  energy	  programme	  where	  in	  2009	  the	  network	  also	  collaborated	  with	  La	  Via	  Campesina,	  the	  World	  March	  of	  Women	  and	  the	  new	  Movement	  of	  Victims	  Affected	  by	  Climate	  Change	  in	  Central	  America	  (FoEI	  2010).	  	  FoEI	   does	   not	   only	   promote	   the	   global	   justice	   agenda	   in	   its	   international	  positions,	   it	   also	   seeks	   to	   ‘live’	   social	   justice	   and	   democratic	   forms	   of	  interaction	   within	   the	   network.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   network	   has	   come	   to	  espouse	   values	   around	   participation	   and	   social	   justice	   both	   internally	   and	  towards	  the	  outside	  world	  makes	  FoEI	  a	  particularly	  interesting	  case	  to	  study	  in	   researching	   the	   idea	   of	   NGOs	   as	   democratic	   links	   between	  marginalised	  communities	  and	  global	  institutions:	  “A	  microcosm	  of	  the	  planet	  earth,	  our	  small,	  diverse	  network	  is	  familiar	  with	  both	   conflict	   and	  solidarity.	  We	  strongly	  believe	  in	   the	   need	   for	   democracy,	   transparency,	   accountability,	  participation	   and	   equity	   in	   decision-­‐making	   at	   all	   levels,	   not	  only	  within	  our	  organisation	  but	  also	  at	  the	  governmental	  and	  institutional	  levels”	  (Navarro	  2004,	  3).	  Why	  has	  FoEI	  prioritised	  responsiveness	  to	  the	  grassroots	  to	  such	  a	  degree	  and	  made	  it	  such	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  its	  own	  identity?	  What	  are	  the	  challenges	  associated	   with	   the	   commitment	   to	   decentralisation,	   bottom-­‐up	   decision-­‐making	  processes	  and	  closeness	  to	  local	  communities	  and	  social	  movements?	  And	   does	   this	   make	   the	   network	   a	   particularly	   good	   example	   of	   how	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international	   networked	   civil	   society	   organisations	  may	   act	   as	   ‘democratic	  transmission	  belts’	  in	  world	  politics?	  	  	  The	   particular	   outlook	   and	   values	   that	   have	   characterised	   FoEI	   from	   its	  inception	   are	   clearly	   central	   explanatory	   factors.	   Despite	   the	   considerable	  diversity	  among	   its	  members,	   it	   is	   the	   convergence	  around	  common	  values	  that	  keeps	  the	  network	  together.	  These	  values	  are	  not	  based	  on	  a	  narrowly	  ecological	   or	   conservationist	   interpretation	   of	   environmental	   politics.	  More	  than	   many	   other	   international	   environmental	   NGOs,	   FoEI	   has	   always	  emphasised	  the	  ‘human’	  dimension	  of	  environmental	  politics,	  and	  has	  linked	  environmental	  struggles	  to	  a	  wider	  social	  justice	  agenda:	  “we	  take	  an	  unusual	  stance	   among	   environmental	   groups,	   in	   that	   we	   focus	   almost	   as	   much	   on	  social	  justice	  issues	  as	  on	  environmental	  issues,	  and	  we	  are	  very	  interested	  in	  the	   intersections	   between	   environmental	   and	   social	   issues”	   (FoE	  spokesperson	  quoted	  in	  Carmin	  and	  Bast	  2009,	  357)	  	  This	  means	  that	  FoEI’s	   focus	   is	  more	  naturally	  aligned	  with	  the	  demands	  of	  civil	  society	  groups	  in	  the	  global	  South	  than	  other	  environmental	  groups	  that	  also	   originated	   in	   the	   global	   North.	   Moreover,	   this	   focus	   positions	   the	  network	   as	   a	   key	   player	   in	   both	   the	   global	   environmental	   and	   the	   global	  justice	   movement,	   so	   that	   it	   can	   assume	   the	   dual	   roles	   of	   pushing	   for	   a	  greater	   recognition	   of	   justice	   issues	   in	   the	   environmental	   arena,	   as	  well	   as	  highlighting	   the	   environmental	   dimension	   within	   the	   global	   justice	  movement:	  	  “Often	   the	   political	   priorities	   of	   non-­‐environmental	  organisations	  correspond	  more	  closely	  to	  our	  agenda	  than	  the	  campaign	  priorities	  or	  strategies	  chosen	  by	  our	  environmental	  colleagues	  at	  WWF,	  Greenpeace,	  or	  groups	  within	   the	  Climate	  Action	  Network”,	   so	   that,	   “it	   is	   our	   task	   to	   push	   for	   issues	   of	  social	   justice	  within	  their	  more	  purely	  environmental	  agenda”	  (FoEI	  secretariat	  summary	  document	  for	  NOVIB,	  2003,	  quoted	  in	  Doherty	  2006,	  867)	  “The	  deeply	  entrenched	  view	  that	  the	  development	  process	  is	  a	  critical	   source	   of	   environmental	   problems,	   and	   therefore	   that	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environment	   can	   not	   be	   separated	   from	   human	   rights	   and	  social	   equity,	   shapes	   the	   specific	   ways	   in	  which	   FoE	   engages	  the	  global	  justice	  movement”	  (Carmin	  and	  Bast	  2009,	  357)	  Closely	   related	   to	   these	   worldviews	   are	   FoEI’s	   commitments	   to	   internal	  democracy,	   solidarity	   with	   social	   movements	   and	   participation	   by	   the	  grassroots.	   While	   the	   distinction	   between	   internal	   and	   external	   lines	   of	  accountability	   is	   useful	   in	   analysing	   more	   hierarchical	   and	   ‘closed’	   groups	  such	   as	   WWF	   and	   Greenpeace,	   differentiating	   between	   members	   and	  grassroots	  or	  local	  communities	  becomes	  much	  harder	  in	  the	  case	  of	  FoEI.	  As	  was	   already	  described	   above,	   FoEI	   considers	   itself	   a	   network	  of	   grassroots	  organisations	  and	  has	  pursued	  a	  deliberate	  strategy	  of	  decentralisation	  and	  valuing,	   rather	   than	   suppressing,	   the	   diversity	   among	   its	   member	   groups.	  This	   is	   only	   possible	   because	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   FoEI	   is	   less	   concerned	   about	  maintaining	   a	   ‘unified	   front’	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   outside	   world	   and	   sees	   the	  autonomy	  of	  its	  member	  groups	  together	  with	  the	  potential	  for	  conflict,	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  address	  these	  conflicts	  through	  dialogue,	  as	  integral	  elements	  of	  its	  identity.	  	  	  	  FoEI’s	  commitment	  to	  democratic	  and	  equitable	  forms	  of	  dialogue	  among	  its	  members	   (where	   the	   influence	   of	   member	   groups	   is	   decoupled	   –	   at	   least	  formally	  –	  from	  financial	  clout	  and	  the	  number	  of	  individual	  supporters)	  has	  allowed	   for	   a	   stronger	   embrace	   of	   Southern	   positions	   by	   the	   network.	   The	  period	   of	   conflict	   and	   internal	   debate	   that	   FoEI	   experienced	   after	   the	  departure	  of	  Accion	  Ecologica	   in	  2002	  mirrors	  similar	  conflicts	  experienced	  by	  other	  transnational	  social	  movements:	  	  “In	  particular,	  political	  conditions	  faced	  by	  activists	  from	  much	  of	   the	   global	   South	   lead	   them	   towards	  more	   radical	   critiques	  and	   more	   confrontational	   strategies	   for	   change.	   Northern	  activists	  may	  or	  may	  not	  adopt	  the	  structural	  critiques	  of	  their	  Southern	   counterparts,	   but	   they	   tend	   to	   adopt	   reformist	  strategies	   that	   are	   more	   consistent	   with	   institutionalized	  political	  discourse	  and	  practices”	  (Smith	  2002,	  521)	  In	  the	  case	  of	  FoEI,	  the	  international	  network	  has	  come	  to	  embrace	  the	  views	  of	   its	   Southern	   members	   even	   more	   fully	   over	   recent	   years.	   In	   the	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‘environmental	   space’	   versus	   ‘ecological	   debt’	   debate	   for	   instance,	   the	  network	   has	   embraced	   demands	   for	   recognising	   the	   latter.	  Moreover,	   FoEI	  rejects	   market-­‐based	   mechanisms	   such	   as	   REDD	   or	   carbon	   markets	   as	  solutions	   to	  environmental	  problems.	  One	   interesting	  consequence	  has	  also	  been	  a	  shift	  of	  focus	  away	  from	  international	  institutions.	  In	  becoming	  more	  participatory	   and	   committed	   to	   local	   voices,	   social	   movements	   and	   the	  grassroots	   in	   the	   global	   South,	   FoEI	   has	   also	   become	   more	   radical	   in	   its	  opposition	   to	   dominant	   institutions	   and	   seems	   to	   be	   distancing	   itself	   from	  pursuing	   direct	   engagement	   with	   state	   elites,	   market	   players	   and	   many	  international	   organisations.	   The	   2007	   annual	   report	   states	   that	   “(o)ur	  participation	   in	   international	   fora	   will	   thus	   become	   secondary	   to	   our	  resistance	  work”	  (FoEI	  2008).	  This	  stance	  contrasts	  with	  earlier	  depictions	  of	  FoEI’s	   strategy;	   Wapner,	   for	   example,	   locates	   the	   activities	   of	   FoEI	   at	   the	  “intersection	   between	   national	   and	   international	   processes”	   and	   describes	  how	   the	   organisation	   lobbies	   state	   officials	   directly,	   promotes	   more	  responsible	   corporate	   practices	   (through	   its	   involvement	   in	   Ceres	   for	  instance),	   and	   tries	   to	   influence	   international	   institutional	   structures	  (Wapner	  1996).	  Judging	  from	  more	  recent	  analyses	  of	  the	  network	  (Doherty	  2006;	  Rootes	  2006)	  and	  from	  the	  way	  FoEI	  portrays	  itself	  in	  its	  own	  words,	  this	  characterisation	  needs	  to	  be	  at	  least	  partially	  revised.	  	  This	  observation	  needs	  to	  be	  qualified	  with	  two	  further	  remarks.	  Firstly,	  the	  disillusionment	   with	   international	   intergovernmental	   processes	   is	   most	  pronounced	   among	   Southern	   groups.	   They	   are	   thus	   more	   likely	   to	   shun	  international	   meetings	   than	   Northern	   groups.	   One	   interviewee	   suggested	  that	   this	   might	   reinforce	   skewed	   attendance	   patterns	   at	   international	  intergovernmental	  conferences,	  where	  Northern	  groups	  are	  still	  choosing	  to	  participate	  as	  NGO	  observers	  while	  Southern	  groups	  are	  more	  interested	  in	  alternative	  fora	  and	  local	  and	  national	  processes	  (interview	  with	  director	  of	  Global	   Forest	   Coalition69,	   07.04.2010).	   Although	   FoEI	   as	   a	   network	   may	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decide	  to	  focus	  more	  on	  domestic	  and	  local	  actions	  and	  less	  on	  the	  UNFCCC	  process	   for	   instance,	  members	  groups	   from	  Europe	  and	  North	  America	  still	  choose	   to	   attend	   the	   meetings	   of	   the	   climate	   convention	   as	   national	   FoE	  groups.	  As	  a	  result,	   the	  attendance	  pattern	  of	  delegates	   from	  FoE	  groups	  at	  the	   international	   negotiations	   might	   continue	   to	   be	   regionally	   unbalanced,	  and	  not	  only	  because	  of	  different	  financial	  resources	  by	  member	  groups.	  The	  result	   is	   that,	   “although	  FoEI	   doesn’t	  want	   to	   have	   a	   regionally	   unbalanced	  team	   they	   will	   always	   have	   it	   because	   of	   people’s	   own	   will.	   You	   can’t	   tell	  people	  please	  don’t	  show	  up	  at	  the	  climate	  negotiations	  because	  we	  have	  too	  many	  Europeans	  there”	  (interview	  with	  director	  of	  Global	  Forest	  Coalition70,	  07.04.2010).	  	  	  Secondly,	  as	  was	  also	  remarked	  by	  an	  interviewee,	  the	  political	  demands	  of	  a	  number	  of	  Latin	  American	  left-­‐wing	  governments	  resonate	  with	  the	  demands	  of	   social	   movements	   and	   the	   positions	   espoused	   by	   FoEI	   (interview	   with	  climate	   campaigner,	   FoEI,	   06.05.2010).	   This	   means	   that	   even	   within	   the	  intergovernmental	   processes,	   there	   are	   “official”	   voices	   that	   have	   adopted	  the	   language	  of	   the	  anti-­‐hegemony	  and	   the	   ideas	  of	  global	   justice	   that	  FoEI	  pursues	  as	  alternatives	  to	  the	  neoliberal	  world	  order.	  	  	  The	  case	  of	  FoEI	   raises	  a	  number	  of	   challenging	  questions	   for	   the	   idea	   that	  NGOs	   can	   act	   as	   conduits	   between	   local	   communities	   and	   global	  policymaking	   processes.	   If	   the	   ‘local’	   is	   actively	   resisting	   the	   ‘global’	   (Fogel	  2004)	  the	  logical	  consequence	  for	  a	  grassroots-­‐based	  organisation	  may	  be	  to	  turn	   away	   from	   global	   institutions	   in	   the	   search	   for	   alternative	   paradigms	  and	  venues.	  However,	  given	  the	  great	  diversity	  within	  the	  FoEI	  network,	  such	  a	   conclusion	   is	   not	   necessarily	   applicable	   to	   all	  member	   organisations	   and	  different	   national	   organisations	  may	   choose	   to	   pursue	   their	   own	   strategies	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   their	   governments	   and	   intergovernmental	   fora.	   Moreover,	   even	  within	   the	   intergovernmental	  processes	  multiple	  and	  competing	  discourses	  can	   be	   found.	   Some	   of	   these	   discourses	   are	   closer	   to	   the	   environmental	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justice	  agenda	  espoused	  by	  networks	  such	  as	  FoEI	  and	  therefore	  present	  the	  possibility	   for	   these	  organisations	   to	  align	   themselves	  with	   the	  demands	  of	  individual	  governments.	  	  	  
iv. The	  Climate	  Action	  Network	  CAN	   differs	   from	   the	   three	   international	   ENGOs	   described	   in	   this	   and	   the	  previous	   chapter	   in	   that	   it	   is	   actually	   a	   coalition	   of	   autonomous	   and	   very	  diverse	  NGOs	   that	  have	  come	   together	  with	   the	  explicit	  purpose	  of	   shaping	  global	  climate	  policy.	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  CAN’s	  activities	  are	  targeted	  at	  the	  UNFCCC.	   As	   an	   example	   of	   an	   influential	   NGO	   network	   that	   operates	  specifically	   at	   the	   interface	  between	  one	  particular	   international	   institution	  and	   the	   wider	   NGO	   community,	   CAN	   constitutes	   an	   interesting	   object	   for	  further	  investigating	  some	  of	  the	  questions	  set	  out	  in	  chapter	  V.	  Many	  large	  international	   NGOs,	   including	   WWF,	   Greenpeace	   and	   FoEI,	   have	   played	  important	   roles	   in	   CAN	   since	   its	   creation	   and	  CAN	  has	   certainly	   influenced	  the	   strategies	   these	   organisations	   have	   employed	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   climate	  convention.	   Moreover,	   CAN	   unites	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   NGOs	   from	   around	   the	  world	  within	  its	  network	  and	  therefore	  constitutes	  an	  interesting	  case	  study	  in	   its	  own	  right	   in	   investigating	  how	  and	  whether	   local	   communities	  are	   in	  fact	   represented	   by	   international	   NGOs	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   global	   environmental	  policymaking	  bodies.	  Due	  to	  the	  particular	  focus	  of	  CAN	  (on	  the	  UNFCCC)	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  it	   is	  actually	  a	   ‘coalition’	  of	  independent	  NGOs,	  it	  can,	  however,	  not	  be	  directly	  compared	  to	  the	  multi-­‐issue,	  transnational	  groups	  portrayed	  thus	  far.	  	  CAN’s	  vision	   is	  of	  “a	  world	  striving	  towards	  and	  achieving	  the	  protection	  of	  the	   global	   climate	   in	   a	   manner	   which	   promotes	   equity	   and	   social	   justice	  between	   peoples,	   sustainable	   development	   of	   all	   communities,	   and	  protection	   of	   the	   global	   environment”	   (CAN	   2002).	   As	   of	   early	   2010,	   CAN	  claims	   to	   have	   over	   500	   member	   organisations	   worldwide,	   although	   that	  number	  has	  substantially	  risen	  further	  since	  (CAN	  n.d.	  ‘About	  CAN’).	  CAN	  acts	  as	   the	   designated	   ‘constituency	   focal	   point’	   for	   the	   environmental	   and	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development	  NGOs	  with	  observer	  status	  at	  the	  UNFCCC.	  Its	  responsibilities	  in	  this	  role	   include	  acting	  as	  a	  conduit	   for	   the	  exchange	  of	  official	   information	  between	   the	   constituency	   members	   and	   the	   secretariat,	   and	   coordinating	  observer	   interactions	   at	   sessions.	   During	   the	   UNFCCC	   sessions,	   CAN	  organises	   regular	   meetings	   among	   its	   members	   to	   help	   them	   share	  information	  and	  expertise	  about	  the	  issues	  under	  negotiation	  and	  coordinate	  their	  activities.	  CAN	  also	  produces	  the	  ECO	  newsletter,	  a	  short	  bulletin	  which	  is	  published	  daily	  during	  the	  negotiations	  and	  presents	  a	  critical	  commentary	  on	  the	  proceedings,	  and	  is	  an	  important	  source	  of	  information	  for	  both	  civil	  society	   and	   governmental	   attendants.	   Moreover,	   CAN	   has	   developed	   a	  tradition	   of	   holding	   a	   ‘Fossil	   of	   the	   Day’	   ceremony	   during	   which	   the	  governmental	  party	  (or	  parties)	  that	  –	  according	  to	  CAN	  –	  has	  (or	  have)	  been	  the	  biggest	  obstacle	   to	  progress	  on	  a	  given	  day	   is	   singled	  out	  and	  awarded	  this	  ‘prize’.	  During	  high-­‐profile	  negotiations	  such	  as	  the	  Copenhagen	  summit,	  this	   ceremony	   manages	   to	   attract	   considerable	   media	   coverage.	   CAN’s	  activities	  are	  coordinated	  by	  a	  small	  international	  secretariat	  (with	  four	  and	  a	  half	  permanent	  staff	  as	  of	  March	  2010	  (interview	  with	  executive	  director,	  CAN	   International,	   17.03.2010)	   which	   used	   to	   be	   based	   near	   the	   UNFCCC	  secretariat	  in	  Bonn	  but	  is	  now	  located	  in	  Washington	  DC.	  	  	  
v. Exploring	  forms	  of	  responsiveness	  in	  CAN	  The	   origins	   of	   CAN	   date	   back	   to	   an	  NGO	  meeting	   in	   Loccum	   (Germany)	   in	  1989,	   where	   several	   European	   and	   North	   American	   environmental	   NGOs	  decided	   to	   work	   in	   a	   concerted	   fashion	   in	   order	   to	   push	   for	   more	  intergovernmental	  action	  on	  global	  climate	  change.	  The	  participants	  included	  both	   scientific	   and	   research	   organisations	   and	   advocacy	   groups,	   as	  well	   as	  international	   and	   national	   organisations.	   The	   three	   large	   international	  environmental	  NGOs	  discussed	  thus	  far	  –	  WWF,	  Greenpeace	  and	  FoEI	  –	  were	  all	  present	  at	   the	  meeting	   (McGregor	  2009,	  95)	  and	  have	  played	   important	  roles	  in	  the	  network	  since.	  Around	  the	  time	  of	  its	  creation,	  CAN	  consisted	  of	  63	  NGOs	  from	  22	  countries	  and	  operated	  initially	  under	  the	  guidance	  of	  the	  Environmental	   Defence	   Fund	   (EDF)	   and	   Greenpeace	   (Newell	   2000,	   126).	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Although	   CAN’s	   early	   member	   groups	   were	   all	   from	   developed	   countries,	  these	   participants	   undertook	   deliberate	   efforts	   to	   expand	   the	   network	   to	  include	  groups	  from	  Southern	  countries	  (McGregor	  2009,	  107).	  By	  1993,	  CAN	  had	  seven	  regional	  blocks	  “as	  networking	  nodes	  with	  individual	  coordinators	  and	  subsets”	  (Duwe	  2001,	  179):	  Europe,	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe,	  South	  Asia,	  South-­‐East	  Asia,	  Africa,	  Asia,	  Latin	  America,	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	  In	   line	   with	   its	   geographic	   expansion,	   CAN’s	   membership	   has	   also	   grown	  rapidly	   over	   the	   years:	   from	   63	   member	   organisations	   when	   it	   was	   first	  founded	   in	   1989,	   to	   333	  members	   groups	   in	   2002,	   and	   over	   500	  member	  organisations	  as	  of	  early	  2010	  (CAN	  n.d.	  ‘About	  CAN’).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  composition	  of	  CAN’s	  membership	  has	  become	  more	  diverse	  –	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  growing	  awareness	  of	  the	  climate	  change	  problem	  among	  individuals	  and	  organisations	   that	   are	   not	   from	   a	   ‘traditional’	   environmental	   background.	  CAN’s	   members	   began	   to	   include	   groups	   as	   varied	   as	   development	  organisations,	  churches	  and	  consumer	  NGOs	  (interview	  with	  board	  member,	  CAN	  Europe,	  09.11.2009).	  This	  considerable	  growth	  in	  membership	  can	  itself	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  form	  of	  authorisation	  (Castiglione	  and	  Warren	  2006),	  and	  it	  has	  arguably	   strengthened	   not	   only	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   network	   but	   also	   its	  credibility	   and	   influence	   with	   governmental	   delegates	   (interview	   with	  executive	   director,	   CAN	   International,	   17.03.2010).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  maintaining	   a	   consistent	   and	  manageable	   flow	   of	   information,	   overcoming	  power	   and	   resource	   differences	   to	   enable	   equal	   participation,	   developing	  common	   positions	   and	   coming	   to	   consensus	   on	   what	   are	   often	   highly	  controversial	  questions	  have	  become	  increasingly	  challenging	  objectives.	  The	  considerable	   expansion	   in	  membership	   also	   prompted	   CAN	   to	   undertake	   a	  number	   of	   initiatives	   to	   develop	   more	   formalised	   democratic	   decision-­‐making	  structures	  within	   the	  network	  that	  can	  be	  reconciled	  with	   the	  need	  for	   effectiveness.	   The	   adoption	   of	   the	   CAN	   charter	   in	   2002	   is	   a	   notable	  example.	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CAN	  started	  work	  on	  preparing	  a	   formal	  document,	  outlining	  and	  clarifying	  the	   membership	   rules,	   network	   rules	   and	   guiding	   principles	   for	   network	  governance	   in	  2001.	   Prior	   to	   this,	   CAN	  had	  been	  described	   as	   an	   “informal	  network	  with	  a	  specified	  but	  unwritten	  set	  of	  rules	  for	  good	  conduct”	  (Duwe	  2001,	  179).	  CAN’s	  members	  discussed	  and	  accepted	  the	  draft	  charter	  at	  the	  CAN	  general	  assembly	  held	  in	  October	  2002	  at	  COP8	  in	  New	  Delhi	  (McGregor	  2009,	   130).	   Some	   members	   voiced	   their	   concerns	   about	   the	   network	  becoming	  too	  centralised	  and	  one	  organisation	  –	  the	  Climate	  Network	  Africa,	  based	  in	  Kenya	  –	  withdrew	  as	  a	  result	  (ibid).	  The	  new	  charter	  requires	  CAN	  members	  to	  “respect	  and	  apply	  the	  rules	  of	  this	  Charter,	  support	  the	  vision,	  mission	   and	   activities	   of	   CAN,	   and	   bind	   itself	   to	   the	   CAN	  Code	   of	   Conduct”	  (CAN	   2002).	   The	   charter	   also	   recognises	   “that	   voting	   by	  members	  will	   not	  promote	   fairness	   of	   decision-­‐making”	   since	   the	   “CAN	   membership	   is	   not	  equally	   representative	   of	   all	   national,	   regional	   and	   other	   constituencies”	  (CAN	   2002).	   Instead,	   CAN	   strives	   for	   “sufficient	   consensus”	   whereby	   “the	  support	   for	  a	  decision	  by	  most	  of	   the	  members	   in	   their	   constituent	  groups,	  with	   only	   a	   small	   minority	   dissenting,	   will	   also	   be	   deemed	   to	   be	   full	  consensus	  in	  special	  circumstances”	  (CAN	  2002).	  	  	  	  Organisations	  that	  want	  to	  join	  CAN	  apply	  for	  membership	  to	  their	  regional	  nodes.	   ‘Nodes’	   are	   associations	   of	   CAN	  members	   in	   a	   particular	   country	   or	  group	   of	   countries.	   With	   the	   exception	   of	   large	   international	   NGOs	   (who	  apply	   to	   and	   are	   only	   members	   of	   CAN	   International),	   organisations	   are	  asked	  to	  become	  members	  of	  their	  national	  and	  regional	  nodes,	  which	  makes	  them	  members	  of	  CAN	  International	  by	  default.	  The	  nodes	  are	  an	  important	  feature	  of	  CAN’s	  governance	  structure	  as	   they	  assume	  a	  representative	  role	  for	  the	  member	  groups	  in	  their	  respective	  countries	  or	  regions	  (which	  does	  not	  preclude	  the	  direct	  participation	  by	  individual	  groups	  in	  the	  development	  of	   CAN’s	   positions).	   They	   also	   play	   an	   important	   role	   in	   coordinating	   a	  common	   perspective	   among	   a	   more	   tightly	   knit	   national	   or	   regional	   ‘sub-­‐community’	   of	   member	   groups	   within	   the	   larger	   network.	   National	   and	  regional	  nodes	  are	  expected	  to	  have	   their	  own	  governing	  bodies,	   “based	  on	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principles	   of	   accountability	   to	   its	  members	   and	   transparency”	   (CAN	  2002).	  The	  network	   is	  particularly	  keen	   to	   strengthen	  cooperation	  and	   interaction	  among	  member	  groups	  at	  the	  regional	  level	  and	  has	  undertaken	  a	  number	  of	  initiatives	   to	   that	   effect,	   such	   as	   regional	   capacity	   building	  workshops.	   The	  significance	  attached	  to	  the	  regional	  nodes	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  provisions	  governing	  the	  CAN	  general	  assembly,	  the	  highest	  decision	  making	  body	  of	  the	  global	  network.	  The	  charter	  requires	  the	  general	  assembly	  to	  be	  convened	  at	  least	   every	   two	   years	   but	   in	   practice	   meetings	   tend	   to	   happen	   more	  frequently	  as	  they	  take	  place	  around	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions.	  For	  the	  assembly	  to	   be	   properly	   convened,	   at	   least	   90%	   of	   the	   following	   must	   be	   present:	  representatives	  of	  each	  national	  node	  or	  their	  corresponding	  regional	  node,	  each	   regional	   node,	   as	   well	   as	   representatives	   of	   each	   of	   the	   international	  member	   NGOs	   (with	   offices	   in	   more	   than	   20	   countries)	   (CAN	   2002).	   The	  assembly	  is	  tasked	  with	  addressing	  “the	  vision	  and	  strategy	  of	  CAN,	  and	  both	  the	   substance	   of	   future	   climate	   solutions	   as	   well	   as	   the	   governance,	  administration	  and	  funding	  of	  the	  global	  network”	  (CAN	  2002).	  	  	  Policy	  working	   groups	  within	   the	   network	   develop	   CAN’s	   positions	   on	   the	  more	   technical	   issues	   under	   discussion	   in	   the	   climate	   negotiations.	   These	  thematic	  sub-­‐groupings	  are	  open	  to	  any	  interested	  CAN	  member	  and	  most	  of	  CAN’s	   positions	   are	   first	   debated	   and	   developed	   within	   these	   working	  groups,	   before	   a	   draft	   position	   statement	   is	   circulated	   among	   the	   broader	  CAN	   membership	   for	   comments	   and	   approval.	   Due	   to	   the	   size	   and	  geographical	   spread	   of	   the	   network,	   policy	   discussions	   happen	   to	   a	   large	  extent	   in	   electronic	   form,	   for	   example	   via	   the	   internal	   email	   exchange	   or	  through	  web-­‐based	  collaborative	  editing	  tools.	  The	  UNFCCC	  COPs	  and	  other	  inter-­‐sessional	  meetings	   constitute	   important	   opportunities	   for	   face-­‐to-­‐face	  discussion.	  For	  policy	  proposals	  to	  become	  official	  CAN	  policies	  they	  need	  to	  be	  endorsed	  by	  members	  on	  a	  non-­‐objection	  basis.	  In	  practice,	  this	  can	  mean	  that	  “if	  we	  put	  forward	  a	  draft	  position	  and	  don’t	  hear	  any	  objections	  within	  an	   ample	   time	   period,	   it’s	   taken	   as	   consensus”	   (interview	   with	   executive	  director,	  CAN	  International,	  17.03.2010).	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  An	  earlier	  in-­‐depth	  case	  study	  of	  CAN	  was	  undertaken	  by	  Duwe	  (2001)	  and	  is	  based	  on	  primary	  research	  conducted	  mainly	  prior	  to	  September	  2000.	  While	  he	   finds	   that	   the	   network	   coordinators	   are	   committed	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   the	  network	   as	   a	   truly	   global	   community,	   language,	   funding	   and	   capacity	  differences	   among	   members	   still	   constitute	   practical	   challenges	   to	   equal	  participation.	  Power	  differences	  are,	  for	  example,	  evident	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  CAN	  Europe	   and	   US-­‐CAN	   maintain	   permanent	   offices	   with	   full-­‐time	   staff	   in	  Brussels	   and	  Washington	   respectively,	   whereas	  most	   of	   the	   other	   regional	  coordinators	  are	  dividing	  their	  time	  between	  their	  own	  NGOs	  and	  the	  work	  for	  CAN	  (Duwe	  2001,	  179).	  Duwe	  identifies	  different	  perceptions	  among	  the	  network	   members	   towards	   CAN	   itself	   and	   the	   network’s	   ability	   to	   help	  address	   the	   root	   causes	  of	   global	   climate	   change.	  While	   some	  groups	   focus	  almost	   exclusively	   on	   the	   environmental	   challenge,	   others	   emphasize	   the	  equity	   dimension	   of	   climate	   politics.	   He	   also	   finds	   that	   some	   individuals	  (“those	   disappointed	   or	   preoccupied	   with	   other	   work	   or	   issues”)	   feel	  antagonised	   and	   excluded	   from	   the	   dialogue	   (Duwe	   2001,	   185).	   Duwe	  identifies	  as	  a	  main	  reason	  for	  the	  discontent	  of	  some	  members	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  participation	  of	  many	  Southern	  NGOs	  at	  the	  international	  negotiations	  is	  funded	   by	   donors	   via	   CAN	   –	   this	   places	   the	   network	   coordinators	   in	   a	  position	  of	  power	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  these	  groups	  who	  depend	  on	  CAN	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  send	  a	  representative	  to	  the	  UNFCCC	  sessions	  (Duwe	  2001,	  188).	   In	  spite	  of	  these	  problems	  and	  tensions,	  he	  finds	  that	  “CAN	  has	  institutionalized	  the	   inclusion	  of	  underrepresented	  views	   to	  some	  extent,	  and	   that	   there	  are	  valuable	   initiatives	   to	   facilitate	   cooperation”	   and	   concludes	   that	   “existing	  efforts	   and	   mechanisms	   and	   the	   visible	   potential	   for	   transcending	   severe	  gaps	  in	  priorities	  and	  capacity	  outweigh	  the	  power	  imbalances”	  (Duwe	  2001,	  189).	  	  	  A	   number	   of	   developments	   have	   taken	   place	   within	   CAN	   since	   2001	   that	  demonstrate	   the	   network’s	   awareness	   of	   the	   problems	   identified	   by	   Duwe	  and	  its	  intention	  to	  address	  them.	  CAN’s	  secretariat	  is	  formally	  charged	  with	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ensuring	  “sufficient	  voice	  from	  the	  developing	  world”	  when	  organising	  global	  meetings,	   largely	   through	   making	   appropriate	   funding	   arrangements,	   and	  has	  also	  appointed	  a	  designated	  ‘Southern	  Capacity	  Programme	  Coordinator’	  to	   help	   the	   network	   to	   achieve	   this	   goal.	   While	   CAN	   has	   been	   running	  capacity	   building	   projects	   on	   a	   small	   scale	   for	   a	   number	   of	   years,	   the	  additional	   funding	   (from	   foundations	   and	   a	   few	   governments)	   available	   in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  2009	  Copenhagen	  Summit	  allowed	  the	  network	  to	  scale	  up	  and	  consolidate	  its	   ‘Southern	  Capacity	  Building	  Programme’	  (interview	  with	  executive	  director,	  CAN	  International,	  17.03.2010).	  The	  programme	  “aims	  to	  strengthen	   the	   capacity	   and	   voice	   of	   CAN	   Southern	   NGO	   members	   to	  influence	   the	   international	   and	   national	   negotiation	   processes	   towards	  creating	   a	   robust	   post-­‐2012	   global	   architecture	   for	   climate	   protection	  efforts”	   (CAN	   n.d.	   ‘Southern	   Capacity	   Programme’).	   According	   to	   CAN	  International’s	   executive	   director,	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   the	   programme	   have	  shown	  success	  “in	  reinvigorating	  some	  of	  the	  different	  CAN	  regions	  and	  have	  led	   a	   number	   of	   Southern	   participants	   taking	   on	   coordinating	   roles	   or	  engaging	  more	  extensively	  in	  the	  different	  policy	  working	  groups”	  (interview	  with	   executive	   director,	   CAN	   International,	   17.03.2010).	   The	   programme	  works	  with	  “a	  group	  of	  participants	  representing	  all	  regions	  of	  the	  world	  that	  are	   equipped	   with	   relevant	   knowledge	   and	   skills	   to	   engage	   with	   their	  respective	  decision-­‐makers	  at	  home	  as	  well	  as	  during	  the	  negotiations”	  (CAN	  n.d.	  ‘Southern	  Capacity	  Programme’).	  Starting	  in	  2010,	  CAN	  has	  also	  provided	  regular	   funding	   support	   for	   ‘Southern	  Capacity	  Programme	  Fellows’	   from	  a	  cross-­‐section	  of	  developing	  countries,	  including	  (in	  2010)	  Tuvalu,	  Indonesia,	  Uruguay,	   the	   Ivory	  Coast,	   India,	  Senegal,	  Bhutan	  and	  others,	   to	  enable	   their	  attendance	  at	  UNFCC	  events	  and	  more	  active	  participation	  in	  the	  activities	  of	  CAN.	  As	  part	  of	   the	   ‘Southern	  Capacity	  Building	  Programme’,	  CAN	  now	  also	  publishes	   a	   short	   newsletter	   called	   ‘Voice’	   in	   which	   it	   presents	   “Frontline	  views	   –	   voices	   from	   communities	   in	   developing	   countries	  most	   affected	   by	  escalating	  climate	  change	  impacts.”	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vi. Responsiveness	  in	  CAN:	  motives,	  challenges	  and	  effects	  Two	  of	  CAN’s	  strategies	  as	  set	  out	  in	  its	  2002	  charter	  are	  “contributing	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  global,	  regional,	  national	  and	   local	  climate	  change	  agendas	  through	  mobilising	   a	   genuinely	   inclusive	   civil	   society	   process	   at	   all	   levels”	  and	   “addressing	   the	   participatory	   gap	   through	   the	   creation	   of	   inclusive	  processes”	   (CAN	   2002).	   Since	   the	   network	   does	   not	   have	   individual	   but	  organisational	  members,	  any	  grassroots	  work	  is	  undertaken	  by	  the	  members	  groups	  directly	  and	  autonomously.71	  CAN	  does	  not	  set	  out	  requirements	  for	  internal	  democracy	  within	  the	  member	  groups	  since	  it	  brings	  together	  such	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  organisations,	  of	  which	  membership	  based	  groups	  are	  only	  one	  category.	  Moreover,	  CAN	  itself	  does	  not	  engage	   in	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  work	  –	   its	  mission	   is	   to	   “influence	   the	   design	   and	   development	   of	   an	   effective	   global	  strategy	  to	  reduce	  greenhouse	  gas	  emission”	  (CAN	  2002).	  Assessed	  from	  the	  perspective	   of	   its	   potential	   contribution	   to	   overcoming	   the	   democratic	  deficits	  in	  global	  climate	  policy	  processes,	  the	  network	  is	  able	  to	  point	  to	  its	  global	   membership,	   its	   ability	   to	   formulate	   common	   positions	   despite	   the	  considerable	  diversity	  of	  its	  member	  groups,	  and	  its	  efforts	  to	  strengthen	  the	  voice	   and	   participation	   of	   Southern	   civil	   society	   groups,	   both	   within	   CAN	  itself	   and	   the	   global	   climate	   policy-­‐making	   process	   more	   broadly.	   Much	  hinges	   upon	   the	   internal	   power	   dynamics	   within	   CAN	   and	   the	   ability	   of	  Southern	  groups,	  particularly	  of	  organisations	  with	  close	  and	  credible	   links	  to	   communities	   in	   the	   global	   South,	   to	   shape	   the	   network’s	   positions	   and	  policies.	  	  	  The	  rapid	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  member	  organisations	  since	  when	  it	  was	  first	   founded,	  and	  especially	  over	  recent	  years,	  has	  strengthened	  the	  role	  of	  CAN	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  policymakers	  and	  delegates	  in	  the	  climate	  negotiations	  and	  has	  enabled	   the	   network	   to	   speak	   with	   a	   more	   global	   voice	   than	   before.	   As	   it	  became	   more	   diverse,	   however,	   both	   geographically	   and	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	   This	   is	   why	   the	   previous	   section	   looked	   only	   at	   forms	   of	   responsiveness	   to	   member	  organisations	   and	   not	   to	   ‘external’	   local	   communities	   (which	   was	   also	   assessed	   in	   the	  discussions	  of	  the	  three	  multi-­‐issue	  INGOs).	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range	   of	   concerns	   and	   priorities	   of	   its	   members,	   CAN	   had	   to	   develop	  decision-­‐making	   structures	   that	  would	   be	   responsive	   to	  members	   but	   also	  allow	  the	  network	  to	  develop	  joint	  positions	  on	  the	  growing	  number	  of	  issues	  under	   discussion	   in	   the	   climate	   negotiations.	   As	   with	   other	   networks,	   the	  development	   of	   common	   positions	   has	   become	   more	   difficult	   as	   CAN	   has	  expanded	  in	  size.	  One	  interviewee	  argues	  that	  CAN	  was	  in	  fact	  more	  effective	  in	   the	   past	   and	   has	   lost	   some	   of	   its	   flexibility	   and	   agility	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  inflow	  of	  new	  members.	  This	   is	   largely	  to	  do	  with	  the	   fact	   that	  many	  of	   the	  new	  members	  are	  not	  from	  a	  climate	  –	  or	  even	  a	  traditional	  environmental	  -­‐	  background	   and	   only	   have	   a	   “particular	   or	   temporary	   interest	   in	   climate	  change”	   (interview	   with	   board	   member,	   CAN	   Europe,	   09.11.2009).	   The	  interviewee	  is	  critical	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  network	  has	  become	  “more	  ideological	  and	  less	  pragmatic”	  as	  a	  result	  (interview	  with	  board	  member,	  CAN	  Europe,	  09.11.2009).	  Others,	   however,	   also	   see	  practical	   benefits	   in	  having	   to	  work	  through	   a	   wider	   range	   of	   perspectives	   in	   the	   development	   of	   common	  positions.	  Although	  this	  may	  render	  the	  process	  more	  lengthy,	  it	  also	  helps	  to	  open	   the	   eyes	   of	   those	   involved	   to	   the	   complexities	   of	   some	   of	   the	   most	  challenging	  issues	  –	  thus	  ultimately	  leading	  to	  stronger	  results:	  “We	   have	   a	   really	   broad	   membership	   so	   just	   coming	   to	  consensus	  on	  really	  challenging	  policy	  positions	  can	  take	  more	  time	  and	  effort	  than	  in	  the	  past.	  I	  think	  we	  would	  all	  say	  it’s	  for	  the	  better	   in	   terms	  of	  having	   a	   thoroughly	  nuanced	  approach	  and	   position	   on	   difficult	   issues”	   (interview	   with	   executive	  director,	  CAN	  International,	  17.03.2010).	  	  In	   the	   case	   of	   CAN	   it	   was	   mainly	   the	   growing	   constituency	   of	   Southern	  member	  groups	  who	  tried	  to	  push	  for	  more	  emphasis	  on	  the	  equity	  aspects	  of	   climate	  politics	   in	  CAN’s	   common	  policy	   statements	   (Duwe	  2001).	  Duwe	  recounts,	   for	   instance,	   a	   “heated	   exchange	   between	   the	   Indian	   Centre	   for	  Science	  and	  Environment	  (CSE)	  and	  the	  US	  World	  Resources	  Institute	  (WRI)	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  Rio”	  (Duwe	  2001,	  179)	  over	  whether	  population	  growth	  or	  overconsumption	  constituted	  the	  root	  of	  the	  climate	  problem.	  While	  CAN	  has	  come	  to	  embrace	  many	  of	  the	  concerns	  of	   its	  Southern	  members	  more	  fully	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since	   then,	   there	   are	   certain	   issues	   on	  which	   it	   is	   difficult	   for	   some	   of	   the	  groups	   to	   see	   eye	   to	   eye.	   Speaking	   about	   forest	   policy,	   one	   interviewee	  claims,	  for	  example,	  that	  “CAN	  has	  not	  been	  able	  to	  get	  a	  radical	  position	  on	  a	  lot	   of	   issues	   because	   of	   opposition	   from	   powerful	   US	   groups	   which	   are	  basically	   funded	   by	   large	   corporations”	   (interview	   with	   director	   of	   Global	  Forest	  Coalition,	  07.04.2010).	  	  	  The	   fact	   that	   certain	  differences	  among	  members	   cannot	  be	  bridged	   is	   also	  illustrated	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	   FoEI	   and	   CAN.	   As	   FoEI	   started	   to	  embrace	  a	  more	  radical	  climate	  justice	  agenda	  and	  became	  more	  committed	  to	   the	   rejection	   of	   market-­‐based	   mechanisms,	   it	   found	   itself	   in	   growing	  disagreement	  with	  the	  more	  conservative	  environmental	  groups	  within	  CAN.	  In	   addition	   to	   these	   ideological	   differences,	   FoEI’s	   strong	   emphasis	   on	  internal	  participatory	  processes	  and	  working	   jointly	  with	  social	  movements	  also	  contributed	  to	  its	  growing	  detachment	  from	  CAN:	  	  “our	  way	  of	  working	  and	   developing	   our	   policies	   –	   that	   didn’t	   always	   tally	   with	   CAN.	   We	   are	  working	   through	   different	   kinds	   of	   processes”	   (interview	   with	   climate	  campaigner,	   FoEI,	   06.05.2010).	   FoEI	   eventually	   decided	   to	   withdraw	   from	  CAN	   and	   started	   to	   work	  more	   closely	   with	   the	   new	   Climate	   Justice	   Now!	  (CJN!)	  network,	  which	  had	  emerged	   in	   the	  period	  after	   the	  Bali	   conference.	  Since	   international	   and	   national	   groups	   are	   admitted	   separately	   to	   CAN,	  however,	   some	   of	   the	   national	   FoE	   organisations	   have	   stayed	  members	   of	  CAN	  and	  FoE	  as	  a	  network	  therefore	  continues	  to	  maintain	  institutional	  links	  with	  CAN.	  	  	  This	  considerable	  growth	  in	  membership	  since	  its	  creation	  has	  strengthened	  CAN’s	   claim	   to	   represent	   a	   truly	   global	   constituency	   of	   NGOs	   in	   its	  coordinating	   role	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   UNFCCC.	   CAN	   has	   adopted	   an	   internal	  governance	  structure	  designed	  to	  allow	  its	  increasingly	  diverse	  membership	  to	  develop	  common	  policy	  positions.	  It	  has	  also	  undertaken	  important	  steps	  to	  address	  the	  very	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  resources	  –	  and	  hence	  ability	  to	  participate	   effectively	   in	   CAN	   and	   in	   the	   UNFCCC	   processes	   –	   among	   its	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members.	  Nonetheless,	  very	  practical	  obstacles	  to	  participation	  remain,	  such	  as	  the	  near	  exclusive	  use	  of	  English	  as	  the	  language	  of	  communication	  within	  CAN	  (interview	  with	  director	  of	  Global	  Forest	  Coalition,	  07.04.2010).	  It	  might	  also	   be	   hypothesized	   that	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   ‘rival	   representative’	   of	  Southern	  CSOs	  and	   social	  movements	   in	   the	   shape	  of	  CJN!	  has	  had	  positive	  effects	   on	   CAN’s	   efforts	   to	   strengthen	   its	   responsiveness	   to	   Southern	  members	   over	   recent	   years,	   although	   this	   finding	   would	   need	   to	   be	  substantiated	  with	  more	  specific	  analysis.	  	  	  
vii. Comparison	  with	  the	  CBD	  Alliance	  	  While	   in	  the	  case	  of	   the	  UNFCCC,	  CAN	  acts	  as	  the	  designated	  focal	  point	   for	  the	   constituency	   of	   development	   and	   environmental	   NGOs,	   no	   such	   formal	  umbrella	  organisation	  exists	  for	  the	  NGOs	  engaging	  with	  the	  United	  Nations	  CBD.	   The	   closest	   counterpart	   to	   CAN	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   biodiversity	  convention	   would	   be	   the	   CBD	   Alliance,	   a	   more	   informal	   network	   of	   civil	  society	  organisations	  and	  NGOs	  working	  on	  issues	  of	  biodiversity	  around	  the	  convention.	   Unlike	   CAN,	   however,	   the	   CBD	   Alliance	   does	   not	   have	   formal	  members.	   Instead,	   the	  alliance	   refers	   to	   the	   “global	   civil	   society	  community	  around	   the	   CBD”	   as	   its	   primary	   constituency,	   encompassing	   “non-­‐governmental	   organisations,	   Indigenous	  Peoples’	  Organisations,	   community	  based	  organisations	  and	  social	  movements”	  (CBD	  Alliance	  n.d.).	  Its	  aim	  is	  to	  “facilitate	  more	  diverse,	  coordinated	  and	  effective	  civil	  society	  input	  into	  CBD	  policymaking	  (…)	  premised	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  global	  policymaking	  should	  be	  a	  transparent	  und	  democratic	  undertaking”	  (CBD	  Alliance	  2012a).	  	  	  Trying	   to	  undertake	  an	   in-­‐depth	   investigation	   into	   forms	  of	   responsiveness	  within	   the	  CBD	  Alliance	  would	  be	  relatively	  meaningless	   in	   light	  of	   the	   fact	  that	   the	   CBD	   Alliance	   presents	   a	   much	   looser	   network	   than	   any	   of	   the	  organisations	   analysed	   thus	   far	   and	   possesses	   very	   little	   in	   terms	   of	   a	  permanent	  organisational	   infrastructure.	  A	  brief	   look	  at	  the	  CBD	  Alliance	  is,	  however,	  useful	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  comparison	  with	  CAN.	  The	  two	  networks	  differ	  not	   only	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   organisational	   structure	   but	   also	   in	   terms	   of	   the	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importance	   they	   attach	   to	   speaking	   with	   one	   voice	   versus	   promoting	   a	  diversity	   of	   voices.	   While	   CAN	   tries	   to	   develop	   common	   policy	   positions	  within	  the	  network	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  enhance	  the	  overall	  impact	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  climate	  negotiations,	  the	  CBD	  Alliance	  openly	  acknowledges	  the	  diversity	  of	  perspectives	  and	  opinions	  among	  its	  affiliated	  organisations	  and	  thus	  avoids	  the	  search	  for	  consensus	  positions.	  	  	  The	  main	  activities	  of	  the	  CBD	  Alliance	  include	  the	  “general	  coordination	  and	  communication	   among	   civil	   society	   throughout	   the	   inter-­‐sessional	   and	  sessional	   periods”,	   the	   provision	   of	   financial	   support	   for	   Southern-­‐based	  CSOs	   and	   indigenous	   peoples’	   organisations	   and	   social	   movement	  representatives	   to	   participate	   in	   CBD	   meetings,	   and	   the	   publication	   and	  distribution	   of	   the	   ECO	   newsletter	   (CBD	   Alliance	   n.d.	   ‘What	   does	   the	   CBD	  Alliance	   do?’).	   The	   alliance	   emerged	   from	   a	   project	   started	   by	   the	  Environmental	   Liaison	   Centre	   International	   and	   only	   developed	   into	   a	  separate	   organisation	   between	   COP7	   (in	   2004)	   and	   COP8	   (in	   2006)	  (interview	  with	  coordinator,	  CBD	  Alliance,	  11.05.2010).	  The	  CBD	  Alliance	   is	  not	  funded	  by	  the	  convention	  but,	  like	  CAN,	  has	  to	  raise	  its	  money	  from	  other	  sources:	   its	   core	   funding	   in	   2010	   came	   from	   SwedBio,	   the	   ‘Resilience	   and	  Development	   Programme’	   of	   the	   Stockholm	   Resilience	   Centre	   (based	   at	  Stockholm	  University),	  with	  some	  additional	  funding	  coming	  from	  the	  Oxfam	  Novib	  Fund	  and	  the	  Christensen	  Fund.	  The	  alliance	  continues	  to	  struggle	  with	  funding	   shortfalls	   and	   operates	   on	   a	   very	   limited	   budget	   (interview	   with	  director	  of	  Global	  Forest	  Coalition,	  07.04.2010).72	  As	  of	  2010,	  there	  was	  one	  fulltime	  and	  one	  part-­‐time	  coordinator	  working	  for	  the	  CBD	  Alliance.	  	  Describing	   its	   governance	   and	   organisational	   structure,	   the	   CBD	   Alliance	  admits	  that	  it	  “has	  always	  had	  a	  bit	  of	  an	  identity	  crisis:	  is	  it	  an	  Alliance,	  or	  a	  network?	  Does	   it	  have	  members?	  What	   is	   it?”	  (CBD	  Alliance	  n.d.).	  The	  same	  document	   explains	   that	   its	   loose	   organisational	   structure	   and	   ‘informality’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Precise	  figures	  were	  not	  available,	  as	  the	  CBD	  Alliance	  does	  not	  publish	  a	  financial	  report.	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allow	   the	   alliance	   to	   keep	   its	   overheads	   low	   and	   avoid	   time-­‐consuming	  decision-­‐making	  processes.	  It	  also	  states	  that,	  “Given	  the	  current	  capacity	  of	  the	  CBD	  Alliance,	  in	  terms	  of	  staff,	  admin	  and	  funding,	  it	  is	  not	  feasible	  at	  this	  time	   to	  move	   towards	   a	   formal	  membership	   structure”	   (ibid).	   The	   alliance	  has	   a	   self-­‐selected	   board	   with	   11	   members	   (for	   the	   2009-­‐2010	   term),	  participation	   in	   which	   is	   open	   to	   individuals	   affiliated	   with	   various	   civil	  society	   groups	   around	   the	   CBD.	   Two	   seats	   on	   the	   board	   are	   reserved	   for	  representatives	   from	   the	   International	   Indigenous	   Forum	   for	   Biodiversity	  (IIFB).	  In	  May	  2010	  the	  alliance	  created	  a	  smaller	  executive	  committee	  from	  among	   the	   board	   members	   to	   manage	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   activities	   (CBD	   Alliance	  2012a)	  	  The	  CBD	  Alliance	  explicitly	   rejects	   any	   representative	   function	  on	  behalf	   of	  other	   civil	   society	   groups:	   “the	   Alliance	   does	   not	   represent	   civil	   society	  organisations	   around	   the	   CBD	   –	   nor	   do	   we	   speak	   for	   the	   diversity	   of	   civil	  society	  voices”	  (CBD	  Alliance	  2012a).	  In	  its	  publications	  (such	  as	  the	  ‘media	  kit’	  and	  the	  ‘Top	  10	  for	  COP	  10’),	  the	  alliance	  is	  careful	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  objective	   is	   to	   present	   various	   viewpoints	   rather	   than	   to	   develop	   any	  consensus-­‐based	  positions	  or	  demands.	  Instead,	  the	  network	  sees	  its	  role	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  “The	  CBD	  Alliance	  does	  not	  represent	  any	  organisations,	  but	  rather	  we	  ‘add	  value’	  to	  existing	  civil	  society	  work	  –	  we	  support	  the	  work	  of	   all	   organisations	   as	   per	   our	  mandate”	   (CBD	  Alliance	   n.d).	   It	   is	   up	   to	   the	  individual	  CSOs	  to	  decide	  how	  to	  draw	  on	  the	  CBD	  Alliance:	  “people	  develop	  common	   positions	   together	   and	   we	   provide	   the	   space	   for	   this	   to	   happen”	  through	  “continually	  providing	  the	  space	  for	  collectivities	  to	  form”	  (interview	  with	  coordinator,	  CBD	  Alliance,	  11.05.2010).	  These	  may	  happen,	  for	  example,	  at	   the	  meetings	   organised	   by	   the	   alliance	   for	   civil	   society	   around	   the	   CBD	  meetings.	   Since	   there	  are	  only	  a	   limited	  number	  of	   speaking	   slots	   available	  for	   civil	   society	   representatives	   during	   the	   sessions	   of	   the	   CBD,	   the	   groups	  have	   to	   decide	   among	   themselves	   who	   will	   deliver	   a	   statement.	   However,	  even	  in	  these	  cases,	  civil	  society	  representatives	  will	  normally	  not	  speak	  on	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behalf	  of	  the	  CBD	  Alliance	  but	  single	  out	  certain	  groups	  or	  speak	  “on	  behalf	  of	  many	  CSOs	  gathered	  here”	  (ibid)	  	  The	   fact	   that	   the	  alliance	  shuns	  away	   from	  potentially	  difficult	  processes	  of	  policy	   and	   position	   development	  means	   that	   it	   has	   been	   able	   to	   avoid	   the	  conflicts	  that	  CAN	  has	  encountered.	  Among	  the	  NGOs	  engaging	  with	  the	  CBD	  are	   both	   very	   market-­‐friendly	   and	   highly	   market-­‐critical	   groups,	   whose	  positions	   on	   ABS,	   for	   example,	   are	   in	   stark	   contrast.	   The	   CBD	   Alliance	   has	  avoided	  ‘internalising’	  these	  conflicts.	  However,	  this	  is	  also	  largely	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  of	  the	  large	  Northern	  conservation	  NGOs	  (who,	   in	  the	  case	  of	  CAN,	  have	  often	  been	  criticised	  by	  other	  members	  for	  their	  closeness	  to	  business)	  have	  stayed	  relatively	  aloof	   from	  the	  alliance.	  The	  relationship	  between	  them	  is	  perhaps	  best	  characterised	  as	  one	  of	  ‘friendly	  co-­‐existence’.	  Due	   the	   large	   delegations	   and	   the	   substantial	   expertise	   that	   these	   groups	  bring	  to	  the	  CBD	  meetings,	  they	  are	  less	  dependent	  on	  the	  services	  provided	  by	  the	  alliance.	  In	  fact,	  the	  CBD	  Alliance’s	  focus	  on	  the	  smaller	  CSOs	  engaging	  with	  the	  CBD	  provides	  an	  important	  counterweight	  to	  the	  strong	  influence	  of	  a	  small	  number	  of	  large	  NGOs	  there.	  	  	  Rather	  than	  trying	  to	  help	  CSOs	  to	  speak	  with	  ‘one	  voice’	  in	  the	  CBD	  context,	  the	   alliance	   seeks	   specifically	   to	   support	   the	   active	   participation	   of	  marginalised	   groups.	   One	  way	   in	  which	   the	   alliance	   tries	   to	   achieve	   this	   is	  through	  providing	  funding	   for	  them	  to	  attend	  the	  COPs.	  While	  such	  funding	  was	  previously	  provided	  on	  an	  ad	  hoc	  basis,	  the	  network	  decided	  in	  2009/10	  “to	  switch	  to	  a	  system	  of	  selecting	  more	  long	  term	  ‘supported	  partners’	  who	  would	  be	  funded	  to	  attend	  not	  singular,	  but	  a	  series	  of	  meetings	  on	  a	  specific	  area	   of	   expertise”	   (CBD	  Alliance	   2010,	   12).	  However,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   CBD	  Alliance	  was	  only	  able	  to	  fund	  four	  ‘supported	  partners’	  (all	  from	  indigenous	  peoples’	   organisations)	   in	   2010	   is	   an	   indication	   of	   the	   tight	   financial	  constraints	  the	  network	  faces.	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Besides	   funding	   attendance,	   the	   alliance	   also	   uses	   the	   publications	   it	  produces	   around	   the	  CBD	  COPs	   to	   give	   a	  platform	   to	  voices	   from	  Southern	  NGOs,	  IPOs	  and	  social	  movement	  organisations.	  One	  of	  the	  key	  outputs	  of	  the	  CBD	  Alliance	  is	  the	  regular	  publication	  of	  ECO	  (similar	  in	  style	  to	  the	  bulletin	  published	  by	  CAN	  in	  the	  UNFCCC	  context),	  which	  offers	  an	  often	  very	  critical	  commentary	   on	   the	   negotiations	   and	   on	   the	   actions	   and	   positions	   of	  particular	   governments.	   In	   May	   2008	   the	   secretariat	   of	   the	   CBD	   started	  producing	   its	   own	   newsletter,	   ‘square	   brackets’,	   for	   civil	   society	   in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  CBD	  Alliance.	  In	  this	  publication,	  the	  CBD	  Alliance	  also	  seeks	  to	  ensure	  that	  “content	  (is)	  contributed	  by	  southern,	  community-­‐based	  and	   Indigenous	   Peoples’	   organisations”	   (CBD	   Alliance	   2010,	   3)	   but	  acknowledges	   that	   “it	   is	   less	   independent	   than	   the	   ECO”	   and	   that	  “contributors	  cannot	  ‘name	  names’,	  or	  Parties”	  (CBD	  Alliance	  2010,	  7).	  	  Unlike	  CAN,	  the	  CBD	  Alliance’s	  objective	   is	  not	  to	  develop	  consensus	  across	  the	   CSOs	   engaging	  with	   the	   CBD.	   Instead	   the	   CBD	  Alliance	   understands	   its	  role	  more	  as	  a	  ‘broker’	  or	  ‘platform’	  for	  interested	  CSOs	  and	  tries	  to	  provide	  information	   about	   the	   issues	   under	   discussion	   in	   the	   negotiations	   and	  opportunities	  for	  networking	  with	  other	  groups.	  The	  alliance	  puts	  particular	  emphasis	   on	   supporting	   the	   participation	   by	   Southern	   groups,	   IPOs,	   local	  communities	   and	   social	   movements	   in	   this	   way.	   Going	   beyond	   this	   role	  would	   require	   much	   more	   substantial	   funding	   than	   the	   alliance	   currently	  receives.	   The	   following	   table	   summarises	   the	   main	   points	   of	   difference	  between	  CAN	  and	  the	  CBD	  Alliance	  that	  were	  discussed	  above.	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   Climate	  Action	  Network	   CBD	  Alliance	  
Formal	  status	  	  
Designated	  ‘focal	  point’	  for	  NGOs	  with	  observer	  status	  at	  UNFCCC	   No	  formal	  ‘focal	  point’	  status	  within	  CBD	  
Membership	  
Organisations	  apply	  for	  membership	  to	  national	  or	  regional	  nodes	   No	  formal	  members;	  serves	  global	  civil	  society	  community	  around	  the	  CBD	  
Governance	  
Charter	  adopted	  in	  2002:	  CAN	  general	  assembly	  is	  highest	  decision-­‐making	  body	  
Loose	  network	  structure;	  self-­‐selected	  board	  
Staff	   Small	  secretariat	  	   Position	  of	  coordinator	  	  Exchange	  of	  information	  between	  NGOs	  and	  UNFCCC	  secretariat	  and	  development	  of	  common	  positions	  among	  members	  
Support	  coordination	  and	  communication	  among	  civil	  society	  community	  around	  CBD	  
Main	  
objectives/	  
functions	   Objective	  is	  to	  support	  civil	  society	  to	  speak	  with	  one	  voice	  on	  global	  climate	  issues.	  




Secretariat	  charged	  with	  ensuring	  participation	  by	  groups	  from	  developing	  countries	  (NB	  Southern	  Capacity	  Building	  Program)	  
Focus	  is	  on	  providing	  support	  for	  small	  Southern	  CSOs	  and	  IPOs	  engaging	  with	  CBD	  (but	  limited	  financial	  means)	  
Policy	  
positions	  
Policy	  working	  groups	  develop	  positions;	  need	  to	  be	  endorsed	  by	  members	   Does	  not	  seek	  to	  develop	  common	  policy	  positions	  	  
Table	  3:	  Differences	  in	  organisational	  structure	  and	  function	  of	  Climate	  Action	  
Network	  and	  CBD	  Alliance	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viii. Conclusion	  This	  chapter	  has	  looked	  at	  three	  very	  different	  networks:	  FoEI,	  a	  multi-­‐issue	  NGO,	  which	  embarked	  on	  a	  process	  of	  grounding	  its	  work	  and	  its	  identity	  at	  the	   grassroots	   level,	   and	   two	   issue-­‐specific	   NGO	   networks	   that	   focus	   their	  efforts	  on	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  the	  CBD	  respectively	  and	  do	  so	   in	  very	  different	  ways.	  Unlike	  WWF	  and	  Greenpeace,	  these	  three	  groups	  are	  characterised	  by	  highly	   diverse	   memberships,	   which	   renders	   coordination	   processes	  potentially	   more	   difficult.	   Each	   group	   has	   emphasized	   different	   forms	   of	  responsiveness.	   FoEI’s	   has	   focussed	   on	   further	   strengthening	   internal	  democratic	  and	  participatory	  processes	  and	  tries	  to	  ground	  all	  its	  work	  at	  the	  grassroots	   level.	   Reflecting	   the	   values	   of	   local	   member	   groups,	   it	   takes	   a	  highly	   critical	   stance	   towards	   many	   of	   the	   solutions	   promoted	   within	   the	  current	   institutions	   of	   environmental	   governance	   and	   has	   become	   less	  willing	  to	  work	  within	  the	  existing	  structures.	  CAN	  –	  whose	  raison	  d’être	  is	  to	  bring	  the	  combined	  power	  of	  NGOs	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  UNFCCC	  negotiations	  –	  has	  gone	   to	   considerable	   lengths	   to	   develop	   common	   ground	   among	   an	   ever	  larger	   and	   more	   heterogeneous	   membership	   base	   but	   has	   encountered	   a	  number	  of	  difficulties	  in	  the	  process.	  The	  CBD	  Alliance,	  in	  contrast,	  avoids	  the	  formulation	  of	  common	  political	  positions	  and	  tries	   to	  actively	  promote	  the	  diversity	   of	   the	   CSOs	   engaging	   with	   the	   CBD.	   The	   alliance	   is,	   however,	  constrained	   by	   a	   lack	   of	   resources	   and	   can	   only	   act	   as	   a	   limited	  ‘counterweight’	   to	   the	   large,	   well-­‐funded	   and	   influential	   international	  conservation	  NGOs	  working	  with	  the	  CBD.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  turn	  to	  the	  lessons	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  analyses	  of	  the	  organisations	  looked	  at	  in	  this	   and	   the	   previous	   chapter	   and	   ask	  what	   these	   cases	   tell	   us	   about	   their	  potential	   to	   act	   as	   ‘representatives’	   of	   local	   communities	   in	   international	  institutions.	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VIII. “Living	   the	   change	   we	   want	   to	   see”?	   NGOs	   as	  
democratic	  links	  and	  democratic	  demand	  makers	  How	   can	   NGOs	   contribute	   to	   linking	   affected	   communities	   to	   international	  institutions?	   Can	   they	   act	   as	   democratic	   conduits,	   which	   display	  responsiveness	  towards	  local	  communities	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  are	  able	  to	  make	   their	   voices	   heard	   in	   international	   institutions	   on	   the	   other?	   What	  evidence	   is	   there	   for	   democratic	   practices	   and	   forms	   of	   responsiveness	  within	   international	   NGOs?	   What	   are	   the	   democratic	   demands	   directed	   at	  international	   intergovernmental	   institutions	   by	   civil	   society	   organisations?	  This	  thesis	  has	  attempted	  to	  offer	  some	  answers	  to	  these	  questions.	  	  	  This	   thesis	   adopted	   a	   dual	   focus	   on	   NGOs	   as	   both	   democratic	   links	   and	  democratic	   demand	   makers,	   which	   necessitated	   an	   investigation	   of	   both	  internal	  practices	  and	  external	  demands.	  The	  rationale	  for	  this	  dual	  approach	  was	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   point	   of	   reference	   should	   not	   only	   be	   the	  democratic	   legitimacy	   of	   the	  NGOs,	   but	   ultimately	   that	   of	   the	   international	  institutions	  they	  engage	  with.	  Of	  course,	  the	  internal	  and	  external	  dimensions	  presented	  here	  are	  not	  exhaustive	  –	  they	  do	  not	  capture	  the	  full	  spectrum	  of	  activities	   through	  which	  NGOs	  may	  contribute	   to	   the	  democratic	   legitimacy	  of	   international	   institutions	   –	  nor	   are	   they	   two	   sides	  of	   the	   same	   coin.	  The	  most	  effective	  route	  to	  strengthening	  the	  democratic	   legitimacy	  of	   IGOs	   lies	  in	  institutional	  reforms	  designed	  to	  promote	  the	  equitable	  representation	  of	  member	  states	  and	  the	  participation	  of	  civil	  society	  stakeholders.	  There	  is	  a	  long	  way,	  however,	  from	  demanding	  these	  types	  of	  reforms	  to	  actually	  taking	  credit	   for	   their	   implementation.	   In	   other	   words,	   NGO	   influence	   over	   these	  potentially	  very	  large	  levers	  for	  change	  is	  limited	  and	  involves	  getting	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  other	  actors	  (especially	  governments)	  on	  board.	  This	  is	  different	  in	  the	   case	   of	   their	   own	   internal	   practices,	   over	   which	   the	   NGOs	   have	   much	  more	   influence.	   The	   adoption	   of	   more	   democratic	   practices	   by	   individual	  NGOs	  might	  well	   have	   a	   strongly	   transformative	   effect	   on	   the	   organisation	  itself,	  but	  only	  a	  limited	  and	  indirect	  effect	  on	  the	  IGOs	  that	  it	  interacts	  with.	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Nonetheless,	   the	   two	   dimensions	   are	   related.	   If	   existing	   and	   emerging	  participatory	   spaces	   within	   international	   institutions	   are	   occupied	   by	  nonstate	   actors	   who	   do	   not	   represent	   affected	   citizens	   but,	   for	   example,	  commercial	   interests	   or	   global	   elites,	  more	  participation	  would	  undermine,	  not	  strengthen,	  the	  democratic	  legitimacy	  of	  these	  institutions.	  	  	  This	   final	   chapter	  will	   outline	   the	   conclusions	   that	   have	   emerged	   from	   the	  analysis,	   highlight	   the	   contribution	   of	   the	   thesis	   and	   also	   acknowledge	   its	  limitations.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  findings	  from	  the	  previous	  two	  chapters,	  the	  first	  section	  (i)	  will	  discuss	  the	  factors	  that,	  with	  particular	  reference	  to	  the	  cases	  of	   WWF,	   Greenpeace	   and	   FoEI	   (and	   with	   additional	   insights	   from	   the	  discussions	   of	   CAN	   and	   the	   CBD	   Alliance),	   shape	   the	   potential	   of	   these	  organisations	   to	   act	   as	   representatives	   of	   local	   communities.	   Conclusions	  regarding	   the	   role	   of	   as	   NGOs	   as	   representatives	   based	   on	   the	   conceptual	  framework	  derived	  from	  Pitkin	  are	  presented	  in	  section	  (ii).	  Relating	  to	  the	  findings	   of	   the	   analysis	   of	   ‘external’	   democratic	   demands	   formulated	   by	  NGOs,	  section	  (iii)	  asks	  whether	  IGOs	  –	  especially	  the	  UNFCCC	  in	  the	  case	  of	  climate	  policy	  –	  are	  indeed	  the	  right	  targets	  or	  whether	  NGOs	  should	  direct	  their	   efforts	   elsewhere.	   The	   thesis’	   contribution	   to	   the	   academic	   debate	   in	  empirical	   and	   theoretical	   terms	   is	   set	   out	   in	   section	   (iv),	   together	   with	   a	  discussion	   of	   possible	   policy	   implications.	   This	   section	   will	   also	   show	   the	  limitations	  of	   the	  research	  and	  suggest	  a	  number	  of	  ways	   in	  which	  some	  of	  the	   ideas	   put	   forward	   in	   this	   thesis	   may	   be	   further	   developed.	   A	   short	  conclusion	  (v)	  sums	  up	  the	  chapter.	  	  	  
i. What	  shapes	  the	  ‘representative’	  role	  of	  NGOs?	  The	   analysis	   of	   the	   three	   large	  multi-­‐issue	  ENGOs	   in	   the	   previous	   chapters	  provides	   important	   insights	   into	   how	   particular	   organisational	  characteristics	  determine	   the	  potential	  of	   these	  groups	   to	   implement	   forms	  of	  responsiveness	  to	  affected	  communities	  and	  hence	  shape	  their	  potential	  to	  act	   as	   democratic	   ‘links’	   between	   these	   communities	   and	   international	  institutions.	   The	   following	   organisational	   characteristics	   appear	   especially	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relevant:	  organisational	  structure	  (including	  geographical	  spread);	  decision-­‐making	   processes;	   strategy	   for	   bringing	   about	   change;	   resource	   type/	  funding;	   alliances	   with	   other	   groups;	   and	   values.73	   These	   different	  characteristics	   are	   interrelated	   and	   often	   influence	   each	   other.	   While,	   for	  example,	  particular	  features	  of	  the	  formal	  governance	  structure	  set	  the	  broad	  parameters	  for	  how	  members	  get	  to	  participate	  in	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  (e.g.	   do	   all	  member	  organisations	  participate	   in	   the	  AGM	  and	  do	   they	   elect	  the	   board?),	  many	   key	   decisions	   are	   often	   taken	   in	   a	  much	  more	   informal	  way	  and	  are,	   if	   at	   all,	   habitually	  nodded	  off	  by	   the	  board.	  Furthermore,	   the	  values	   espoused	   by	   an	   organisation	   are	   likely	   to	   determine	   the	   type	   of	  alliances	   it	  will	   enter	   into,	   and	   these	   alliances	   in	   turn	  will	   likely	   shape	   the	  organisation’s	  beliefs	  and	  values.	  The	  following	  table	  lists	  the	  organisational	  characteristics	   referred	   to	   above	   and	   shows	   the	   specific	   aspects	   associated	  with	  each.	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73Rootes’	   (2006)	   analysis	   of	  how	   the	  British	  branches	  of	  WWF,	  Greenpeace	   and	  FoEI	  have	  responded	   to	   the	   challenge	   of	   globalisation	   identifies	   a	   range	   of	   similar	   factors	   to	   explain	  their	  divergent	  responses:	  “strategy	  and	  tactics,	  organisational	  structures	  and	  relationships	  with	  other	  actors	  in	  the	  environmental	  movement	  network”	  (Rootes,	  2006,	  784).	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Organisational	  
characteristic	  
Associated	  aspects	  Organisational	  structure	  	   • Presence	  around	  the	  world	  • Centralisation	  vs.	  decentralisation	  
• Formal	  governance	  structure	  (overlaps	  with	  
decision-­making	  processes)	  Decision-­‐making	  processes	   • Participation	  by	  − Staff	  from	  around	  the	  world	  
− Member	  organisations/	  offices	  
− Individual	  members	  
• Opportunities	  for	  input	  by	  affected	  communities	  
− Policies/	  guidelines	  Strategy	  for	  bringing	  about	  change	   • Choice	  of	  methods	  • Target	  audiences	  • Focus	  on	  local	  vs.	  international	  Resource	  type/	  funding	   • Individual	  donations/	  paying	  supporters	  • Funding	  from	  foundations	  or	  government	  agencies	  
• Funding	  from	  business	  actors	  and	  corporations	  Alliances	  and	  partnerships	   • Relations	  with	  business	  • Relations	  with	  social	  movements	  
• Global	  justice	  movement	  (overlaps	  with	  values)	  Values	   • Climate	  justice	  (emphasis	  on	  fairness	  and	  equity)	  
• Value	  of	  participation	  
• Role	  of	  markets	  	  
Table	   4:	   Organisational	   characteristics	   (with	   associated	   aspects)	   shaping	   the	  
potential	   for	   international	   NGOs	   to	   act	   as	   representatives	   of	   affected	  
communities	  
	  The	   impact	   of	   each	   of	   these	   characteristics	   on	   the	   role	   of	   NGOs	   as	  representatives	  will	   be	  discussed	  below.	  The	   table	  at	   the	   start	  of	   each	   sub-­‐section	  gives	  a	   first	   indication	  of	  how	  the	  organisational	  characteristics	  and	  associated	   aspects	   outlined	   above	   differ	   between	   the	   three	   organisations.	  The	   subsequent	   discussion	   then	   tries	   to	   discern	   the	   way	   these	   differences	  shape	  the	  potential	  of	  NGOs	  to	  assume	  representative	  functions,	  drawing	  on	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the	   findings	   from	  the	  empirical	  analyses	   in	   the	  previous	  chapters.	  Points	  of	  similarity	  are	  not	  presented	  in	  the	  tables	  but	  addressed	  in	  the	  discussion.	  	  	  
Organisational	  structure	  




Friends	  of	  the	  
Earth	  








New	  offices	  are	  set	  up	  by	  central	  organisation;	  licensing	  agreement	  with	  WWF	  International	  
New	  offices	  are	  set	  up	  by	  central	  organisation;	  licensing	  agreement	  with	  Greenpeace	  International	  







Council	  appoints	  members	  of	  international	  board	  (internal	  and	  external)	  
Board	  members	  must	  of	  independent	  of	  GPI’s	  internal	  affairs	  
Board	  members	  are	  elected	  at	  BGM	  
	  
Table	   5:	   Comparison	   of	   organisational	   structure	   of	   WWF	   International,	  
Greenpeace	  International	  and	  Friends	  of	  the	  Earth	  International	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One	   very	   basic	   requirement	   for	   an	   INGO	   to	   be	   able	   to	   ‘represent’	   affected	  communities	   in	   global	   policymaking	   processes	   is	   to	   have	   an	   institutional	  presence	  in	  those	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  where	  these	  communities	  are	  based.	  The	  number	  and	  strength	  of	  national	  offices	  or	  network	  members	  in	  countries	  of	  the	  global	  South	  is	  a	  first	  indicator	  of	  an	  INGO’s	  potential	  for	  receiving	  input	  from	  those	  communities	  on	  the	  ground.	  All	  of	   the	  analysed	  organisations	   in	  the	  previous	  two	  chapters	  have	  expanded	  their	  international	  presence	  since	  their	   inception.	   Although	   the	   NGOs	   were	   all	   originally	   set	   up	   in	   Western	  Europe	   or	   North	   America,	   WWF	   started	   opening	   offices	   in	   a	   number	   of	  developing	   countries	   as	   early	   as	   the	   1970s	   and	   Greenpeace	   and	   FoEI	  followed	  suit	  in	  the	  1980s.	  Similarly,	  CAN	  established	  various	  regional	  nodes	  in	  the	  years	  immediately	  following	  its	  creation	  in	  1989	  and	  has	  experienced	  a	  large	  influx	  of	  members	  from	  developing	  countries	  over	  recent	  years.	  Out	  of	  the	   three	   multi-­‐issue	   NGOs,	   FoEI	   is	   the	   one	   with	   the	   most	   entrenched	  presence	  in	  the	  global	  South	  today,	  in	  particular	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  of	  the	   national	   FoE	   groups	   are	   themselves	   networks	   of	   local	   and	   community-­‐based	  CSOs.	  	  Of	  course,	  an	  institutional	  presence	  in	  countries	  of	  the	  global	  South	  is	  by	  itself	  only	  an	  enabling	  factor	  and	  tells	  us	  little	  about	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  offices	  or	  member	   organisations	   in	   these	   countries	   are	   able	   to	   inform	   the	   policy	  positions	  that	  the	  global	  organisation	  puts	  forward	  at	  the	  international	  level.	  There	   are	   almost	   always	   substantial	   differences	   relating	   to	   income,	   the	  number	   of	   individual	   supporters,	   staff	  members,	   and	   the	   relationship	  with	  the	   respective	   national	   government	   among	   the	   national	   member	  organisations.	   These	   different	   resources	   translate	   into	   an	   unequal	  distribution	   of	   influence	  within	   the	   global	   organisation,	   be	   it	   at	   the	   formal	  governance	   level	   or	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   more	   informal	   decision-­‐making	  processes.	   One	   important	   consideration	   is	   thus	   whether	   an	   NGO	   tries	   to	  implement	   forms	   of	   responsiveness	   designed	   to	   mitigate	   these	   internal	  power	  imbalances.	  In	  addition,	  national	  member	  organisations,	  in	  particular	  in	  developing	   countries,	  would	  need	   to	  be	  able	   to	  operate	  with	  a	  degree	  of	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autonomy	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  ‘pick	  up’	  the	  concerns	  of	  local	  communities	  there	  and	  feed	  these	  ‘upwards’	  into	  the	  policymaking	  processes	  of	  the	  global	  organisation.	  While	   giving	  more	   independence	   to	   local	   and	   national	   offices	  could	   strengthen	   their	   ability	   to	   respond	   to	   their	   respective	   local	   and	  national	   contexts,	   too	  much	  decentralisation	  can	  also	  undermine	   the	  ability	  of	  the	  organisation	  to	  speak	  with	  one	  voice	  or	  maintain	  a	  clearly	  recognisable	  ‘brand’	   or	   image.	   One	   important	   point	   of	   differentiation	   between	   the	  centralised	   groups	   and	   networks	   analysed	   here	   is	  whether	   the	   new	   offices	  abroad	  are	  set	  up	  based	  on	  strategic	  considerations	  (WWF	  and	  Greenpeace)	  or	  whether	  pre-­‐existing	  civil	  society	  groups	  apply	  to	  join	  a	  network	  (FoEI	  and	  CAN).	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  the	  members	  are	  able	  to	  enjoy	  much	  more	  autonomy	  from	   the	   central	   organisation’s	   headquarters,	   have	   a	   stronger	   independent	  organisational	   identity	   and	   are	   in	   principle	   always	   able	   to	  make	   use	   of	   an	  ‘exit	  option’	  by	  leaving	  the	  network.	  This	  also	  means	  that	  the	  greater	  degree	  of	  diversity	   among	   the	  members	  makes	   it	   often	   challenging	   to	   try	   to	   speak	  with	  one	  voice	  on	  global	  policy	  issues.	  	  The	  formal	  governance	  structure	  of	  an	  NGO,	  as	  laid	  out	  in	  its	  statues,	  is	  only	  an	   approximate	   indicator	   of	   the	   extent	   of	   responsiveness	   to	   member	  organisations,	   as	   many	   policy	   decisions	   are	   in	   practice	   taken	   by	   the	  organisation’s	   executives.	   The	   board’s	   function	   is	   often	   largely	   supervisory	  and	   therefore	   it	   includes	   individuals	   external	   to	   the	  organisation	   (as	   in	   the	  case	  of	  WWF	  and	  Greenpeace).	   In	   the	  case	  of	  FoEI,	   the	  board	  members	  are	  elected	   at	   the	   biannual	   general	  meeting,	  which	   constitutes	   a	   key	   forum	   for	  exchange	  and	  deliberation	  among	  members.	  Its	  importance	  to	  the	  network	  is	  highlighted	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  BGM	  lasts	  an	  entire	  week.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	   FoEI	   therefore,	   the	   formal	   governance	   structure	   of	   the	   INGOs	   provides	  little	   indication	   of	   the	   level	   of	   internal	   democracy	  within	   the	   organisation.	  More	   practical	   insight	   may	   be	   gained	   from	   looking	   at	   the	   more	   informal	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  (discussed	  below).	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The	  importance	  of	  the	  regional	  level	  is	  especially	  apparent	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	   FoEI	   and	   CAN.	   FoEI	   recognises	   the	   value	   of	   encouraging	   deliberation	  among	  groups	  based	   in	   the	  same	  region	  and	  plans	   to	   further	  strengthen	   its	  regional	  structures.	  CAN	  acquired	   its	  structure	  of	   regional	  nodes	  soon	  after	  its	   creation	   and	   has	   also	   undertaken	   deliberate	   efforts	   to	   strengthen	  cooperation	   and	   interaction	   among	   members	   at	   the	   regional	   levels	   over	  recent	  years.	  This	  indicates	  that	  exchanges	  at	  the	  regional	  level	  are,	  in	  some	  instances,	  more	  productive	  than	  deliberations	  among	  members	  from	  around	  the	   world,	   since	   groups	   from	   the	   same	   region	   often	   struggle	   with	   similar	  challenges	   and	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   able	   to	   relate	   to	   each	   other’s	  experiences.	  The	  analysis	  of	  these	  networks	  shows	  that	  the	  regional	  level	  has	  an	   important	   intermediating	   function	   between	   local	   level	   concerns	   and	  global	  coordination	  processes.	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Decision-­making	  processes	  




Friends	  of	  the	  
Earth	  
International	  Policy	  positions	  are	  subject	  to	  consultation	  around	  organisation	  and/or	  developed	  by	  international	  committees	  or	  steering	  groups	  
Policy	  positions	  are	  subject	  to	  consultation	  around	  organisation	  and/or	  developed	  by	  international	  committees	  or	  steering	  groups	  





supporters	   Individuals	  signal	  support	  through	  membership	  and/	  or	  donations	  
Individuals	  signal	  support	  through	  membership	  and/	  or	  donations	  
Individuals	  can	  participate	  in	  policy	  discussion	  through	  local	  groups	  
Opportunities	  
for	  input	  by	  
affected	  
communities	  
WWF	  Intl.	  has	  formal	  standards	  for	  stakeholder	  engagement	  in	  conservation	  work	  
No	  formal	  policy	  at	  international	  level;	  use	  of	  community	  testimonies	  
Network	  is	  made	  up	  of	  over	  5000	  local	  groups,	  mainly	  based	  in	  Global	  South	  
	  
Table	   6:	   Comparison	   of	   decision-­making	   processes	   of	   WWF	   International,	  
Greenpeace	  International	  and	  Friends	  of	  the	  Earth	  International	  
	  The	   extent	   to	   which	   elements	   of	   responsiveness	   are	   truly	   evident	   in	   the	  decision-­‐making	   processes	   of	   an	   organisation	   is	   extremely	   hard	   to	   assess.	  Formal	   governing	  documents	   such	  as	   the	   articles	  of	   agreement	   and	  bylaws	  are	  only	  vague	  indicators	  and	  oftentimes	  have	  relatively	  little	  impact	  on	  how	  operational	  and	  strategic	  decisions	  are	  taken	  in	  practice.	  It	   is	  not	  surprising	  that	   interviewees	   tend	   to	   claim	   that	   an	   organisation	   tries	   to	   involve	   a	  representative	   cross-­‐section	   of	   its	   staff	   –	   including	   those	   based	   in	   various	  national	   offices	   around	   the	  world	   –	   in	   its	   decision-­‐making	   processes.	   Such	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personal	  impressions	  are,	  however,	   likely	  to	  be	  selective	  and	  subjective	  and	  should	   therefore	   be	   treated	   with	   a	   good	   degree	   of	   scepticism.	   Some	  interviewees	   also	   acknowledged	   the	   fact	   that	   some	   national	   offices	   have	  more	   influence	   than	   others	   and	   that	   lengthy	   consultation	   processes	   are	  sometimes	  avoided	  for	  reasons	  of	  practicality.	  	  	  FoEI	  places	  great	  emphasis	  on	  the	  democratic	  and	  participatory	  nature	  of	  the	  process	  through	  which	  decisions	  are	  taken.	  Members	  are	  not	  encouraged	  to	  ‘sign	  up’	   to	   joint	  decisions;	   instead	   relations	  among	   them	  are	   characterised	  by	  a	   lively	  exchange	  of	  views,	  discussion	  and	  dialogue.	  One	  consequence	  of	  this	   very	   process-­‐orientated	   approach	   is	   that	   the	   network	   sometimes	  struggles	  (or	  avoids)	  to	  speak	  with	  one	  voice	  on	  specific	  global	  policy	  issues.	  Compared	  to	  FoEI,	  the	  decision-­‐making	  styles	  of	  both	  Greenpeace	  and	  WWF	  can	   be	   described	   as	   primarily	   ‘top-­‐down’.	   Still,	   interviewees	   from	   both	  organisations	   are	   keen	   to	   point	   out	   that	   policies	   on	   particular	   issues	   are	  subject	   to	  broad	  consultation	  around	  the	  network	  and/or	  are	  developed	  by	  planning	  committees	  or	  steering	  groups	  that	  bring	  together	  individuals	  from	  around	   the	   organisation	   who	   possess	   expertise	   on	   that	   particular	   issue.	  Conflicts	  over	  positions	  among	  members	  may	  still	  arise	  but	  sometimes	  have	  the	  advantage	  that	  the	  organisation	  is	  able	  to	  better	  prepare	  itself	  for	  points	  of	   disagreement	   with	   or	   among	   governments	   in	   international	   negotiations	  (interview	   with	   director	   of	   global	   policy,	   WWF	   International,	   11.02.2010).	  Technology	   is	   an	   important	   enabler	   of	  more	   participatory	   decision-­‐making	  processes	   in	  all	   the	  assessed	  organisations.	   Services	   such	  as	  email,	   intranet	  discussion	  fora,	  Skype	  or	  web-­‐based	  collaborative	  editing	  tools	  have	  made	  it	  much	  easier,	  faster	  and	  cheaper	  to	  gather	  input	  from	  colleagues	  from	  around	  the	  world.	  Social	  media	  have	  also	  opened	  up	  new	  ways	  for	  NGOs	  to	  interact	  with	   their	   individual	   supporters	   from	   around	   the	   world	   (through,	   for	  example,	   discussions	   on	   blogs,	   Facebook,	   Twitter).	   Overall,	   however,	  individual	  supporters	  are	  not	  really	  able	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  NGOs’	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  in	  a	  systematic	  way.	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The	   extent	   to	  which	   an	  organisation	   engages	  with	   affected	   communities	   or	  community-­‐based	   organisations	   in	   developing	   countries	   is	   also	   hard	   to	  assess.	  While	  particular	  examples	  of	  engagement	  can	  always	  be	  found,	  these	  tell	   us	   little	   about	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   forms	   of	   responsiveness	   are	  implemented	   in	   a	   more	   systematic	   fashion	   in	   the	   organisation’s	   decision-­‐making	   processes.	   One	   exception	   are	   organisation-­‐wide	   standards	   such	   as	  WWF’s	   ‘Standards	   of	   Conservation	   Project	   and	   Programme	   Management’,	  although	   examples	   such	   as	   these	   do	   not	   necessarily	   reflect	   a	   deeply	  entrenched	  participation	  culture	  within	  an	  organisation.	  The	  fact	   that	  many	  of	  FoEI’s	  member	  groups	  in	  developing	  countries	  consist	  of	  local	  community	  organisations	  makes	  this	  organisation	  stand	  out	  from	  the	  other	  international	  environmental	  NGOs.	  	  	  A	  number	  of	  crosscutting	  points	  can	  be	  made	  about	  the	  possibilities	  for	  and	  challenges	   of	   including	   forms	   of	   participation	   and	   responsiveness	   in	  decision-­‐making	   processes.	   One	   obvious	   fact	   is	   that	   more	   complex	   or	  technical	   issues	   are	   harder	   to	   deal	   with	   through	   broadly	   participatory	  processes	   and	   require	   a	   considerable	   degree	   of	   prior	   knowledge	   and	  expertise.	   Other	   obstacles	   to	   participatory	   processes	   include	   the	   uneven	  distribution	  of	  resources	  within	  an	  organisation,	  as	  well	  as	  time	  pressure	  and	  the	   need	   to	   react	   quickly	   to	   new	   developments.	   Moreover,	   the	   particular	  interests	   of	   individual	   member	   groups	   and	   the	   ‘greater	   good’	   of	   the	  international	  organisation	  may	  not	  be	  naturally	  aligned.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	   ‘soft’	   mechanisms	   available	   for	   dealing	   with	   conflict	   such	   as	   the	   use	   of	  dialogue	   techniques	   or	   mediators.	   However,	   interviewees	   from	   WWF	   and	  Greenpeace	  also	  point	  out	   that	   there	  are	   limits	   to	  how	   far	   the	  organisation	  will	   go	   to	   find	   a	   compromise	   and	   that	   it	   will	   ultimately	   resort	   to	   more	  ‘executive’	   forms	   of	   decision-­‐making.	   This	   presents,	   once	   more,	   a	   point	   of	  differentiation	   from	   FoEI,	   which	   has	   gone	   to	   great	   lengths	   to	   address	   and	  discuss	   the	   differences	   among	   its	   members.	   For	   networks	   made	   up	   of	  autonomous	   organisations	   the	   option	   of	   exit	   from	   the	   network	   usually	  presents	  the	  last	  recourse	  if	  differences	  cannot	  be	  bridged.	  
	   271	  
Strategies	  for	  bringing	  about	  change	  




Friends	  of	  the	  
Earth	  
International	  Practical	  conservation	  work;	  lobbying	  and	  advocacy;	  provision	  of	  knowledge	  and	  expertise	  	  
Awareness-­‐raising:	  ‘bearing	  witness’	  and	  high-­‐publicity	  ‘stunts’;	  lobbying	  and	  advocacy;	  mobilisation	  	  
Supports	  and	  empowers	  local	  CSOs	  in	  their	  struggle	  for	  environmental	  and	  social	  justice.	  	  	  Choice	  of	  methods	  
Mainly	  insider	  strategies	   Insider	  and	  outsider	  strategies	   Mainly	  outsider	  strategies	  
Target	  
audiences	  
Governments,	  business	  and	  international	  institutions	  
The	  public,	  governments	  and	  international	  institutions	  	  
Local	  CSOs,	  ‘grassroots’	  (shift	  away	  from	  international	  institutions)	  	  
Focus	  on	  local	  
vs.	  international	  
International	  and	  local	  (practical	  conservation	  work)	  	  
International	  	   Local	  	  
	  
Table	   7:	   Comparison	   of	   strategies	   for	   bringing	   about	   change	   of	   WWF	  
International,	  Greenpeace	  International	  and	  Friends	  of	  the	  Earth	  International	  
	  The	  strategies	  for	  bringing	  about	  change	  adopted	  by	  a	  particular	  NGO	  shape	  the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   organisation	   prioritises	   responsiveness	   to	   local	  communities	  in	  its	  work	  and	  the	  opportunities	  available	  for	  doing	  so.	  On-­‐the-­‐ground	   conservation	  projects	   are	   at	   the	  heart	   of	  WWF’s	  work.	  At	   the	   same	  time,	   the	   organisation	   also	   seeks	   to	   leverage	   change	   through	   lobbying	   and	  working	   in	   partnership	   with	   decision-­‐makers	   at	   the	   national	   and	  international	   levels.	   Greenpeace’s	   high	   publicity	   stunts	   and	   its	   efforts	   to	  mobilise	   a	   large	   number	   of	   citizens	   around	   its	   campaigns	   (especially	   on	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climate	   change	   in	   the	   run-­‐up	   to	   Copenhagen)	   are	   designed	   to	   increase	   the	  pressure	   on	   decision-­‐makers;	   in	   addition,	   the	   organisation	   also	   conducts	  behind-­‐the-­‐scenes	   lobbying	   of	   politicians	   and	   business.	   FoEI’s	   vision	   of	  change	   starts	   from	   within:	   through	   its	   member	   groups	   it	   supports	   and	  empowers	  local	  CSOs	  and	  communities	  in	  their	  individual	  and	  joint	  struggles	  for	   greater	   environmental	   justice.	   More	   than	   the	   other	   two	   NGOs,	   FoEI’s	  campaigns	   go	   beyond	   purely	   environmental	   issues	   to	   encompass	   social	  concerns.	  	  	  There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   organisations’	   ‘core	   business’	  determines	   the	   extent	   and	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   they	   choose	   to	   practice	  responsiveness	   to	   local	   communities.	   WWF	   works	   closely	   with	   local	  communities	   in	   its	   conservation	   projects	   and	   has	   pledged	   in	   a	   number	   of	  internal	   guidelines	   to	   involve	   these	   communities	   –	   with	   a	   particular	  emphasis	   on	   indigenous	   peoples	   –	   in	   the	   decisions	   that	   relate	   to	   its	  operational	   work.	   Through	   the	   practical	   conservation	   aspect	   of	   its	   work,	  WWF	   is	   therefore	   closely	   exposed	   to	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   realities	   of	  many	   local	  communities	  in	  developing	  countries.	  Its	  engagement	  with	  local	  communities	  in	   conservation	  work	  prompted	  Wapner	   (1997)	   to	   argue	   that	  WWF’s	  work	  results	   in	   the	   empowerment	  of	   these	   communities	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   other	  powerful	  actors	   in	   a	   local	   and	   national	   setting.	   However,	   the	   objectives	   of	   WWF’s	  projects	  are	  often	  not	  developed	   in	  partnership	  with	   the	   local	   communities	  but	   by	   conservation	   experts,	   or	   are	   set	   by	  WWF’s	   externals	   partners,	   often	  governments	   or	   international	   agencies.	   Conflicts	   may	   arise	   when	   the	  communities	   on	   the	   ground	   oppose	   these	   objectives	   or	   the	   ways	   through	  which	  they	  are	  pursued.	   In	   fact,	   the	  organisation	  has	  more	  than	  once	   found	  itself	   at	   the	   receiving	   end	   of	   criticisms	   for	   allegedly	   failing	   to	   protect	   the	  interests	   of	   local	   communities	   or	   even	   promoting	   their	   resettlement	   away	  from	   protected	   areas	   (for	   example,	   Beymer-­‐Farris	   and	   Bassett	   2012;	  Huisman	   2012).	  WWF	   has	   usually	   denied	   these	   allegations,	   pointing	   to	   its	  policies	  on	  stakeholder	  engagement	  and	  indigenous	  communities.	  However,	  these	  engagement	  processes	  tend	  to	  take	  place	  at	  the	  local	  and	  national	  level,	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in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   respective	   conservation	   projects,	   and	   there	   is	   no	  evidence	   that	   consultation	  processes	  with	   local	   communities	  directly	   shape	  the	  organisation’s	  global	  policy	  positions.	  	  	  	  Greenpeace’s	   tactics	   also	   shape	   the	   opportunities	   for	   practicing	   forms	   of	  responsiveness.	   As	   was	   mentioned	   in	   the	   discussion	   of	   Greenpeace,	   the	  success	   of	   its	   high-­‐profile	   stunts	   usually	   requires	   an	   element	   of	   surprise,	  which	  necessitates	  the	  involvement	  of	  only	  a	  small	  group	  of	  campaigners	  in	  the	  preparations	  and	  decision-­‐making	  at	   short	  notice	   to	  quickly	   respond	   to	  opportunities	   as	   and	   when	   they	   arise	   and	   therefore	   precludes	   more	  participatory	   approaches.	   These	   stunts,	   however,	   are	   only	   one	   element	   of	  Greenpeace’s	  campaigning	  work.	  Reaching	  out	  to	  a	  more	  global	  and	  diverse	  audience	  through	  the	  internet	  and	  social	  media	  in	  support	  of	  the	  campaigns	  has	   become	   increasingly	   important	   over	   recent	   years.	   Greenpeace	   aims	   to	  mobilize	  supporters	   to	  participate	   in	  both	  online	  as	  well	  as	  offline	   forms	  of	  protest.	   The	   success	   of	   these	   strategies	   depends	   to	   a	   large	   degree	   on	   the	  ability	  of	  the	  organisation	  to	  understand	  what	  issues	  motivate	  supporters	  to	  take	  what	   type	   of	   actions	   and	   therefore	   requires	   it	   to	   be	   responsive	   to	   an	  increasingly	  global	  target	  audience.	  	  	  FoEI	  has	  changed	  the	  nature	  of	  its	  strategies	  for	  achieving	  change	  over	  recent	  years.	   As	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   the	   group	   has	   embarked	   on	   a	  process	   of	   transitioning	   from	   a	   lobbying	   and	   advocacy	   organisation	   into	   a	  transnational	   environmental	   movement	   with	   close	   links	   to	   the	   grassroots.	  While	  individual	  national	  member	  organisation	  may	  choose	  to	  continue	  their	  campaign	   work	   directed	   at	   their	   respective	   governments	   or	   at	   IGOs,	   the	  international	  network	  is	  distancing	  itself	  from	  these	  processes.	  This	  contrasts	  with	   earlier	   depictions	   that	   locate	   the	   organisation’s	   activities	   at	   the	  “intersection	  between	  national	  and	   international	  processes”	   (Wapner	  1996,	  132).	  The	  FoEI	  portrayed	  here	  places	  an	  explicit	   emphasis	  on	  participation	  and	  ‘downward	  accountability’.	  There	  is	  little	  doubt	  that,	  through	  its	  multiple	  member	   groups	   in	   countries	   of	   the	   global	   South	   and	   the	   culture	   of	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participation	  within	   the	  network,	  FoEI	   is	   in	  a	  very	  strong	  position	   to	  speak	  for	  local	  communities	  from	  around	  the	  world.	  Moreover,	  through	  supporting	  local	   communities	   in	   fighting	   against	   marginalisation,	   exclusion	   or	  suppression	  in	  their	  respective	  environments,	  the	  network	  can	  contribute	  to	  empowerment	   and	   the	   realisation	   of	   community	   rights	   within	   local	   and	  domestic	  settings.	  Listening	  to	  the	  voices	  of	  its	  members	  has	  prompted	  FoEI	  to	   adopt	   a	   more	   overtly	   critical	   stance	   towards	   dominant	   institutions	   of	  global	  governance	  and	  the	  solutions	  propagated	  therein.	  	  	  As	   a	   cross-­‐cutting	   point	   it	   is	   worth	   pointing	   to	   the	   practice	   of	   bringing	  ‘community	  testimonials’	  or	  ‘witnesses’	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  a	  wider	  public	  or	  a	  particular	  target	  audience	  in	  the	  context	  of	  international	  negotiations.	  NGOs	  often	   see	   this	   as	   the	  most	  practical	   and	  direct	  way	  of	  making	   the	   voices	   of	  affected	  communities	  heard	  in	  international	  institutions	  but	  are	  also	  aware	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  this	  approach.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  of	  course,	  this	  practice	  may	  simply	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  clever	  piece	  of	  PR	  strategy,	  employed	  in	  the	  hope	  that	   associating	   a	   human	   face	   and	   an	   individual	   storyline	   with	   a	   complex	  human	   problem	   such	   as	   climate	   change	   is	   going	   to	   appeal	   on	   a	   more	  emotional	   level	   to	   decision-­‐makers	   and/	   or	   donors.	   Moreover,	   the	   NGO	  sponsor	   will	   usually	   decide	   who	   gets	   to	   participate	   and	   to	   what	   extent	   –	  which	   means	   that	   participation	   might	   be	   understood	   as	   primarily	  instrumental	  to	  achieving	  their	  goals.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  it	  can	  also	  be	   understood	   as	   opening	   up	   spaces	   for	   participation	   or	   descriptive	  representation	  (i.e.	  an	  individual	  speaks	  for	  a	  community	  whose	  experiences	  he	  or	  she	  shares)	  in	  very	  practical	  terms.	  One	  interviewee,	  for	  example,	  tells	  of	   an	   indigenous	   community	   leader	   who,	   at	   the	   invitation	   of	   Conservation	  International	  (CI),	  “was	  able	  to	  organise	  the	  Conservation	  International	  side	  events	  with	   full	   indigenous	  participation”,	   something	   that	   according	   to	  her,	  “almost	  never	  happens	  with	  CI,	   they	  always	  have	  these	  Washington	  money-­‐makers	  talking	  about	  how	  to	  save	  tropical	  rainforests	  and	  now	  you	  had	  this	  group	   of	   quite	   radical	   indigenous	   peoples	   talking	   about	   how	   their	   rights	  should	   be	   put	   first”	   (interview	   with	   director	   of	   Global	   Forest	   Coalition,	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07.04.2010).	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  mentioning	  that	  both	  CAN	  and	  the	  CBD	  Alliance,	  who	   used	   to	   fund	   the	   attendance	   of	   representatives	   from	   Southern	   and	  community-­‐based	  CSOs	  on	  an	  ad-­‐hoc	  basis,	  have	  shifted	  to	  a	  system	  whereby	  they	   try	   to	   provide	   long-­‐term	   support	   for	   the	   participation	   of	   particular	  individuals	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  more	  constructive	  participation.	  	  	  The	  relative	  emphasis	  placed	  on	  ‘insider’	  or	  ‘outsider’	  strategies	  by	  individual	  NGOs	   acts	   as	   a	   filter	   for	   the	   type	   of	   local	   demands	   and	   positions	   that	   the	  organisation	  is	  willing	  to	  incorporate	  in	  its	  international	  policy	  positions.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  change	  WWF,	  for	  example,	  plays	  by	  the	   ‘rules	  of	  the	  game’	  and	  aims	  to	  maintain	  and	  strengthen	  its	  credibility	  with	  the	  global	  elites.	  As	  a	  result	   of	   this	   WWF	   enjoys	   good	   access	   to	   key	   decision-­‐makers	   but	   also	  embraces	   relatively	   moderate	   points	   of	   view.	   By	   contrast,	   groups	   that	  espouse	   ‘outsider’	   strategies	   (protests,	   civil	   disobedience	   and	   sometimes	  direct	  action)	  and	  do	  not	  seek	  the	  ‘approval’	  of	  those	  in	  power	  are	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  challenge	  dominant	  institutions	  and	  norms.	  	  	  Rootes	  speaks	  about	  a	  “division	  of	  labour”	  among	  environmental	  NGOs,	  with	  WWF,	   for	   example	   “capitalizing	   upon	   the	   agenda-­‐setting	   actions	   of	   more	  radical	   groups”	   (Rootes	   2006,	   770).	   However,	   according	   to	   Fisher’s	   (2010)	  explanation	   of	   the	   failure	   of	   civil	   society	   to	   play	   a	   constructive	   role	   at	   the	  Copenhagen	  summit	  in	  December	  2009,	  the	  pursuit	  of	  outsider	  strategies	  by	  many	  of	  the	  civil	  society	  groups	  led	  to	  a	  situation	  whereby	  even	  those	  groups	  that	  worked	  with	  delegates	  ‘on	  the	  inside’	  ended	  up	  being	  marginalised.	  She	  reckons	   that	   the	   prior	   call	   for	   large-­‐scale	   protests	   and	   the	   engagement	   in	  non-­‐violent	   direct	   action	   by	   many	   civil	   society	   groups	   contributed	   to	   the	  decision	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   Danish	   organisers	   “to	   limit	   access	   to	   NGO	  delegations.”74	  She	  concludes	  that:	  “Although	  outsider	  tactics	  are	  an	  effective	  means	  of	  gaining	  media	  attention,	  they	  have	  the	  unintended	  consequence	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  This	  explanation	  is	  challenged	  by	  McGregor	  who	  argues	  that	  the	  decision	  to	  restrict	  access	  was	  primarily	  related	  to	  fire	  restrictions	  and	  security	  concerns	  (2011,	  4). 
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increasing	   the	   disenfranchisement	   of	   civil	   society	   in	   international	   regimes”	  (Fisher	  2010,	  16).	  	  The	   assumption	   that	   insider	   strategies	   can	   be	   equated	   with	   ‘constructive	  engagement’	  is,	  of	  course,	  subjective.	  Conversely	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  insider	  strategies	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  co-­‐optation	  by	  political	  elites.	  NGOs	  that	  choose	  to	  engage	   in	   this	  way	  work	  within	  existing	  discourses,	  power	  relations	  and	  dominant	   institutions	   and	   rarely	   challenges	   these	   structures	   outright.	   If,	  however,	  civil	  society	  organisations	  believe	  that	  the	  dominant	  institutions	  of	  global	   governance	   and	   the	   discourses	   that	   underpin	   them	   (such	   as	   that	   of	  sustainable	   development)	   are	   beyond	   repair	   or	   themselves	   sources	   of	  environmental	   injustice,	   it	   is	  only	  logical	  to	  reject	  reformist	  approaches	  and	  search	   for	   alternatives.	   The	   consequence	   of	   reduced	   influence	   in	  international	   institutions	   is,	   in	   this	   view,	   not	   a	   ‘price’	   as	   such.	   Other	  approaches	  are	  considered	  more	  effective	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  global	  justice	  and	  sustainability.	  The	  choice	  of	   strategy	   for	  CSOs	  depends	   to	  a	   large	  extent	  on	  the	   overlap	   between	   their	   objectives	   and	   those	   of	   the	   target	   institutions	  (Dryzek	   2012,	   110).	   According	   to	   Dryzek,	   CSOs	   pursuing	   social	   justice	   or	  environmental	   objectives	   should	   refrain	   from	   engagement	   with	   overtly	  neoliberal	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  WTO	  but	  may	  succeed	  in	  the	  search	  for	  common	  ground	  with	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  UNEP	  (ibid).	  	  
	   277	  
Resource	  type/	  funding	  









Individual	  contributions.	  Funding	  from	  governments	  and	  intl.	  agencies,	  corporate	  donations	  and	  foundations	  
Individual	  contributions.	  Refuses	  money	  from	  governments	  and	  corporations	  
Individual	  contributions.	  	  Grants	  from	  some	  governmental	  bodies	  and	  foundations.	  Refuses	  corporate	  donations	  
	  
Table	   8:	   Comparison	   of	   main	   funding	   sources	   of	   WWF	   International,	  
Greenpeace	  International	  and	  Friends	  of	  the	  Earth	  International	  
	  The	  composition	  of	  an	  NGO’s	  income	  stream	  is	  also	  likely	  to	  shape	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  organisation	  is	  able	  and	  willing	  to	  prioritise	  responsiveness	  to	  local	   communities.	   The	   most	   important	   sources	   of	   income	   for	   the	   NGOs	  profiled	   here	   are	   donations	   and	   contributions	   from	   individual	   supporters,	  funding	  from	  foundations	  and	  (inter-­‐)	  governmental	  agencies	  and	  donations	  from	  business.	  	  	  WWF,	   Greenpeace	   and	   FoEI	   all	   rely	   on	   individual	   supporters	   as	   a	   main	  source	  of	  income.	  Elements	  of	  authorisation	  and	  accountability	  can	  certainly	  be	   found	   in	   the	   decision	   of	   a	   multitude	   of	   individuals	   to	   ‘vote	   with	   their	  wallets’	  by	  supporting	  the	  organisations	  financially	  or,	  vice	  versa,	  sanctioning	  them	   with	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   their	   support.	   While	   WWF’s	   individual	  supporters	   can	   be	   labelled	   ‘conservative’	   with	   respect	   to	   both	   ends	   and	  means,	   Greenpeace	   supporters	   are	   likely	   to	   welcome	   the	   more	   radical	  approach	   taken	   by	   the	   organisation,	   including	   the	   willingness	   of	   its	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campaigners	   to	   risk	  arrest	  or	  other	   legal	   consequences.75	  FoEI’s	   supporters	  are	  harder	  to	  classify	  due	  to	  the	  very	  different	  identities	  of	  the	  national	  FoE	  groups	   in	   different	   countries.	   In	   general,	   however,	   they	   will	   share	   the	  assumption	  that	  social	  and	  environmental	  problems	  are	   inextricably	   linked.	  A	  common	  feature	  for	  all	  organisations	  is	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  individual	  donations	  stem	  from	  supporters	  in	  Western	  Europe	  and	  North	  America.	  The	  responsiveness	  to	  paying	  supporters	  is	  therefore	  divergent	  from	  the	  types	  of	  mechanisms	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  responsiveness	  to	  affected	  communities	  in	  developing	   countries.	   It	   is	   possible	   to	   advance	   the	   argument	   that	   the	  responsiveness	  to	  paying	  supporters	   in	  the	  global	  North	  may	  in	  some	  cases	  correspond	   to	   a	   form	   of	   “accountability-­‐by-­‐proxy”	   (Koenig-­‐Archibugi	   and	  MacDonald	   2012)	   for	   affected	   communities	   in	   the	   global	   South,	   whereby	  paying	   supporters	   sanction	   the	  organisation	   if	   it	   is	   found	   to	  act	   against	   the	  interests	   of	   local	   communities.	   This	   is,	   however,	   only	   likely	   to	   happen	   in	  cases	  of	  very	  serious	   (and	  publicised)	   conflict	  and	  does	  not	  hold	  up	   from	  a	  democratic	  representation	  perspective	  based	  on	  Pitkin	  as	  it	  lacks	  the	  element	  of	  direct	  responsiveness	  to	  the	  communities.	  One	  related	  point	  that	  emerged	  from	  the	  discussion	  of	  Greenpeace	  is	  the	  growth	  of	  fundraising	  income	  from	  offices	   in	   developing	   countries	   (albeit	   from	   a	   very	   low	   base),	   which	   may	  change	  the	  dynamics	  outlined	  above	  over	  time.	  	  	  The	  need	  to	  raise	  funds	  from	  individual	  supporters	  can	  also	  create	  conflicts	  between	  the	  need	  for	  clear	  and	  simple	  public	  messages	  and	  the	  very	  complex	  challenges	  generated	  by	  many	  global	  environmental	  problems	  –	   leading	  the	  organisations	  to	  reject	  more	  complex	  “alternative	  representations	  of	  people/	  nature	   relations	   and	   social	   interests”	   (Jeanrenaud	   2002,	   119).	   Marketing	  necessities	  such	  as	  protecting	  a	  clearly	  recognisable	  ‘brand	  identity’	  across	  a	  large	   organisation	  may	   create	   the	   need	   to	   keep	   dissenting	   perspectives	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  In	  an	  article	  for	  The	  Guardian,	  environmental	  consultant	  Solitaire	  Townsend	  distinguishes	  between	  the	  “types	  of	  people”	  who	  would	  support	  Greenpeace	  and	  WWF:	  “If	  environmental	  problems	  make	  you	  really	  pissed	  off	  and	  you	  want	  to	  get	  out	  there	  and	  stick	   it	   to	  the	  man,	  you	  go	  to	  Greenpeace.	  If	  they	  make	  you	  sad,	  and	  you	  want	  to	  sit	  in	  your	  room	  with	  a	  cuddly	  toy	  and	  look	  at	  picture	  of	  cute	  animals,	  you	  would	  go	  to	  WWF”	  (Townsend	  2011).	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check.	  In	  reality,	  however,	  this	  tension	  is	  perhaps	  not	  as	  stifling	  as	  it	  appears	  at	  first	  glance,	  even	  for	  a	  relatively	  conservative	  organisation	  such	  as	  WWF.	  This	  is	  illustrated	  by	  the	  results	  of	  a	  “corporate	  review”	  that	  WWF	  undertook	  in	  1998	  (Rootes	  2006,	  771).	  According	  to	  Rootes,	  WWF	  was	  surprised	  to	  find	  that	  “its	  audiences	  did	  not,	  as	  expected,	  see	  WWF’s	  proper	  role	  as	  confined	  to	  conservation,	  but	  believed	  WWF	  should	  be	  covering	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  issues	  of	  which	  sustainable	  development	  was	  a	  key	  element”	  (ibid).	  In	  most	  instances,	  moreover,	  NGOs	  are	  likely	  to	  get	  around	  the	  conflict	  between	  PR	  needs	  and	  developing	   constructive	   policy	   positions	   quite	   pragmatically,	   by	   simply	  tailoring	   their	   output	   such	   as	   publications	   to	   the	   respective	   audiences	   (i.e.	  glossy	  annual	  reports	  for	  paying	  supporters	  and	  more	  technical	  policy	  papers	  for	  governmental	  decision-­‐makers).	  	  Of	   course,	   individual	  donations	  are	  not	   the	  only	   source	  of	   income	   for	   these	  NGOs.	  Other	   large	   funding	  sources	   for	  WWF	  International	  are	  governments	  and	  aid	  agencies;	  money	  which	  is	  often	  linked	  to	  WWF’s	  role	  in	  implementing	  donor-­‐funded	   projects	   on	   the	   ground.	   The	   fact	   that	   this	   gives	   WWF	  considerable	   power	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   smaller	   and	   less	   well	   resourced	   local	  community	   organisations	   has	   already	   been	   pointed	   out	   (Chapin	   2004).	  Moreover,	   it	   is	   understandable	   that	   institutional	   donors	   often	   want	   to	   see	  concrete	  results	  within	  a	  clear	  timeframe.	  Participatory	  processes,	  however,	  might	   be	   ‘messy’	   and	   lengthy	   and	   not	   fit	   many	   standard	   approaches	   for	  impact	   measurement.	   The	   pressure	   to	   prove	   quick	   results	   (sometimes	   in	  order	  to	  secure	  follow-­‐up	  funding)	  may	  therefore	  undermine	  the	  practices	  of	  responsiveness	   in	   NGO	   projects.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   however,	   governmental	  agencies	  and	  foundations	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  react	  sensitively	  to	  allegations	  of	  conflict	  between	  local	  communities	  and	  implementing	  NGO	  partners	  –	  which	  means	  that	  it	   is	  in	  WWF’s	  interest	  to	  pursue	  collaborative	  and	  participatory	  solutions	  to	  challenges	  that	  might	  arise.	  In	  some	  instances,	  the	  funding	  may	  even	   come	   with	   ‘strings	   attached’	   specifying	   social	   safeguards,	   the	  implementation	   of	   international	   norms	   for	   the	   participation	   of	   indigenous	  peoples	   and	   other	   provisions	   relating	   to	   community	   participation	   (Chapin	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2004).	   This	   trend	   is	   also	   reflected	   in	   a	   growing	   number	   of	   ‘participatory’	  social	  impact	  assessment	  tools.	  	  	  It	   is	   easy	   to	   assume	   that	   the	  NGOs’	   dependence	  on	   income	   from	   individual	  supporters	  and,	  in	  some	  instances,	  businesses	  from	  the	  global	  North	  creates	  incentives	  against	   them	  becoming	  more	   responsive	   to	   local	   communities	   in	  the	   global	   South.	   Some	   observers	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   reluctance	   of	  Northern	   NGOs	   to	   address	   the	   issue	   of	   consumption	   patterns	   in	  industrialised	   countries	   is	   linked	   to	   their	   concerns	   about	   alienating	   their	  supporter	   bases	   and	   political	   allies	   there,	   including	   corporate	   supporters	  (O’Neill	  and	  VanDeever	  2005,	  203).	  It	  has	  also	  been	  argued	  that	  the	  focus	  on	  pleasing	   donors	   in	   the	   shape	   of	   governments,	   aid	   agencies	   or	   large	  foundations	   has	   led	   to	   an	   emphasis	   on	   ‘upward	   accountability’	   –	   with	   the	  assumption	  that	  this	  also	  results	  in	  a	  neglect	  of	  ‘downward	  accountability’	  to	  local	  communities	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  	  Many	   of	   these	   alleged	   influences	   are,	   however,	   not	   as	   stifling	   as	   perhaps	  perceived.	  The	  risk	  that	  donors	  are	  going	  to	  withhold	  funding	  as	  a	  result	  of	  an	   organisation	   becoming	   more	   responsive	   to	   local	   communities	   on	   the	  ground	   is	   small	   and	   mitigated	   by	   the	   factors	   outlined	   above.	   Still,	   it	   is	  possible	   that	   social,	   human	   rights	   or	   equity	   issues	   are	   not	   necessarily	   a	  primary	   concern	   for	   supporters	   of	   environmental	   or	   conservation	   NGOs.	  While	   FoEI	   supporters	   have	   always	   been	   prone	   to	   see	   social	   and	  environmental	   issues	   as	   closely	   linked,	   even	   those	   supporters	   that	   are	  sometimes	  assumed	  to	  care	  only	  about	  narrow	  green	  issues	  or	  cuddly	  panda	  bears	  have	  learned	  that	  environmental	  protection	  and	  conservation	  can	  only	  work	  if	  humans	  are	  part	  of	  the	  solution.	  Public	  agencies	  and	  foundations	  that	  fund	  NGOs	  are	  themselves	  engaged	  in	  or	  at	  least	  exposed	  to	  the	  discourse	  of	  stakeholder	   participation	   and	   therefore	   likely	   to	   support	   participatory	  approaches.	   As	   for	   corporate	   donors,	   potential	   impacts	   are	   likely	   to	   differ	  depending	  on	  the	  business	   interests	  at	  stake.	  Conflicts	  of	   interests	  are	  most	  apparent	   when	   corporations	   have	   extensive	   operations	   in	   developing	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countries,	   with	   potentially	   negative	   impacts	   on	   the	   livelihoods	   of	   local	  communities.	   In	   those	   instances	   it	   is	   important	   that	   the	   NGO	   that	   accepts	  corporate	  money	  has	  strict	  organisational	  policies	  and	  guidelines	  to	  prevent	  any	  attempt	  at	  undue	  influence.	  	  	  
Alliances	  and	  partnerships	  










None	   Becoming	  more	  important	   Alliances	  with	  social	  movements	  including	  La	  Via	  Campesina	  
Relations	  with	  
business	  
Promotes	  self-­‐regulatory	  initiatives	   Some	  but	  not	  a	  key	  feature	   No	  	  
Global	  Justice	  
Movement	  
Shapes	  context	  organisation	  operates	  in	   Has	  become	  increasingly	  important	   Strong	  links	  
	  
Table	   9:	   Comparison	   of	   alliances	   and	   partnerships	   of	   WWF	   International,	  
Greenpeace	  International	  and	  Friends	  of	  the	  Earth	  International	  
	  Large	  international	  NGOs	  with	  roots	  in	  the	  global	  North	  are	  not	  naturally	  the	  type	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  most	  closely	  in	  touch	  with	  the	  struggles	  of	  local	   communities	   in	   the	   global	   South.	   Southern-­‐based	   social	   movements	  such	  as	  La	  Via	  Campesina,	  the	  transnational	  peasant	  farmers’	  network,	  or	  the	  Indigenous	   Environmental	   Network,	   an	   alliance	   of	   indigenous	   peoples,	  constitute	   more	   authentic	   interlocutors	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   membership.	  Better-­‐resourced	   and	   more	   tightly	   centralised	   organisations	   have	   the	  advantage,	   however,	   that	   they	   are	   often	  well	   connected	  with	   key	   decision-­‐makers	  within	   international	   institutions	   or	   governments	   and	   are	   therefore	  more	   effective	   at	   exerting	   influence.	   Through	   interacting	   with	   social	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movements	   from	   the	   global	   South,	   international	  NGOs	   are	   likely	   to	  pick	  up	  ideas,	   demands	   and	   discourses	   that	   they	   might	   then	   incorporate	   in	   their	  international	  policy	  positions	  and	  ‘carry’	  to	  international	  fora.	  	  	  Out	   of	   the	   three	  multi-­‐issue	   environmental	   NGOs,	   FoEI	   is	   undoubtedly	   the	  one	   that	   works	   most	   closely	   with	   social	   movements	   and	   has	   started	  developing	   global	   policy	   positions	   in	   dialogue	   with	   them.	   The	   further	  intensification	   of	   its	   alliances	   with	   social	   movements	   is	   one	   of	   the	  components	  of	  FoEI’s	  strategic	  plan.	  For	  the	  network	  this	  constitutes	  a	  logical	  extension	  of	  its	  focus	  on	  internal	  democratic	  processes	  and	  working	  with	  the	  grassroots:	   “the	  reason	  we	  can	  work	   in	   that	  sphere	   is	  because	  many	  of	  our	  groups	  are	  part	  of	   that	  movement.	   (…)	  Their	  ways	  of	  working	  are	  similarly	  democratic.	  They	  have	  similar	  targets.	  (…)	  We	  tend	  to	  talk	  the	  same	  language,	  operate	   the	   same	   way	   (…)	   (interview	   with	   climate	   campaigner,	   FoEI,	  06.05.2010).	  	  	  The	  organisational	  characteristics	  of	  WWF	  and	  Greenpeace	  mean	  that	  these	  two	  NGOs	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  naturally	  ‘in	  sync’	  with	  social	  movements	  than	  FoEI.	   However,	   for	   Greenpeace	   in	   particular,	   contacts	   with	   movement	  organisations	   have	   become	   more	   important	   over	   recent	   years.	   A	   further	  deepening	   of	   these	   relationships	   would,	   however,	   probably	   require	   the	  organisation	   to	   rethink	   its	   main	   strategies	   for	   achieving	   global	   change.	  Through	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  climate	  justice	  movement	  (see	  also	  discussion	  in	  next	  section)	  many	  of	   the	  demands	  emanating	   from	  social	  movements	   in	  the	   global	   South	   have	   begun	   to	   crop	   up	   more	   prominently	   in	   the	  international	  debates	  on	   climate	   change.	  This	  has	  undoubtedly	   also	   shaped	  the	  way	  more	   conservative	   NGOs,	   which	   have	   traditionally	   not	   engaged	   in	  close	   interactions	   with	   social	   movements,	   have	   started	   framing	   their	  positions.	  	  	  Finally,	  as	  a	  point	  arising	  from	  the	  discussion	  of	  CAN,	  it	  might	  be	  interesting	  to	   further	   investigate	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   not	   only	   its	   alliances	   shape	   the	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responsiveness	  of	  an	  NGO	  to	  affected	  communities,	  but	  also	  the	  emergence	  of	  ‘rival	  representatives’.	  Climate	  Justice	  Now!	  (CJN!),	  which	  formed	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Bali	  Conference	  represents	  a	  more	  justice-­‐focussed	  climate	  network	  of	  CSOs	   and	   movements,	   many	   of	   which	   come	   from	   countries	   of	   the	   global	  South.	   In	   demanding	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	   historical	   responsibility	   for	  climate	   change	   and	   ecological	   debt	   by	   industrialised	   countries	   and	   in	  rejecting	   market-­‐based	   mechanisms,	   the	   network	   is	   more	   closely	   aligned	  with	   many	   of	   the	   demands	   coming	   from	   Southern	   CSOs	   and	   social	  movements	   than	  CAN.	  Further	  analysis	  would	  be	   required	   to	   investigate	   to	  what	   extent	   the	   emergence	   of	   CJN!	   contributed	   to	   efforts	   within	   CAN	   to	  strengthen	  its	  responsiveness	  to	  Southern	  members.	  	  	  A	  very	  different	   form	  of	   ‘alliance’	   is	   that	  of	  corporate	  partnerships.	  WWF	  in	  particular	  not	  only	  accepts	  corporate	  donations	  but	  also	  works	  directly	  with	  companies	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  promote	  more	  sustainable	  practices	  by	  industry.	  WWF	   has	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   set-­‐up	   of	   a	   number	   of	   self-­‐regulatory	   initiatives	   by	   business,	   such	   as	   the	   Roundtable	   on	   Sustainable	  Palm	   Oil	   and	   the	   Roundtable	   for	   Responsible	   Soy,	   as	   well	   as	   certification	  bodies	   such	   as	   the	   Forest	   Stewardship	   Council	   (FSC)	   and	   the	   Marine	  Stewardship	   Council	   (MSC).	   Through	   its	   support	   for	   these	   private	   forms	   of	  governance	  WWF	  contributes	  to	  the	  legitimisation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  corporations	  as	   “regulator”	   (Tienhaara,	  Orsini	   and	   Falkner	   2012,	   49).	   To	   the	   extent	   that	  these	   initiatives	   have	   a	   ‘displacement	   effect’	   on	   governmental	   forms	   of	  regulation,	   the	  ability	  of	   local	   communities	   to	  be	  represented	   through	   their	  governments	   is	   potentially	   diminished.	   This	   makes	   the	   quality	   of	   the	  participatory	   provisions	   of	   these	   initiatives	   and	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   they	  allow	   for	   local	   communities	   to	   influence	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   all	   the	  more	   important.	   Ensuring	   that	   these	   forms	  of	   responsiveness	   are	  provided	  for	   in	   these	   initiatives	   constitutes	   an	   important	   role	   for	  participating	  NGOs	  such	  as	  WWF.	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Values	  










Output-­‐oriented	  values	  dominant	  (“sustainability-­‐efficiency”	  Alcock	  2008)	  	  
Output-­‐oriented	  values	  dominant	  (“sustainability-­‐equity”	  Alcock	  2008)	  	  
Process-­‐oriented	  values	  dominant	  (participation,	  democracy,	  solidarity)	  	  
Role	  of	  markets	  
Support	  for	  market-­‐based	  approaches	  	   Does	  not	  reject	  market-­‐based	  approaches	  in	  principle	  
Rejection	  of	  market-­‐based	  approaches	  in	  principle	  
	  
Table	   10:	   Comparison	   of	   dominant	   values	   of	  WWF	   International,	   Greenpeace	  
International	  and	  Friends	  of	  the	  Earth	  International	  
	  Dominant	  values	  are	   important	  elements	  of	  organisational	  culture	  and	  they	  are	  probably	  the	  most	  important	  determinants	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  an	  NGO	  is	   willing	   to	   practise	   responsiveness	   to	   local	   communities.	   Values	   cannot	  really	   be	   treated	   as	   a	   distinct	   category	   to	   the	   different	   organisational	  characteristics	  outlined	  above	  as	  values	  underpin	  and	  are	  in	  turn	  influenced	  by	   many	   of	   them.	   Organisational	   values	   are	   therefore	   simultaneously	  enabling	   factors	  but	  also	  shaped	  by	  greater	   responsiveness	   to	  marginalised	  communities.	  	  	  Conceptually,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  values	  attached	  to	  the	  processes	  within	   the	   organisation	   and	   the	   values	   reflected	   in	   the	   positions	  that	   the	   organisation	   puts	   forward	   in	   the	   international	   arena	   (although,	  again,	  the	  two	  are	  closely	  linked	  in	  practice).	  An	  organisation	  that	  prioritises	  democratic	   and	   participatory	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   is	   more	   likely	   to	  create	  internal	  spaces	  where	  the	  voices	  of	  marginalised	  communities	  can	  be	  heard.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  FoEI,	  it	  is	  the	  processes	  of	  democratic	  deliberation	  that	  have	  become	   just	  as,	   if	  not	  more,	   important	   than	   the	  outcomes.	  Developing	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common	  policy	  positions	  is	  less	  important	  for	  the	  network	  than	  the	  broader	  convergence	   around	   shared	   values	   and	   the	   practice	   of	   solidarity	   among	  members.	  As	  a	  result	  of	   its	  commitment	  to	  democratic	  values	  in	   its	   internal	  relations	   the	   network	   is	   willing	   to	   accept	   potential	   trade-­‐offs,	   such	   as	  reduced	  ‘efficiency’	  (for	  example,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  speed	  of	  decision-­‐making).	  	  	  A	   second	   consideration	   concerns	   the	   values	   that	   shape	   the	   organisation’s	  worldview	  and	  hence	  the	  positions	  that	   it	  puts	   forward	  at	   the	   international	  level.	  These	  values	  determine	  the	  external	  parameters	  within	  which	  forms	  of	  responsiveness	  might	  then	  come	  to	  shape	  the	  NGO’s	  policies.	  For	  example,	  as	  was	  repeatedly	  found	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  both	  ‘external	  demands’	  and	  ‘internal	  practices’,	   divergent	   attitudes	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   markets	   constitute	   fault	   lines	   that	  cannot	  easily	  be	  smoothed	  over.	  	  	  The	  voices	   coming	   from	  marginalised	  affected	   communities	   are	  often	  more	  radical	   than	   the	   dominant	   discourses	   among	   policy	   elites,	   including	   many	  Northern	   NGOs	   (Smith	   2002).	   Those	   local	   communities	   that	   organise	  themselves	   politically	   tend	   to	   do	   so	   in	   opposition	   to	   powerful	   actors	   or	  externally	  imposed	  policies	  that	  impact	  their	  lives	  negatively.	  Their	  political	  organisation	   constitutes	   a	   form	   of	   resistance	   against	   much	  more	   powerful	  corporations,	  governmental	  bodies	  or	  politicians.	  As	  a	  result,	  their	  demands	  are	   often	   more	   radical,	   anti-­‐hegemonic	   or	   critical	   of	   corporate	   power.	   By	  contrast,	  communities	  that	  benefit	  from	  the	  status	  quo	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  take	  political	   action,	   unless	   their	   status	   is	   threatened	   and	  will	   therefore	   be	   less	  ‘visible’	   among	   civil	   society.	   The	   extent	   to	   which	   international	   NGOs	   are	  prepared	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   more	   radical	   critiques	   of	   many	   Southern	   CSO,	  community-­‐based	   organisations	   or	   IPOs	   depends	   on	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  these	  fit	  with	  the	  organisation’s	  existing	  values	  and	  dominant	  strategies	  (Bob	  2005).	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ii. The	  internal	  dimension:	  conclusion	  and	  broader	  trends	  This	  thesis	  has	  tried	  to	  explore	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  international	  NGOs	  might	  contribute	   to	   making	   the	   voices	   of	   affected	   communities	   heard	   in	  international	  institutions.	  Proposing	  a	  representation	  perspective	  to	  analyse	  the	  role	  of	   international	  NGOs	  is	  a	  bold	  endeavour	  in	  light	  of	  the	  commonly	  voiced	  criticisms	  that	   these	  organisations	  are	  elitist,	  detached	   from	  the	  real	  needs	   of	   communities	   in	   developing	   countries	   and	   therefore	  ‘unrepresentative’	  of	   the	  vast	  majority	  of	   the	  world’s	  population.	   In	   further	  exploring	   the	   notion	   that	   even	   large	   international	   NGOs	   with	   Northern	  origins	   can	   act	   as	   democratic	   links	   between	   affected	   communities	   and	  international	   institutions,	   this	   thesis	   has	   aimed	   to	   counter	   some	   of	   these	  criticisms.	  The	  discussion	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  representation	  together	  with	  the	  analysis	  of	  individual	  NGOs	  has	  shown	  that	  there	  is	  indeed	  some	  potential	  for	  large	   international	   NGOs	   and	   NGO	   networks	   to	   act	   as	   representatives	   of	  marginalised	   communities	   in	   global	   policymaking	   processes.	   However,	   this	  potential	   is	   also	   severely	   constrained	   and	   shaped	   by	   organisational	  characteristics	  such	  as	   the	   formal	  structure,	  decision-­‐making	  processes,	   the	  strategy	   for	   bringing	   about	   change,	   the	   funding	   base,	   alliances	   and	  partnerships,	  as	  well	  as	  values.	  As	  the	  discussion	  above	  and	  the	  analyses	   in	  the	  previous	  chapters	  have	  shown,	  NGOs	  differ	  in	  their	  potential,	  ability	  and	  willingness	   to	   act	   as	   ‘representatives’	   of	   local	   communities	   in	   global	  environmental	   governance.	   The	   rebuttal	   of	   arguments	   advanced	   by	   some	  NGO	  critics	  relating	  to	  the	  predominance	  of	  developed	  country	  NGOs	  within	  global	   civil	   society,	   their	   reliance	   on	   supporters	   and	   donors	   in	   the	   global	  North	   and	   the	   absence	   of	   internal	   democracy	   in	   these	   organisations,	   can	  therefore	  only	  be	  partial.76	  	  	  The	  investigation	  of	  internal	  practices	  by	  NGOs	  used	  as	  its	  point	  of	  departure	  Pitkin’s	   concept	  of	   “substantive	   representation”.	  Substantive	   representation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	   Moreover,	   there	   are	   numerous	   groups	   that	   are	   often	   also	   included	   in	   the	   definition	   of	  NGOs	  but	  to	  whom	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  developed	  here	  cannot	  be	  applied	  to	  (such	  as	  ‘pure’	  research	  groups	  or	  NGOs	  that	  were	  set	  up	  to	  promote	  business	  interests).	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conceives	   of	   the	   activity	   of	   representing	   as	   “distinct	   from	   its	   external	   or	  formal	   trappings”	   (Pitkin	  1967,	  114).	  This	  makes	   this	  concept	  better	  suited	  than	   other	   accounts	   of	   representation	   for	   application	   to	   this	   relatively	   ‘un-­‐orthodox’	   context	   –	   the	   internal	   practices	   of	   international	   environmental	  NGOs.	  Key	   to	  substantive	  representation	   is,	  according	   to	  Pitkin,	  evidence	  of	  responsiveness	  to	  the	  represented.	  The	  empirical	  analyses	  of	  different	  NGOs	  in	   this	   thesis	   therefore	   focussed	   on	   identifying	   different	   forms	   of	  responsiveness	   through	  which	   the	   interests,	   preferences	   and	   values	   of	   the	  represented	  are	  transmitted	  to	  those	  doing	  the	  representing.	  Those	   in	  need	  of	  more	  and	  better	  representation	  were	  defined	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis	  as	   local	   communities	   negatively	   affected	   by	   policies	   developed	   in	  international	   inter-­‐governmental	   institutions.	   While	   the	   analysis	   has	  identified	   a	   number	   of	   ways	   in	   which	   international	   NGOs	   can	   potentially	  develop	   responsiveness	   to	   local	   communities	   (through,	   for	   example,	   their	  global	   presence,	   internal	   guidelines	   for	   stakeholder	   participation,	   or	  interactions	   with	   social	   movements),	   it	   also	   found	   that	   this	   potential	   is	  usually	   only	   weakly	   realised	   to	   date.	   Nonetheless,	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	  broader	   trends	   at	   work	   that	   could	   prompt	   NGOs	   to	   further	   continue	  strengthening	   their	   responsiveness	   to	   marginalised	   communities	   in	   the	  future.	   Drawing	   on	   Pitkin’s	   categories,	   such	   a	   development	   might	   be	  interpreted	   as	   a	   shift	   from	   trusteeship	   towards	   mandate-­‐based	   forms	   of	  representation.	   It	   is	   suggested	  here	   that	  at	   least	   two	  broad	  global	   trends	   in	  environmental	  politics	  (and	  beyond)	  contribute	  to	  a	  gradual	  shift	  of	  the	  role	  of	   international	   NGOs	   towards	   stronger	   responsiveness	   to	   marginalised	  communities	  and	  hence	  to	  exercising	  mandate-­‐based	  forms	  of	  representation	  rather	  than	  acting	  as	  trustees:	  firstly,	  the	  ‘participatory	  turn’	  in	  global	  politics	  and	  secondly,	  the	  growing	  importance	  of	  equity	  and	  justice	  issues,	  which	  has	  brought	   many	   CSOs	   to	   engage	   more	   closely	   with	   existing	   patterns	   of	  marginalisation	  and	  find	  ways	  to	  overcome	  these.	  	  	  The	   notion	   of	   a	   ‘participatory	   turn’	   in	   global	   environmental	   politics	   and	  world	  politics	  more	  broadly	  was	  already	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  III	  (section	  iii.)	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of	  the	  thesis.	  This	  development	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  what	  Bäckstrand	  et	  al	  have	  called	   the	   “deliberative	   turn”	   and	   which	   they	   describe	   as	   “an	   increased	  attention	   in	   environmental	   politics	   to	   procedural	   qualities	   such	   as	  participation,	   dialogue,	   transparency	   and	   accountability”	   (Bäckstrand	   et	   al	  2010a,	   3).	   At	   the	   international	   institutional	   level	   this	   has	   involved	   an	  emphasis	   on	   the	   participation	   by	   organised	   civil	   society	   and	   other	   private	  actors	  in	  environmental	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  and	  forms	  of	  governance.	  However,	   participatory	   norms	   have	   also	   ‘cropped	   up’	   in	   slightly	   different	  disguises	   in	   other	   contexts.	   For	   instance,	   critical	   questions	   around	   the	  accountability	   and	   legitimacy	   of	   NGOs	   have	   led	   to	   a	   degree	   of	   self-­‐examination	   by	   civil	   society	   groups	   themselves.	   One	   response	   has	   been	   a	  growing	   emphasis	   on	   working	   with,	   rather	   than	   just	   ‘for’,	   the	   supposed	  beneficiaries	   of	   NGO	   projects.	   Both	   the	   development	   and	   conservation	  discourses	  have	  similarly	  witnessed	  a	  shift	  towards	  participatory	  approaches	  that	  sees	  beneficiaries	  and	  local	  communities	  not	  as	  passive	  recipients	  but	  as	  rights-­‐holders.	   On	   a	   whole	   different	   level,	   the	   internet	   has	   had	   a	   hugely	  transformative	  effect	  on	  the	  possibilities	  for	  participation	  by	  citizens	  (Kanie	  et	   al	   2012,	   298).	   Secretive	   or	   hierarchical	   forms	   of	   decision-­‐making	   are	   at	  odds	   with	   the	   promises	   of	   open	   democracy	   and	   mass	   mobilisation	   online.	  Groups	   such	   as	   Avaaz,	  which	  was	   only	   launched	   in	   2007,	   allow	  millions	   of	  individuals	  worldwide	  to	  express	  their	  support	  for	  particular	  political,	  social	  or	   environmental	   issues	  at	   the	   click	  of	   a	  button.	  The	  various	  developments	  recounted	  here	  are	  of	  a	  very	  disparate	  nature.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  each	  one	  contributes	  in	  a	  different	  way	  to	  the	  ideal	  that	  citizens	  are	  able	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  making	  of	  the	  decisions	  that	  affect	  and	  concern	  them.	  	  	  Yet	  another	  development	   is	   the	  ascendency	  of	   the	  global	   justice	  movement,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  growing	  influence	  of	  Southern	  civil	  society	  groups	  in	  the	  field	  of	   global	   environmental	   politics.	   Organisations	   such	   as	   the	   Third	   World	  Network	  and	  Focus	  on	   the	  Global	   South	  have	  already	   for	  a	   long	   time	  made	  important	  contributions	  to	  placing	  considerations	  of	  justice	  and	  equity	  on	  the	  environmental	   NGOs’	   agenda.	   More	   recently,	   Climate	   Justice	   Now!	   has	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evolved	   as	   “a	   network	   of	   organisations	   and	   movements	   from	   around	   the	  globe	  committed	  to	  the	  fight	  for	  social,	  ecological	  and	  gender	  justice”.77	  The	  success	  of	  these	  organisations	  in	  framing	  climate	  change	  in	  justice	  and	  equity	  terms	  has	  forced	  even	  ‘traditional’	  environmental	  NGOs	  to	  open	  up	  to	  these	  debates	  and	  to	  justify	  their	  own	  demands	  more	  explicitly	  in	  these	  terms.	  This	  does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  that	  reformist	  international	  environmental	  NGOs	  have	  ‘internalised’	  the	  more	  radical	  discourse	  of	  environmental	  justice.	  What	  might	   be	   at	   play,	   however,	   has	   been	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   “civilizing	   force	   of	  hypocrisy”	  (Elster	  1998,	  12	  quoted	  in	  Dryzek	  2009,	  9),	  whereby	  the	  “public	  exchange	   may	   come	   to	   proceed	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   principles,	   and	   so	   the	  principles	   take	   effect	   (…)	   irrespective	   of	   the	   initial	   motivations”	   (Dryzek	  2009,	  10).	  	  	  Searching	   for	   forms	   of	   responsiveness,	   which	   Pitkin	   considers	   a	   defining	  element	  of	   substantive	   representation,	   has	   guided	   the	   empirical	   analysis	   of	  the	  various	  NGOs	  in	  this	  thesis.	  While	  many	  forms	  of	  responsiveness	  to	  local	  communities	  are	   to	  date	  still	  nascent,	  operate	   indirectly	  or	  are	  only	  weakly	  developed	   in	   practice,	   there	   is	   growing	   pressure	   on	   international	   NGOs	   to	  demonstrate	   evidence	  of	   responsiveness	   to	  members,	   a	  broader	  public	   and	  communities	   that	   are	   marginalised	   in	   global	   policy-­‐making	   processes.	  	  Provided	  that	   there	   is	   indeed	  a	  gradual	  shift	   towards	  mandate-­‐based	   forms	  of	   representation	   taking	   place,	   we	   could	   expect	   NGOs	   to	   become	   more	  accountable	  to	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  stakeholders	  over	  time.	  	  Is	  this,	  however,	  an	  unambiguously	   positive	   development?	   Drawing	   on	   Pitkin,	   the	   activity	   of	  representation	   was	   presented	   as	   a	   spectrum	   of	   activities	   located	   between	  trustee	  and	  mandate	  forms	  of	  representation.	  The	  element	  of	  trusteeship	  in	  its	   pure	   form,	   it	   was	   argued,	   lacks	   responsiveness	   to	   the	   represented	   and	  does	   therefore	   not	   meet	   the	   democratic	   threshold.	   Nonetheless,	   there	   is	  much	   value	   in	   the	   idea	   that	   NGOs	   can	   act	   as	   trustees	   for	   certain	  constituencies,	   especially	   future	   generations,	   who	   as	   the	   Brundtland	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Website	  of	  CJN!	  http://www.climate-­‐justice-­‐now.org/.	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Commission	  stated	  in	  1987:	  “do	  not	  vote;	  they	  have	  no	  political	  or	  financial	  power;	   they	   cannot	   challenge	   our	   decisions”	   (WCED	   1987,	   8). A	   trustee	  model	   of	   representation	   can	   act	   as	   an	   important	   counterweight	   to	   some	  of	  the	  weaknesses	  inherent	  in	  mandate-­‐based	  forms	  of	  representation,	  whereby	  the	  realisation	  of	  present-­‐day	   interests	  may	  restrict	   the	  choices	  available	  to	  future	   generations.	   The	   potential	   contribution	   of	   NGOs	   as	   trustees	   in	   this	  sense	  should	   therefore	  not	  easily	  be	  dismissed.	   In	   fact,	  present	  day	  citizens	  who	   care	   strongly	   about	   the	   wellbeing	   of	   future	   generations	   are	   likely	   to	  welcome	   the	  advocacy	  work	  undertaken	  by	   some	  NGOs	  on	  behalf	  of	   future	  generations.	   Through,	   for	   example,	   supporting	   these	   NGOs	   financially	   they	  might	   ‘authorize’	   their	   role	   as	   trustees.	   However,	   the	   important	   point	   of	  differentiation	   is	   that	   the	   constituency	   doing	   the	   authorizing	   and	   that	   on	  whose	  behalf	  the	  NGOs	  is	  claiming	  to	  act	  are	  not	  the	  same.	  This	  is	  acceptable	  if	  –	  as	  in	  the	  important	  case	  of	  future	  generations	  –	  the	  represented	  are	  not	  able	  to	  speak	  for	  themselves.	  However,	  if	  the	  represented	  are	  actually	  able	  to	  speak	   up	   and	   participate,	   there	   is	   cause	   for	   concern	   from	   a	   democratic	  perspective.	   Substantive	   representation	   as	   understood	   by	   Pitkin	   does	   not	  seek	  to	  resolve	  the	  tensions	  between	  these	  two	  interpretations	  of	  the	  roles	  of	  representatives.	   In	   fact,	   it	   is	   precisely	   this	   ‘controversy’	   which	   substantive	  representation	  has	  to	  navigate	  in	  practice.	  	  	  The	  discussion	   in	   the	  previous	  section	  of	   this	  chapter	  has	  drawn	  mainly	  on	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  three	  multi-­‐issue	  ENGOs:	  WWF,	  Greenpeace	  and	  FoEI.	  CAN	  and	   the	  CBD	  Alliance	  differ	   from	   these	   groups	   in	   that	   their	   raison	  d’être	   is	  strategic	   and	   limited	   to	   shaping	   civil	   society	   input	   into	   the	   global	  policymaking	   processes	   on	   climate	   and	   biodiversity	   respectively.	   They	  constitute	  networks	  of	  completely	  autonomous	  NGOs	  and	  are	  not	  united	  by	  one	  organisational	   identity.	  Strictly	  speaking,	   rather	   than	  providing	  us	  with	  insights	   into	   the	   internal	   practices	   of	   individual	   organisations,	   the	  comparative	  discussion	  of	  CAN	  and	  the	  CBD	  Alliance	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  (chapter	  VII)	  helps	  to	  illuminate	  the	  dynamics	  characterising	  “the	  plurality	  of	  mechanisms	   that	   horizontally	   link	   activities	   of	   various	   actors”	   (Dingwerth	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and	  Pattberg	  2006,	  193)	  in	  global	  governance	  (see	  discussion	  in	  chapter	  II).	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  vertical	  linkages	  that	  NGOs	  might	  help	  to	  establish	  between	  local	   communities	   and	   international	   institutions,	   the	   nature	   of	   these	  horizontal	   linkages	  among	  groups	  of	  different	  size	  and	  influence	  shapes	  the	  opportunities	  for	  access	  and	  participation	  open	  to	  them.	  	  	  CAN	   in	  particular	  has	  played	  an	   important	   role	   in	  bringing	   together	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  NGOs	  interested	  in	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  change	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  strengthening	   their	   overall	   influence	   through	   the	   development	   of	   joint	  positions.	   Large	   Northern	   based,	  well-­‐resourced	   environmental	   NGOs	   have	  had	  a	  very	  strong	  standing	  within	  CAN	  since	  the	  network’s	   inception.	  Their	  influence	   was	   increasingly	   challenged	   as	   CAN’s	   membership	   became	  more	  diverse,	   not	   only	   geographically	   but	   also	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   concerns	   new	  members	  brought	  to	  the	  table	  (human	  rights,	  social	   issues,	   justice	  etc.).	  The	  departure	   of	   FoEI	   from	  CAN	   as	  well	   as	   the	   establishment	   of	   an	   alternative	  network	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Climate	  Justice	  Now!	  has	  shown	  the	  limits	  of	  finding	  common	  ground	  among	  an	  ever	  more	  heterogeneous	  NGO	  community.	  The	  big	  ideological	  fissures	  among	  global	  civil	  society	  over	  the	  issue	  of	  capitalism	  and	  the	  role	  of	  markets,	  and	  the	  divergent	  views	  of	  the	  dominant	  institutions	  of	   global	   governance	   as	   legitimate	   or	   fundamentally	   beyond	   reform,	   could	  not	   be	   bridged.	   The	   CBD	   Alliance	   has	   largely	   managed	   to	   avoid	   these	  ideological	  clashes	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  develop	  joint	  positions	  among	  the	  groups	  it	  interacts	  with.78	  	  	  
iii. The	  external	  dimension:	  are	  IGOs	  the	  right	  target?	  The	   examination	   of	   the	   democratic	   demands	   formulated	   by	   NGOs	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	   UNFCCC	   and	   CBD,	   which	   was	   presented	   in	   chapter	   IV,	   found	   that	  democratic	  demands	  are	  much	  more	  prevalent	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  former.	  The	  reasons	  for	  the	  difference	   in	  emphasis	   include	  the	  particular	  characteristics	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   3	   in	   chapter	   VII	   sets	   out	   the	   main	   differences	   in	   terms	   of	   organisational	  characteristics	  and	  functions	  of	  the	  CAN	  and	  the	  CBD	  Alliance.	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of	   the	   issues	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  biodiversity	   loss,	   the	  relatively	  stronger	  focus	   on	   national	   implementation	   in	   the	   CBD	   versus	   the	   debates	   around	  building	  new	  institutions	  in	  the	  UNFCCC,	  the	  better	  developed	  provisions	  for	  participation	  by	  indigenous	  peoples	  in	  the	  biodiversity	  convention,	  as	  well	  as	  	  the	  composition	  and	  focus	  of	  the	  respective	  NGO	  communities	  engaged	  with	  the	   two	   conventions.	   Not	   exactly	   surprising	   is	   the	   finding	   that,	   overall,	  demands	   for	   more	   participation	   by	   societal	   stakeholders	   are	   better	  developed	   and	  more	   frequently	   voiced	   than	   demands	   relating	   to	   equitable	  representation	   through	   governments.	   After	   all,	   the	   NGOs	   themselves	   are	  most	   likely	   to	   benefit	   from	   these	   participatory	   provisions	   and	   will	   almost	  certainly	   subscribe	   to	   a	   positive	   assessment	   of	   the	   benefits	   of	   civil	   society	  participation.	  The	  NGO	  demands	  were	   replete	  with	   references	   to	  particular	  international	   institutions	   that	   are	   widely	   regarded	   as	   being	   especially	  representative	  (such	  as	  the	  Adaptation	  Fund	  Board	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol)	  or	  participatory	  (Global	  Fund,	  WCD,	  etc.).	  By	  advocating	  the	  implementation	  of	  comparable	   standards	   in	   the	  UNFCCC,	   the	  NGOs	  are	   trying	   to	   contribute	   to	  the	  transfer	  of	  particular	  democratic	  norms	  from	  one	  institutional	  setting	  to	  another.	   This	  would	   support	   the	   general	   observation	   that	   NGOs	   can	   act	   as	  “norm	  entrepreneurs	  spreading	  a	  norm	  that	  global	  policy	  making	  should	  be	  more	  inclusive	  and	  accountable	  to	  affected	  stakeholders”	  (Tallberg	  and	  Uhlin	  2012,	  212/213).	  	  The	   desirability	   of	   more	   equitable,	   participatory	   and	   therefore	   democratic	  international	   institutions	   has	   not	   really	   been	   questioned	   in	   this	   thesis.	   In	  light	   of	   the	  weak	   progress	  made	   on	   the	   environmental	   protection	   front	   to	  date	   it	   is	   worth	   asking,	   however,	   if	   broadly	   inclusive,	   representative	   and	  consensus-­‐orientated	  processes	  are	  really	  able	  to	  deliver	  stronger	  results.	  A	  closer	   examination	   of	   the	   “links	   and	   trade-­‐offs	   between	   input	   and	   output	  legitimacy”	  (Biermann	  and	  Gupta	  2011,	  1861)	  would	  most	  likely	  come	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  relationship	  is	  highly	  ambiguous.	  Drawing	  on	  a	  range	  of	  empirical	   analyses	   of	   participatory	   environmental	   policy	   practices,	  Bäckstrand	  et	  al	  point	  to	  “central	  tensions	  or	  trade-­‐offs	  between	  the	  ambition	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to	  increase	  democratic	  engagement	  and	  to	  promote	  effective	  environmental	  problem-­‐solving”	   (2010b,	   225).	   With	   respect	   to	   the	   UNFCCC,	   some	  explanations	  for	  the	  slow	  progress	  towards	  a	  global	  agreement	  have	  focussed	  on	   the	   cumbersome	   decision-­‐making	   process	   within	   the	   UN	   and	   have	  resulted	  in	  calls	  for	  alternative	  approaches.	  Underlying	  some	  of	  the	  criticisms	  of	  the	  UN	  process	  are	  often	  deeper	  (but	  not	  always	  stated)	  doubts	  about	  the	  fundamental	  ability	  of	  democratic	  and	  inclusive	  processes	  to	  deliver	  the	  type	  of	  fast	  and	  fundamental	  changes	  necessary	  to	  drastically	  reduce	  emissions	  in	  industrialised	   countries	   and	   change	   the	   emissions	   trajectory	   of	   the	   major	  developing	  countries.	  	  	  These	   debates	   gained	   in	   intensity	   within	   the	   NGO	   community	   after	   the	  Copenhagen	   ‘fiasco’	   in	   2009.	   They	   were	   for	   the	   most	   part,	   however,	  conducted	   behind	   closed	   doors	   and	   have	   not	   yet	   led	   to	   a	   fundamental	  adjustment	  of	  positions.	  Most	  NGOs	  continue	  to	  publicly	  subscribe	  to	  the	  UN	  process	   and	   call	   for	   a	   global	   agreement.	   A	   rare	   and	   self-­‐critical	   public	  defection	   from	  this	  position	   is	  made	  by	  Maier	   (2010)	  who	  holds	   that	  NGOs	  have	  become	  sidetracked	  by	  the	  justice	  and	  equity	  discussions	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  UN	  context	  and	  by	  joining	  the	  calls	  for	  ever	  greater	  amounts	  of	  payments	  and	   technology	   transfer	   to	   developing	   countries.	   Instead	   of	   focusing	   their	  energies	  on	  the	  UNFCCC	  process,	  he	  believes	  that	  NGOs	  could	  achieve	  more	  by	  building	  on	  and	  helping	  to	  further	  strengthen	  those	  domestic	  policies	  that	  have	  already	  managed	  to	  deliver	  substantial	  results	  	  (he	  directs	  his	  argument	  at	  NGOs	   from	  Germany).	  Other	   supporters	   of	   such	   a	   “bottom-­‐up	  approach”	  hold	  	   “that	   climate	   change	   policies	   should	   be	   designed	   and	  implemented	  at	   the	   lowest	   feasible	   level	  of	  organisation.	  This	  does	   not	   mean	   that	   everything	   should	   be	   done	   at	   the	   local	  community	   level,	   but	   that	  where	   something	   can	   be	   done	   at	   a	  local,	  city,	  regional	  or	  single-­‐nation	   level,	   then	  it	  makes	  sound	  sense	  to	  focus	  policy	  attention	  there,	  without	  the	  need	  to	  fit	  it	  into	  a	  formal	  global	  charter	  for	  action”	  (Rayner	  2010,	  617).	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Some	   analysts	   warn,	   however,	   of	   the	   danger	   of	   “a	   collapse	   into	   a	  decentralised,	   purely	   bottom-­‐up	   approach”	   that	   would	   mean	   “the	  disintegration	   of	   global	   climate	   policy”	   (Falkner,	   Stephan	   and	   Vogler	   2010,	  261).	  While	   Falkner,	   Stephan	   and	   Vogler	   agree	   that	   “the	   push	   for	   a	   ‘global	  deal’	   is	   producing	   diminishing	   returns”	   (2010,	   260),	   they	   still	   see	   value	   in	  striving	  for	  an	  overarching	  international	  framework	  for	  climate	  policy.	  They	  argue,	   however,	   that	   this	   may	   more	   effectively	   be	   achieved	   through	   a	  “’building	   blocks’	   approach,	   which	   develops	   different	   elements	   of	   climate	  governance	   in	  an	   incremental	   fashion	  and	  embeds	   them	   in	  an	   international	  political	   framework”	   (2010,	   252).	   Such	   a	   process	   “would	   recognise	   that	  domestic	   policies	   need	   to	   be	   embedded	   in	   a	   broader	   international	   effort,	  within	   the	   UNFCCC	   or	   through	   an	   affiliated	   negotiating	   process”	   (Falkner,	  Stephan	   and	   Vogler	   2010,	   259).	   This	   would	   allow,	   however,	   for	   partial	  agreements	  to	  be	  reached	  on	  particular	  issues,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  “coalitions	  of	  the	  willing	  (…)	  where	  a	  small	  proportion	  of	  states	  need	  to	  be	  in	  the	  vanguard”	  (Giddens	  2009,	  226).	  	  	  The	   “fragmentation”	   of	   the	   global	   climate	   architecture	   has	   important	  implications	   for	   issues	   of	   democracy,	   equitable	   representation	   and	  participation	  that	  are	  yet	  to	  be	  explored	  in	  depth	  (Biermann	  et	  al	  2009,	  30).	  Bottom-­‐up	   approaches,	   for	   instance,	   may	   at	   first	   glance	   appear	   more	  promising	   than	  top-­‐down	  approaches	   for	  enabling	   the	  participation	  of	   local	  communities.	   They	   do	   not,	   however,	   by	   themselves	  manage	   to	   address	   the	  problems	  of	  equity	  and	  representation	  that	  arise	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  divergence	  between	   responsibility	   and	   affectedness	   in	   the	   case	   of	   climate	   change.	   The	  same	   point	   applies	   to	   “an	   approach	   based	   an	   agreements	   or	   partnerships	  between	  individual	  nations,	  groups	  of	  countries	  and	  regions”	  (Giddens	  2009,	  220).	  A	  defining	   feature	  of	   these	  more	   ‘functional’	   institutions	   is	   that	   “their	  logic	  would	  be	  power-­‐centred	  –	  both	   in	   terms	  of	  negotiating	  bargains	  quite	  narrowly	  around	  the	  core	  interests	  of	  the	  major	  powers	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  fora	   being	   essentially	   hierarchical	   and	   exclusionary”	   (Hurrell	   and	   Sengupta	  2012,	  476).	  Only	  a	  global	  framework	  can	  cater	  to	  demands	  for	  representation	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and	  participation	  that	  are	  based	  both	  on	  affectedness	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  shape	  outcomes.	  	  
	  
iv. Contributions,	  limitations	  and	  ways	  forward	  This	   thesis	  has	   touched	  on	   a	  wide	   range	  of	   debates	   around	   the	  democratic	  legitimacy	  of	  international	  institutions,	  the	  various	  potential	  contributions	  of	  NGOs	   thereto,	   and	   the	   ability	   (or	   inability)	   of	   international	   NGOs	   to	   act	   as	  ‘links’	   between	   affected	   communities	   and	   international	   institutions	   in	   the	  context	  of	  global	  environmental	  politics.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  thesis	  has	  made	  use	  of	   the	   findings	   from	   the	   empirical	   analysis	   of	   internal	   practices	   of	  international	  NGOs	  as	  well	  as	  their	  external	  democratic	  demands.	  Moreover,	  the	   discussion	   has	   brought	   together	   insights	   from	   the	   literature	   on	   global	  democracy,	   representation	   theory,	   environmental	   politics,	   the	   role	   of	   non-­‐state	   actors	   in	   global	   politics,	   and	   existing	   analyses	   of	   individual	   NGOs.	  Rather	  than	  trying	  to	  confirm	  or	  disconfirm	  a	  set	  hypothesis	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  ‘NGOs	  are	  representative(s)’,	  the	  thesis	  proceeded	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  range	  of	   research	   questions.	   The	   thesis	   did	   not	   take	   an	   existing	   theory	   from	   the	  standard	  social	  science	  toolbox	  and	  apply	  it	  to	  new	  data.	  Instead,	  it	  followed	  an	  exploratory	  approach	  and	  treaded	  on	  new	  ground	  both	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  conceptual	  framework	  as	  well	  as	  the	  empirical	  analysis.	  Many	  of	  the	  findings	  discussed	   in	   this	  and	  the	  previous	  chapters	  are	   tentative.	  Nonetheless,	   they	  present	  important	  contributions	  to	  an	  emerging	  debate	  and	  can	  lead	  the	  way	  for	  further	  investigation.	  	  	  	  The	  contribution	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  threefold.	  Firstly,	  the	  thesis	  has	  provided	  a	  new	   comparative	   empirical	   analysis	   of	   the	   democratic	   demands	   made	   by	  CSOs	   in	   their	   interactions	   with	   the	   UNFCCC	   and	   the	   CBD.	   Secondly,	   it	   has	  presented	  case	  studies	  of	  the	  internal	  workings	  of	  the	  three	  most	  prominent	  international	   ENGOs	   and	   of	   two	   issue-­‐specific	   NGO	   networks.	   These	   case	  studies	  differ	  from	  existing	  empirical	  analyses	  of	  these	  organisations	  in	  that	  their	  focus	  is	  specifically	  on	  investigating	  the	  notion	  that	  NGOs	  can	  link	  local	  communities	   to	   international	   organisations.	   Thirdly,	   the	   thesis	   has	   put	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forward	   a	   new	   framework	   for	   thinking	   about	   this	   ‘linkage’	   role	   of	  international	   NGOs	   based	   on	   Pitkin’s	   seminal	   work	   on	   the	   concept	   of	  representation.	  	  	  The	  thesis	  is	  located	  within	  the	  body	  of	  International	  Relations	  literature	  that	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  contribution	  of	  civil	  society	  to	  the	  democratisation	  of	  global	   governance.	  Within	   this	   relatively	   broad	   field,	   the	   thesis	   speaks	   to	   a	  number	   of	   more	   specific	   questions.	   Firstly,	   in	   adopting	   the	   ‘dual	   focus’	   on	  internal	  practices	  and	  external	  demands,	   the	  thesis	  responds	  to	  a	  call	  made	  predominantly	  by	  scholars	  of	   social	  movements	  and	  applies	   it	   to	  NGOs:	   the	  fact	   that	   the	   democratic	   contribution	   of	   civil	   society	   actors	   should	   be	  assessed	   both	   with	   reference	   to	   their	   internal	   practices	   and	   their	   external	  democratic	   demands	   (Marchetti	   2008;	   della	   Porta	   2009).	   The	   comparative	  investigation	  of	  the	  NGOs’	  democratic	  demands	  directed	  at	  two	  conventions	  in	   chapter	   IV	   offers	   an	   additional	   take	   on	   the	   role	   of	   NGOs	   in	   the	  “construction	  and	  diffusion	  of	  democratic	  norms”	  (Uhlin	  2010,	  32).	  	  	  The	  investigation	  of	  internal	  practices	  by	  NGOs	  and	  the	  effect	  that	  they	  have	  on	  representation	  responds	  to	  the	  frequently	  voiced	  calls	  for	  more	  research	  into	   the	   accountability,	   transparency	   and	   legitimacy	   of	   international	   civil	  society	  organisations	  (VanRooy	  2004;	  Collingwood	  2006;	  Kissling	  and	  Steffek	  2008;	   Erman	   and	   Uhlin	   2010;	   Bexell,	   Tallberg	   and	   Uhlin	   2010).	   The	  application	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  representation	  to	  the	  role	  of	  NGOs	  allows	  for	  a	  more	   systematic	   conceptualisation	   and	   investigation	   into	   how	  NGOs	  might	  help	   to	   link	   “the	   local	   to	   the	   international	   levels	   of	   politics”	   (Princen	  1994,	  33)	   or	   act	   as	   “transmission	   belts”	   (Steffek	   and	   Nanz	   2008)	   between	   local	  communities	  and	  international	  institutions.	  	  In	  focussing	  on	  this	  linkage	  role,	  the	   particular	   approach	   adopted	   in	   this	   thesis	   also	   differs	   from	   that	   of	  MacDonald	   (2008).	   While	   she	   argues	   that	   NGOs	   should	   be	   subject	   to	  democratic	  control	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  public	  power	  they	  exercise,	  this	  thesis	  explores	  the	  potential	  contribution	  of	  NGOs	  in	   linking	  affected	  communities	  to	  a	  third	  agent	  of	  public	  power:	  international	  institutions.	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  The	  issue	  of	  representation	  has	  often	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  polarising	  the	  debate	  on	   the	   role	   and	   contribution	   of	   NGOs.	   However,	   neither	   a	   simplified	  ‘transmission	  belt	  model’	  nor	  an	  across-­‐the-­‐board	  criticism	  of	  powerful	  NGOs	  as	  fundamentally	  ‘unrepresentative’	  of	  the	  world’s	  poor	  capture	  the	  diversity	  of	   practices	   among	   them.	   One	   main	   contribution	   of	   this	   thesis	   lies	   in	  enriching	   the	  debate	  on	   the	  role	  of	  NGOs	   in	  global	  governance	  with	  a	  more	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	   their	  potential	   to	  represent	   local	  communities	   in	  international	   institutions.	   Through	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   internal	   practices	   of	  various	  international	  NGOs	  and	  the	  identification	  of	  a	  range	  of	  organisational	  characteristics	  that	  shape	  their	  roles	  as	  ‘representatives’	  the	  thesis	  addresses	  a	   gap	   in	   the	   research	   on	   the	   democratising	   potential	   of	   NGOs.	   A	   further	  empirical	   contribution	   of	   the	   thesis	   lies	   in	   its	   analysis	   of	   the	   internal	  structures	  and	  the	  coordination	  processes	  within	  the	  Climate	  Action	  Network	  and	  the	  CBD	  Alliance.	   It	   shows	  how	  a	  wide	  range	  of	   independent	  NGOs	  can	  work	   together	   to	   ‘channel’	   their	   inputs	   into	   particular	   global	   policymaking	  processes	   and	  what	   challenges	   they	   face.	  While	   CAN	   has	   already	   been	   the	  subject	  of	  a	  number	  of	  academic	  analyses,	  these	  have	  mostly	  been	  in	  relation	  to	   the	   influence	   it	   has	   exerted	   on	   the	   negotiations.	   Seemingly	   no	   academic	  research	   exists	   on	   the	   role	   of	   the	   CBD	   Alliance	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  biodiversity	  convention.	  	  	  In	   theoretical	   terms,	   the	   thesis	   enters	   new	   ground	   in	   applying	   Piktin’s	  concept	   of	   substantive	   representation	   to	   the	   ‘representative	   role’	   of	   NGOs.	  The	   argument	   that	   substantive	   representation	  may	  be	   taking	  place	   even	   in	  the	  absence	  of	  formal	  elections	  follows	  the	  line	  of	  reasoning	  put	  forward	  by	  Castiglione	   and	  Warren	   (2006)	   and	   others	   that	   elements	   of	   representation	  can	   be	   detached	   from	   the	   nation-­‐state	   context.	   This	   perspective	   presents	   a	  riposte	  to	  the	  ‘nobody	  elected	  the	  NGOs’	  argument	  that	  is	  sometimes	  used	  to	  discredit	  democratic	  claims	  by	  and	  about	  global	  civil	  society	  (Anderson	  and	  Rieff	  2004).	  The	  particular	  conceptualisation	  of	  representation	  employed	   in	  this	   thesis	  also	  differs	   from	  the	  notion	  of	   “discursive	  representation”	  or	   the	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“representation	  of	   discourses”	   (Dryzek	   and	  Nyemeyer	  2008;	  Dryzek	  2012).	  In	   this	   view,	   representation	   at	   the	   transnational	   level	   is	   not	   about	   the	  representation	   of	   individuals	   but	   about	   the	   “discourses	   to	   which	   they	  subscribe”	  (Dryzek	  and	  Nyemeyer	  2008,	  481).	   	  Provided	  that	  we	  are	  indeed	  witnessing	  a	  participatory	  or	  “deliberative	  turn”	  (Bäckstrand	  et	  al	  2010a)	  in	  global	   environmental	   politics,	   the	   two	   conceptualisations	   of	   representation	  may	   actually	   overlap	   in	   practice.	   	   The	   question	   of	   how	   to	   operationalise	  participation	   and	   responsiveness	   to	   communities	   on	   the	   ground	   is	   already	  shaping	   the	   terms	   in	   which	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   discourses	   across	   the	  environmental	  policy	  field	  are	  being	  conducted.	  	  	  For	   the	   most	   part,	   however,	   analysts	   of	   NGOs	   shun	   the	   concept	   of	  representation	   both	   because	   of	   its	   rootedness	   in	   the	   domestic	   context	   and	  the	   fact	   that	   the	   activity	   of	   ‘representing’	   is	   quickly	   associated	   with	   the	  outcome	  of	  ‘representative’	  –	  implying	  a	  normative	  judgement	  of	  the	  role	  of	  NGOs.	  Instead	  the	  debate	  has	  usually	  been	  conducted	  in	  the	  language	  of	  ‘NGO	  accountability’:	   a	   more	   generic	   and	   potentially	   less	   loaded	   term	   than	  representation.	   Scholte	   views	   accountability	   “primarily	   as	   a	   means	   to	  constrain	   power	   and	   make	   it	   responsive	   to	   the	   people	   that	   it	   affects,	  especially	   people	   who	   tend	   otherwise	   to	   be	   marginalised	   and	   silenced”	  (2011,	   15).	   An	   important	   facet	   of	   the	   concept	   is	   the	   distinction	   between	  “internal”	  and	  “external”	  accountability	  (Keohane	  2003	  quoted	   in	  Biermann	  and	   Gupta	   2011,	   1857)	   which	   corresponds	   to	   responsiveness	   to	   ‘internal’	  and	  ‘external’	  stakeholders,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  NGO	  case	  studies.	  It	  is	  worth	  asking	   whether	   there	   are	   any	   advantages	   to	   using	   the	   concept	   of	  representation	   over	   that	   of	   accountability	   when	   thinking	   about	   the	  democratic	  contribution	  of	  private	  actors	  such	  as	  NGOs.	  	  	  A	  first	  observation	  should	  be	  that	  these	  are	  not	  two	  different	  concepts	  but,	  in	  fact,	   closely	   related.	   Accountability	   is,	   as	  was	   discussed	   in	   chapter	  V,	   a	   key	  element	   of	   representation;	   yet	   representation	   can	   also	   be	   understood	   in	   a	  broader	   sense.	   In	   addition	   to	   accountability,	   it	   also	   encompasses	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authorisation	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   side	   of	   the	   representation	   spectrum,	   the	  notion	  of	  trusteeship.	  The	  activity	  of	  representing	  includes	  accountability	  but	  also	  goes	  beyond	  this.	  Moreover,	  and	  especially	  pertinent	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  particular	   interpretation	   of	   the	   democratic	   deficit	   of	   international	  institutions	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  II	  of	  the	  thesis,	  the	  concept	  of	  representation	  is	  better	  suited	  than	  the	  concept	  of	  accountability	  for	  examining	  the	  idea	  that	  NGOs	  can	  act	  as	  links	  between	  two	  other	  types	  of	  actors.	  While	  most	  debates	  around	   NGO	   accountability	   are	   concerned	   with	   the	   type	   of	   sanctions	  available	  to	  stakeholders	  to	  control	  the	  NGOs’	  actions	  –	  for	  example,	  stopping	  or	  shaping	  a	  project	  on	  the	  ground	  –	  the	  focus	  here	  is	  different.	  The	  point	  of	  departure	   in	   this	   research	   is	   that	   international	   institutions	   should	   be	  accountable	  to	  those	  communities	  impacted	  by	  their	  decisions.	  These	  forms	  of	   “external	   accountability”	   by	   IGOs	   to	   the	   affected	   communities	   are,	  however,	   only	   weakly	   developed.	   Conceptualising	   NGOs	   as	   potential	  representatives	   focuses	  our	  attention	  on	  the	  extent	   to	  which	   it	  can	  credibly	  be	   claimed	   that	   they	   speak	   for	   these	   impacted	   communities	   in	   the	  “empowered	  spaces”	  (Dryzek	  2009).	   It	   is	   true,	  however,	   that	  this	  difference	  in	   emphasis	   has	   been	   very	   hard	   to	   capture	   empirically	   as	   both	   an	  accountability	   framework	   and	   a	   democratic	   representation	   framework	   rely	  primarily	  on	  evidence	  of	  responsiveness.	  	  The	  contribution	  of	  the	  thesis	  to	  the	  policy	  debate	  can	  largely	  be	  formulated	  in	   the	   form	   of	   recommendations,	   relating,	   for	   example,	   to	   how	   NGOs	   can	  strengthen	   their	   responsiveness	   to	   local	   communities.	   What	   has	   become	  apparent	   is	   that	   ‘paper	   initiatives’	   such	   as	   internal	   policies	   or	   codes	   of	  conduct	   are	   by	   themselves	   not	   sufficient	   to	   implement	   ‘downward’	  accountability	   practices	   within	   an	   organisation.	   Developing	   a	   culture	   of	  participation	  and	  responsiveness	  requires	  time,	  effort	  and	  resources.	  Some	  of	  the	  specific	  steps	  organisations	  could	  take	  involve,	  for	  example,	  inviting	  local	  community	   representatives	   to	   become	   external	   board	   members,	   and	  supporting	  and	  strengthening	  dialogue	  among	  member	  groups	  and	  external	  stakeholders	  at	  the	  regional	  level.	  Organisations	  that	  choose	  to	  go	  down	  the	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route	   of	   greater	   responsiveness	   to	   local	   communities	   need	   to	   be	   aware,	  however,	  of	   the	  potential	  opportunity	  costs	  such	  as	  slower	  decision-­‐making	  processes	   and	   perhaps	   more	   open	   conflict	   within	   the	   organisation.	  Nonetheless,	   allowing	   for	   constructive	   disagreement	   as	   a	   possible	  consequence	   of	   more	   ‘bottom-­‐up’	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   enables	  organisational	  learning	  and	  might	  actually	  strengthen	  the	  final	  positions.	  	  	  	  There	   are	   also	   important	   implications	   for	   funders	   (such	   as	   foundations	   or	  international	   agencies)	   who	   need	   to	   be	   conscious	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   certain	  demands	   for	   ‘upward	   accountability’	   can	  make	   it	  more	   challenging	   for	   the	  sponsored	   organisation	   to	   implement	   practices	   of	   participation	   and	  democracy.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   it	   is	  understandable	   that	   funders	  want	   to	   see	  fast	  and	  impressive	  results	  in	  return	  for	  their	  money.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  an	  excessive	   focus	  on	  output	   and	   impact	   tracking	  and	   the	   creation	  of	   a	   ‘target	  culture’	   can	   undermine	   the	   ability	   of	   organisations	   to	   take	   decision	   in	   an	  inclusive,	   participatory	   and	   democratic	   fashion	   -­‐	   something	   which	   often	  necessitates	   a	   more	   lengthy	   process	   of	   consultations.	   To	   overcome	   this	  dilemma,	   impact	   targets	   set	   by	   funders	   can	   be	   matched	   with	   (jointly	  developed)	   democratic	   process	   requirements,	   setting	   out	   not	   only	   the	  desired	   results	   but	   also	   how	   they	   should	   be	   achieved.	   In	   addition,	   funders	  urgently	  need	  to	  increase	  their	  efforts	  to	  fund	  Southern	  civil	  society	  groups,	  even	   if	   this	   happens	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   ‘usual	   suspects’.	   The	   fact	   that	  Southern	  CSOs	  are	  in	  most	  cases	  still	  vastly	  outnumbered	  by	  their	  Northern	  counterparts	  in	  international	  meetings	  is	  primarily	  (though	  not	  exclusively)	  a	  problem	  of	  insufficient	  resources.	  	  The	   limitations	   of	   NGO	   representation	   and	   responsiveness,	   however,	   also	  underline	   the	   importance	   of	   creating	   direct	   means	   for	   access	   for	   affected	  communities	  to	  international	  institutions,	  independent	  of	  ‘NGO	  sponsors’	  (for	  example,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ombudsman	  processes).	  Moreover,	  some	  of	  the	  policy	  proposals	  for	  developing	  “more	  institutionalized	  involvement	  of	  civil	  society	  representatives	   in	   intergovernmental	   decision-­‐making”	   (Biermann	   and	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Gupta	   2011,	   1863)	  might	   consider	   linking	   participation	   rights	   for	   NGOs	   to	  requirements	   for	   accountability,	   responsiveness	   and	   internal	   democracy.	  This	  might	   help	   to	   overcome	   a	   strict	   insider/	   outsider	   divide	   and	   open	   up	  mechanisms	   for	   input	   by	   communities	   (including	   non-­‐members),	   thus	  reinforcing	  the	   idea	  of	  NGOs	  as	   links	  between	  international	   institutions	  and	  affected	  citizens.	  	  	  The	   approach	   followed	   in	   this	   thesis	   also	   has	   a	   number	   of	   important	  limitations	  that	  need	  to	  be	  acknowledged.	  Methodologically,	  interviews	  need	  to	   be	   treated	  with	   caution	   as	   interviewees	   often	   adopt	   the	   language	   of	   the	  researcher,	  which	  makes	  it	  hard	  to	  get	  ‘authentic’	  answers.	  This	  problem	  was	  unavoidable	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  research	  as	  many	  of	  the	  interviewees	  were	  themselves	   familiar	   with	   the	   policy	   and	   academic	   debates	   relating	   to	   NGO	  accountability	   and	   stakeholder	   participation.	   Consequently,	   there	   is	   little	  doubt	  that	  responses	  were	  often	  (consciously	  or	  subconsciously)	  phrased	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	   to	   ‘please’	   the	   interviewer.	   It	  might	  be	  possible	   to	  overcome	  this	  bias	   through	  conducting	  an	  even	  broader	   range	  of	   interviews,	  not	  only	  with	  current	  NGO	  staff,	  but	  also	  former	  staff	  and	  external	  stakeholders.	  There	  is,	   however,	   on	   balance,	   a	   diminishing	   value	   added	   by	   each	   additional	  interview	  once	  a	  sufficient	  number	  has	  been	  conducted.	  The	  more	  pragmatic	  approach	  –	  which	  was	  also	   followed	   in	   this	   thesis	   –	   is	   to	  use	   interviews	  as	  only	   one	   of	   several	   types	   of	   sources	   and	   supplement	   the	   analysis	   with	  written	  primary	  documentation	  and	  secondary	  analyses.	  	  	  Another	  limitation	  applies	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  procedural	  democratic	  demands	  conducted	  for	  chapter	  IV.	  Due	  to	  the	  relatively	  generic	  language	  employed	  by	  the	  NGOs	  in	  their	  submissions,	  it	  was	  impossible	  to	  draw	  out	  much	  evidence	  of	  variation	  among	  the	  democratic	  demands	  made	  by	  different	  NGOs.	  In	  fact,	  the	  convergence	  around	  very	  similar	  formal	  procedural	  standards	  across	  the	  spectrum	  of	  radical	  to	  reformist	  groups	  is	  notable.	  Of	  course,	  by	  specifically	  looking	   out	   for	   these	   demands,	   no	   insight	   was	   gained	   as	   to	   what	  organisations	   are	   actually	   silent	   on	   these	   issues.	   Moreover,	   contrary	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positions	  (i.e.	  opposing	  more	  democratic	  and	  participatory	  forms	  of	  decision-­‐making)	  that	  might	  be	  held	  by	  individual	  NGOs	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  included	  in	  written	  submissions.	  	  	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  ideas	  presented	  in	  this	  thesis	  may	  and	   should	   be	   further	   developed.	   Due	   to	   the	   relatively	   broad	   conceptual	  framework	   ‘linking’	   local	   communities	   to	   international	   institutions	   via	  international	  NGOs	  (who	  constituted	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  analysis),	  the	  thesis	  did	  not	  manage	  to	  pay	  sufficient	  attention	  to	  the	  level	  of	  the	  local	  communities.	  In	   fact,	   in	   variously	   speaking	   about	   ‘the	   poor’,	   ‘the	   marginalised’	   and	   ‘the	  represented’,	  the	  thesis	  may	  be	  criticised	  for	  subscribing	  to	  a	  discourse	  that	  downplays	   the	   independent	   agency	   and	   resilience	   of	   these	   communities.	  Research	  that	  focuses	  more	  specifically	  on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  local	  communities	  provides	   an	   important	   counterweight	   to	   this	   tendency.	  This	   could	  be	  done,	  for	  example,	  through	  conducting	  a	  sufficient	  number	  of	  in-­‐depth	  case	  studies	  of	   how	   particular	  NGOs	   have	  worked	   –	   or	   failed	   to	  work	   –	  with	   particular	  communities	  in	  the	  context	  of	  specific	  campaigns	  and	  how	  local	  communities	  were	   able	   to	   exert	   influence	   in	   these	   instances	   (cf.	   Hertel	   2006).	   This	  approach	  might	   help	   to	   explore	   specific	   instances	   of	   ‘interest	   transmission’	  from	  local	  communities	  via	  NGOs	  to	  international	  institutions.	  	  	  At	  the	  level	  of	  the	  NGOs,	  further	  work	  might	  go	  both	  deeper	  and	  wider.	  The	  analysis	   of	   the	   five	   different	   NGOs	   and	   NGO	   networks	   undertaken	   in	   this	  thesis	  allowed	  for	  a	  comparative	  exploration	  of	  crosscutting	  factors.	  More	  in-­‐depth	   case	   studies	   of	   individual	   organisations,	   conducted	   for	   example	  through	  participant	  observation	  over	  a	  period	  of	  time,	  might	  add	  additional	  insights	   into	   the	   ‘hidden’	   power	   dynamics	   that	   characterise	   intra-­‐organisational	   relations.	   In	   addition,	   the	   analysis	   should	   be	   expanded	   to	   a	  wider	  range	  of	  organisations,	  especially	  Southern	  NGOs.	  To	  what	  extent	  have	  major	   NGO	   players	   from	   the	   global	   South	   tried	   to	   implement	   forms	   of	  responsiveness	   to	   local	   communities?	   Are	   the	   factors	   that	   shape	   their	  potential	  for	  doing	  so	  the	  same	  as	  for	  their	  Northern	  counterparts	  or	  do	  they	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differ?	  Moreover,	  it	  would	  be	  instructive	  to	  look	  beyond	  environmental	  NGOs	  at	  organisations	  active	  in	  other	  issue	  areas	  where	  practices	  of	  accountability	  to	   beneficiaries	   are	   often	   more	   developed.	   One	   particularly	   noteworthy	  organisation	   in	   this	   regard	   is	   the	  group	  ActionAid,	  which	  has	  developed	   its	  own	  ‘Accountability	  Planning	  and	  Learning	  System’	  (ALPS).79	  	  Another	   area	   that	   might	   be	   further	   explored	   is	   the	   impact	   of	   civil	   society	  actors	   on	   democratisation	   processes	   within	   institutions	   of	   environmental	  governance.	   Compared	   to	   other	   issue	   areas	   such	   as	   human	   rights	   or	   trade,	  NGO	   visions	   and	   initiatives	   relating	   to	   	   “horizontal”	   and	   “vertical”	   reforms	  (Falk	  2005,	  171)	  within	  environmental	  institutions	  have	  been	  relatively	  less	  explored.	   There	   is	   scope	   here	   for	   further	   investigation	   that	   goes	   beyond	  identifying	  demands	  and	  tries	  to	  trace	  the	  actual	   impact	  of	  NGOs	  on	  reform	  processes	  across	  different	  institutions.	  	  	  	  	  	  
v. Conclusion	  Can	  NGOs	  link	  local	  communities	  to	  international	  organisations?	  The	  answer	  is	   clearly	  not	   a	   resounding,	  but	  only	  a	  very	   contingent,	   ‘yes’.	  The	   thesis	  has	  shown	   that	   there	   is	   indeed	   some	  potential	   for	   international	  NGOs	   to	   act	   as	  representatives	   of	   local	   communities	   in	   international	   organisations.	   This	  potential	   is,	   however,	   only	   weakly	   realised	   to	   date	   and	   it	   is	   shaped	   and	  restricted	   by	   a	   range	   of	   organisational	   characteristics.	   NGO	   ‘transmission	  belts’	  do	  not	   run	   smoothly.	  They	  may	  get	   jammed,	   crammed	  or	  overloaded	  with	  expectations.	  	  	  The	   engagement	   by	   international	   NGOs	   with	   international	   institutions	   is	  therefore	  no	   substitute	   for	   the	  direct	   participation	  of	   affected	   communities	  themselves.	  An	   important	  democratic	  contribution	  for	   influential	   INGOs	   lies	  in	   using	   their	   standing	   and	   influence	   with	   global	   policymakers,	   as	   well	   as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	   ActionAid	   (2006).	   Accountability	   Planning	   and	   Learning	   System,	  http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/actionaids_accountability_learning_and_planning_system.pdf	  last	  accessed	  01.12.2012	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their	   resources,	   to	   lobby	   for	   and	   support	  more	   equitable	   and	   participatory	  forms	  of	  decision-­‐making	  at	  the	  international	  level.	  The	  discussion	  is	  far	  from	  complete,	  however,	  and	  this	  final	  chapter	  has	  highlighted	  a	  number	  of	  areas	  for	  further	  analysis	  in	  this	  still	  emerging	  field	  of	  research.	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